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Abstract 
 
 
In this research work the analysis of the process of indigenous technological change in 
the equipment goods sector in Portugal is made. The framework of analysis is based on 
evolutionary theories of technical change, on systems theory, on innovation systems 
theory, on theories of industrial innovation  and on an ever-present historical perspective. 
There are two main thrusts behind this work. The first is the realisation that there are 
national differences in economic development rates and more particularly in innovation 
rates and that there is a need to explain those differences. The second thrust addresses 
the need to explain the variation at firm level and how the behaviour of firms is related to 
its innovative performance. A general model, based on the chain-linked model of 
innovation, is developed as a conceptual framework to achieve the goal of explaining 
variation at a firm level. The explanation of the reciprocal interactions between the two 
main conceptual blocks, the firms and the environment, is the final goal of this study. The 
main research questions are: What is the main determinant of Portuguese indigenous 
industrial innovation? Is it the political/economic/cultural institutional environment? Or is it 
the strategy followed by the economic agents? What is the relative importance of each 
factor in the process of indigenous industrial innovation? 
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PART I. GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
By and large, the literature on the theory of technical change has focused its efforts and 
derived most conclusions from studies conducted in the developed and industrialised 
countries (DCs). The underlying rationale is that technological change is created in the 
developed countries and subsequently transferred to less developed countries (LDCs), by 
licensing or similar or other agreements. Most of the literature treats technical change in 
LDCs within the conceptual framework of technology transfer and neo-classical economic 
theories, assuming an almost completely passive and unproductive recipient in terms of 
knowledge and technology creation and generation. 
 This approach now seems to be insufficient from several perspectives. There is 
empirical evidence that indigenous technical change occurs in LDCs, although the nature, 
magnitude, rate and direction differ substantially from that in DCs. Prevailing theory fails, 
then, to conveniently explain the empirical evidence (Katz, 1987). Moreover, in as much 
as technical knowledge or, by and large, technical information, has some characteristics 
that make it a distinct factor of production, the technology transfer framework seems not 
to be completely appropriate to analyse technical change in LDCs. These characteristics 
include an endogenous nature and a tacit nature. 
 The endogenous nature of technical information prevents it from being treated as 
just another production factor on a notional production function. The technology transfer 
framework assumes an exogenous nature of technical change, whereby a given set of 
alternative technology packs is just waiting on the shelves of DCs to be chosen by LDCs 
and promptly assimilated and set on a production line. 
 The tacit nature of technical knowledge implies that a given package of technical 
information is not easily or even perfectly or completely understood, replicated or 
imitated. It rather emphasises the importance of learning and searching phenomena, in 
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as much as they lead to peculiar, distinct approaches to technology or knowledge 
creation. 
 In this research work the analysis of the process of technological change within a 
less developed country - Portugal - is made from a different perspective. In search for a 
more useful approach, the framework of analysis is based on evolutionary theories of 
technical change (e.g., Dosi et al, 1988, Clark and Juma, 1987, Nelson, 1982, Metcalfe, 
1993) and on an ever-present historical perspective. An evolutionary approach to the 
study of technical change will comprise two main conceptual blocks: the environment, 
encompassing and setting the general constraints and opportunities that the units of 
analysis must face, and the so called routines (using Nelson’s terminology), the general 
behavioural procedures and action guidelines available to the units of analysis or entities, 
whereby the entities are considered the firms. The interplay between the two conceptual 
blocks will ultimately explain the output, i.e., the selection results. 
 In line with this approach, there are two main thrusts behind this work. The first is 
the realisation that there are national differences in development rates and more 
particularly in innovation rates and that there is a need to explain those differences. The 
second thrust addresses the need to explain the variation at firm level. The second one is 
a somewhat more ambitious goal insofar as it constructs a general model as a conceptual 
framework to achieve the goal of explaining variation at a firm level. 
 Consequently, the main general research question is to find out what are the 
determinants of Portuguese indigenous industrial innovation, or in a more detailed 
manner: 
 
What is the main determinant of Portuguese indigenous industrial 
innovation? Is it the political/economic/cultural institutional environment? Or 
is it the strategy followed by the economic agents? 
 
There are complex interactions between each sphere of enquiry and each one 
bears an important impact upon the others. However, it is to disentangle those 
  
14 
1
4
 
interactions and the assessment of their relative importance that is the main goal of this 
research.  
  The structure of the thesis is as follows: the first three chapters, which make up 
Part I, are of an introductory nature. The present chapter, which is a very short 
introduction, explains the motivation, the conceptual framework, the main research 
questions and the structure of the thesis. The second chapter describes the methodology 
and the reasons behind the choices that were made. The third chapter gives an overview 
of the industrial sector under study.  
Part II includes chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, and consists of an analysis of the features 
of the environment. The aim is to identify and highlight the factors that had more impact 
on the innovation trajectory of the industry as a whole. 
The environment is seen as being made of several elements and related to 
macro-level institutional aggregates, where the concept of institution is used in its broader 
sense, potentially including, for instance, the price mechanism. The macro-elements of 
the environment are reduced to the following set: 
 
 The national institutional set-up for knowledge creation and dissemination. This 
element includes universities and research institutes and, in a general sense, all the 
political or public bodies associated with the philosophy and management of this 
network. 
 The national market element, including a set of variables usually used to describe its 
characteristics: demand and supply curves, structure, degree of protection, factor 
endowments, etc. 
 The impact of the international institutional and market set-up. 
 
The reason to focus on these elements, particularly the first two, since the latter 
is more ill defined and specified, is the conviction that peculiar characteristics of both 
elements varying from country to country have an important impact on the extent, nature 
and direction of localised technological change. More particularly, the analytical partition 
  
15 
1
5
 
of the national institutional set-up (the environment/system) results in the following three 
sub-systems: the general economic environment, the education system and the research 
system, which are described and analysed in three separate chapters, chapters 5, 6, and 
7 respectively. Chapter 4 is an introductory chapter to Part II including a review of the 
literature as well as the arguments that are behind the choice of this particular conceptual 
approach. Chapters 5, 6 and 7 portray each subsystem in a descriptive way but at the 
same time analyse their influence on individual technological capacities, and where 
appropriated and needed, the links connecting each sub-system and the overall impact 
on firm's behaviour. Chapter 8 summarises those perceived impacts and its relationships 
with the behaviour of the firms. 
 The environment itself determines to a certain degree the availability and choice 
of routines of a given set of units of analysis, but a random routine factor is also present. 
There is a whole range of procedures by which a firm can cope with a certain perceived 
signal from the outside exogenous environment. The following part of this work is an 
analysis of those possibilities and the way they impacted upon the life of the units of 
analysis (the firms). Within the general conceptual framework above described, and for 
the purposes of studying technical change in a specific environment, routines may be 
synonymous with strategy, defined in a broad sense, and more specifically synonymous 
with innovation strategy and R&D strategy. The set of factors that were considered 
relevant for the purposes of this study and for which information was sought are 
represented in Annex B. 
Part III comprises the micro-component of this study, that is, it describes and 
analyses the results obtained from the field study. Chapter 9 is the introductory chapter to 
Part III, and it consists of a review of the literature as well as putting forward the 
arguments for the conceptual approach followed in this Part III. Chapter 10 is an 
aggregate analysis of the empirical results. Chapter 11 is an extensive and detailed 
description of the histories of each firm that was studied. Although rather descriptive it 
aims to conjugate practice and theory by advancing also detailed explanations for the 
trajectory of each firm. The chapter aims also to prepare the ground, in a thorough 
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manner, for the next chapter, Chapter 12, which will generalise the individual analysis of 
the previous chapter and will propose a general model for explaining differential 
behaviour and innovation. Chapter 13 is a summary concluding Part III. Part IV, which 
includes the last Chapter 14, is a comprehensive conclusion of the thesis, whereby use is 
made of additional concepts to logically integrate all the conceptual and empirical topics 
covered by the preceding sections of the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2. THE METHODOLOGY 
 
2.1 Preliminary remarks 
 
Ever since the research goals of this study were defined, the question was put of whether 
the methodology should be based on a broad mail survey, including a representative 
sample of all the industrial sectors, or if it should be based on a case study approach, 
including only one industrial sector. Because the study aimed at exploring a present 
situation determined by its past deeds, it was thought more appropriate to use the 
interview-based case study, due to the following reasons: 
 
 knowledge of the exact variables that have affected most the innovative performance 
is partly unknown, 
 an open-ended approach is more adequate to scrutinise the intricacies of the past, 
 personal contact with the actors is more likely to bring about clues to as what has 
happened than a distant, impersonal questionnaire, 
 possibility of collecting greater amounts of data from each unit of analysis. 
 
The choice of a case study approach as opposed, for instance, to a mail survey brings an 
inevitable reduction in its generality, because the sample is, generally, much smaller. It 
would be probably best to follow a dual methodological approach. On the one hand, a 
mail survey would be conducted, encompassing a representative sample of the 
population, while on the other hand, a smaller sample would be chosen to conduct case 
studies. This would combine the best of two worlds, that is, the depth provided by the 
case studies and the width made possible by a mail survey, in spite of the fact that a mail 
survey would probably capture a fairly static picture of the scene. But, due to pragmatic 
limitations related to time availability and finance capacity, it was decided to proceed only 
with the case studies approach. This could provide a fairly good amount of study material 
and it could fulfil appropriately the research goals provided that the main difficulty, which 
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lay in the capacity to design a questionnaire that would capture the dynamic interactions 
between the firm and the environment and within the firm, could be surmounted. 
 
2.2 The choice of the sector 
 
The reason for choosing the capital goods sector is that we assume that this sector has a 
crucial role to play in terms of the innovative performance of the whole of manufacturing 
industry, acting as a fundamental point of diffusion of technological capabilities 
throughout the society, and more particularly in terms of its indigenous capacity to 
innovate (Rosenberg, 1976). Thus, studying what happens or happened within this sector 
may eventually bring about more understanding to the innovative performance of 
Portuguese industry, than say, looking at another sector whose perceived technological 
characteristics may rend it less useful to that purpose. Thus, while the study concentrates 
on just one sector, it is hoped its conclusions can be extrapolated to other sectors as well. 
 Indirectly there is another practical advantage in choosing this sector, and that is 
the relatively low number of firms operating in this sector and consequently the 
representativeness that a small sample will have. According to 1993 statistics there were 
approximately 2795 firms in business producing equipment for the agriculture, metal-
working, food and beverage, textiles and shoes and building sectors and also weighing, 
refrigeration, industrial ovens, optical and scientific equipment (Associação dos 
Industriais Metalúrgicos, Metalomecânicos e Afins de Portugal- Associação Nacional das 
Empresas Metalúrgicas e Metalomecânicas, 1997). In another study (Vasconcelos, 
1994), a finer analysis of the equipment goods sector points to an even smaller number 
(342 firms) which seem to represent 90% of total sales of the sub-sector. If so, the 
representativeness of the sample acquires another significance. 
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2.3 Defining the sample 
 
Regarding the case studies, the sample size was inevitably reduced to a small number of 
firms, given resource and time limitations. Its size, however, was such as to allow for a 
certain degree of heterogeneity or else it would be of little analytical use. The intention 
was to have a group of innovative firms confronted with a group of non-innovative firms 
and make a comparative analysis of these firms based on the dynamics of their history. 
 The sample consisted of nineteen firms. It was based on a comparative 
methodology between two groups of firms matched by a set of criteria (inspired by the 
SAPPHO matched pair methodology). It consisted of two groups: the “innovative group” 
and the “non-innovative group” or "average group". We think this procedure is equivalent 
to the experimental group and the control group methodology adopted in the social 
sciences. In this case, the experimental group consisted of the “innovative” group and the 
control group was the “average” group. The objective, as stated, was to see if common 
behavioural patterns within the groups and different behavioural patterns between the 
groups could be discerned that in turn could point out regularities. 
 
2.4 Preliminary comments on the process of building up the sample 
 
 Each firm was individually matched with a pair in the other group. The criteria for 
matching the firms were the similarity of the product lines and the size of the firm, as 
measured by the total number of employees (this criteria was not strictly followed; see 
below). It is in this procedure that we can find similarities between the SAPHO 
methodology because, like the SAPHO study, it is the product (or innovation in the case 
of SAPHO) that is matched, and not necessarily firms. The firms are matched because 
the products happen to be manufactured in a certain firm. In the SAPHO case the 
innovations were divided into the successful ones and the unsuccessful ones. In this 
study the products are divided into the innovative ones and the average ones. Those are 
the links with the SAPHO methodology. Otherwise, the methodology closely resembles 
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that of the experimental-control methodology, whereby we compare two groups and not 
necessarily individual elements of the groups. However, the groups are build-up in such a 
way that the whole of their elements confers the group definite characteristics. The 
experimental group is the group with the relatively more innovative firms. Its salient and 
defining characteristic is its innovativeness. The control group pretends to include the 
relatively less innovative but not exclusively so. It can also include innovative firms. This 
is possible because of the individuality of the pairing of the products and firms. Firms 
(products) are only compared with its pair, not with the other firms (products) in the 
experimental group. As such, it is possible that one firm in the control group is relatively 
more innovative that another firm, other than its pair, in the experimental group. By virtue 
of these factual possibilities we can have the presumption that the control group is 
representative of an “average” condition of innovative performance of Portuguese firms, 
which, then, is its defining characteristic as a whole. 
 Asides from the mentioned, another advantage of pairing each firm in this way is 
that we can create a condition of analytical bipolarization that will force the surfacing of 
extreme characteristics.  By imposing extreme conditions, the probabilities of finding 
factors that are illustrative, illuminating and explicative increase substantially. On the 
other hand, we can incur in the danger of extrapolating uncritically the artificial analytical 
conditions to construct conceptual frameworks that are used in the explanation of real 
conditions and as such distort the perception of reality. 
A disadvantage of the matched pair methodology is the subjectivity inherent in 
the definition of “similar products” and “innovative” and “average” products. Here, 
similarity of products means that the products perform similar functions, using (at least 
some) similar technological and technical principles and constructs. The subjectivity in 
defining innovative and average products is even greater. Below we will describe how 
those problems were tackled. 
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2.5 Building up the sample: the details 
 
The innovative group was the first group to be selected. The rationale for selecting the 
innovative group case studies was essentially based on the characteristics of the 
products manufactured by the firms, which included the following: new features, quality 
and performance and new products (sector-wide or world-wide). These criteria of 
innovativeness were confronted with the following sources of information and the 
subsequent organisation of that information determined the selection of the innovative 
group. The sources of information for selecting the innovative group were: reports in 
newspapers or industry journals (referring names of firms known by their above average 
innovative capacity), award winning enterprises, opinion of the professional association of 
the sector (who provided a list of firms that, according to their opinion and the criteria of 
innovativeness referred above, were above average performers), opinion of individuals 
(industrialists) knowledgeable of the sector (a dozen individuals provided each one a list 
of firms who they fought performed better than average in terms of innovative output) and 
information on expenses in R&D or human resources devoted to R&D by individual firms 
as provided by national statistics.  
 It turned out that there were quite a few firms that were common to two or more 
sources of information, so that the first selection of the innovative group was based on the 
intersection of the information from all the sources. After that, if there were two or more 
firms in the same product line, one of them (or two, in one of the product lines) was 
arbitrarily chosen and the others rejected. To assure that a broad range of size classes 
was included (the smallest firm had sixteen employees and the largest twenty five 
hundred) the last step was repeated, first replacing the previously rejected firms and then 
choosing again another firm whose size was more adequate to our goal of including a 
broad range of size classes. This was the way the ten firms that composed the innovative 
or experimental group were selected. 
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 Each firm of the "non-innovative" group sample was then selected by randomly 
picking up a name out of a list of firms that were included in the same product line and 
confronting it with its pair. The professional association of the sector (Associação dos 
Industriais Metalúrgicos e Metalomecânicos do Norte / Associação dos Industriais 
Metalúrgicos e Metalomecânicos do Sul, 1994) provided this list, which was quite a long 
one. The procedure was, in detail, as follows. The firms in the list were previously 
grouped according to their product line (according to a standard classification developed 
by the Association). We then picked up a firm from the previously selected innovative 
group and identified its product line. We then went to the list, looked at the group that 
contained that product line and randomly selected one firm with approximately the same 
size, i.e., within an error of more or less than 10% (this was not always possible). 
Confirmation was then sought that the firm was really in a product line similar to its 
innovative pair (e.g., by telephoning the firm). If it proved not to be the case, the last step 
was repeated. We repeated this procedure for each and every one of the ten firms of the 
innovative group and chose from the list the respective pair. This was the way the 
matching exercise was done and this was the way the average or control group was 
selected (see below for some limitations in this process). 
The sample of firms selected for this study is presented in Annex A, indicating the 
main product lines, previously manufactured as well as presently manufactured, in order 
of decreasing importance (in terms of percentage of total sales). 
 
2.6 Concluding remarks on the process of building up the sample  
 
Ideally, the intention was that matched firms would be in the same size class and 
competing with each other, but this was found to be a more difficult task than anticipated, 
due to the small size of the industrial structure and due to the niche strategies pursued by 
most of the firms. Consequently there were difficulties in finding firms operating in the 
same product line. For two of the firms it was not possible to find a perfect match by type 
of product, although there were other firms operating in the same product line. The 
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reason underlying this is that the allocation of each firm to each group is based on its 
relative performance to its pair, and those firms were performing at similar levels 
(according to our criteria of product improvement, quality or newness). In those cases, a 
firm operating in a product line whose technology had close affinities with the technology 
of the product manufactured by the firm in the "innovative group" was chosen.  
 In another instance, namely that regarding the largest firm, whose main product 
line was in electricity power stations, the firm was left as a stand-alone case because it 
was not possible to find another firm operating in the same product line. The only 
alternative was a subsidiary of a multinational firm, but its activities on Portuguese soil 
were mainly as a commercial and manufacturing outpost so that conclusions based on 
behavioural comparison related to innovative performance between the two firms were 
bound to be fallacious, if they were only to be made based on the activities of the firms in 
Portuguese territory. It was decided not to discard this case because otherwise the 
sample would not be representative of the whole population regarding the size 
dimension. 
 
2.7 Preparing the field study 
 
The empirical information was obtained by visual observation of the premises of the firms 
and during personal interviews with the owner/manager of the firm or with a Director, 
following an interview guide that contained a set of topics and a semi-structured 
questionnaire. The list of topics and the questionnaire is in Annex B. It includes all 
fundamental quantitative aspects and qualitative topics covered in the interviews. The 
questionnaire, in conjunction with the list of interview topics, served the dual function of 
being simultaneously an aide-mémoire and a framework for conducting the interview as 
well as a rather precise structure for the quantitative part of the interview. 
 The topics to cover during the interview were first subject to an initial structuring 
exercise whereby an initial draft of the questionnaire/aide-mémoire was made. The ideas 
behind the topics and the questionnaire were itself influenced by a series of previous 
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contacts with a number of industrialists where there were informal discussions with the 
aim of making an exploratory investigation regarding the discussion of research goals and 
the adequacy of the intended research methods.  
 It was then followed by a pre-pilot phase. The pre-pilot phase consisted of a 
series of interviews aiming at improving the draft of the quantitative part of the 
questionnaire, to determine whether the topics to be addressed in the interviews were 
adequate to the characteristics of the target population and adequate to the purposes of 
the study and to see if any relevant topic was missing. The interviewees were informed of 
the research goals and invited to discuss it and to suggest improvements, either in 
general term or specifically to the structure of the aide-mémoire. The pre-pilot phase 
consisted of interviews with four individuals, namely, two industrialists, the director of an 
interface institution and a university professor. One of the industrialists was a mechanical 
engineer, who worked first in product development in a small firm, and later in a division 
of a large firm, first as an engineer in the product development department and then in 
the commercial department. The second one was also a mechanical engineer who 
worked in a firm recently bought by a multinational firm. He had several contacts with the 
university, related to development of products and also as a teacher. The director of the 
interface institution had previous industrial and university experience. 
After incorporating into the aide-mémoire and interview topics some conclusions 
reached during the pre-pilot phase, the aide-mémoire was tested twice in a real live 
situation. The objectives of the pilot phase were the same as those of the pre-pilot phase 
with the addition of aiming at testing and assessing the whole exercise with concrete 
experiences and, specifically, testing and measuring the amount of information and 
quantitative data that could realistically be retrieved under time constraints imposed by 
real conditions. The pilot phase consisted of two interviews with two industrialists, both 
with high level executive functions inside their respective organisations. The interviews 
were conducted so as to emulate as far as possible real conditions. Contrary to the 
interviewees in the pre-pilot phase, the interviewees in the pilot phase were not told that 
they were being used to test an interview script. 
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2.8 Specifying the information to be collected during the field study 
 
The final outcome of all the above mentioned preparatory steps was systematised in the 
document that is present in Annex B. The document is composed of two parts: one of the 
parts contains all the interview topics, their precise definition, the objectives behind them 
and the relation with the questions of the aide-mémoire. The other part is the 
questionnaire properly speaking which, although it was elaborated to capture the 
quantitative part of the information, it also contained the interview topics and as such 
served also as an aide-mémoire. 
 The topics of the interview were constructed having in mind two things: first, an 
historical perspective was absolutely necessary. This was so because it was necessary to 
abide to the conceptual framework outlined previously, which presupposed an 
evolutionary and dynamic perspective of the process of indigenous innovation. 
Furthermore, in order to achieve the research goals we had committed ourselves to 
pursue it was essential an historical perspective. Second, the more information we could 
collect, the better, because we had very few clues as to what factors could be more 
important. As a consequence, as many topics as possible were in the aide-mémoire 
because we did not had a precise indication of what variables or factors would be more 
important, i.e., we wanted to minimise the risk of not including the request for information 
that could prove to be precious later on. Many of the factors we included were known and 
inspired on the literature (OECD, 1997), such as the sources of innovation, barriers, 
demand conditions, etc. Others were influenced by knowledge of the specific Portuguese 
conditions and the perception that they were important factors in explaining the 
indigenous innovative pattern and its evolution (such as the qualifications profile, the type 
of production equipment and how old it was, financing conditions, organisation and 
decision making, etc). Others still were introduced because they fit logically within a 
certain topic. 
As it was mentioned before, one of the great preoccupations was with the 
historical perspective of the firm. One of the first topics (the third one) implied that the 
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interviewee gave an historical perspective of the firm. It was a preliminary introduction to 
the more detailed aspects that would latter be asked for. It acted as a “situating” exercise 
and a way to have a comprehensive perspective of the firm. If possible, the history of the 
firm was divided into defined periods, subjectively dictated by the interviewee. They could 
provide important clues to periods of discontinuity in the firm. 
 
Table 1. List of topics used in the fieldwork. 
 
1. Date of start-up 
2. Ownership status 
3. A historical perspective of the firm 
4. Initial product line/range and its subsequent evolution until this day 
5. Factors deemed to have a direct relation to innovative performance: 
 a) Technical knowledge 
 b) Demand for the product(s) 
 c) Source of technology and its impact 
 d) Customers 
6. Type of production equipment 
7. Finance 
8. Organisation and management 
 a) Functional layout. 
 b) Decision-making. 
 c) Managerial techniques. 
 d) Marketing.  
 e) Internationalisation. 
 9. External conditions 
 a) Government influences 
 b) General institutional environment and its impacts 
10. A historical account of the most important innovation (or the most significant failure) 
and how it came about. 
 
 
 After this introduction the interviewee was asked about the details, always in a 
historical perspective. Details were asked about the evolution of the following aspects: the 
product lines, production methods and equipment, number and qualification of personnel, 
demand conditions faced by the firm, financing conditions, organisational and 
management methods and techniques, among others (the details are in the aide-
mémoire, Annex B). The conversation was not rigidly oriented, quite the contrary. In 
general, mention was made of the main topics and it was left to the interviewee the task 
of explaining the situation of the firm. It was expected that during his intervention crucial 
aspects related to the firm would come out amidst the other standard information that was 
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being requested systematically but not forcefully. The same methodology was applied 
when the interviewee was asked about the way he perceived external or environmental 
features (such as government influences, social conditions, supply conditions, etc.). 
Annex B states in precise terms the objectives that are behind each topic and each 
question. Once again we should say that quite a few were (originally) exploratory, since 
there was no prior knowledge of what the importance of a particular topic would be.  
 Table 1 contains a list of the topics. Only the topic title is present. The reader is 
referred to Annex B for a complete specification of the objectives and contents of the 
topic as well as its relation to the questionnaire/aide-mémoire. 
 
2.9 Some aspects related to the analysis of the data and the identification of the 
relevant variables. 
 
 
After interviewing all the nineteen firms and collecting all the possible information, 
according to the topics specified in the aide-mémoire, the analysis of the data was made, 
a task that lasted several months. The method for identifying and selecting the relevant 
variables, namely those that are present in Table 48, is now described. 
 First, all the questions on the aide-mémoire (in Annex B) that could possibly be 
codified were codified in terms of continuous, nominal or ordinal categories. Some of the 
questions were already quantified, and as such, the task of coding was made easier or 
indeed automatic. For instance, the variable “graduate intensity” defined as the ratio 
number of graduates in the firm/total personnel of the firm was quite a straightforward 
task implying only the calculation of the ratio. Another straightforward example is the 
variable “use of CAD” which was coded as a nominal variable with only two possible 
outcomes, zero or one: if the firm used CAD the variable would take the value one, if the 
firm did not use CAD, the variable would take the value zero.  
 Other variables implied the analysis of the information collected during the 
fieldwork and its classification into categories. For example, the variable “predominance 
of production machinery”, coded also as a nominal variable, implied the creation of two 
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categories: one of the categories was defined as a firm whose number of manual 
production machines exceeded 50% of the total number of production machines, the 
other was defined as a firm whose number of manual production machines was less than 
50% of the total number of production machines. The threshold of 50% is quite arbitrary. 
It was possible to establish another percentage (and, in fact, during the analysis, several 
similar variables were created differing only on the threshold value; however, the 
statistical significance was not affected by the change in the threshold values). There are 
other instances of this kind of exercise implying thorough analysis of the disparate 
outcomes of the empirical results followed by a systematisation of those results into 
arbitrarily defined exhaustive categories. One example is the variable “type of strategy”, 
coded as a nominal variable, which included the following categories and respective 
values: if the firm had the routine procedure of elaborating formal medium and long term 
planning exercises the variable would take the value 3, if the firm had only the routine 
procedure of elaborating medium-term formal planning exercises the variable would take 
the value 2, if the firm did not have any routine procedure of elaborating formal plans but 
nevertheless had definite non-written ideas of what goals it should achieve and when and 
how to achieve them, the variable would take the value 1, and if the firm did not have any 
formal or informal routine planning procedure and its action was oriented only by the 
demands of daily compromises, the variable would take the value 0. These four 
categories exhaust all the possibilities revealed by the analysis of the empirical results. If 
there were other firms in the sample that did not fit into any of these categories it would 
be necessary to create another category. But according to our perception, that was not 
necessary. Another example of this kind of coding procedure was done with the variable 
“type of domestic customer”, “type of training”, and others. 
 Another group of variables was codified from the start into ordinal categories. 
They were originally formulated as such and they were included in the questionnaire as 
questions that demanded the active involvement and the judgement of the interviewee. 
The same scale was used for all these variables, namely a five-point Likhert-type scale: 1 
for insignificant, 2 for slightly significant, 3 for moderately significant, 4 for very significant 
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and 5 for crucial. In all cases the interviewee did the scoring. There were quite a number 
of variables that took this form (cf. Annex B). Important examples (i.e., variables that are 
in Table 48) are, for instance, the variables “importance of external competition” or 
“competition based on quality and performance”. 
It was not possible to codify all the empirical information. For instance, traits such 
as “adaptive capacity”, “flexibility”, “vision of the future”, among others, were perceived as 
important characteristics of the firms but were nevertheless impossible to codify. The 
variable "Approach to product conception" represents an example of a trait that was 
possible to codify. The codifying exercise produced, in the end, one hundred and thirty 
five variables (including continuous variables, nominal variables and ordinal variables).  
 The task now was to see which variables were useful for our purposes.  To do 
that we introduced all the variables in a statistical software package and performed 
statistical tests, namely regression statistics and non-parametric tests. These were the 
statistical tests whose outcomes determined the selection of the variables that are 
present in Table 48. These variables are all explanatory variables. There was only one 
dependent variable, namely the “innovativeness” variable. This variable is a nominal 
variable that can take two values: zero or one. If the firm belongs to the “innovative” group 
the variable takes the value one, if the firm belongs to the “average” group the variable 
takes the value zero. After exhaustive tests, the twenty-two variables that figure in Table 
48, in Chapter 10, came out as the ones that showed up statistically significant test 
results and they were retained. All the other remaining one hundred and thirty variables 
were discarded. A note on this procedure is on order. Apparently we proceeded in a not 
very orthodox way, since we are applying statistical tests that presuppose randomness to 
a sample whose random nature is not established. We believe that the procedure 
described in section 2.5 and section 2.6 is fairly close to a stratified random sampling. 
However, there are doubts about that. The way that the innovative group was chosen was 
not strictly random (it was a deliberate grouping of recurrent firms) and the matching pair 
exercise and the need to incorporate the size dimension did not follow strictly the rules for 
random sampling. However, we thought that there was no other way to make the analysis 
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and the selection of the variables in due time because of the wealth of information we 
had. On the other hand, the selection could have been done through visual methods or 
through descriptive statistics, but such a cumbersome procedure was, at the least, 
unjustified, if all the statistical tools specifically created to address and facilitate tasks like 
those we embarked on, were ready available. Nevertheless, a final comparison between 
the results of non-parametric and regression tests and the descriptive statistics was made 
and, as expected, they were perfectly compatible. Due to these shortcomings only the 
descriptive statistics are present in this study (in Annex C). 
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CHAPTER 3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE EQUIPMENT GOODS SECTOR 
IN PORTUGAL 
 
In this brief description of the industrial sector we shall speak not only of the equipment 
goods sub-sector but rather of the whole metallurgical sector, embracing the manufacture 
of metallic products as well as the upstream basic steel sub-sector. We shall do so 
because all the sub-sectors are somewhat connected in terms of skills and technology in 
spite of the sector’s great heterogeneity. We shall however refer specifically to the 
situation of the capital goods producer whenever appropriate and possible. 
 The metal sector has been a relatively important one in the industrial structure of 
Portugal for quite some time. It has been, and it certainly is today, a sector with mixed 
characteristics. One the one hand, its socio-economic relevance comes from its 
quantitative importance in terms of employment and number of establishments. On the 
other hand it leaves much to be desired in terms of its qualitative features. It has long 
been like this and recent qualitative developments were not enough to radically alter the 
relative state of things. It somehow reflects the intermediate position of development that 
characterises Portugal. Quantitatively its industrial structure reflects a considerable 
activity and production diversity in the metal sector but in terms of scope, or technological 
capability, the horizons are more restricted.  
Macedo (1982) refers to the stimuli given to industrial activities during the second 
half of the 18
th
 century and to the innumerable metallurgic workshops that were set-up 
during that time but he also stresses that the industrial development that occurred at that 
time was characterised by an “extensive” nature, i.e., by an enlargement of existing 
activities and production and not by a significant improvement or upgrading of the existing 
techniques of production. Most of the establishments were small regional workshops 
based on handicraft methods of production and satisfying local needs. The more 
important factories were state-owned facilities producing military equipment located in the 
capital city. 
 Overall the situation did not change much during the 19
th
 century. The sector 
remained structurally important in quantitative terms but qualitatively it did not make any 
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kind of dramatic leapfrogging although it continued a steady and regular improvement 
path. By this time there were three main geographical centres of concentration of the 
industry. One was in Lisbon, which was the most important one, both in quantitative as 
well as qualitative (technological) terms, another was Porto and a third one was 
Guimarães. This last industrial concentration was quite specialised, namely in cutlery, 
and its presence dates back from historical times (Pereira, 1917).  
The 19
th
 century, particularly the 2
nd
 half, was characterised by a gradual 
industrialisation process of the country and the substitution of the small local workshop or 
the domestic worker by centralised production in factories. The myriad of small 
workshops were confronted with the improved quality and the low prices of (mostly 
consumer) products manufactured by the larger facilities that existed in the main urban 
centres (Lisbon and Porto) that were technologically more sophisticated and enjoyed 
economies of scale. A considerable proportion of these facilities were foreign owned or 
else foreign capital had an important stake in it. According to numbers advanced by 
Monica (1982) based on Serrão (1978) and industrial statistics of 1890 there were, in the 
1880s, approximately 2800 people employed in Lisbon, 1200 in Porto, 1000 in 
Guimarães and about 200 scattered around the rest of the country, reflecting a 
considerable downsizing of the sector (Macedo refers the existence of 572 blacksmiths in 
1796 only in one remote province). The main production is still consumer goods and not 
investment goods (i.e. machinery). But there is national production of machines, inclusive 
of steam engines. However, the majority of them are imported. In 1917, only about 10% 
of the machines in operation in the industrial sector were made domestically (Mónica, 
1982).  
Overall the sector went through a process of concentration and technological 
upgrading (the Bessemer process is introduced in 1905) in the three districts mentioned, 
and it was characterised by a considerable heterogeneity and perhaps duality. On one 
side there are factories with a reasonable dimension (but none of them very large) and 
using state of the art machinery. Some of these factories are foreign-owned, other are the 
state-owned factories and others still are owned by nationals. Most of them, if not all, 
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employ foreign technicians. Production is not specialised. The product portfolio is 
diversified, reflecting the limitations of a small market. Eventually the most important 
products are metallic products and structures. On the other side there is a vast majority of 
small factories or small workshops producing a vast array of consumer products or small 
metallic structures.  
From 1880 to 1930 the employment in the sector increases three-fold and the 
imports of iron increase two-fold but the consumption per head in 1930 is still at a very 
modest 17.5 kg (compared with 130 kg in France). Development remains gradual. The 
intentions to promote the sector, via government initiatives, especially by creating a 
national basic iron foundry and steel industry and by supporting domestic producers, is 
never really put into practice at this time (i.e. until the end of the 2
nd
 World War). Almost 
all the raw material is imported, and there are no conditions for treating the national 
production of mineral iron (which was anyway diminutive). 
The situation will change after the 2
nd
 World War when finally the industrial take-
off took place. The lack or difficulty of foreign supply of components and machinery during 
the war period stimulated the domestic production of components and machines, 
whenever there were necessary conditions and know-how. It also alerted the country to 
its excessive dependency on foreign sources. Thus, it is under this stimulus to increase 
auto sufficiency that government supports the creation of a national basic iron and steel 
industry (Ribeiro et al., 1987). There are also attempts to support and protect both the 
heavy and light mechanical industries. The heavy mechanical industry benefits from the 
general expansion of national infrastructures (electrification, railways and ports). The 
plans to support and protect the lighter industries are not so successful. Plans to initiate 
national production of cars are once again doomed to fail. They were not the first ones 
(Rodrigues, 1995) although these efforts were preceded by the largest evaluation 
procedure to date. However, by this time (1950s), producers of motorcycles were already 
in place. The objective of the implementation of a car production facility was also to 
develop the supporting supplier industries. The failure of the plan limited the development 
of capital goods producers. But this development was also limited by other factors such 
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as: the small dimension of the Portuguese market (the demand for capital goods was less 
than proportionately adequate to the size of the population), lack of indigenous capacity 
in certain technological fields, competition from abroad and consequent reluctance of the 
national supplier dominated industries (such as textiles) to buy domestic products 
(generally of inferior quality) and also lack of a coherent and constant government policy 
related to procurement and fiscal incentives to stimulate the acquisition of domestic 
capital goods.  
 In any case the following decades (the 1950s, the 1960s and early 1970s) saw 
the equipment sub-sector grow at an enviable rate of 11.3% (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. Average annual growth rates for the metallurgic sector, 1958-1990. 
Sub-sector 
 
1958-1973 1973-1990 
   
Basic Metallurgy 11,7% 6,4% 
Non-metallic Minerals 8,8% 5,5% 
Metallic and Electric Equipment 11,3% -0,8% 
Transportation Equipment - 0,4% 
Source: Neves (1994). 
 
It was indeed a period of above average growth for Portugal when it experienced the real 
industrial take-off. The share of the sector in total industrial output grew from 16.2% in 
1958 to 22.8% in 1990 (Neves, 1990) and 20.7% in 1993 (INE, 1997a), but it is still well 
under the share of the sector in other developed countries which is about 40% (this 
numbers are for basic metallurgy, metal products, non-electrical machinery, electrical 
machinery, transport equipment and professional goods). Within the European Union 
area only Greece shows similar numbers, namely 23.0% in 1990 (OECD, 1992b). So, in 
comparative terms, the sector does seem to show a certain underdevelopment in spite of 
its considerable growth during the last decades.  
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The heavy mechanical sector particularly benefited during this period, eventually 
more than the light mechanical industries, due to the influence of considerable 
infrastructure development. So, in a certain sense, the previous industrial structure and 
product portfolio was maintained, characterised by a few large firms, now more 
specialised, technologically more advanced and particularly active in metallic structures 
or products, and a large population of small firms, many of them technologically laggard.  
However the product portfolio improved considerably. Almost everything was now 
produced nationally as a result of a policy of import substitution, although many producers 
were subsidiaries of multinational firms. There was also a greater preoccupation with the 
impacts of large firms’ sub-contracting activities on the production of domestic firms and 
there was more preoccupation in incorporating national components in final products. 
However, indigenous technological capabilities are still modest. In an analysis of a group 
of heavy mechanical firms, Gomes et al. (1975) refer to the systematic recourse to 
external engineering, which probably reflects domestic deficiencies, and which also has 
the perverse effect of diverting to foreign producers possibilities for national producers of 
equipment goods. The author also stresses the relatively low figures of investment in 
design and project and the accompanying impacts in terms of building up internal 
technological capability (and the perhaps excessive reliance on external know-how 
through licence agreements or other agreements). The position of suppliers of 
components and other light equipment to the producers of heavy equipment seemed 
nevertheless to be ameliorating relative to the past. 
By the early 1970s the portfolio of engineering products was already relatively 
sophisticated, including some products of considerable technical difficulty. Table 3 
represents a sample of those products and the technological complexity associated with 
them.  
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Table 3. Engineering products in Portugal by the mid 1980s. 
Commodity 
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Extracting presses 125 X Other metal-cutting machine-tool 72 X 
Sea-going bulk carriers 190 X Planning, shaping machine-tool 79 H 
Reaming machines 86 O Locomotives, electric 276 X 
Garden tractors 109 X Excavating ,machine 68 X 
Other metal-forming machine tool 85 X Milling machines 74 V 
Electric furnaces 79 X Wood-working machine-tools 75 V 
Fuses, electrical 47 V Locomotives, diesel 272 X 
Switches, electrical 47 V Combine harvester and threshers 100 V 
Rail motor passenger vehicles 208 H Metal-working presses 94 H 
Threshing machines 52 X Lathes 95 H 
Forging and stamping machines 90 V Looms 166 H 
Transistors, crystal diodes 83 H Typewriters 139 O 
Scales, industrial 116 H Sound, tape recorders 70 V 
Passenger cars, assembled 167 H Diesel engines, excl. car 129 X 
Road tractors, assembled 157 H Cables 36 H 
Graders and levellers 85 X Internal combustion engines 96 H 
Grinding and sharpening machines 63 X Transformers, >5kV 124 H 
Transformers, <5kV 38 H Electric motors, >1HP 115 H 
Fertilisers distributors 56 X Ploughs 43 X 
Drilling and boring machines 83 H Tankers, launched 266 H 
Motorcycles 92 H Other sea-going merchant vessels 213 H 
Source: UNIDO (1988). 
Note: The UNIDO (Technological) Complexity Index does not pertain to the product itself but to the 
technological requirements for its production.  
Legend: H = production started before 1971; X = production started in 1971-1975; V = production started in 
1976-1980; O = production started in 1980-1984. 
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The presence of a Porter-like demand structure was also improved when a 
number of multinational car producers established manufacturing (and not only 
assembling) factories in Portugal during the 1980s. As a result of that certain sub-sectors 
of the light mechanical industries have improved, particularly in qualitative terms. It had a 
relatively important impact in terms of producers of components, and also of producers of 
equipment goods. 
In spite of these developments the sub-sector of producers of equipment goods 
in Portugal was small by the mid 1980s. Rendeiro (1985) says that in 1985 there are only 
20 firms manufacturing machine-tools whereby ten of them represent 90% of national 
output (of machine-tools). Perhaps the number of firms advanced by this author is 
excessively diminutive, because only machine-tools for metal work are considered. In 
spite of the small number of firms, their average dimension is not less than the average 
dimension of comparable European firms (i.e. basically medium-small firms). Aggregate 
statistics seem to support Rendeiro regarding the smallness of the sector. Domestic 
production covered only 17% of total consumption of non-electrical machinery in 1986 
and in 1992 the number was at 14% (Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Ratio exports/imports in the metallurgic sector. 
 1986 1992 
Metallic products 1.06 0.79 
Non-electrical machinery 0.17 0.14 
Electrical and other machinery 0.57 0.58 
Transport equipment 0.55 0.36 
Source: INE (1997). Contas Nacionais, 1986-1992. Instituto Nacional de Estatística. Lisboa 
 
 
Technologically there is great diversity with some firms achieving technological 
proficiency by a mix of technology transfer through formal agreements and/or imitation or 
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creative imitation followed by a gradual incorporation and development of technology 
specific and indigenous to the firm. 
 
Table 5. Annual growth rates of the metallurgic sector (1958-1990). 
 Machinery Basic 
metallurgy 
Transport 
equipment  
       
 Million Esc. a.a.g.r. Million Esc. a.a.g.r. Million Esc. a.a.g.r. 
 (1990 p.)  (1990 p.)  (1990 p.)  
       
1958 62474   6583     
1959 68571  9,8% 7500  13,9%   
1960 80915  18,0% 6259  -16,5%   
1961 88251  9,1% 9514  52,0%   
1962 93209  5,6% 15593  63,9%   
1963 99389  6,6% 16762  7,5%   
1964 116306  17,0% 20593  22,9%   
1965 129019  10,9% 24676  19,8%   
1966 147878  14,6% 20881  -15,4%   
1967 156068  5,5% 21565  3,3%   
1968 176770  13,3% 23759  10,2%   
1969 194055  9,8% 27644  16,4%   
1970 217119  11,9% 27302  -1,2%   
1971 243075  12,0% 30885  13,1%   
1972 289431  19,1% 31246  1,2%   
1973 311939  7,8% 34745  11,2%   
1974 299873  -3,9% 29746  -14,4%   
1975 274804  -8,4% 25691  -13,6%   
1976 274168  -0,2% 30968  20,5%   
1977 197671  -27,9% 37634  21,5% 122017   
1978 220794  11,7% 45559  21,1% 112684  -7,6% 
1979 233676  5,8% 45225  -0,7% 129088  14,6% 
1980 250066  7,0% 45462  0,5% 143436  11,1% 
1981 251284  0,5% 46314  1,9% 148461  3,5% 
1982 253725  1,0% 48235  4,1% 131507  -11,4% 
1983 247007  -2,6% 44648  -7,4% 96783  -26,4% 
1984 232632  -5,8% 40412  -9,5% 91754  -5,2% 
1985 226632  -2,6% 41061  1,6% 105791  15,3% 
1986 221576  -2,2% 47740  16,3% 110798  4,7% 
1987 228265  3,0% 56568  18,5% 123598  11,6% 
1988 234634  2,8% 57815  2,2% 125666  1,7% 
1989 245976  4,8% 69226  19,7% 142614  13,5% 
1990 272087  10,6% 99971  44,4% 148924  4,4% 
Source: Neves (1994). Note: a.a.g.r. stands for average annual growth rate. 
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 But the general trend regarding equipment goods production has been one of 
stagnation, which masks wild annual fluctuations in terms of output (Table 5). Note that 
annual average growth rate for these sub-sectors (non-electric and electric equipment) 
during 1974-1990 was negative (see Table 2) but the share in total exports of the whole 
sector has increased from 15.6% of total exports in 1985 to 21.1% of total exports in 1993 
(OECD, 1996d). In part this is due to the increasing share of the transport sector (namely 
multinational car producers) that is directed to export markets (Table 5  supports this 
growth trend during the last years).  
Assessments of industrial structural change of Portugal (UNIDO, 1992) from 
1980 to 1990 reveal insignificant changes in non-electrical machinery and a slight 
increase in electrical machinery.  
In terms of the total significance of the sector the trend is a decreasing one (but 
so too is total manufacturing). The share of the total sector (metallic products, all 
machinery and transport equipment) in total output has decreased from 6.8% of GDP in 
1980 to 3.8% of GDP in 1992 (OECD, 1996d). 
The following tables of official statistics provide a statistical description of the 
whole metallurgic sector as it is nowadays. 
 
Table 6. Main indicators of the sector in 1995. 
 Metallic Non-electric  Electric Transport Instruments 
 products Machinery machinery Equipment  
      
No. of firms 11270 2815 1188 861 418 
 68% 17% 7% 5% 3% 
      
Employment 78728 38502 46609 39831 5473 
 38% 18% 22% 19% 3% 
      
Sales 552646 326809 625748 787619 39277 
(Million 1995 Esc.) 24% 14% 27% 34% 2% 
      
Sales/employment 7,0 8,5 13,4 19,8 7,2 
      
Costs with personnel/employment 1,6 2,1 2,5 3,0 2,0 
      
Employment/No. of firms 7,0 13,7 39,2 46,3 13,1 
 Source: INE (1997). Estatísticas das Empresas-Indústria, 1995. Instituto Nacional de Estatística. Lisboa. 
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There is a large proportion of firms (68%) that are involved in the manufacturing 
of metallic products or structures, which, as referred above, is a somewhat permanent 
feature of the sector. Proportionately it is the sector that contributes more to total 
employment but proportionally less than the numbers of firms in the sector, reflecting the 
low average size of firms. It is also the one with the lower labour productivity (in terms of 
sales). The numbers for the sectors linked to machinery, which are those with more 
interest to these study, reflect the greater weight of the electrical machinery sector (on 
which it is included some of the heavy electromechanical industries referred above) 
relative to the non-electrical machinery, and the disproportion between the employment 
and sales of the two sectors, which in turn reflect the lower labour productivity of the non-
electrical machinery sector relative to the electric machinery sector and its lower firm 
average size. The transport sector, in which multinational companies have an important 
weight, is the one with the higher productivity and also higher average firm size. 
Multinational firms have also a strong presence in the electric machinery sector.  
 In the context of a government supported programme (integrated in PEDIP; see 
next chapters) for the development of the equipment goods sector in Portugal 
Vasconcelos (1994) delimits more rigorously the sector to include only manufacturers of 
industrial equipment goods in a restricted sense (see Table 7) and in doing so he 
identifies a much more restricted number of firms. Manufacturers of tools are also 
excluded from the analysis. It is based on this sample, which Vasconcelos (1994) claims 
to represent about 90% of total sales of the equipment goods sector (in 1992) and 
representing an employed population of 22000 people, that he proceeds with the analysis 
of the (equipment goods) sector.  
  
41 
4
1
 
Table 7. The equipment goods sector; restricted sample. 
Activity 
(manufacture of...) 
Observations No. of 
firms 
1) Turbines, pumps, compressors, 
transmission mechanisms 
Includes manufacture of turbines and equipment for energy 
production, pumps, hydraulic systems and equipment 
11 
2) Furnaces, burners Furnaces and burners for various industries  8 
3) Lifting and motion equipment Includes all equipment for industrial use, lifting equipment for 
construction. Excludes lifts and escalators. 
45 
4) Refrigeration/ventilation 
equipment 
Excludes household appliances 10 
5) Packing equipment  12 
6) Scales and weighing equipment Only for industrial uses 8 
7) Other machines for general use Filtering and purifying equipment (liquids and gases), 
distillers, rectifying machinery, etc. Includes painting 
equipment. 
6 
8) Machines for agriculture Includes tractors for agriculture 52 
9) Metal-working machine-tools  26 
10) Other machine-tools Machine-tools for wood-working, stone-working and other 
materials 
35 
11) Machinery for extracting 
industries and construction 
Includes equipment for crushing, concrete mixers, etc. 
Excludes stone-working machine-tools and lifting equipment. 
19 
12) Machinery for the food 
industries 
Excludes filtering equipment, rectifiers, and exchangers. 50 
13) Machinery for the 
textiles/garments/shoes industries 
 27 
14) Machinery for the industries of 
construction 
materials/ceramics/glass 
Equipment for manufacture of construction materials, 
ceramic or glass products. Excludes machine-tools. 
13 
15) Machinery for rubber and 
plastic industries 
Excludes metallic moulds 6 
16) Other specific machines  Includes machinery for other uses not mentioned, including 
machines for paper and printing industry. 
22 
17) Motors, transformers, and 
electrical equipment for distribution 
and control 
Excludes low-tension light equipment. 23 
TOTAL  373 
Source: Vasconcelos (1994). 
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 In terms of the importance of activity areas it is found that the manufacture of 
“Motors, transformers, and electrical equipment for distribution and control”, activity 17 in 
Table 7, contributes to 40% of total sales, 25.7% of total employment and 41.1% of total 
exports of the sector, reflecting the importance of a particular group of enterprises in the 
sector. The second most important activity is the manufacture of “Turbines, pumps, 
compressors, transmission mechanisms”, activity 1 of Table 7, contributing to 11.4% of 
total sales and 8.8% of total exports of the sector. Taken together they indicate the 
“...important level of specialisation of the sector in the production of electrical equipment 
and equipment for the production of energy...” (Vasconcelos, 1994, p.26). The next 
activity areas, in terms of decreasing importance are: “Machinery for the food industries”, 
with 9.5% of total sales and 7.6% of total exports, “Machines for agriculture”, with 7.9% of 
total sales and 5.6% of total exports, “Lifting and motion equipment”, with 5.5% of total 
sales and 3.8% of total exports and “Other machine-tools” with 4.9% of total sales and 
5.7% of total exports. It should be mentioned that the 3.3% contribution to total sales of 
“Metal–working machine-tools” is not proportionate to its 5.4% contribution to total 
exports. 
The size distribution of the firms is not very different from the general pattern of 
Portuguese industry, i.e., almost 90% of firms have less than 100 employees. Only 3.9% 
of firms have more than 200 employees and only 1.5% of firms have more than 500 
employees. However, total employment does not obey to this last pattern. Employment is 
more or less evenly distributed between firms with less than 100 employees (c. 44%), 
between 100 and 500 employees (c. 30%), and more than 500 employees (c. 26%). 
Average productivity increases remarkably (approximately two-fold) for the firms above 
500 employees, but below that threshold there are no significant relationships between 
size and average labour productivity. 
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Table 8. Size distribution of firms in the equipment goods sector and its 
characterisation. 
Size No. of firms Employment Sales Exports 
 No. % No. % Million Esc % Million Esc % 
<10 45 13.2 284 1.3 1753 1.0 32 0.1 
10-29 123 36.0 2185 10.0 13528 7.4 820 3.8 
30-49 68 19.9 2612 12.0 17363 9.5 884 4.1 
50-99 65 19.0 4551 20.8 28043 15.4 2125 9.7 
100-199 28 8.2 3808 17.4 22708 12.4 4684 21.5 
200-499 8 2.3 2711 12.4 19045 10.4 2577 11.8 
500-1000 3 0.9 1867 8.6 26000 14.2 3502 16.1 
>1000 2 0.6 3813 17.5 54123 29.6 7184 32.6 
Total 342  21831  182569  21812  
Source: Vasconcelos (1994). 
 
Geographically there is an uneven distribution of firms favouring the two largest 
urban districts of the country (Lisbon and Porto). Other districts show up, located in the 
vicinity or in between the two main urban districts (Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Geographic distribution of production of the equipment goods sector (% 
of total production by district) 
 
 
Source: Vasconcelos (1994). 
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Geographic concentration seems to be linked or accompanied by a certain degree of 
geographical/regional specialisation. The most evident specialisation, in terms of the 
activity areas defined previously in Table 7 are as represented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9. Regional specialisations in the equipment goods sector. 
District Activity 
Lisbon 1) Turbines, pumps, compressors, transmission mechanisms ; 17) Motors, 
transformers, and electrical equipment for distribution and control 
 
Porto 9) Metal-working machine-tools ; 17) Motors, transformers, and electrical 
equipment for distribution and control 
 
Aveiro 12) Machinery for the food industries 
 
Braga 
 
13) Machinery for the textiles/garments/shoes industries 
 
Leiria 2) Furnaces, burners ; 14) Machinery for the industries of construction 
materials/ceramics/glass ; 15) Machinery for rubber and plastic industries 
 
Santarém 14) Machinery for the industries of construction materials/ceramics/glass 
 
 Source: Vasconcelos (1994). 
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PART II. EXPLAINING THE SYSTEM LEVEL 
CHAPTER 4. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The quest for the determinants of the wealth of nations is perhaps as old as nations 
themselves. Throughout history several factors were decisive or crucial in determining the 
wealth of particular nations. 
The classical school of economic thought, typified by the works of Adam Smith 
and Ricardo shares the same liberal principles of the early physiocrat school particularly 
regarding the notion of natural economic laws and the principle of freedom of economic 
action, but it disagrees on the identification of the source of wealth of a nation (or wealth 
in general). For the classical school, labour (any kind of labour) is the source of wealth 
and not only land or agricultural activity. The amount or type of labour involved in 
agriculture or any economic activity determines the productivity of the land or any other 
resource. Thus it is the productivity of labour that determines the wealth of nations and it 
is within this perspective that the division of labour and trade are analysed. Division of 
labour increases the efficiency of labour as well as the country specialisation. 
The so-called nationalist schools of economic theory, whose most strong or 
known advocate is List, attack the universal and individualistic nature of economic activity 
proposed by the classical school. Against the classical reasoning that assumes that the 
wealth of a nation is only the sum of the wealth of the individuals, List opposes the 
concept of the nation as an intermediary between the individual and the human genre, 
and that what counts more is not wealth in itself but the potential to create wealth.  As a 
corollary not all economic activities/sectors are considered equally conducive to wealth 
creation unlike the assumptions behind the classical framework which do not discern 
between the wealth creation effects of different sectors of activity (only different kind of 
labour). The nationalist school cherishes the notion of “productive forces” to distinguish 
between those sectors of the economy that are potential multipliers of wealth. 
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The last two approaches analysed the role of technical change in economic 
development, each one according to its own theoretical principles. The classical school 
does not explicitly emphasise the role of industry in economic development and offers 
little in the explanation of the determinants of technical change. However, Adam Smith 
proposed the idea that the division of labour is a direct cause of inventive activity, 
distinguishing between earlier and later instances in the state and sophistication of the 
division of labour: 
 
“A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures in which 
labour is most subdivided, were originally the inventions of common 
workmen, who, being each of them employed in some very simple operation, 
naturally turned their thoughts towards finding out easier and readier 
methods of performing it...[...] All the improvements in machinery, however, 
have by no means been the inventions of those who had occasion to use the 
machines. Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the 
makers of machines, when to make them became the business of a peculiar 
trade; and some by the that of those who are called philosophers or men of 
speculation, whose trade it is not do anything, but to observe everything; and 
who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers 
of the most distant and dissimilar objects” (Smith, 1970, p. 114-115) 
 
The nationalist school gives explicit attention and importance to science and 
technology and its impact on industrial and economic development, but advances little, 
although it tries hard, in the way of explaining the mechanisms underlying the process of 
innovation. 
Karl Marx addresses the determinants and dynamics of technical change and 
industrial innovation in much more detail. He devotes an extensive chapter in the first 
volume of the Capital to the analysis of machinery and the development of machinery in 
industry and its implications on labour. The analysis of Marx (1979, first published 1867) 
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is of course a critique of the capitalist system. He argues that what is behind the 
development of machinery is the exploitation of the “relative surplus value” arising from 
labour: “Machinery produces relative surplus-value...reducing the value of labour-power” 
(p.530). In addition to this general rule, Marx suggests specific determinants of technical 
change. As such, he makes the development of machinery and the innovation process 
endogenous to its analysis of the economic system. The main determinant of technical 
change is linked to the benefits that capital extracts from lesser dependency on labour, 
but it is not the sole: 
 
“The object of improved machinery is to diminish manual labour, to provide 
for the performance of a process or the complementation of a link in a 
manufacture by the aid of an iron instead of the human apparatus...The 
adaptation of power to machinery heretofore moved by hands is almost of 
daily occurrence...the minor improvements in machinery having for their 
object economy of power, the production of better work, the turning off more 
work in the same time, [...] and although sometimes of no great moment, 
have somewhat important results.”(p. 559) 
 
It is interesting to note that Marx already notices the very important long-term 
cumulative effects of small improvements anticipating recent theoretical considerations 
about the typology and the impacts of innovation (Freeman and Perez, 1988). He is also 
aware of the cumulative and systemic features of the process of innovation and its 
implications for economic growth, for the patterns of economic cycles and for the 
international division of labour. Marx’s analysis is paramount insofar as it places 
technology at the centre of the process of economic change unlike the classic school of 
economics (of which Marx is very critical) that at most gives sparse attention to the 
subject and treats technology in a rather exogenous manner. 
Rosenberg (1994) argues that Marx has an intellectual indebtedness to 
Babbage’s works on the relationship between technology and the economy (“On the 
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Economy of Machinery and Manufactures”, first published in 1833, as cited by 
Rosenberg, 1994): “... Babbage’s influence on Marx is [...] pervasive, as would be 
revealed by a close textual comparison of Babbage’s treatment of the causes and 
consequences of the division of labour with that of Marx...” (p.43). Rosenberg notes that 
the emphasis of Marx is different: “...Much of Marx critique of capitalism flows from 
examining exactly those characteristics of the division of labour that Babbage identified 
as sources of improved efficiency in the factory. However; Marx considers them from a 
very different perspective...from the point of view of the welfare of the worker.” (p. 44) 
Rosenberg argues that Babbage provides one of the earliest accounts of the 
determinants of technical change and inventive activity. The combination of Babbage’s 
own technical skills and inventiveness and his interest on economic issues explains the 
prominent role that technology acquires in his works unlike the purely theoretical 
treatment of social scientists. The author notes that the analysis of Babbage takes into 
consideration a set of economic factors broader than that of Marx:  
 
“It is also worth noting that Babbage shows an acute awareness of the 
economic forces that drive inventive capability in specific directions and that 
influence the timing of inventive effort. In fact his observations deserve to be 
regarded as possibly the earliest treatment of the economic determinants of 
inventive activity. [...] It seems to be a reasonable claim that Babbage is the 
first observer of the events of the industrial revolution to call attention in an 
explicit way to the causal links between economic forces and inventive 
activity.” (p. 32-33) 
 
The theoretical confrontation and differentiation between the schools mentioned 
above continued throughout the 20
th
 century. The classical school evolved into the so-
called neo-classical marginalist school and the nationalist and Marxist perspectives are 
included in the broader historical schools which is often in direct confrontation with the 
  
49 
4
9
 
other schools. At the risk of over-simplifying one can say that these are the two streams 
of economic thought that nowadays are most influential in terms of intellectual impact. 
The historical school was born out of the difficulty that some authors expressed in 
accepting the limits on the economic science draw by the classic English and French 
authors and their abstractions and generalisations.  The historical schools argue that the 
economic structure of defined social groups (such as nations) is in constant 
transformation, going through some well-defined and successive stages of development. 
This notion is in contrast with the universal and fixed character of the economic laws 
proposed by the classical (and later the neo-classical) school. 
Schumpeter (1939) is the early 20
th
 century’s most notable author within the 
historical school that places science and technology at the centre stage of economic 
development. The theoretical framework of Schumpeter challenges established 
classical/neo-classical concepts such as the desirability and assumption of perfect 
competition, perfect information and general equilibrium. Schumpeter argues that the 
constant stream of innovations that are produced by the capitalist system heavily 
determines the process of economic development. Science and technology are treated as 
endogenous factors and the economic reality is treated within an organic (evolutionary) 
and not mechanistic (equilibrium) perspective:   
 
“The opening up of new markets, ...and the organisational development from 
the craft shop and factory to such concerns...illustrates the same process of 
industrial mutation – if I may use the biological term – that incessantly 
revolutionises the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the 
old one, incessantly creating a new one. This process of Creative 
Destruction is the essential fact about capitalism.” (Schumpeter, 1947, p.83) 
 
Schumpeter criticises explicitly the mainstream neo-classical theoretical 
framework and emphasises innovation, dynamic factors and desiquilibrium as the main 
characteristics of the process of economic development: 
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“As a matter of fact, capitalist economy is not and cannot be stationary. Nor 
is it merely expanding in a steady manner. It is incessantly being 
revolutionised from within by new enterprise, i.e., by the intrusion of new 
commodities or new methods of production or new commercial opportunities 
into the industrial structure as is exists at any moment. Any existing 
structures and all the conditions of doing business are always in a process of 
change.  Every situation is being upset before it has had time to work itself 
out. Economic progress, in capitalist society, means turmoil.” (Schumpeter, 
1947, p.31-32) 
 
The work of Schumpeter highlighted the conflict between the two intellectual 
traditions mentioned above. Reinert (1995) expresses this conflict, in the context of the 
discussion of the determinants of the wealth of nations, in the following way:  
 
“An important problem facing the standard economic theory of today is that 
the countries which grew rich did so in the wrong way. In the neo-classical 
world, additional wealth is supposed to spread through lowered 
prices...However, as technology progresses a nation can get rich in two very 
different ways. One is the mechanism suggested by Smith and Ricardo; 
technological change only causes prices to fall. The other way, which is not 
discussed outside the field of labour economics, is that an important portion 
of the benefits from technological change is being distributed inside the 
producing nations through higher profits, higher wages, and higher taxable 
income overall [...] When the first mechanism operates the benefits of 
technological change are spread exclusively to the consumers of goods 
produced. When the second mechanism operates, the producer (company 
and nation) of goods retains an important part of the benefits of improved 
productivity.” (p. 27) 
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Schumpeter’s work also contributed to foster new intellectual efforts that explicitly 
include technology as an essential factor and determinant of the wealth of nations. One of 
its merits, recognised in Dosi et al (1988), is “...his constant emphasis on innovation as 
the main source of dynamism in capitalist development, his sense of historical 
perspective, his recognition of the importance of the conceptual distinctions between 
invention, innovation and diffusion of innovations, and his recognition of the vital 
importance of the links between organisational, managerial, social and technical 
innovations.” (p.5).  
Recent theorising on economic theory tried to account for the perceptions or 
perspectives advanced by Schumpeter and to express alternatives to the neo-classical 
economic theory. The so-called neo-Schumpeterian or evolutionary theories of economic 
change (Nelson, 1982, Clark and Juma, 1987, Saviotti and Metcalfe, 1991) propose, as 
the name says, an evolutionary perspective instead of the mechanistic perspective 
involved in the neo-classical theory. Both schools of thought have recognised the 
endogenous nature of technical change (see Thirtle and Ruttan, 1987, or Verspagen, 
1992, for reviews of the neo-classical school) but the neo-classical construct remains a 
mechanistic and restricted one. Evolutionary theories include the following general 
characteristics: 
 
“The focus of attention is on a variable or set of them that is changing over 
time and the theoretical quest is for an understanding of the dynamic 
process behind the observed change; a special case would be a quest for 
understanding of the current state of the variable or a system in terms of how 
it got there. The theory proposes that the variable or system in question is 
subject to somewhat random variation or perturbation, and also that there 
are mechanisms that systematically winnow on that variation. Much of the 
predictive power of that theory rests with its specification of the systematic 
selection forces. It is presumed that there are strong inertial tendencies 
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preserving what has survived the selection process. However, in many 
cases there are also forces that continue to introduce new variety, which is 
further grist for the selection mill” (Nelson, 1995, p.54) 
 
Evolutionary theories stress the notions of path-dependency, co-evolution, 
variation and selection. These notions can be applied either at technology, firm or 
institutional level, to explain how a specific technology, firm or institution shows the 
characteristics that it has at a certain point in time. It is a relatively easy step to extend the 
object of analysis to nations and to try to explain the wealth of a nation using evolutionary 
arguments.  
Having recognised the fundamental importance of technological change and 
other forms of innovation (organisational or managerial) as a crucial factor behind 
economic development, and having established a theoretical framework that 
accommodates differences in the economic situation of countries, there has been recently 
a new approach, known as “Systems of Innovation” and sometimes also “Systems of 
National Innovation”, that tries to explain the mechanisms that turn technological change 
and innovation into increased economic gains and performance at the level of the nation. 
Saviotti (1997) argues that the foundations of such an approach rest on the 
complementary of five disciplines/research traditions, only one of which is connected to 
evolutionary theories of economic change. The disciplines/research traditions are 
systems theory, non-equilibrium thermodynamics, biology, organisation theories and 
economic antecedents of evolutionary theories. Taken together they constitute the 
theoretical justification of the approach, inasmuch as it “...predicts structure formation, 
qualitative change, indeterminacy, irreversibility, path dependence and multistability, 
properties that are commonly displayed by National Systems of Innovation” (Saviotti, 
1997, p.182) 
Earlier, Clark and Juma (1987) also stressed the theoretical background provided 
by the thermodynamics discipline and the implications in terms of “irreversibility” and 
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“self-organisation” of a system and its applications to the study of the dynamics of 
technological systems. 
Freeman and Soete (1997) claim recognition for List’s earlier attention to national 
innovation systems: “Not only did List analyse many features of the national system of 
innovation which are at the heart of contemporary studies (education and training 
institutes, science, technical institutes, user-producer interactive learning, knowledge 
accumulation, adapting imported technology, promotion of strategic industries, etc.)  He 
also put great emphasis on the role of the state in co-ordinating and carrying through 
long-term policies for industry and the economy.” (Freeman and Soete, 1997, p.298)  
Lundvall’s (1992) book represents a major advancement in terms of the 
theoretical formulation of the theory already previously sketched in Lundvall (1988). The 
author argues that a successful process of innovation is heavily dependent on user-
producer interactions and specifically on the competence of the interacting parts and on 
the strength of the interaction. He also suggests that a nation is a somewhat privileged 
framework for user-producer interaction (notwithstanding international relationships) 
because of cultural, political and other institutional similarities that facilitate or make more 
economical the interaction process. 
Porter (1990), who comes from the theoretical perspective of the management 
school, proposed also an analysis based on the interaction of several dimensions within 
one nation. He uses the term “diamond” to refer to the determinants of “competitiveness” 
of a nation as a system. The determinants are classified in four broad categories: 1) 
factor conditions: the nation’s position in factors of production, such as skilled labour or 
infrastructures, 2) demand conditions: the nature of home demand, 3) related and 
supporting industries: the presence or absence in the nation of supplier industries and 
related industries, and 4) firm strategy, structure and rivalry: the conditions in the nation 
governing how companies are created, organised and managed, and the nature of 
domestic rivalry. The complex and systemic interactions between these broad set of 
factors determines then the performance and the so-called “competitiveness” of a nation, 
whereby the term “competitiveness” of a nation is derived from the notion of 
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competitiveness at the level of the firm (for a discussion see Georghiou, L. and Metcalfe, 
J. (1993) and Reinert (1995)). 
Nelson’s (1993) work is another addition to the “National Innovation Systems” 
approach. It presents a collection of case studies and tries to compare and analyse the 
differences between the different nations. There is a set of characteristics that is common 
and centre stage to all studies. Learning is the main phenomenon that is stressed. Its 
various dimensions, as identified by several authors, are worked upon: learning by doing 
(Arrow, 1962), learning by using (Rosenberg, 1982) and learning by interacting (Lundvall, 
1992). OECD (1992c) even refers to learning by learning, to remind that in order to learn 
you have to possess some pre-requisites, i.e., some absorptive capacity. Aside from this 
central emphasis, the following characteristics are also common (Edquist, 1997): the 
approach is holistic and interdisciplinary, it is historically oriented, the differences in the 
systems are focused upon rather than abstracted from, it emphasises interdependence 
and non-linearity, it involves product as well as organisational innovations and the 
institutions are central to the analysis. 
The recent focus on learning processes coming out from these and other studies 
of systems of innovation implies a focus on information flows rather than individual inputs 
or outputs of the system: 
 
“Systemic approaches are giving new insights into innovative and economic 
performance in the OECD countries. Technology-related analysis has 
traditionally focused on inputs (such as research expenditures) and outputs 
(such as patents). But the interactions among the actors involved in 
technology development are as important as investments in research and 
development and they are key to translating the inputs into outputs. The 
study of national innovation systems directs attention to the linkages or web 
of interaction within the overall innovation system.”(OECD, 1997a, p.3) 
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As a consequence the measurement of traditional inputs (such as R&D 
expenditure or R&D personnel) and outputs are now seen as an insufficient source of 
information of the whole system because they fail to provide an adequate picture of the 
inner workings of the system (asides from being a rather static picture of it). Recent 
studies are trying to systematically probe the interactions within the system and to 
develop indicators that are appropriate to capture the dynamics and the interactions of 
the system. Examples of such studies include research on industry alliances (e.g. 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1990), innovation surveys (e.g., OECD, 1992d and 1997), 
the type and the dynamics of relationships between firms (Swann, 1996) and firm surveys 
among others. 
The following chapters are an attempt to describe and to understand what are the 
systemic influences on the dynamics of technical change in Portuguese society. The 
(Portuguese) system is arbitrarily divided into three sub-systems and the interactions and 
reciprocal influences between the sub-systems, whose perceived impact on technical 
change are seen as important, will be discussed. The statistical information is not 
extensive, nor, for that matter, is some of the qualitative information, especially in terms of 
information flows between the several actors of the system. Consequently many 
statements are based on deductive exercises and their nature is rather hypothetical, 
others are corroborated or supported by empirical evidence discussed in the next part of 
the thesis. The choice of topics, issues and characteristics of the system that were 
included in its description and subject to analysis represent those issues that were 
identified as potentially important and with a higher potential in terms of explanatory 
power. In this work, the proposal of Edquist (1997) is followed, as it concerns this choice:  
 
“In addition, none of the major authors provide a sharp guide to what exactly 
should be included in a (national) system of innovation; they do not define 
the limits of the system in an operational way [...] both Nelson and Lundvall 
explicitly state that the boundaries are unspecific. My own proposal is 
subject to our ability to identify the determinants of innovation...[...] However, 
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it might be an impossible task to identify the boundaries in detail...[...] An 
important complement to these attempts at specification is then to try to 
identify the core elements in systems of innovation, and focus on the 
relations between these...” (p. 27) 
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CHAPTER 5. THE EVOLUTION OF THE ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
 
5.1 The industrial revolution 
 
Portugal was a latecomer to the industrial revolution. It was indeed very late in coming to 
the industrial revolution, according to what is known today about the subject and 
compared with other developed European countries on the forefront of the industrial 
revolution (UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, etc.) or even with other 
latecomers such as Japan, or Russia. 
 The question of the retardation of Portugal in developing a modern industrial 
structure has been the subject of numerous and long-dated concerns. More recently 
several studies tried on a more systematic basis to find the causes of such retardation 
(Pereira, 1983, Serrão e Martins, 1978, Cabral, 1976, Castro, 1973, Serrão, 1980, 
Castro, 1978) and have provided a wealth of quantitative and qualitative information 
about the evolution of the system during the last centuries. Even more recently, there 
were new attempts to conceptualise and organise the information retrieved so far and to 
estimate quantitative long-series data for the mentioned period (Nunes et al, 1989, Reis, 
1993, Lains, 1995) and new hypotheses have revived the debate. 
 The differential between Portugal and other developed countries became more 
acute after the second half of the XIX century. This historic period was for many countries 
a time of rapid growth and industrialisation. Portugal was also involved in that expansion 
but its rate of growth was slower than other underdeveloped countries growth rates or just 
equal to the developed countries growth rates. Just before the start of the 1
st
 World War 
the difference in GNP per capita between other developed countries was “... greater than 
ever” (Reis, 1993). Table 10 represents the situation. 
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Table 10. GNP per capita of Portugal as a fraction of GNP per capita of other 
countries. 
 
 
 
1860 
 
 
1913 
 
1950 
 
1975 
 
1994
1
 
 
Germany 
 
77% 
 
37% 
 
41% 
 
34% 
 
32% 
Denmark 93% 34% 31% 36% 31% 
France 75% 42% 33% 32% 38% 
UK 47% 29% 28% 49%  50% 
Italy 92% 66% 65% 59 49% 
Source: Bairoch (1976) as cited in Reis (1993). 
1) Source: OECD (1996d) 
 
The distance that separated Portugal from other countries was not substantial in 
1860 with the exception of the United Kingdom by then the most advanced industrial 
nation. Between 1860 and 1913 the distance increased dramatically, as reflected by the 
ratio of GNP per capita of Portugal to the GNP per capita of a group of developed 
countries. That inequality has remained until the present day and the differential even 
increased although it did not became significantly greater. 
By the end of 1910 Portugal compared rather badly in terms of economic 
development with other European developed countries as some of the usual indicators 
show (Table 11). 
 
Table 11. Indicators of economic development in 1910. 
 Portugal Europe 
   
GNP per capita (1960 US$) 290 499 
Population in cities greater than 5000 17% 36% 
Cotton consumption (Kg per capita) 2.97 5.81 
Spindles per 1000 80.6 237.0 
Iron consumption (Kg per capita) 11.1 80.0 
Coal consumption (Kg per capita) 200 1509 
Source: Reis (1993). 
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Reis (1993) argues that there are essentially three theses that emerged in the 
literature about the causes of Portuguese industrial sluggishness. According to one of 
them the problem lay in the external dependence of Portugal, namely as regards raw 
materials and access to energy sources and particularly in the dependence of Portugal 
upon Great Britain. In the absence of protectionist tariffs (a measure supposedly imposed 
by the UK) Portugal specialised in primary products and imported a great deal of 
manufactures thus crippling its industry and compromising its opportunities for growth via 
industrialisation. Pereira (1983) concludes that “... the history of Portugal during the 
second half of the XIX century illustrates the case of the countries whose industrialisation 
was blocked by the United Kingdom” (p.315). The thesis, however, raises problems of 
incongruity with available data. On the one hand exports were not a significant part of 
GNP at the time (total exports represented 3% of GDP in 1842, 5.1% of GDP in 1870 and 
3.2% of GDP in 1890; source: Mata, 1994) and on the other hand Portuguese tariffs 
during the second-half of the XIX century were among the highest in Europe placing the 
country in the protectionist “club” of which the USA is the paradigmatic example  (Table 
12). 
 
Table 12. Import duties as a percentage of import value. 
 United 
kingdom 
Portugal USA 
    
1855-1865 11.2 29.8 22.2 
1865-1875 6.6 26.6 37.5 
1875-1885 5.0 29.6 29.7 
1885-1895 5.0 31.1 26.6 
1895-1905 5.3 28.3 25.5 
1905-1913 5.0 27.2 21.4 
Source: Reis (1993). 
 
 
A second thesis argues that the underdevelopment of Portuguese economy was 
due to the land ownership structure of the country inherited from the old regime (the so-
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called Absolutist regime, a very conservative regime in place until 1820) subsequently 
subject to restructure after the so-called liberal reforms (post-1820) of the first half of the 
XIX century, but one which resulted in an excessive concentration of property in the 
South of the country and an excessive fragmentation in the North of the country. The 
impact on development of this structure lay on the one hand in the lack of motivation of 
the large landlords of the South to invest in industrial projects because they could extract 
big profits from the land even if irrationally or inefficiently explored, and on the other hand, 
on the incapacity, on the ignorance and on the fragility of the economy of subsistence of 
the small peasants which constituted the majority of the population on the North and its 
subsequent inability to generate sufficient demand conditions for the creation of 
investment capital. Or, in other words, the process that Pollard (1990) refers to: “… more 
wealth flowed into the hands of the investing middle classes rather than the spending 
landed or poorer classes…” found difficulties in occuring. The counter-argument against 
this thesis is that there are instances that similar structures (either excessive 
concentration or excessive fragmentation) did not prevent increases in productivity 
(Chorley, 1981). The obstacles associated with the lack of progress in the agricultural 
sector may be related to other factors such as lack of technical support, social tensions 
deriving from the adoption of machines and the cost structure associated with economies 
of scale (Reis, 1982). 
 Finally the third thesis (Cabral, 1979, Serrão e Martins, 1978) finds the causes in 
the social and cultural structure of Portuguese society, blaming its class rigidity, the 
weakness of the middle-classes and a state dominated by a social group with vested 
interests in import-export activities: The critique usually made to this thesis is that it does 
not go deep enough into the causes of that state of things and it does not satisfactorily 
explain why the actors acted as they did, given the circumstances. 
All these theories are not mutually exclusive and all contain a piece of the puzzle. 
Cabral (1978) mixes elements of the second and third theories when he tries to explain 
the dynamics of the industrial revolution or more accurately the dynamics of the 
introduction of the capitalist mode of production (the analysis is heavily grounded in 
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Marxist theories) using social groups as the units of analysis. Roughly speaking, he 
argues that the middle-class, or the “bourgeoisie” was divided in two main conflicting 
blocks: one linked to merchant activities and agriculture, whereby the United Kingdom 
and the overseas colonies are the main destinations or sources, and the block linked to 
production activities, namely manufacturing. The antagonism between the two blocks was 
more acute in questions like protective tariffs (the merchant block was against tariffs 
because it made their products more expensive and the production block was in favour 
because it could not compete in terms of price, or for that matter in terms of quality and 
characteristics, with foreign products) and the building of physical infrastructure (for which 
the merchant block, which relied on transport by sea, saw no apparent or worthy benefit). 
This theory is now seen as an oversimplification and does not capture all the complexity 
of the problem. In a sense it is contradicted by the facts, such as the high import duties 
that places Portugal definitely alongside the protected. On the other hand, a finer analysis 
of the diversity and features of the products that were really under tariff protection may 
after all allow some space for the theory (because not all products were subject to 
protection) or it may even allow space for other theories that recognise a cohabitation, 
although not always peaceful, between the two blocks. It seems, for instance, that capital 
goods were not subject to import duties as heavy as those for other consumer goods 
such as textiles. Within the textiles category the level of protection depended on the fact 
that the product was manufactured in Portugal. In the case of machinery, since many of 
the machines were not manufactured domestically, the duties were generally low, which 
apparently had perverse effects on the indigenous development of a capital goods sector. 
For this author, the second half of the 18
th
 century represents a period of transition from a 
feudal regime to a capitalist regime. He stresses the coexistence of both structures in the 
same historical period and analyses the transition from a socio-economic perspective 
characterising the power and interests of each social class/group and the confrontations 
that arise from conflicting interests and intentions. He argues that the conditions for a full-
fledged capitalist mode of production are definitely in place when the last remnants of the 
feudal land ownership structure of the country are finally abolished by the end of the first 
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third of the 19
th
 century (a process that started after the liberal revolution of 1820) thus 
putting, as a way of speaking, the land in the hands of the market and allowing for its 
mobility. The mobility of the land was particularly accelerated after the liberal revolution 
due to one important event, the nationalisation and subsequent public auction of the land 
and property of the church. The wealth of the church was enormous. It is estimated that 
the total value of the church property immediately before 1820 included hundreds of 
buildings and one third of the total national arable land. It was believed that the event 
contributed to increase the productivity of the land and to increase production and trade 
(Saraiva, 1978).  
The laws that regulated the economic activity of the country were marked by 
strong feudal characteristics including, among others: the impossibility to alienate some 
lands from their ancestral owners, the succession rights that imposed the eldest son as 
the heir of all the property and did not allow the fragmentation of the land among the 
other progeny, the laws that stubbornly perpetuated a system with many characteristics of 
a serfdom, the local taxes, different from region to region, raised by the landlords, the 
church, and the county that suffocated the landed or landless small peasant or the small 
artisans and craftsmen, internal tolls falling on the circulation of goods and people and 
taxes charged over export activities. The liberal revolution of 1820 (see below) marked 
the beginning of the crumbling of this legal structure but its complete replacement by 
another legal framework would take fifty years.   
 It is generally accepted (Macedo, 1982) that during the second half of the 18
th
 
centurt the state gave priority to the development of the industrial structure. But the result 
of that development was more quantitative (i.e., more “industrial” units came into 
existence) than qualitative (i.e., the methods of production remained essentially 
unaltered). It should be noted however that this quantitative development is not without 
importance since by increasing the share of population employed in the secondary sector 
it influenced the future establishments of national priorities or at least awareness of the 
need to increase wealth by means of industrialisation. Matos (1996) refers the 
establishment of factories-schools during the second half of the 18
th
 century whose 
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objective was to be models of excellency so as to demonstrate, to propagate and to 
induce imitation of the methods employed on them.  
Pereira (1991) argues that the calico-printing industry is one of the first (if not the 
first) sub-sectors of the textile industry in Portugal to acquire modern industrial 
characteristics during the second half of the 18
th
 century. He particularly refers to the 
large dimensions of the so-called “proto-factories”, aggregating workforce and processes 
in very large workshops. The development of the factories seem to be a direct 
consequence of the industrial policy of the time and were supported in several ways by 
the state (financially, tariff barriers and tax exemptions). The backwardness of Portugal 
was already evident at the time. Lisbon was one of the few seaports linked to Oriental 
trade that does not establish calico-printing factories at the beginning of the 18
th
 century. 
Its introduction had to wait until 1775 with the mentioned help from the state,  which was, 
by the way, interested in establishing more than the calico-printing industry and was in 
fact putting pre-conditions for its establishment, namely that the new factories should also 
embark in the weaving business (requisites that were not really imposed). The business 
was dominated by merchants’ capital, on one hand, and the artisan or craftsman on the 
other. Most of the tissue was imported, printed in the factories and then sold internally or 
exported. 
 At the time the economy was, in many ways, dominated by an elite of merchants, 
the capitalists of the epoch (linked to export-import activities and the so-called state 
monopolies such as tobacco, but also to credit activities, land exploration and 
speculation, and many other activities) and the calico printing industry was an opportunity 
among others to add extra value to their diverse activities, and they were particularly well 
placed in the business flow since they imported and exported many kinds of textiles. We 
can say that there is a process of vertical integration of commerce with industry. The 
funds they provided needed, however, the technical skills of the craftsmen many of whom 
were foreigners and who later established their own factories. 
The presence of foreign technicians (particularly British, but also French and 
Belgian, to cite only the more common nationalities established in Portugal) is another 
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recurrent theme of the process of industrialisation process of Portugal. Behind the 
introduction of new industries or new products one is almost sure to find a foreign name. 
This fact is true for the 18
th
, the 19
th
 (and also to the 20
th
 century, although it is a process 
with different contours) which is an evidence of the persisting technological dependence 
of the country, but also of its efforts to “stay in touch”. In spite of the presence of foreign 
technicians, many of the factories were backwards compared to their analogue in Europe. 
Apparently there were no efforts to turn endogenous the expertise of the foreigners who, 
naturally, explored their skills for their own profit, often recurring to secrecy. Many phases 
of the process were made manually and with no chemical aids. Printing with cylinders 
was introduced in 1800, and the steam engine, allowing the introduction of colour 
machines was only introduced in 1847 (Pereira, 1991). 
 One can advance several ideas about the factors affecting the slow rate of the 
industrialisation process at this time, asides from (but also building on) the general 
arguments put forward above. First, although the merchants played an important role in 
providing finance for the endeavour (and this is a factual counter argument against a 
dualistic structure of a middle-class composed of a “conservative” component linked to 
export-import activities and the “progressive” component linked to manufacture), they 
lacked a feeling for the business (it was just another one in their portfolio, and one on 
which they had to divide control with the technical experts) and what they wanted was 
quick turnover and profits (more like a commercial activity). No real importance was 
attached to strategic factors like the appropriation of the technology embodied in the 
foreign craftsman. Second, in spite of its technical backwardness the sector contributed to 
the introduction, establishment and diffusion of large factories with relatively complex 
logistics and a fairly sophisticated division of labour. Third, it was the start of a process of 
industrial concentration which later gave place to a process of vertical integration with 
other textile sub-sectors (spinning and weaving, particularly weaving), although the 
printing sector remained relatively autonomous until quite late in the 19
th
 century. 
One reason often mentioned for the late industrialisation of Portugal was the 
absence of social or civil stability particularly during the 1
st
 half of the 19
th
 century. Cabral 
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(1981) links the restlessness to the dynamics of change of regime to a capitalist mode of 
production (see above). The transition was slow because the conflicts were not, in many 
cases, radicalised. The truth is that civil unrest occurred frequently after 1820 and before 
that there was turbulence and destruction brought by the Napoleon invasions of the early 
1800s. Some authors argue that the ideological influence of the French regime and 
invasions accelerated or accentuated and inspired the need for change (Saraiva, 1978). 
The so-called Liberal Revolution introduced a democratic system in place of a regime 
based on the absolute power of the monarch (but the regime remained a monarchy, a 
parliamentary one). The unrest lasted until around 1850 where finally a relatively long 
period of social peace and stability ensued (more or less until 1910). The chronology of 
the events is given in Table 13, involving a first period marked by the  confrontation 
between the partisans of the old pre-1820 regime (the “Absolutists”) and the “Liberals” 
and a second period involving confrontations between the radical and conservative 
factions of the Liberals.  
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Table 13. Changes of political regime or changes in government involving a break 
in the pre-existing law and main failed attempts with the same aim in Portugal: 
1820-1851. 
     
Characteristics Date Place Result Comments 
      
Liberal Revolution 
 
 
24-8-1820 
15-9-1820 
Porto 
Lisbon 
Successful 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confrontation  
between the “Liberals” 
and  
 “Absolutists” (old 
regime) 
Absolutist Revolt 
(moderate faction) 
 
27-5-1823 Lisbon Successful 2 
Absolutist revolt 
(radical faction) 
30-4-1824 Lisbon Unsuccessful  
Military coup d’état 
 
31-7-1826 Porto Successful 3 
Absolutist revolts-civil 
war 
 
1826-1827 Several Unsuccessful  
Absolutist Restoration 
(radical faction) 
26-4-1828 Lisbon successful 4 
Liberal revolt 
 
May-Jul. 
1828 
Porto unsuccessful  
Liberal revolts-civil war 
 
1828-1834 Several successful 5 Final defeat of the old 
regime  
Liberal radical coup 
d’état (start of the 
period known as 
“Setembrismo”) 
10-9-1836 Porto 
Lisbon 
successful 6  
Liberal conservative 
coup d’état  
 
3-11-1836 Lisbon unsuccessful   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Confrontations 
between the 
“Liberal” factions 
Liberal conservative 
revolt-civil war 
 
Jul.-Sept. 
1837 
Several unsuccessful  
Liberal radical revolt 
 
13-3-1838 Lisbon  Unsuccessful  
Liberal conservative 
coup d’état (Start of the 
period known as 
“Cartismo”) 
 
9-2-1942 Porto Successful 7 
Democratic revolt 4-2-1844 Torres 
Novas 
Unsuccessful  
Popular mutiny (Maria 
da Fonte) 
 
Apr.-May 
1846 
Minho Successful 8 
Liberal radical revolt-
civil war (Patuleia) 
 
Oct.1846-
Jun.1847 
Several unsuccessful  
Liberal radical coup 
d’état (Regeneration) 
 
1-5-1851 Porto Successful 9 
Source: Mata (1991). 
Notes: 
1) The kings were replaced and most of their power transited to an elected parliament that approved a new 
Constitution in 1822. 
2) The Constitution of 1822 was abolished and it was initiated the elaboration of a new Fundamental 
Document of the Nation (the Carta Constitucional) by the absolutist government that returned much of the 
power to the Monarch. 
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3) The Carta Constitucional is approved by the Queen of the moment. 
4) His brother that was supported by the more radical faction of the absolutist movement replaces the King 
and the Carta Constitucional is put aside. 
5) A very violent period with widespread civil war. The conservative wing of the liberals wins and replaces the 
King and reinstates the Carta Constitucional. 
6) The moderate wing of the liberal faction replaces the Carta Constitucional by the more radical (and 
democratic) Constitution of 1822. 
7) The Carta Constitucional replaces again the Constitution of 1822. 
8) Mutiny led to fall of government. 
9) Elections for a new Parliament that modified the Carta Constitucional. After this event it follows a relatively 
long period of stability. 
 
Finally, after 1850, a compromise was found and the two factions agreed on the 
Constitution letter and on a scheme that alternated the two factions in the government. 
In spite of the restless nature of the period it is in the first quarter of the 19th 
century that an increasing social awareness and preoccupation with industrial 
developments begins to translate in more palpable civil actions. Among them is the 
creation of professional associations whose objectives included the promotion and 
diffusion of technological knowledge and its economic application. These new 
societies/associations created after the Liberal Revolution of 1820 differed from earlier 
scientific societies created at the end of the 1700s in the sense that they were more 
concerned with the application (and diffusion) of knowledge for the sake of wealth 
creation and not only with purely scientific and intellectual motivations. 
As Table 14 shows the number of associates is extremely small (total population 
in 1830 was approximately 3.5 million and in 1890 approximately 5.5 million) and they 
were concentrated in Lisbon (specially) and Porto, the two largest cities. The list in Table 
14 is not exhaustive but it represents a very representative sample (Matos, 1996). This 
panorama reflects another recurrent theme of Portuguese industrialisation, which is the 
lack of diffusion of technical and scientific capabilities throughout the country, a problem 
that has persisted until today. These two main population centres (and Lisbon above all) 
have always concentrated a (very) disproportionate share of the physical and human 
scientific and technological capital. 
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Table 14. Date of creation of some associations and number of associates. 
Name Date Number of 
associates 
 
Sociedade Promotora da Indústria Nacional 
 
1822 
 
 
 
Associação Industrial Portuguesa 
 
1837 
756 
 
Associação Industrial Portuense 
 
1851 
76 (in 1852) 
344 (in 1856) 
 
Associação Promotora da Indústria Fabril 
 
1860 
 
183 (in 1868) 
Source: Matos (1996). 
 
 Nevertheless the associations were instrumental in several ways. Their greatest 
efforts were in the diffusion of knowledge by several means. Most of the associations 
initiated the publication of technical periodic magazines that gave notice of scientific or 
technical books recently published and translated foreign articles that they considered 
relevant for the Portuguese industry. Some of them also set up their own libraries with 
books purchased by the association or offered by the associates or others altough their 
success (in terms of visits) seemed not to be very great. 
The associations promoted actively the realisation of periodic industrial fairs or 
expositions whose character could be local, regional, national or international. The first 
formal national event of this type was apparently in 1845 (Matos, 1996) although Serrão 
(1980) dates it to 1838 but there were earlier instances of informal shows of national 
industrial or agricultural artefacts since 1827. During the second half of the 19th century 
the events became more regular and the associations begun to send their members 
abroad to participate in European fairs or expositions. Other activities of dissemination of 
technological knowledge included the realisation of demonstration actions of imported 
machinery. 
 The associations were also active in educational activities being responsible for 
the implementation of some of the first technical courses and lobbying strongly for the 
  
69 
6
9
 
implementation of technical schools, a matter to which we shall refer in more detail in 
another section. 
We shall open a parenthesis here to say that the more active members in these 
associations were also very active in political terms and there are many instances of 
members of government and members of parliament who were active associates. So the 
evolution of national priorities in the development of industry and the development of 
indigenous technical capacity can be partially assessed by looking at the activities and 
objectives of these associations. Another remark is that the scope of the term “industry” at 
the time was wider than its current meaning today, including not only the manufacturing 
sector but also the agricultural sector and even the services sector, at least until 1840 
when the meaning of the term seems to have stabilised on its present form. Even so and 
given the social momentum embedded in the social values behind a collective endeavour 
such as a professional association we expect that the multivariate sectoral concerns of 
those associations will last longer than the change of meaning of the word. 
One important contribution that this intermingling between professional 
associations and government produced was the systematic collection of industrial data 
that started around 1841, after the creation of a specialised institution with that function. 
The Industrial Census of 1881 (Ministério das Obras Públicas, 1881) seems to be the first 
reliable set of industrial statistics and it also contained a great deal of qualitative 
information (descriptions of the surveyors and observations of the industrialists) which 
made this survey the main source of information for students and researchers of 
Portuguese industrial development and history. 
 Based on the industrial census of 1845 Serrão (1980) identifies a surge in 
industrial activity by the year 1836 (based on the number of surviving industrial units 
established in a particular year) and associates it with the definite establishment of the 
liberal regime in 1836 (and the period that followed, the so-called “Setembrismo” that 
ended with the so-called “Cartismo”; see Table 13) and its policy of industrial support by 
means of tariff protection. Bonifácio (1991) argues that the revitalisation of industry was 
due to the following period (the “Cartismo”) characterised by greater stability and equal 
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tariff protection. The author, based on the industrial census of 1845, takes a look at the 
products manufactured at the time, verifying their poor quality, the traditional 
manufacturing processes still employed and the diminutive number of large factories, i.e., 
it confirms a general picture of backwardness advanced by other authors. According to 
manufacturing statistics of 1814 (Castro, 1978) industrial output consisted mainly of 
traditional consumer goods such as textiles, of the most crude type according to Bonifácio 
(1991), leather products, ceramics, paper, cutlery and other metallic structures, calico-
printing, foodstuffs and chemically derived consumer products (soap, detergent). 
Bonifácio (1991) confirms the general portfolio of the Portuguese industrial product in 
1845, deducing from the list of products that were to be protected by tariffs the (little) 
diversity and (poor) quality of the industrial product. However the production of steam 
engines (in 1848) is already noted by several authors (Bonifácio, 1991, Serrão, 1980, 
Matos, 1991). Serrão (1980) refers to the presence of Portuguese-made machines in the 
industrial fair of 1848. 
 The steam engine was introduced quite late in Portugal. Castro (1978) estimates 
1835 as the year steam engines were first applied for industrial manufacturing purposes, 
deriving his conclusions from cross-comparisons of dispersed data. Serrão (1980) 
describes the first attempts to introduce the steam engine in Portugal, the first 
demonstration dating from 1742. There was an attempt by a powerful industrialist to apply 
the steam engine to the food-milling sector during the 1810s but its demands for 
excessive monopolistic concessions and the consequent protests from competitors 
terminated the attempt. 
 The steam engine was first introduced in the transport sector namely in sea 
transport, by the year 1821. Due to the very poor existing road infrastructure a great deal 
of domestic trade (and passenger transport) was done by sea (by sailing ships along the 
coast) and the economic viability of the steam ship was confirmed since the first moment 
of operation. Besides the cargo services by 1823 there were already regular passenger 
lines between Lisbon and Porto. By 1870 traffic by sailing vessels had declined due to the 
competition with the steam vessels. It is thus by this way that the steam engine insinuates 
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itself in Portugal. Probably they were the main locus and source of technical tacit learning 
for the would-be manufacturers described above and other technicians. 
 
Table 15. Diffusion of the steam engine in the industrial sector: 1835-1881. 
 No. of 
machines 
Power 
(HP) 
Comments 
 
1835 
 
 
1 
 
16 
 
1
st
 official mention of steam engine in industry 
1852 
 
70 983 79% of HP was concentrated in Lisbon; 7.2% in 
Porto. 
1881 328 7052 Sectoral distribution (no. of machines): 
38.4% in textiles 
9.1% in tobacco 
8.5% in milling 
8.8% in other food industries 
7.9% in metallurgy 
 
Source: Castro (1978) and Serrão (1980) based on the Industrial Surveys of 1852 and 1881. 
 
 
After 1835 the diffusion of the steam engine throughout the industrial sector was 
consistent but at first circumscribed to Lisbon and Porto.The introduction of the steam 
engine in Porto was later and the diffusion slower than in Lisbon. Some authors argue 
that it was at this time that the divergence between Lisbon and Porto begun (Cordeiro, 
1996). This observation is of course related to the argument of the uneven technical 
resource distribution of the country. Overall the diffusion of the steam engine was slow. 
According to not very reliable statistics the diffusion of the steam engine in the industrial 
sector obeyed the pattern described in Table 15. 
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Table 16. International comparisons on the rate of diffusion and penetration of the 
steam engine.  
 UK France USA Portugal 
 Horse power Horse power a.a.g.r. Horse power a.a.g.r. Horse power a.a.g.r. 
1830  10000      
1835      16  
1838    36000    
1848  60000 10.5%   983 27.4% 
1852        
1860    1.7x10
6
 19.2%   
1862  205000 9.2%     
1870 725000       
1881      1052 7% 
1900    10.7x10
6
 4.7%   
Source: Pollard (1990) and Castro (1978). 
a.a.g.r. : average annual growth rate 
 
 In international terms Portugal compared in absolute terms in the way described 
in Table 16.  In terms of growth rate there is apparently a very dynamic first period 
followed by a much slower rate. The discrepancy or differential in weighted terms is 
described in Table 17. However unreliable the statistics are, they give a clear indication of 
the state of backwardness of Portuguese industry even quite late into the 19th century. 
 
Table 17. Horsepower per 1000 inhabitants. 
 UK France Germany Belgium Portugal 
      
1840 13 1 0.6 8 0.02 
1860 24 5 5 21 0.25 
1881     1.49 
Source: Pollard (1990), Castro (1978), Mata e Valério (1994). 
 
 However, the economy did grow and the diffusion of machinery throughout the 
industrial units continued. During the second half of the 19
th
 century infrastructure building 
helped to sustain that growth and to open the country internally. It is during this period 
  
73 
7
3
 
that a national market was built up, in contrast with the regional markets that 
predominated in the country due to poor conditions of the road and transport 
infrastructure and to pre-liberal social conditions (cf. above). The construction of roads in 
concrete started in 1849 and the construction of railway lines started in 1853. The railway 
mileage grew at an annual average rate of 3.3% between 1846 and 1902 and the road 
mileage grew at an annual average rate of 11.3% between 1850 and 1900 (Castro, 1978 
and Serrão, 1980). A wave of diffusion of new machinery apparatus occurred around 
1890. Imports of machinery and intermediate goods raised, new industrial sectors came 
to life, such as cement, extraction and production of industrial oils, fertilisers and iron. 
Demand from the primary sector and infrastructure development was partly behind the 
growth of the industrial sector. Foreign investment began to take hold, and to invest side 
by side with nationals, in the more dynamic industrial sectors, as well as those connected 
with material infrastructures such as transportation, communications, electricity and 
financial services. The technology was in many cases provided by the foreign firms, since 
there was no indigenous capacity able to supply many products related to the electrical or 
communications infrastructures as well as to transport infrastructures and machinery 
(such as trains and the accompanying apparatus). 
But in spite of the structural changes, the political stability and the policy of 
differential protection of national industry, growth was not enough even to maintain the 
pace with the rest of the industrialised countries (Table 18). Given the initial inferior 
conditions from which Portugal started in the 2
nd
 half of the 19
th
 century and in spite of 
being an important period of structural change in Portugal, it was also a period of 
economic divergence with respect to the more industrialised countries and even to those 
which were taking-off during that period. Thus, Portugal grew but did not grow enough. It 
would have to wait more than fifty years before it could attain Rostow’s kind of take-off 
stage. 
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Table 18. International comparisons of growth rates in the 19
th
 century. 
   Annual average 
rate of growth 
(%) 
 
1815-1914 France Industrial Growth 2.03 
  Physical Product 1.5 
  Output per head 1.2 
1815-1914 UK Physical product 2.65 
  Output per head 1.3 
1859-1913 Germany Net domestic product 2.6 
  Output per head 1.5 
1851-1913 Portugal Industrial Growth 2.46 
  Physical product 1.15 
  Output per head 1.17 
Source: Pollard (1990), Lains (1995) and Mata (1994) 
 
 At the end of the first quarter of the twentieth-century, the capitalist structure of 
the country was still very fragile and immature. The share of industrial activities in total 
output was small compared with the share of agriculture. At the end of 1930 more than 
half of the active population was still employed in the primary sector and only one fifth 
was employed in the industrial sector (less than the share employed in the services 
sector; see Table 19 and Figure 4). The numbers should be compared with those of the 
UK, for instance, where in 1801 the share of active population employed in agriculture 
was 35.9% and in 1851 was 21.7%, or the numbers in Germany, with a share of 54.6% in 
1849/58 and 35.1% in 1910/13. Only Japan, a latecomer to industrialisation, showed 
larger shares in primary employment, namely 73% and 66% in 1887 and 1902 
respectively. The technological base of the majority of industrial units was extremely 
backward, the share of consumer goods in total output was large and capital goods share 
was extremely small, huge conglomerates similar to those that emerged in other industrial 
countries were in a embryonic state and the financial sector was underdeveloped, as well 
as the infrastructure system (roads, railway, communications). The Portuguese economy 
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as a whole was not, at the time, affected by the business cycle phenomena, which is a 
good indicator of the level of capitalist development of the country.  
We recall now the initial arguments that tried to explain this process of 
development and we shall add some additional comments. Our aim here is to add 
additional explanatory factors to them and to enrich the corpus of knowledge, although 
we have made some observations when it was considered appropriate, because any 
tentative explanation of the development level of the industrial sector and its innovative 
capacity includes several interacting factors. But we think that there are two factors that 
were particularly influential.  
 The first is the state of the educational system and the level of education of the 
population which acted as a multiplier of the problems of the country, since in so far as its 
absorptive capacity was extremely low, reduced considerably the alternatives opened to 
society as a whole. The severe underdevelopment of the educational system, 
characterised by an enormous illiteracy rate, large deficiencies at the elementary and 
secondary level, an incipient technical education and an outmoded university education, 
all adding together to result in an insufficient and backdated human resource base. This 
is true in spite of the fact that a concern for educational matters was present at official 
level and there was an awareness that there was a correlation between industrial 
development and educational level. However these concerns did not express themselves 
in deeds and the state did not invest in education. Private efforts were present but they 
were far from providing anything that resembles universal education even at basic level. 
We shall recall that alongside with this lack of priority in investment in knowledge or 
intangible capital there was a great deal of investment in physical infrastructure. Thus, 
one possible explanation for the lack of investment in education is the pressure of the 
lobbying groups on the government (itself infiltrated by elements of powerful private 
interests). These lobbying groups may have included foreign groups since a great deal of 
the public works were contracted to, or benefited, foreign companies. There is also the 
consideration of a more cynical perspective relating to a deliberated policy of lack of 
investment in education imposed by the developed nations on Portugal and the resulting 
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improvement of the terms of trade and competitive advantages of those nations arising in 
a context of competition between countries within a global capitalist system, a theme that 
takes us back to the theory of dependence of Portugal, which is eloquently defended by 
some authors (Mhull, 1982). In any case the lack of official priority for education is a 
mirror of the lack of priority for education sensed by society as a whole or by its most 
powerful groups, namely the large landowners and the merchants. This leads us to the 
other argument relating to large interests retained by large landowners in the continuation 
of semi-feudal production relations (in the primary sector) and concomitant impediments 
to the modernisation of the country, perpetuating a social structure marked by a relatively 
high level of rigidity and raising all sorts of obstacles that resulted in a difficult and slow 
transition from a feudal or semi-feudal mode of production to a capitalist mode of 
production, goals that were facilitated by the deficient communication infrastructure and 
the relative isolation or at least difficulty of movements between regions. 
This theme is also intrinsically related to the argument of the lack or else an 
inefficient entrepreneurial spirit or mentality, another argument advanced at the start of 
the section and which makes an echo of the arguments of the literature on the causes of 
the underdevelopment of the Portuguese economy and as a possible explanation of the 
underdevelopment of the industrial sector. The common line of reasoning in the literature 
is that the typical Portuguese capitalist preferred investment in land and commerce or in 
state sponsored business to the detriment of industry, an attitude that was dictated or 
explained more by sociological reasons (social mobility and/or acceptance, fear of 
progress) than by rational economic behaviour. In a comparative study of the Portuguese 
textile industry Ingerson (1982) sees no radical differences between the investment 
portfolio of 18
th
 century British capitalists and 19
th
 century Portuguese capitalists with 
industrial interests. Fonseca (1987) reaches basically the same conclusions or at least 
defies the archetype of Portuguese rich bourgeoisie showing that the motivation behind 
the investment was as rational as it could possibly be, given the circumstances of 
expected rates of return. Investment in industrial projects was apparently more risky in 
Portugal than elsewhere (namely in the developed countries) and the profits were not as 
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great as they were elsewhere. According to the argument it was the circumstances that 
were to blame not the capitalists. This argument is expanded by Reis (1984), who tries to 
prove, through the use of the so-called “counter-factual methodology” of the “New 
Economic History” school, that the investment choices made at the time were, perhaps 
not the best, but at least not very far away from the optimum. He does not however make 
a similar exercise with the educational factor (which, we may concede, is understandably 
difficult to make). The argument is somewhat plausible if we take into account the 
reduced knowledge base of the country, the national scarcity of producers and supply of 
capital goods, the lack of technical services, the need to import technical and human 
resources for more ambitious industrial projects, a series of difficulties related to transport 
and communications and a small internal market compounded by a lack of official 
protection (asides from import tariffs) such as procurement. However it is also true that 
the proportion of total investment of Portuguese capitalists made in direct industrial 
investment was extremely small, and the vast number of small, familiar industrial 
initiatives was deficient in substantive knowledge, innovative characteristics, 
manufacturing processes and production organisation. Mónica (1987) says that 
industrialisation in Portugal benefited greatly from foreign agents, namely important 
British and French industrialists with established interests in their countries of origin, or 
more modest technicians that established themselves in Portugal. An important 
contribution to industrialisation came also from rich Portuguese merchants who made 
their fortunes in Brazil, and later returned to Portugal. Mónica also subscribes to the 
argument (similar to Reis) that the initial conditions and the characteristics of the country 
did not permit the desired industrialisation at the time. It emphasises particularly the 
weight of the state in the economy and the close links between the more important 
capitalists and the state and the not always clear actions undertaken by the latter.  
The second factor, which in itself is also partly a consequence of 
underdevelopment (thus creating a vicious circle), probably having a direct cause-effect 
relationship with the first factor, is an unbalanced industrial structure characterised by the 
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primacy of the production of consumer goods and its huge dependency on foreign capital 
goods and intermediate goods. 
 Rosenberg (1977) suggests the fundamental importance of the capital goods 
sector in the creation of a sustainable indigenous technological capacity and its diffusion 
throughout the economy. The pattern of user-producer relationships in the process of 
innovation is also stressed by Lundvall (1988), who argues that close, continuous, strong, 
effective interactions are paramount in the process of technological innovation, and in 
defining specialisation patterns within national borders. The absence of these information 
flows undermines the process of developing indigenous technological capability, as 
illustrated by Unger (1988) in the following statement: 
 
"However, the user-producer approach also argues that inertia tends to 
consolidate the existing user-producer networks, an inertia that leads to 
decision-making on the basis of past experiences. This inertia develops not 
only within national systems of innovation, but also with regard to 
relationships involving domestic user firms and foreign producers well 
established in the international machinery or technology markets. This is a 
picture extremely familiar to many LDCs. Thus the permanent links 
reinforced through imported capital goods and technology create a degree of 
technological dependence that may not be overcome unless very specific 
policy measures are targeted to that end." (Unger, 1988, pp.482-483) 
 
 And indeed the Portuguese economy did follow this familiar pattern. So, lacking 
an adequate capital goods sector and facing no demand from the consumer goods 
sector, the very important ingredients necessary to develop its own technological 
capability are, from the outset, absent from the Portuguese economy. During the second 
and third quarters of the twentieth-century, the industrial or development polices were not 
so much in the promotion and support of domestic capabilities but rather relied on a 
rather classic pattern followed also by other NICs, a conjugation of tariff protection, price 
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controls, public support and procurement of investment related to infrastructure 
development, and a policy of supporting the creation of industries with potential import-
substitution effects on consumer goods. 
 
5.2 The first quarter of the XX century 
 
The first quarter of the XX century was again a period of considerable turmoil in 
Portuguese society (from 1910 to 1916 there were 16 governments and from 1920 to 
1926 there were 29 governments). In 1910, after the assassination of the King two years 
earlier, the monarchic regime was replaced by a Republican political regime. The 
economy suffered a considerable setback (see Annex D), the two most proximate causes 
being the deplorable state of public finance (the state resorted to public borrowing to 
finance infrastructure development, particularly railways and roads and it did not 
managed to control the debt) and the first world war, in which Portugal entered on the 
allied side. 
 
Table 19. Employment structure in 1890-1925. 
 Agriculture Industry Services 
    
1890 61.8% 17.9% 20.4% 
1900 62.2% 18.7% 19.1% 
1910 57.8% 21.6% 20.5% 
1920 56.0% 20.5% 23.4% 
1925 55.2% 19.8% 25.0% 
Source: Neves (1994). 
Note: agriculture includes fisheries. 
 
The 1910s is the only decade since 1850 that has a negative annual average rate 
of growth (-4.6%). It represents a period of deep economic depression and strong 
inflationary pressures. In spite of the political turmoil, overall the period is characterised 
by consolidation and upgrading of technological industrial capacity, although at a slow 
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rate again. It is during this period that the seeds of some of the future large Portuguese 
conglomerates were planted, as well as the development and growth of the financial 
system. The industrial conglomerates created some of these financial institutions. New 
technologies were adopted and diffused through the industrial sector (e.g., electricity), 
replacing old steam vintages, and infrastructure development in communications 
continued (although the railway mileage and the road system suffered an investment 
cutback). Foreign investment was again behind many of the innovations introduced 
during this period and, in general, the structure of the industry was characterised by a few 
progressive firms (not necessarily very large and certainly not as large as many 
contemporary European firms) surrounded by a myriad of small, traditional, slowly 
developing firms. Changes in the structure of employment developed slowly. Employment 
in the primary sector diminished only gradually and secondary employment registered 
almost no change (Table 19 and Figure 4). 
What characterises most this period is probably a slow and gradual but “safe” 
rate of “capacity building” in the sense that there was more preoccupation with technical 
education (albeit modest) and there was more learning value added in the contact with 
new technologies brought by or through foreign investment or foreign indirect control. 
In 1926 a military coup created the “Estado Novo”, a totalitarian regime that was 
to last for the next half century (forty-eight years), ending only in 1974. The coup enjoyed 
popular support due to its pledge for a policy of social and financial stability (the two main 
social nightmares of the time). The financial crisis (a public debt above 86% of GDP in 
1923 and a public deficit above 8% of the GDP) and an inflation rate that eroded the 
currency were already being tackled before the coup but the new regime got the credit for 
it (Neves, 1994) and it probably managed the affair more efficiently, or at least created 
suitable conditions for managing the affair more efficiently.  
 During the 1930s the regime defined its basic institutional structure by approving 
in 1933 a new Constitution and by exacting many of its fundamental economic laws. It 
defined the institutional structure that would be in place during the phase of rapid growth 
that followed the 2
nd
 World War. It was a structure characterised by a large degree of 
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state control over economic affairs. The interventionist posture of the state was 
formalised in the planning exercises that characterised the regime. The first long-term 
development plan, which was a sign of that posture, dates from 1935 (Neves, 1996). It is 
a fifteen-year programme of public investments, called the Economic Reconstitution Law, 
whereby defence expenditure absorbed about 50% of total investment and agriculture, 
transport infrastructure and telecommunications (with 31%, 27% and 9%) reflected the 
priorities at the time. The new regime maintained the traditional tariff protections and it 
additionally introduced controls for foreign investment, forbidding foreign direct 
investment in certain sectors. 
 
5.3 From 1945 to 1974 
 
It is generally accepted (Guimarães and Martins, 1989, Neves, 1996) that the real 
industrial take-off for Portugal took place after the Second World War, partly as a 
consequence of a series of contingent factors, of which: 
 
 Availability of considerable financial resources, obtained by the exploitation of the 
neutral position of Portugal during the war. 
 The cumulative diffusion and strengthening of scientific and technological capabilities 
and infrastructures. 
 The increase in internal consumer demand. 
 A post-war general world economic expansion period. 
 Accession of Portugal to international organisations (NATO, OECD, and UN) 
constituted mainly by developed countries whose standards would gradually be 
absorbed by Portuguese decision-making. 
 
Based on the concept of “equilibrium of poverty” developed by Galbraith (1979) 
and in similar conceptual approaches, Neves (1991) estimates the break-off point of 
Portugal of the poverty trap, or in other words, the breakdown of the “equilibrium of 
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poverty”, and places it around the final part of the 1920s. Only later was the country in 
conditions to enter a period of continuous and sustained growth. The take-off is rather 
well illustrated by the available numbers and by its graphical representation in Figure 2. It 
is very clear from the picture where the take-off point for Portugal in terms of GDP per 
capita is situated, namely at the beginning of the 1950s. The trend for above average 
growth was already visible since the 1920s. 
 
Figure 2. Gross Domestic Product per capita (1914 prices). 
Source: Mata e Valério (1994). 
Note: The numbers on which this graph is based are tabulated in Annex D. 
 
According to the numbers in Annex D average GDP growth rate during the period 
1920-1925 was 7.0% and for the period 1925-1930 it was 8.0% (part of this growth is 
probably due to a recover from a severe recession in the 1910s). The recession during 
the period 1940-1945 is explained by the war. The table in Annex D includes particular 
dates (in the 20
th
 century) that are important because they are landmarks of Portuguese 
society, signalling important discontinuities, either political and/or economical. They are:  
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1- 1910: the monarchy is abolished and the political regime becomes republican, 
with elected parliament and president. 
2- 1925: the year before the “coup d’état” that puts in place the “Estado Novo”, a 
dictatorial regime that will last until 1974. 
3- 1973: the year before the “coup d’état” that restores a democratic regime. 
4- 1985: the year before accession to EEC. 
 
Economic policy at this time was guided by the general principle of 
macroeconomic stability, through monetary and exchange rate policy within a framework 
of control of movements of capital, services and goods with other countries, and through 
a budget policy aimed at the equilibrium of public expense and public revenue at low 
levels of GDP. At the microeconomic level there were several mechanisms of market 
regulation through which the private initiative was defined (Confraria, 1995).   
The industrial policy during this time, generally known as the "condicionamento 
industrial" (industrial conditioning), was made operational in a series of medium term 
plans (the Development Plans). The policy behind them conferred to the government a 
rather interventionist stance, literally having the last say in any new industrial investment 
project or on the expansion or contraction of existing ones (prior authorisation for 
investment was needed). The system is best described as a "state capitalism", essentially 
different from the liberal forms of capitalism in the sense that, although the investment 
resources are privately owned, their allocation is strongly dependent on government 
policies. The general objectives of the policy, corporatist by nature and paternalistic in 
character, were (Confraria, 1992): 
 
- To avoid the lack of or too much competition 
- To avoid the nationalisation of the industry 
- To avoid negative effects caused by unequal regional distribution 
  
84 
8
4
 
- To avoid failure caused by the lack of a technological basis and/or financial guarantees 
and its negative impacts on the working class when its livelihood is dependent on 
precarious firms 
 
They were based on the belief that the free operation of the market or free 
competition was a mechanism that would lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of 
resources, to inefficiencies on the time scale necessary for adjustment and would impose 
unnecessary and unacceptable social costs. Having in view the comparative 
disadvantages (namely at the technological level) of national industry and the objective of 
developing some national industrial capacity, restrictions to foreign investment and 
differential protection of domestic industry from international competition were imposed. 
 The policy of “condicionamento industrial” regulated competition through the 
regulation of investment, as mentioned, trying to co-ordinate the entry decisions of new 
firms and the expansion decisions of existing firms, as well as accelerating the exit of 
inefficient firms and favoured investment that would imply import substitution. Competition 
was also regulated by direct or indirect price control and wage regulation through the 
corporatist institutions (Confraria, 1992 and 1995). 
 Analysts of the system (Brito, 1989, Confraria, 1992) concluded that the system 
had more negative than positive effects, by imposing serious non-market entry barriers, 
by creating a sort of complicity between the main private conglomerates and government 
officials resulting in inefficiencies and distortions of all kinds, and by hampering the 
competitiveness and dynamism of individual units, impeding innovation and R&D 
strategies. 
 The Development Plans (applying from 1953 to 1973; see Table 20), emphasised 
the development of infrastructure, energy and industry. Although little more than lip 
service was dedicated by the plans to technological research and training (except the last 
Plan, which realises more strongly than the others the importance of these factors to the 
economy), the fact that they were included in the plans reveals the increasing importance 
that technical matters acquire. Support was given to develop the public research 
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laboratories, many of which started after the war, with the proclaimed aim and main 
function of technically supporting the ongoing development in the specific sectors were 
they were needed. For instance, in 1944 it was decided that the strategy for energy 
production would rely heavily on hydroelectric energy. It followed a huge programme of 
construction of dams (the importance of which is still visible all the Plans) and the LNEC 
(Laboratório Nacional de Engenharia Civil), one of the largest state research laboratories, 
was then created to provide technical support to that endeavour.  
 
Table 20. The Development Plans (Planos de Fomento) 
 1st Plan 2nd Plan Interim 
Plan 
3rd Plan 
 (1953-
1958) 
(1959-
1964) 
(1965-
1967) 
(1968-
1973) 
Total investment     
(Current prices; 109 Esc.): 11.477 27.118 13.13 122.2* 
     
Percentage applied in:     
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 10.8 14.6 9.1 15.1* 
Industry 18.5 28.3 38.2 25.2* 
Energy 41.2 26.1 20.6 14.7* 
Transport and Communications 29.5 38.9 19.0 22.2* 
Research and Education  - 2.1 3.0 4.6* 
Tourism - - 3.1 9.7* 
Health - - 1.0 1.9* 
Housing - - 5.8 6.6* 
Source: OECD, Economic Surveys of Portugal, several issues, except when signalled with an 
asterisk where the source is Neves, 1994. The figures are not strictly comparable, since the data 
presented by Neves refers only to the original intentions of the plan and only investments in 
continental Portugal and Atlantic Islands but not in the African colonies of Angola and Mozambique. 
 
 The Portuguese economy was also characterised in this period by an increasing 
openness. On the one hand, and in spite of the policy of protection, tariff barriers actually 
decreased in terms of percentage of total imports (Table 21) because of the commitments 
of Portugal to the International Organisations that it joined, being no more than 5,6% of 
total imports in 1975. On the other hand, the share of exports in GDP increased 
significantly (Table 22 and Figure 3), reaching in 1990 36% of GDP.  
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Table 21. Levels of tariff protection: import duties as a percentage of total imports 
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 
23.5 19.8 13.5 14.5 10.8 5.6 2.5 1.7 0.6 
Source: Mata e Valério, 1994. Note: Confraria (1995) differentiates nominal from effective protection rates. The 
ones in the table are nominal. The effective rates are generally two to three times higher. 
 
This situation is not different from the general path followed by Europe after the 2
nd
 World 
War, in particular the deliberate policy followed by the European countries to base their 
post-war recovery on a policy that relied on wage moderation, large investment and 
exports (Crafts and Toniolo, 1996).  
 
Figure 3. Exports and imports as percentage of GDP. 
Source: Neves (1994). 
 
Although the situation was not comparable to those countries that suffered the 
worst of the war, Portugal nevertheless adhered to the European and international 
compromises and institutions set up after the war to secure the mutual commitment of 
European (or other) countries in open export markets and to co-ordinate those 
transactions, namely the OEEC (Organisation for European Economic Co-operation), the 
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European Payments Union, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the 
International Monetary Fund, the Marshall Plan, the United Nations and NATO. It was 
also a founding member of EFTA, the European Free Trade Association (it signed the 
Stockolm agreement in 1959) and it is within the framework of the agreement with EFTA 
(which conferred access to new European markets and maintained temporary protection 
of Portuguese export sectors) that exports began to increase significantly. The accesion 
of Portugal to EFTA is not only an important economic but also a political landmark 
marking the more or less definite orientation of Portugal towards integration in the 
European regional block (Sousa, 1995). The growth of exports becomes even more 
accentuated after accession to the EEC, and is accompanied by a substantial growth in 
foreign direct investment. 
 
 Table 22. Degree of openness of Portuguese Economy. 
 As percentage of GDP (current prices) 
    
 Exports Imports F.D.I. 
    
1940 8.01% 12.07%  
1945 10.71% 13.40%  
1950 12.62% 18.65%  
1960 12.57% 20.97%  
1970 14.70% 24.50% 0.4% 
1980 17.73% 36.39% 0.5% 
1985 26.54% 36.23% 1.0% 
1990 36.12% 45.16% 4.3% 
1992 28.42% 38.69% 3.5% 
Source: Neves (1994). 
 
 Overall, the 1950s, 1960s and earlier 1970's marked a phase of transformation of 
the Portuguese economy. GDP growth rates (and industry output growth rates) were 
among the highest in the OECD area during the 1960s (only exceeded by Japan, Spain 
and Greece) averaging 6.6% per year between 1960 and 1968 and 7.4% between 1968 
and 1973 (Table 23). 
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New sectors came into existence (pharmaceutical, heavy machinery, steel) or 
were quantitatively and qualitatively improved (electronics, petrol refinery, chemicals, pulp 
and paper, shipbuilding, electric machinery), traditional sectors lost some of their relative 
importance, although maintaining an important contribution to GDP with certain sub-
sectors developing considerably (such as footwear, or some other foodstuffs). The 
agriculture sector entered a period of increased decline in terms of GDP share but less so 
in terms of employment. The service sector enjoyed rapid growth (Table 24 and Figure 4).  
 
Table 23. Selected indicators of economic performance in Portugal since 1960 and 
international comparisons. 
 Average Percentage Changes 
 1960-1968 1968-1973 1973-1979 1979-1990 
 Total 
OECD 
 
Portugal 
Total 
OECD 
 
Portugal 
Total 
OECD 
 
Portugal 
Total 
OECD 
 
Portugal 
Real gross domestic 
Product (GDP) 
5.1 6.6 
 
4.6 
 
7.4 
 
2.7 
 
2.9 
 
2.7 
 
2.9 
 
Real GDP  
Per capita 
3.9 6.3 3.5 7.7 2.1 1.2 2.1 2.3 
Real gross fixed 
capital formation 
6.5 6.0 5.8 10.7 1.1 -0.4 3.1 3.3 
Real GFCF: 
Machinery/equipment 
7.2 6.3 7.7 12.8 2.7 n.a. 5.3 n.a. 
Source: OECD (1992a) 
 
 As referred to earlier, the state had an important role in all this process of 
industrialisation where it participated actively. Besides its role as a promoter of physical 
infrastructure (energy, roads, railways, etc.) and its procurement function, the state 
intervened directly in the formation of companies and in specific industrial projects, of 
which petrol refinery is an earlier pre-war example. Strategic sectors were identified, and 
the state often took the initiative to build-up the sector in Portugal, in an effort to 
substitute imports and make the country less dependent on foreign. The market structure 
was often imposed by the state by the concession of privileged and limited exploration 
rights. The introduction of petrol refinery in Portugal involved the creation of a firm with 
mixed equity, i.e., the company was owned by the state and by private entities. Often the 
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private shareholders were foreign firms that possessed the necessary technology or 
controlled access to resources. In some other cases the private shareholders were the 
few Portuguese corporations that existed then. Generally, the creation of these mixed 
firms involved complex agreements, regulating the scope of the firm’s activity. The firms 
could be managed by the private shareholders but this was often conditioned by state 
direct or indirect intervention. The same pattern was present in other large industrial 
projects, such as electricity production and distribution, nuclear energy, railways and 
underground, base chemicals, paper and steel. At the end of the period a handful of large 
conglomerates with large interests in industry, banking, insurance and agriculture 
consolidated their position as the main players in the national stage and as the main 
interlocutors between the state’s industrial policy and the market. The installation of 
industrial capacity in the African territories under Portuguese administration was an initial 
training ground for future activities related to internationalisation that will come effectively 
almost a decade later. 
On the other hand, state intervention in traditional sectors, such as wood and 
cork, textiles, equipment and machinery and others, was more of the regulatory type than 
the sponsor type, notwithstanding, of course, its important procurement programme that 
indirectly benefited these industrial sectors. The share of machinery/equipment in 
industrial output increased substantially during the period 1958-1973, which in itself was 
a positive sign regarding indigenous technological capacity. The development of the 
sector was partly related to the electrification programme of the country, where 
electromechanical equipment for electricity production, transformation and distribution 
was needed, and the programmes related to railway and naval upgrading, where 
electromechanical equipment and heavy transport equipment was produced. It also 
enhanced a general expansion of the machine-tools sector and other industrial 
equipment. Due to the size and demand limitations of the domestic market some firms 
became more active in exports of parts and components on a sub-contract basis, and 
also of entire machines. But the main export sectors were still the traditional sectors of 
  
90 
9
0
 
textiles and foodstuffs, although there was an upward trend in the export share of 
machinery and transport equipment (an increase from 3,4% in 1965 to 12,7% in 1974). 
 Regarding either the new sectors or the traditional ones there was a significant 
increase in the rate of transfer of technology in industry, by means of the numerous 
licence agreements implicit in almost every new industrial project and often present in 
expansion, upgrading or new product development of existing firms. The educational and 
research sub-systems also improved alongside and contributed to the absorption of 
knowledge and technology. In fact, the relationships between the sub-systems involve 
mutual reinforcements, that we shall try to analyse below.  
 
Figure 4. Sectoral composition of active population. 
Source: Neves (1994). 
 
 Another important development during this period was the concentration process 
of the banking system in Portugal. This concentration process was partly linked to the 
growth and increasing power of the few industrial Portuguese conglomerates that entered 
the financial sector to avoid shortages of credit from the part of the public sector. The 
banking sector also became more active as an intermediary between private savings and 
industrial investment, although it still preferred operations not linked to industrial 
investment because it attached a high risk to those investments. In general, interest rates 
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for credit to industrial investments are higher than to other credit (such as construction or 
consumption), and credit is given on a short-term basis. A traditional lack of private 
investment banks or the reluctance to provide credit for industrial investment is a feature 
that it is still present in today’s system. 
 
Figure 5. Sectoral composition of industrial product. 
Source: Neves (1994). 
 
Overall, this was a crucial period of development for the Portuguese economic structure. 
It was a period of marked structural change. It was during these decades that the 
economic structure acquired the characteristics of an industrially developed country. The 
share of GDP due to the primary sector decreased from 42% in 1938 to 16,3% in 1973 
(Table 24) and the share of industry increased from 20.8% in 1938 to 38,7% in 1973. The 
share of the service sector also increased to 45% in 1973. Similarly, the share of active 
population employed in the primary sector was reduced from more than half of the active 
population in 1938 to 27,2 % in 1980 (still a very large proportion relative to OECD 
average). The share of active population employed in the secondary sector increased 
from 20,7% in 1938 to 35% in 1973. Figure 4 shows the long series for the sectoral 
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shares of active population. It is interesting to note that the industrial sector never 
occupied a prominent position. 
 
Table 24. Variation in sectoral composition of GDP (1977 prices, million escudos) 
and active population. 
 Sectoral product share in GDP 
 
Active Population by sector 
 Agriculture Industry Services Agriculture Industry Services 
       
1938 40.7% 20.8% 38.5% 53.0% 20.7% 26.3% 
1950 39,0% 23.0% 38.1% 49.1% 24.5% 26.4% 
1955 34.6% 23.9% 41.6% 46.3% 26.7% 27.0% 
1960 29.8% 27.8% 42.4% 43.5% 28.9% 27.5% 
1965 25.1% 32.7% 42.2% 38.1% 31.1% 30.7% 
1970 20.3% 36.0% 43.7% 32.7% 33.4% 33.9% 
1973 16.3% 38.7% 45.0% 28.5% 35.0% 36.5% 
1980 10.3% 40.2% 49.5% 27.2% 36.0% 36.8% 
1985 8.0% 39.5% 52.5% 25.4% 34.7% 39.9% 
1992 4.9% 34.6% 60.5% 15.2% 32.6% 52.2% 
Source: Neves (1994) except for 1980, 1985 and 1992 where the source is OECD, Economic Surveys of 
Portugal (1996). 
 
 
Note also that industrial share in total GDP started a downwards trend after 1980. We can 
say that the bulk of the industrialisation process (in its traditional meaning) was complete 
by this time. It is also during this period that the industrial specialisation pattern of 
Portugal takes its shape. According to Confraria (1992) the main sources of industrial 
employment during the 1960s were the sectors related to transformation of metal but 
since 1986 the main source of industrial employment were the textile, clothing and 
footwear industry apparently halting a trend of diversification of industrial product and 
reverting to the traditional sectors. Structurally, it has remained almost unchanged since 
then (except for transport equipment, the result of foreign direct investment in recent 
years, and more specifically since 1980), at least as it refers to the most important 
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sectors, namely textiles, clothing and footwear, foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco and 
metallic and electric equipment (Table 25 and Figure 5). 
 
Table 25. Variation in composition of manufacturing output (1990 prices). 
  Share of sector in 
Industrial output 
Average annual  
growth rate 
       
  1958 1973 1990 1958-1973 1973-1990 
       
Basic Metallurgy 1.55% 2.34% 4.39% 11.7% 6.4% 
Non-metallic Minerals 4.31% 4.38% 7.16% 8.8% 5.5% 
Chemicals and Rubber 8.46% 10.57% 8.17% 10.3% 1.0% 
Metallic and Electric Equipment 14.68% 20.96% 11.96% 11.3% -0.8% 
Transportation Equipment 0% 0% 6.54%  0.4%* 
Foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco 27.59% 20.97% 22.37% 6.7% 2.9% 
Textiles, clothing and Footwear 21.84% 23.41% 27.00% 9.2% 0.0% 
Paper and Pulp 7.65% 7.21% 6.74% 8.3% 2.1% 
Wood, cork and Furniture 12.76% 8.94% 4.94% 6.2% -1.0% 
Other manufacturing 1.17% 1.22% 0.74% 9.0% -0.5% 
TOTAL  100% 100% 100% 8.7% 2.5% 
Source: Neves (1994). 
* 1980-1990 
 
 
5.4 The period after 1974 
 
Since the change of regime in 1974 the economy has undergone major structural 
changes, falling into three categories (OECD, 1977): 
 
1- Extension of the public sector and, more generally of the role of the state. 
2- Changes in the basic principles of the economic system. 
3- Decolonisation and its consequences. 
 
 After the fall of the “Estado Novo” in 1974 it followed an agitated period that 
altered significantly the institutional framework of Portuguese society. In the name of the 
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principle of the construction of a socialist society, and following a wave of nationalisation, 
as of 1977 the public sector controlled 24.4 per cent of total value added and 45.5 per 
cent of total gross fixed capital formation (OECD, 1976). The degree of nationalisation 
was more predominant in the utilities sector (electricity, gas and water), the financial 
service sector (banking, insurance and real estate) and transport and communications, 
but included also major industrial conglomerates (base chemicals, cement, food 
processing, steel), precisely, and not coincidentally, those that enjoyed extraordinary 
growth and support from the state during the previous regime. The dynamics of the 
private sector was thus subject to a sudden discontinuity with consequences in terms of 
lack or confused strategies both at internal organisational level and at the level of the 
market.  In addition, the exogenous oil price shocks of 1973 provoked a general 
deterioration of the terms of trade, enhanced inflationary pressures and altered the 
expected profitability of earlier investments. A long-term situation of higher levels of public 
deficit, inflation and deficit in the current balance was initiated. 
However, and in spite of the socialist principles pervading the new 1976 
Constitution, there were explicit measures taken to stop the growth of the public sector. 
Yet, and again paradoxically in face of the letter of the Constitution and the institutional 
changes, there were fundamental changes in the economic principles professed by the 
state. The most important changes concerning the economic system centred on the 
private sector and the way it functioned, the labour market and price policies. The 
government recognised the private sector function of allocation of productive resources 
and the superior efficiency of the free market mechanism, deviating from its earlier pre-
1974 allocation policies that blurred the boundaries between the private and public 
sector. Wage determination procedures were altered, notably as a result of independent 
unions replacing the former "guildlike" unions, affecting labour-management relations in a 
way that resembled more those of the industrialised countries. However, the system of 
subsidies and price controls remained, to a large extent, in place, raising doubts on 
whether it helped the enterprises to embark on a more normal operational footing. 
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 The decolonisation process marked the end of the colonial captive markets, an 
incentive for and an acceleration of the internationalisation process. A formal request for 
accession to EEC in 1977 and accession to the European Community in 1986 defined the 
future contours of that often reluctant process. This reluctance was linked to the existence 
of an alternative strategic perspective for the internationalisation of the Portuguese 
economy that advocated the creation of an open market whose core geographical 
boundaries would include all the Portuguese speaking countries, particularly in Africa but 
also Brazil, but frustrated expectations in the creation of a large and protected consumer 
market in those countries, the burden of the colonial war and the adverse political context 
on which the decolonisation was conducted shattered or compromised that perspective. 
On the other hand, for many economic agents and social segments, European integration 
was seen as a unique opportunity to have access to a very large although demanding 
market and a unique opportunity to shake off some of the country's long persisting 
structural problems. Indeed, the opportunities to increase market share in export markets 
was quickly embraced as the export numbers relative to GDP and geographical 
destination show (Table 29) and progress was made in adjustments of the production 
structure and in improving the functioning of markets. 
 
5.5 Accession to the European Economic Community 
 
 The treaty of accession allowed transition periods for some sectors (agriculture, 
fishing, and textiles, among others) before implementing full removal of all internal 
barriers. EC membership also allowed Portugal access to Community funds from various 
sources: structural funds (ERDF, ESF), specific Community funds providing additional aid 
for certain projects and bank finance including that provided by the European Investment 
Bank. Those received until now were aimed at improving and upgrading the overall 
infrastructure system of the country to offset its backwardness relative to the other EC 
countries, to stimulate human capital formation through improved education and 
increased occupational training, to give special assistance to the agricultural sector and to 
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raise physical capital formation at all levels, particularly in the manufacturing sector. The 
process of structural adjustment of Portuguese economy sought to allow for a smooth 
integration into the Community. There has been a considerable effort to adjust the system 
in line with the changes that are decided at Community level and one example is the tax 
system, whereby the former system was replaced by the VAT system.  
 The attempt to reduce the weight of the public sector in the economy led to the 
improvement of the financial situation of the public enterprises and deregulation of 
markets and a process of privatisation that began in 1989, after an amendment of the 
Constitution allowing for full privatisation of the nationalised companies. Many firms that 
were nationalised in 1977 returned (totally or partially) to private ownership. In particular 
almost all financial services were privatised, except the Central Bank (Banco de Portugal) 
and the Caixa Geral de Depósitos (still the largest bank), the large cement, paper, 
brewery manufactures, the refineries, the shipyards and even the telecommunications 
company, just to mention the most important ones. These and other measures have been 
taken since accession to reduce the accumulated distortions of the economic system and 
enhance the reliance on market regulatory mechanisms, from which Portugal and 
Portuguese firms were absent for such a long time due to one form or another of 
government intervention, in response from the commitments made vis-à-vis the European 
Union, and more importantly having in mind a not so distant future where all internal 
barriers will be abolished. 
The Community support during the transition phase revived the planning tradition 
of the Portuguese State. The incentive systems that have been implemented represent 
the operational side of the economic and industrial policies pursued since. The 1
st
 
Framework Programme for Portugal was constituted by four main programmes, two of 
them directed to sectoral goals and the other two with a more horizontal nature, applied 
during the period 1989-1993 and representing the main transition period for the 
Portuguese economy.  
The first two were the PEDIP programme (Programa Específico de 
Desenvolvimento da Indústria Portuguesa-Specific Programme for the Development of 
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Portuguese Industry) directed to the manufacturing sector and the PEDAP programme 
(Programa Específico de Desenvolvimento da Agricultura Portuguesa Portuguesa-
Specific Programme for the Development of Portuguese Agriculture) directed to the 
primary sector.  
 
Table 26. The Community Framework Programmes for Portugal. 
 1
st
 Framework Programme 
for Portugal 
(1989-1993) 
 
2
nd
 Framework Programme for 
Portugal 
(1994-1999) 
     
Total investment:  
(Current prices: million ECU) 
5564  6988 
(forecast) 
 
     
 Million Percentage Million Percentage 
 ECU of total ECU of total 
     
1. Infrastructures 3258 58.6 4320 61.8 
1.1 Transports 1348 24.2 2349 33.6 
1.2 Telecommunications 768 13.8 770 11.0 
1.3 Energy 689 12.4 519 7.4 
1.4 Water/Environment 367 6.6 440 6.3 
1.5 Health 86 1.5 242 3.5 
     
2. Human resources 1114 20.0 1173 16.8 
2.1 Education 396 7.1 485 6.9 
2.2 Training 624 11.2 560 8.0 
2.3 Research and Development 94 1.7 128 1.8 
     
3. Production 1005 18.1 1277 18.3 
3.1 Agriculture 401 7.2 468 6.7 
3.2 Fisheries 0 0 69 1.0 
3.3 Industry and services 474 8.5 562 8.0 
3.4 Tourism 130 2.3 178 2.5 
     
4. Other 187 3.4 218 3.1 
Source: Secretaria de Estado do Plano e Desenvolvimento Regional/Ministério do Planeamento e 
Administração do Território (1994). 
 
The horizontal programmes were the CIENCIA programme (Criação de 
Infraestruturas Nacionais de Ciência, Investigação e Desenvolvimento-Creation of 
National Infrastructure in Science, Research and Development) aimed at developing the 
research and development capacity of the country and the PRODEP programme 
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(Programa para o Desenvolvimento Educacional de Portugal-Programme for the 
Educational Development of Portugal) aimed at the reinforcement of the educational 
system. 
Globally, the combined programmes and investment plan can be grouped 
according to the categories in Table 26 which allows us to assess the changes in priority 
relative to the previous development plans and the relative weight/priority of each area of 
intervention (compare Table 26 with Table 20). Table 26 presents the numbers for the 
First Framework Programme already terminated and the intentions for the 2
nd
 Framework 
Programme now in execution. The 1
st
 Framework Programme was less integrated than 
this presentation leads one to believe. It was more a collection of programmes (of which 
the main four are mentioned above) than an integrated and well-articulated plan. The 
same is not true about the 2
nd
 Framework Programme where there was an effort 
(although not very successful) to integrate the various dimensions of the earlier 
programmes and to bind them in a coherent way. It is constituted also of major 
programmes similar to the ones preceding them (the PEDIP is followed by the PEDIP II, 
the CIENCIA is followed by the PRAXIS XXI, the PRODEP is followed by the PRODEP II, 
and the PEDAP is followed by the PAMAF). 
 Relative to the previous “Planos de Fomento” there are significant changes in the 
perception of priorities. A point in common is the continued importance given to 
infrastructure development. Infrastructure related to transport and telecommunications 
consumes a share of 38% of total investment in the 1
st
 Programme and a share of 45% of 
total investment in the 2
nd
 Programme. Investment priority in transport in the 1
st
 
Programme went to the road system (69% of total) which was considerably backward and 
badly needed upgrading. The first main intercity highways were finally built during this 
period. The road system remains the priority for the 2
nd
 Programme but additional 
attention is being given to the railways, namely the upgrading of the lines to permit higher 
speeds and acquisition of new trains and carriages. Another important aspect, but this 
time in articulation with Spain and the EU, is the introduction of high-speed trains. On the 
other hand, energy loses the significance it had in the earlier plans, although Portugal still 
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remains highly dependent on external energy (the motivation for the high investment in 
the earlier Planos de Fomento). The rate of construction of dams diminished considerably 
and there was a shift in favour of thermoelectric plants after the (apparently) definite 
abandonment of the nuclear alternative. An effort to diversify the sources of energy and 
to rationalise and optimise consumption accompanied this.  
 The major differences relative to the Planos de Fomento are the shift in the 
relative position of industry and the productive sectors on the one hand, and education, 
research and development on the other hand. Industry occupied a prominent position in 
the Planos de Fomento (reflecting the investments in the major industrial sectors 
described above and the global industrialisation process that ensued), a position that is 
now occupied by education, training and research (20,0% and 16.8% of total investment 
in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Programme respectively), for which a minor position was given in the 
Planos de Fomento (a maximum of 4.6% of total investment in the 3
rd
 Plan). Attention 
was also given to the direct relationships between technology and industry and a series 
of projects of an infrastructural nature were supported, namely the implementation of 
sectoral technological centres (with strong linkages to the sectoral employers 
associations), technological institutes (with strong linkages to the universities), technology 
parks and incubators of technology-based firms. 
 These changes represent a major change in perception of the role and impact of 
technology in the society and in the economy, and they represents also a change in the 
perception of how the government should intervene in the economic system relative to 
the period of the Development Plans. These changes come in line with what was said 
about the new principles guiding the economic policy of recent governments, namely, to 
diminish the direct intervention of the government in the economy and let the free market 
be the main mechanism of allocation of resources and reserving for the government the 
regulatory role (and the general supervision of the law). Direct government intervention 
will be restricted to those situations were there is a perceived or potential market failure. 
Infrastructure development seems to have contributed substantially to the 
dynamism of the economy after 1986/1987 and until the first years of the 1990s when the 
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recession began. The period from 1986 to 1990 (Table 27) was marked by relatively high 
rates of growth, higher than EU average. 
 
Table 27. Indicators of development after 1986. 
 GDP GDP  Industrial GFCF Exports 
 1990p p.capita Production   
      
Percentage changes: 
      
1986   7.3 10.9 6.8 
1987 5.5 5.1 4.3 16.8 10.6 
1988 5.8 5.6 3.9 11.2 7.9 
1989 5.7 5.5 6.8 4.3 13.3 
1990 4.3 4.1 9.1 6.8 10.5 
1991 2.1 2.4 0 2.4 0.5 
1992 1.1 5.9 -2.6 5.4 6.1 
1993 -1.2 -1.2 -2.4 -4.8 -5.1 
1994 0.8 -4.8 -0.1 3.9 10.7 
      
Average      
1986/1994: 3.0 2.8 2.9 6.3 6.8 
Source: OECD (1996d). 
 
The average GDP growth rates from 1974 to 1985 and from 1986 to 1994 (Table 23 and 
Table 27) were, nevertheless, considerably less than the previous decades (marked by 
higher extraordinary growth), and probably some of the reasons are to be found in the 
extraordinary circumstances that followed 1974 and mentioned above (for the period 
1974-1985). However in face of the potential for growth due to catching-up, the growth 
rates for the post-1973 period are deceptive in spite of their EU above-average order of 
magnitude (but not significantly above OECD average), and even more so when they are 
compared (as they are often) with the growth rates of countries in similar catching-up 
conditions, namely the Asian NICs (Table 28). Apparently, the reason is not lack of 
investment since the statistics of investment in fixed capital show high values close to 
25% of GDP for the period 1952-1974, close to 30% of GDP during the period 1975-1980 
and again close to 25% of GDP in the 1990s (Neves, 1994). One of the possible reasons 
is the close linkage of the Portuguese economy with Europe, a relatively slow growth 
region. 
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Table 28. Average annual GDP growth rates for selected newly 
industrialised Asian countries. 
 1960-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 
 
South Korea 
 
8.5 
 
8.7 
 
9.2 
Taiwan 9.2 9.7 8.0 
Singapore 8.8 9.0 6.9 
Hong-Kong 10.0 9.5 8.9 
Source: Chowdhury, A. and Islam, I. (1993). 
 
The close links of Portugal with Europe are visible in the increasing importance of 
Europe as a destination of Portuguese exports (Table 29) and as the origin of Portuguese 
imports, particularly after 1980.  
 
Table 29. Trade with Europe. 
 Percentage of total 
 
 Exports 
 
Imports 
1967
a
 38.1 47.2 
1974
b
 39.8 40.0 
1980 58.6 45.3 
1985 62.5 45.9 
1990 73.9 69.2 
1995 80.1 73.9 
Source: OECD (1976, 1980, 1989, and 1996d). 
Note: Europe means the members of the European Economic Community or European Union. 
a) UK, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 
b) UK, Germany, France and Italy. 
 
  Other reasons must be looked for at other levels and particularly at the level of 
national allocation decision, regarding the human capital component and the educational 
and training system, the institutional framework of the country and the interactions 
between the several social and economic agents, and the private (and public enterprises) 
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investment allocation procedures, especially those regarding innovation and research 
and development. 
 The perceived "revealed comparative advantage" has remained largely 
unchanged since accession (OECD, 1994). There has been a slight movement in favour 
of resource-intensive industries, reflecting the good performance in exports markets of 
the sectors linked to forestry, at the expense of labour-intensive industries but both 
remain at the heart of Portuguese industrial specialisation. Its usual weak points (scale 
intensive industries, science-based industries and differentiated goods industries) remain 
virtually unchanged (OECD, 1989 and Neven, 1990; cf. Table 25 and Figure 5). 
 
5.6 The economic system: a summary 
 
The relative slow pace at which the economic conditions of the country evolved 
determined to a great extent its present conditions. The slow transition from an economic 
and social regime based on feudal characteristics to a regime characterised by capitalist 
features, a transition that took place during practically the whole of the 19
th
 century, 
dictated to a great extent the late coming of Portugal to the industrial revolution and lately 
its difficulties in keeping pace with technological advances and their impact on the 
economic system. The characteristics of the regime were behind the income distribution 
structure that was characterised by an extremely uneven and skewed distribution of 
wealth. Wealth was concentrated on a relatively small proportion of the population and 
the vast majority of the population was very poor. The proportion of “investing middle 
classes” was concentrated in the two main cities and insufficient to sustain widespread 
investment on industrial activities. Investment resources were channelled either to 
commercial activities or to the primary sector. A large risk was associated with industrial 
investment due to qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in the knowledge base of the 
country. An unbalanced industrial structure characterised by deficiencies in the 
production of equipment goods was at the same time a consequence of the factors just 
mentioned and a cause of the perpetuation of the situation. The low priority given to state 
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educational policy did not contribute to enhance diffusion of technological expertise and 
its application at industrial level. Due to the low level of commitment to industrial activities 
and the inability to master the strategic implications linked to the dominance of 
technology, a strategy based on a short term perspective and on the exploitation of other 
production factors (such as cheap labour) took hold of the Portuguese industrial ethos 
perpetuating an approach with historic roots on a merchant’s view of business. 
The omnipresent position of the state in the economic system, typified by the 
absolute control of monopoly or oligopoly concessions over several industrial (e.g., 
tobacco) and commercial activities (e.g. trade with India or Brazil) continued, although 
abated, throughout the 20
th
 century in the form of the corporatist regime that was in place 
during half of the century. An industrial and economic policy based on a state licensing 
system proved itself to be a two-edged sword, strongly promoting, on the one hand, the 
industrial development of the country, but, on the other hand, introducing severe market 
distortions on the way the system functioned. Structurally, the industrial sector remained 
unbalanced in terms of the proportion of production of equipment goods and consumer 
goods. Wealth distribution remained skewed although the middle class grew substantially. 
Nowadays the state is actively engaged in removing market distortions, either by 
removing all sorts of protective barriers or by limiting its intervening powers. 
Nevertheless, the educational, technological and distributive heritage is still very visible. 
The openness of Portuguese economy was a powerful competitive impetus to the 
industrial sector but its relative weakness may eventually prevent it from readjusting in a 
timely manner to the considerable threat posed by formidable external innovative 
capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 6. THE EDUCATION SYSTEM 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
One of the main weak points of the evolution of Portuguese indigenous capacity in 
technical change is to be found in the education system which, quite simply, failed to 
provide the necessary quantitative and qualitative inputs of human resources needed to 
carry out the immense and disparate activities underlying the process of technical 
change. Historically, Portuguese society has never placed education at a high level of 
priority (in practical terms), although it has always acknowledged and recognised its 
severe deficiencies at all levels of education and training. Education was not, for a long 
time, a priority for Portuguese society, and the will to implement changes and commit 
resources to that task has often remained only at the stage of declarations of good 
intentions. 
Several causal relationships related to cultural, sociological and economic factors 
might explain the evolution of the education system. Culturally, Portuguese society was a 
latecomer in embracing the new science paradigm that emerged out of the waves of 
rationalist philosophy that started with the Renaissance and continued throughout the 
next centuries, represented by the works of Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo (1564-
1642), Descartes (1596-1650), Newton (1642-1727) and many others, which ultimately 
institutionalised the mechanistic paradigm of science (Boas, 1970). Unlike Italy, France or 
England, in which the legacy of the Aristotelian organic paradigm was increasingly losing 
its regulatory power over science and technology, Portugal remained firmly within the 
limits of the old paradigm and it did not embrace the new philosophy. On the contrary, it 
resisted its implementation, preferring to continue along the way paved out by the organic 
Aristotelian paradigm of science that contributed so much to its world power status in the 
fifteenth and sixteenth century (Barreto, 1991). The influence of Catholic ideology on 
Portuguese cultural ethos is not unrelated with the rejection of the mechanistic paradigm 
whose implicit approach, emphasising analytical fragmentation and specialisation, was at 
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odds with the global, synthetically united view of the Aristotelian paradigm accepted by 
the church. As a result, the pluralistic view of science which emerged in other European 
countries during this time did not have any significant reflection in Portuguese society. 
The existing institutions and their philosophy remained intact and repressive towards the 
new paradigm. The perpetuation of the old paradigm had of course immense impacts in 
terms of the educational approach followed by Portugal. Scientific disciplines were for a 
long time absent from the university (or other) curricula or were inappropriately and 
deficiently taught. 
The social structure of Portuguese society remained stubbornly feudal in 
character until well into the nineteenth-century (and probably well into the 20
th
 century, 
particularly in the rural villages), encompassed within a rigid social class divide with little 
mobility and dominated by patronage relationships: 
 
"Portugal never experienced the Protestant Reformation; indeed it 
repudiated Protestantism and took vigorous steps to root it out. Retaining its 
intensely Catholic culture and identity, Portugal was thus never challenged 
by the pluralism of beliefs and value systems to which the Reformation 
helped give rise nor did the this-worldly concerns that linked Protestantism to 
the growth of capitalism gain widespread acceptance. In part because its 
industrialisation was postponed, Portugal's middle class grew but slowly, and 
society remained fixed in the two class pattern of lord and vassal, patron and 
client, elite and mass" (Wiarda, 1977, pp.40) 
 
As a result, education was a restricted privilege confined to the elite and the 
church, the vast majority of the population being excluded from even the most elementary 
education. It can probably be said that the same was true for other European countries 
but in Portugal the education reserved for the elite was rigid and dogmatic for a long time 
and lacked the pluralism that emerged in Europe after the Enlightenment. Education at 
higher levels was monopolistic in character for a long time, repressing the free circulation 
  
106 
1
0
6
 
of ideas and resisting implementation of new projects and creating barriers to proliferation 
of higher education institutions. The upper classes and the church resisted widespread 
education of the population well into the twentieth-century (in 1938, during the 
proceedings of the 1
st
 Congress of the National Union, the most important corporative 
political and ideological institution under the ruling of Salazar's dictatorship, the 
glorification of illiteracy is professed by several of its members; see Carvalho, 1986) 
The statement of Wiarda helps to complement the system of causal relationships 
that tentatively explain the evolution of the education system by including the economic 
dimension. The postponement of the industrial revolution and the continuation of a 
predominantly rural mode of production contributes to the explanation of low education 
levels (in rural societies, the fundamental unit of production is the family; the children 
have an economic function to perform which, in many senses, and even more if it is a 
poor community, is incompatible with family resources being allocated to formal education 
programmes). 
 
Table 30. Illiteracy rates. 
Year Illiteracy rates 
% of total population 
  
1878 82.4 
1890 79.2 
1900 78.6 
1911 75.1 
1930 67.8 
1940 59.4 
Source: Carvalho (1986). 
 
 
The rate of illiteracy of Portuguese society remained extremely high for a long time 
(Table 30) either if comparisons are made between the more advanced European 
countries (rates of illiteracy in Sweden, Germany, England, Norway and Denmark did not 
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exceed 1% as early as 1881) or between the Mediterranean countries or the eastern 
European countries. 
 
6.2 The background 
 
A factor that contributed to the perpetuation of the influence of the Aristotelian paradigm 
in Portugal was the influence of a particular order of friars, namely the so-called Society 
of Jesus, founded by Ignatius of Loyola in 1540 (with the blessings of the Roman Catholic 
Church). In 1541 the Society established itself in Portugal and since its beginnings it was 
very well accepted and supported by the monarch and the state. The influence of the 
order expanded rapidly and it was not long before it controlled an important part of the 
educational system in Portugal. 
There are positive and negative aspects related to the works of the Society in 
Portugal. The positive aspect is that they provided access to education to a relatively 
large part of the Portuguese society, i.e., they institutionalised public (open to all classes) 
education at every level (primary, secondary and tertiary). Thanks to the Society 
education, particularly primary, was much more widespread than it otherwise would have 
been, and at a relatively low cost for the state. This is one possible reason why the order 
was so well accepted and supported by the monarch and the state. Another reason is 
that it helped to unify and to preserve the unity of the Nation.  
 The educational system of the Society was very well organised and 
systematised. Education was divided in three learning cycles, which can be roughly 
compared to the actual primary, secondary and tertiary level. They founded the second 
university in Portugal, in a town called Évora (the University of Évora, founded in 1559), 
almost three hundred years after the first one was founded (see below) and during the 
two centuries that it lasted it was the only alternative to the other university (the University 
of Coimbra1; see below). The education was of a scholastic nature and it was based on 
                                                     
1 The first University of Portugal was set-up in Lisbon in 1290 under the name Estudo 
Geral but it was transferred to Coimbra in 1308. Subsequently it was again transferred to 
Lisbon and it was only after a number of such transfers that the university settled in 
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the exegesis of Aristotle texts and thinking. The order soon organised a number of 
manuals, completed during the 16
th
 century, that were adopted as standard textbooks 
throughout all their schools (and apparently also adopted in many other schools in the 
rest of Europe), and adopted the pedagogical methods used in the University of Paris at 
the start of the 16
th
 century. 
The negative aspects are essentially connected with the excessive duration of 
the influence of the order in the education system in Portugal and its inflexibility and lack 
of pluralism of ideas. The order controlled public primary and secondary education for 
approximately two centuries (until 1759) and its methods and educational contents 
remained virtually unchanged during that extended period of time. At the tertiary level the 
situation was characterised by a duopoly. On one side the University of Coimbra and on 
the other the University of Évora, but their philosophical orientation was not significantly 
different (both followed the Aristotelian philosophy). Teaching of sciences was oriented 
towards a moral and religious end, i.e. it was a means and not an end in itself, whereby 
the sciences were subordinated to Theology. This approach, together with the influence 
of the order at national level constitute the main target of criticism of the Society of Jesus, 
namely that it erected barriers to the historical process represented by the Renaissance. 
The pluralistic mood towards science that emerged in Europe did not find its way 
to Portugal. The existing institutions, of which the University of Coimbra plays a crucial 
role, remained attached to the old philosophy and repressive (at a minimum 
impermeable) towards the new one. The first Portuguese University, the University of 
Coimbra, set up in 1290, remained the sole one (with the exception of the interim period 
of two centuries, from 1559 to 1759, during which the University of Évora was functioning) 
until 1911, exerting a virtual monopoly power. It strongly opposed (or raised difficulties to) 
the introduction of the new disciplines arising from the scientific revolution then taking 
place in Europe. 
                                                                                                                                                 
Coimbra in 1537. It is generally accepted that until this date the development of the 
University was slow, its staff diminutive and its cultural production irrelevant. Its main 
function was to prepare (reasonably well) staff to supply the state and the church in 
competition with the monasteries and the synagogues. 
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The diffusion of new ideas was made through restricted channels. The most 
common ones were the institution of small Academies founded by aristocrats that 
promoted conferences and seminars with invited foreign distinguished individuals. It 
became fashion among the upper class to sponsor conferences and debates about 
astronomy and the works of Newton or other authors. Some of them installed small 
private laboratories in their homes. These initiatives seem to have become more common 
during and after the 1
st
 half of the 18
th
 century. Private tutors hired by the upper classes 
were another channel of diffusion of those ideas, as well as the incursions of foreign 
popularizing agents of the new amazing things science was achieving. 
Another source of diffusion of modern ideas came from dispersed contributions of 
Portuguese intellectuals resident in Europe, the so-called “estrangeirados”, who, for 
several reasons, wrote books intended to propagate new ideas targeted to the 
Portuguese audience, or critical essays about the state of things in Portugal. The most 
famous of them is Verney (1949) whose work2 had an immense impact in Portugal. He 
was a herald of the pedagogical ideas of the time. It is important to note that Verney 
makes reference to the state of illiteracy of Portugal in the 1740s, which according to him 
was already serious by comparison with other European countries. Similar individual 
contributions came from intellectuals, not linked to any religious order, that studied 
abroad and returned to the country. 
The most important challenge faced by the Society of Jesus in the 1
st
 half of the 
18
th
 century was another religious order (the Congregation of the Oratory of Saint Philip 
Neri, founded in Rome in 1575 and comprising independent communities of secular 
priests under obedience but without vows) that was established in Portugal in 1659. 
Initially oriented to the apostolate, later in the mid 1700s defied the teaching monopoly of 
the Jesuits and obtained from the state similar privileges and support the Jesuits had, 
initiating also public teaching at primary and secondary level, setting up their own libraries 
and publishing their own manuals. The Oratorians were much more open-minded than 
the Jesuits but their basic premises still derived from Aristotelian thinking. However they 
                                                     
2 See reference; the translation of the title is “The True Method of Studying”. 
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were enthusiastic of modern physics and chemistry and their teachings included an 
important study component of practical work. Generally they tried to conciliate Aristotelian 
thought with the new philosophical waves or to reinterpret Aristotelian thought in the light 
of the questions raised by cartesianism, rationalism or empiricism, instead of more or less 
categorically rejecting them like the Jesuits did. 
The final blow to the influence of the Jesuits came by reasons not directly 
connected to reactions to their educational methods and in a radical way when the so-
called Marquis de Pombal gained power in 1750. The Marquis was the right arm of the 
new King (D. José I) and soon ruled the country with an iron fist that was to bring 
convulsion to some established social interests, one of which was the Society of Jesus 
(the other target was the most powerful elements of the aristocracy). By then the 
influence of the Society had expanded to the overseas territories of South-America 
(Brazil, Paraguay and other countries) where the Society (Spanish Jesuits) by virtue of its 
apostolate and educational mission had acquired great spiritual but also territorial and 
administrative influence. They ruled over an enormous territory, dominating thousands of 
natives and exacting laws that regulated every aspect of a society. Following a treaty of 
Portugal with Spain, part of that territory, now under Spanish domination, would pass to 
Portuguese sovereignty. The Society did not accept that sovereignty; it militarily 
organised the natives and a war followed. This was the start of the end of the Society of 
Jesus in Portugal. After defeating the Spanish Jesuits, the Society was completely 
expelled from Portugal in 1759 and all its belongings confiscated. 
That action left the educational system in extreme disarray because the Jesuits 
controlled almost all of it. However there was no immediate attention given to this state of 
things and the remedy came late and the measures to correct the problem were 
intermittent. One of the reasons why the process was lengthy is the lack of alternative 
resources in the country (namely teachers). Another was a relative indifference of the 
state particularly with regard to the primary and secondary level. 
However, it is generally agreed that the rule of the Marquis of Pombal marks a 
period of transition in the educational system of Portugal (Gomes et al, 1988) connected 
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to the secularization impulse given by the regime. The personality and the actions of the 
Marquis are complex and contradictory. He generally embraced the ideas of the 
Enlightenment and he was enthusiastic about the ideas passing through the Europe of 
the time but on the other hand he was a despot and imposed a repressive and brutal 
regime that suffocated any pluralism of ideas. The reforms began with the establishment 
for the first time of a central structure to co-ordinate all questions related to education at 
the primary and secondary level, equivalent to a Directorate-General3. Although we can 
think of these as a measure aimed at increasing the efficiency of the system it is also true 
that one of its main functions was to make sure that the schools and teachers abided by 
the same state-imposed normalised opinions, in the Jesuit style (only the contents were 
now different). 
One of the praised actions attributed to the Marquis was the secularisation of the 
education and the contribution to the elimination of scholasticism in the educational 
system. However, only the Society of Jesus was banned from the educational system, 
which remained to a large extent in the hands of or under direct or indirect control of the 
Catholic Church, through the influence of other orders (one of which was the mentioned 
Congregation of the Oratory, more close to the modern ideas of the Marquis and which 
was influential in the reforms). 
Apparently there was an effort to increase the prestige of the primary and 
secondary teachers by giving them special privileges generally reserved for the nobles. 
There was also an attempt to fill the national vacuum in teaching skills and resources with 
foreign teachers but with very limited success (the reluctance of foreign teachers to come 
to Portugal is probably linked to the highly repressive nature of the regime and its 
obsessive censorship activity; it may also be due to the lack of physical resources and the 
unattractiveness of the function in intellectual terms, if not in pecuniary terms; the only 
foreigners for which it was easy to find candidates were in the military profession). 
 The most important and durable change was the definition for the first time in 
Portugal of a global educational policy. The fundamental idea was that cultural instruction 
                                                     
3 It is a measure in line with a constant centralisation tendency that characterised the 
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should be administered according to the social function that each individual will perform. 
The reform demarcated a dualism. There were those who were to be occupied in 
agriculture or industry that needed no formal instruction at all and the spiritual instruction 
by the local parish was sufficient. There were others that would occupy high functions and 
were divided into two categories: those that would need only to read, to write and to learn 
elementary arithmetic, and those that should proceed to higher studies at university level. 
For the latter group it constituted the secondary level of education. In short, under this 
conception, there was created a rudimentary primary level for the “middle-class”, an 
university level for the elite, and a volatile secondary level whose fundamental function 
was to prepare the individual to the tertiary level. The vast mass of the population would 
remain with no instruction at all. This configuration would last well until the 20
th
 century. 
Besides that, and in line with an elitist perspective of society there was also created a 
special College for the Nobles, in line also with what happened in other European 
countries where the aristocracy realised that it could no longer live on privileges alone 
and needed something else to survive4. Worthy of mention also is the creation of a 
professional commercial school, probably the first of its kind in Portugal. It came about as 
a response to a need to prepare adequately the merchants for their trade with other 
nations. 
In the light of the basic educational policy, it is evident that the more important 
reforms of the Marquis were in the University and they were characterised by the 
principles of the enlightenment, rationalism and utilitarianism (Providência, 1997). 
Besides closing the University of Évora (it was a natural consequence of the expulsion of 
the Society of Jesus) the University of Coimbra was profoundly reformed (at least those 
were the intentions). The methods and the contents were subject to a thoughtful and 
lengthy appreciation, for which a special committee was created. The most remarkable 
part of the reforms is the one regarding the scientific disciplines, which were finally 
implemented in the University. Two new Faculties were created: the Faculty of 
                                                                                                                                                 
regime during the ruling of the Marquis. 
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Mathematics and the Faculty of Philosophy (equivalent to our modern Faculty of 
Sciences). It gave special emphasis and financial support to those disciplines that 
involved experimental work. New monumental buildings were erected, laboratories with 
state-of-the-art equipment were set-up for physics and chemistry, the School Hospital and 
other technical support units were set-up side by side with the Faculty of Medicine and an 
Astronomic Observatory was built for the Faculty of Mathematics. Everything was done 
with great apparatus and pomposity. It also reformed some of the old faculties and the 
other remaining Faculties, namely the Faculty of Law, whereby the Roman and the 
Canonical Law was abolished. However, in practical terms, it was difficult to implement 
the letter of the reform. As was mentioned it was difficult to find teachers for the new 
disciplines, and the old teachers regained much of the old power and influence, soon 
after the political fall of the Marquis in 1777. However, it is generally agreed that the 
reforms gave a new and definite modern impulse to the university (Ricon-Ferraz, 1993). 
Comparing the educational system of the Marquis with that of the Jesuits we can say that 
the system lost in audience but it gained in updating. 
The following regime did not gave any continuity to the reform of the university, 
but the latter had been so far reaching that it made impossible a complete return to the 
old status quo. It strengthened the literary part of higher education and it restricted even 
more access to the tertiary level, while at the same time it enlarged primary education 
and returned it as much as possible to the hands of the church. It thus represented a 
setback relative to the intentions of the Marquis. 
Once again it is at the margins of the main civil educational system that 
acceptance, diffusion and enthusiasm about new ideologies and the advances in science 
and technology is realised (Peixoto, 1997). The Academy of Sciences (of a civil nature) 
was founded in 1780 and it represented the first durable institutional framework of its kind 
encompassing all fields of science. It was founded by two “estrangeirados” (i.e., two men 
who spent most of their time in foreign countries, namely the United Kingdom; both were 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 The fight of the Marquis with the Aristocracy was an attempt to curtail the privileges of 
the aristocracy and to create a “new aristocracy” less reliant on privileges and more on 
economic activity. 
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members of the London Royal Society). One of the main goals of the Academy was 
educational, in which respect it differed from similar European institutions 
(understandable in the light of the poor conditions of available scientific education at the 
time), besides the usual goal of promoting the advancement of science and its application 
to the creation of wealth (the connection between science, technology and economy was 
not yet generally accepted in Portuguese society). The Academy contributed significantly 
to promote the application of science and technology to all possible fields of activity 
during the following 19
th
 century, filling to a certain extent the emptiness of the national 
panorama related to science, technology and technical activities. Its most notable 
contributions, aside from its educational activities, were the publication of scientific 
journals and their consultant activity, and the implementation of some specific projects 
(related to health and geology). 
Military Academies (mostly at secondary level but also at tertiary level) are also 
founded in the late 1700s and early 1800s in Lisbon and Porto (the two main cities) all of 
them linked in one way or another to technical activities. During the first years of the 
1800s primary schools for military personnel and respective families, employing the so-
called self-tuition method, were established in many barracks, an initiative that was part of 
a general plan to improve the professionalism of the army (done after the French 
invasions at the start of the century and implemented by a British officer). Later, due to its 
success, the schools were opened to the civil population and concerns with teaching 
standardisation led to the creation of the first school of teachers in 1816 (Ferreira, 1971-
1975). At a lower level mentioned should be made of the “Casa Pia” an institution 
originally devoted to shelter marginal youth but that evolved in the sense of providing 
these people with technical skills. In some cases it reached high levels of 
professionalism, skill and knowledge, so much so that it was called the University of the 
People (Saraiva, 1980). It may be considered the second professional civil Portuguese 
school, this one a technical school and not only a commercial school. 
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6.3 The liberal period (from the first fifth of the 19
th
 century to earlier 20
th
 
century) 
 
The evolution of the system during the liberal period (1820-1926) of the 19
th
 century and 
the 20
th
 century until the dictatorship regime in 1926 was marked by a high degree of 
instability. Reforms of the education system were made at an astonishing rate reflecting 
the conflicting views of the various political factions that rotationally occupied the 
government seat. No due time was allowed for reforms to settle down or even to take 
place, and many of them were not implemented, being superseded by a new reform. A 
general sense of instability and disarray pervaded the institutions and the educational 
agents, seriously affecting the overall functioning of the system. It is a period 
characterised more by words and declarations of intentions than by deeds, i.e., the laws 
were unrealistic and inapplicable to the Portuguese situation. Qualitative changes were 
introduced but its practical implementation was slow and quantitatively limited. Their 
limited success was due to the economic limitations of the nation but also to internal 
social resistance to change expressed by the deeply rooted class dualism. Basically the 
reforms reflected the struggle between the conflicting views of a classical, humanistic 
paradigm having ancient and strong roots in Portugal as we have seen in the preceding 
section, and the mechanistic, rationalist and utilitarian view of science and technology 
espoused by the more progressive elements of society or those linked to industrial 
sectors of activity (which was not great, as mentioned in the section covering the 
evolution of the economic system in Portugal). The social forces espousing the latter 
eventually became dominant after the fall of the monarchy in 1910, and that change in 
the balance of power is symbolised by the creation of two new universities in 1911 that 
finally and definitely ended the monopoly of the University of Coimbra and were the 
culmination of a long process and struggle to inject new and modern perspectives on the 
education system. 
The more important principles governing the changes in the system, during the 
liberal period, are (Carvalho, 1986): 
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- the principle of freedom of expression 
- the principle of education as a fundamental human right 
- the utilitarian perspective of education and training in addition to its socialising 
function 
 
One of the first measures of the liberal regimes was to abolish the Inquisition 
Court still operative in Portugal in 1820 (the permanence of such an institution reveals 
well the level of censorship and restrictions imposed on Portuguese society at the 
intellectual level). Another measure was to open to anyone the possibility to teach or to 
create schools (as referred to earlier, the prerogative for teaching activities was restricted 
and disputed between established institutions linked to the Church, in spite of the 
attempts by the Marquis to do otherwise). These measures suffered an immediate 
setback in 1823 when the radical conservative regained power and re-established the old 
prerogatives for the religious order (moreover, the Society of Jesus was again allowed 
legal rights in Portugal in 1832, although they never regained their old power). The 
number of primary schools (which was by then around 1000 for a total population of 
approximately 3.7 million) was drastically reduced and a general wave of violent 
repression followed. Soon thereafter the country entered a long period of civil war from 
which it only emerges in 1834, with the victory of the liberal (democratic) forces (cf. Table 
13). 
The agitation did not end here because the liberal factions (the conservative and 
the progressive) continued to fight among themselves. The evolution of the educational 
system reflected this struggle between liberals, although some basic principles are 
common to both sides (such as the principle of universal education). Even so, there was 
a strong tendency from the conservative faction to maintain a rigid hierarchical social 
class structure and to favour a system based on classic and literary studies, at the 
expense of the exact and natural sciences that were regarded as speculative and 
useless. The argument behind the lack of utility of scientific and technical education was 
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that demand for scientific or technical skills by society as a whole was diminutive and thus 
did not justify priority investments in those disciplines. The counter argument was that the 
underdevelopment of the industry or the productive sectors in general was precisely due 
to the lack of adequate national technical skills and that the previous reasoning, if applied 
in practice, was conducive to a vicious circle. 
Anyway, the fundamental laws that would alter the national panorama in terms of 
public education date from 1835-1844. At the primary level, mandatory education became 
law (but with no practical consequences). The most important changes were at the 
secondary level. In light of the principle of freedom of expression the possibility to run 
private secondary schools was open to every one (and not only to restricted institutions 
as before). We shall recall that by then secondary education was almost non-existent. It 
served only as a preparatory step to the university and it covered only a very small 
proportion of the population usually from the upper classes. The liberal reforms 
addressed this situation, in the light of the utilitarian principle of education. Their intention 
was to provide education and instruction that could fulfil the purpose of providing practical 
knowledge and skills to apply at a professional level. The idea was to create an 
educational level that could accommodate those that did not want university education 
but were also insufficiently served by the primary level (which was extremely elementary). 
With this principle in mind the reforms contemplated the creation of “liceus” (inspired by 
the French lycée), secondary schools designed for those who wanted a solid secondary 
level education useful for their professional lives. The schools were effectively created 
between 1840 and 1851 but they faced enormous difficulty due to the lack of adequately 
prepared teachers, manuals and equipment. Subsequently the contents of the secondary 
level were altered several times, either reflecting a greater emphasis on scientific and 
technical disciplines or reflecting a greater emphasis on classic and literary studies (with 
a tendency to degenerate into the type of preparatory studies they were supposed not to 
be). They became effective only at the end of the third quarter of the century, when they 
were the objects of greater demand from a growing middle class. At the tertiary level, the 
University of Coimbra remained almost an “untouchable” institution and there is evidence 
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that opposition to some reforms (namely those that threatened its monopoly) came from 
the university (Cunha, 1937). However, Cruzeiro (1994) argues that the situation post-
1820 was qualitatively different from the situation pre-1820. Before, criticism of the 
University came from inside the university and external criticism was not accepted. 
Afterwards, criticism came essentially from outside and the confrontation became more 
acute and nasty (criticism from inside became also more violent). One of the first 
measures of the liberals was to lower the political level at which the University had to 
answer, which before 1820 was the highest possible, i.e., the University was directly 
dependent upon and answerable to the King. After 1820 it was made answerable to the 
equivalent of a Ministry. There were also attempts to reduce the financial autonomy 
enjoyed by the University at the time, and in general to reduce its privileges. It seemed 
that later, instead of a direct confrontational attitude, the strategy followed by the liberals 
was to develop alternatives to the university by supporting and restructuring existing 
higher education institutions (namely the Academies linked to military technical support 
referred above) or to create new ones. 
The first higher education schools to challenge the monopoly of the University of 
Coimbra were founded in 1837, pushed through by strong military interests and by a 
growing industrial bourgeoisie, against the opposition of the more traditional sectors of 
society namely the rural, landowner bourgeoisie and the church. The aim was to fill a 
vacuum, already recognised by earlier governments, related to technical, professional 
and industrial studies of science and technology. They were the Polytechnic School of 
Lisbon (Escola Politécnica de Lisboa) and the Polytechnic Academy of Porto (Academia 
Politécnica do Porto), who formed and trained essentially engineers, in particular civil 
engineers, industrial engineers and military engineers who would be instrumental during 
the phase of infrastructure development soon to come. These schools were the 
successors of the military academies referred to above (Gomes, 1980) founded at the 
end of the 1700s or early 1800s. 
Attempts to implement secondary and medium level institutions for technical and 
vocational training to support the (mainly handicraft) industrial base were not very fruitful 
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at the start, but succeeded by the mid-1800s, with the creation of the so-called Industrial 
Institutes (Institutos Industriais) alongside with similar schools covering training in 
agriculture and commerce. The creation of these institutes at this time is related to the 
acceleration of infrastructure development and industrial modernisation that pervaded the 
country in the second half of the 19
th
 century and its purpose was to increase the supply 
of adequate technical skills and to provide for the needs and the works of the time. The 
initiative to implement the institutes came from the governmental department that 
oversaw matters related to industrial and commercial activities. 
Other higher institutions created at the margins of the University of Coimbra were 
the schools of surgery and medicine in Lisbon and Porto, created in 1825 and 
reformulated and expanded to include a new school of pharmacy in Lisbon in 1835 
(Ricon-Ferraz, 1993). 
Other Institutions performing what we call today “other scientific and technical 
activities” (museums, libraries, botanical gardens, observatories, etc.) flourished 
considerably  (at least compared with the existing infrastructure) during the second half of 
the XIX century (Silva, 1991), many of them sponsored by private entities, namely 
industrialists. 
The utilitarian perspective of education slowly secured a growing number of 
adepts and other similar schools were set-up until the end of the century, particularly in 
the 2
nd
 half of the century, many of them by private or charitable entities. This process 
was stimulated by the growing industrial activity (albeit modest compared to other 
European countries) and the government recognition of the importance of the industrial 
sector to the economy (the relative underdevelopment of industry was a chronic concern 
of government officials, and its policy measures were the outcome of a systematic search 
for compromise between the industrialists on one side, and the interests of powerful 
landowners to preserve the semi-feudal character of employer-employee relationships 
and the anti-science ideology of the church, on the other hand). 
The institutional infrastructure supporting S&T education was gradually reinforced 
and the long battle between classicists and rationalists bent decisively towards the latter 
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when, following the overthrow of the monarchy in 1910, the new democratic, anti-church, 
political class actively supported the creation of new universities, the strengthening of 
vocational education and technical training, the general reinforcement of curricula 
emphasis on scientific disciplines at the secondary level and a more whole-hearted 
commitment to widespread education. 
 
Table 31. Enrolment ratios in earlier 20
th
 century. 
    1890 1910 1926 
       
Population    5105000 5937000 6507000 
       
Registered students Primary    317000 
  Secondary  7378 17691 25604 
  Tertiary   1262 4117 
  Total  7378 18953 346721 
       
       
Enrolment ratios Primary    4,87% 
  Secondary  0,14% 0,30% 0,39% 
  Tertiary   0,02% 0,06% 
  Total  0,14% 0,32% 5,33% 
Source: Neves (1994) and Carreira (1996). 
 
The monopoly of the University of Coimbra ended at last with the creation of the 
University of Lisbon and the University of Porto in 1911, which included, at least, 
Faculties of Sciences, Medicine and Pharmacy (some of the predecessors of the 
Faculties were the above mentioned Polytechnic Institutes and the Schools of Medicine 
amongst other Faculties created anew). The Industrial Institutes were also restructured 
and became higher institutions, training essentially engineers, and other higher education 
schools were created in other disciplinary areas, finally diversifying the higher education 
panorama in Portugal and subsequently contributing to the diversification of intellectual 
perspectives. 
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In spite of the proclaimed efforts of the republicans to devote special attention to 
the eternal problem of national illiteracy, the gap separating Portugal from developed 
European countries at the end of the 1920s was still considerable, most notably in terms 
of illiteracy rates (see Table 30 and Table 31) and of the level of overall educational 
resources per capita (the number of schools was extremely small and those that existed 
were deficient in many aspects). 
 
6.4 The initial period of the corporatist regime 
 
The corporatist dictatorial regime that was established in 1926 lasted 48 years (until 
1974) and many things happened in the education system. We can roughly distinguish 
two periods: from 1926 to 1960 and from 1960 to 1974. 
The first period was characterised by a change in the way education should fulfil 
its function. The socialising and indoctrinating function of the educational system was 
emphasised relative to the training function of the educational system. (Mónica, 1978) 
argues that the main function of the education system at this time (particularly at the basic 
levels) was one of social control. It was therefore a regression or a reflection of not distant 
times when the moral and educational component of the educational system were more 
important than the training function (that the last seven decades had tried to emphasise). 
Mónica (1977) describes the dilemma the regime faced when confronting the perennial 
problem of the illiteracy rate in Portugal. For large segments of the conservative forces 
now in power, illiteracy was in fact a good thing and a situation to preserve in order to 
avoid political instability derived from the diffusion of revolutionary political ideas 
extremely menacing to the status quo. The idea was that ignorance and illiteracy was 
conducive to social stability and docility and the continuation of existing social structures 
(characterised by the existence of a great duality). These ideas apparently had in one 
way or another prevailed over Portuguese society. Other segments of the conservative 
forces, while not disagreeing fundamentally with the necessity to maintain the social 
structure intact, considered that social stability was easier to maintain if a certain level of 
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carefully oriented education was provided. They also advanced some economic reasons 
as an argument to enlarge the population recipient of elementary education. The strategy 
was to condition what they would learn and what they could read and have access to, 
which was essentially contrary to the principle of liberty of education so dear to the 
previous liberal regime. 
The general negative consequences of this philosophy were, first, the decrease 
in the duration of the compulsory elementary education to only three years; second, the 
general degradation of the institutions, courses and requirements for teachers and its 
expected function; and third, the downgrading of the level of elementary education. This 
was also apparent at the secondary level, accompanied by a shift of emphasis from 
scientific and technical disciplines to literary disciplines (coherent with the new socialising 
function of the education system). 
The positive consequence was that the illiteracy rate decreased more rapidly 
than in any other period for which numbers are known (see Table 30), although at the 
expense of quality and content. Another positive consequence, this one dictated by the 
economic needs of the ever-increasing proportion of the industrial sector in the national 
economy (cf. previous section) was the restructuring, enlargement and general elevation 
of requirements of professional secondary education. The measure, aside from 
addressing economic needs related to labour force qualifications, also created a 
mechanism that contributed to maintain a social divide between the lower classes and the 
upper classes. The secondary level of the educational system was now divided in two 
sub-systems. One is the “ensino liceal” or the education provided at the “liceus” and the 
other is the “ensino técnico” the education provided at the technical secondary schools. 
The first is, in line of an ancient tradition (cf. above), a preparatory step for the university 
and as such frequented by the upper strata of society, the other is an end in itself, a place 
where the fundamental skills of future professional life will be acquired. Cruzeiro e 
Antunes (1978) argue that in spite of its formal similarity (same duration, same cycle 
division), the two schools/sub-systems were intrinsically different, corresponding to two 
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social groups with different origins, and those differences are clearly visible by the social 
profile of the entrants and the respective qualifications at exiting. 
In light of the indoctrination and elitist perspective to which the education system 
was now subject it is with no surprise that the evolution of higher education is 
characterised by a relative stagnation. The influence of the Church was reaffirmed once 
again with the signature of an agreement between the Vatican and the state and the 
Catholic University was established (it had no technological courses).  There was no 
need to increase the size of the higher education system because it was restricted to a 
small proportion of society. During the fifty long period the dictatorship enjoyed, just one 
more university was created (in 1930), the Technical University of Lisbon (Universidade 
Técnica de Lisboa) and it was actually a conflation of several existing higher education 
institutions (one of which was the above mentioned Lisbon-based former Instituto 
Industrial, promoted to higher school in the 1910s). The role of the Universities was 
essentially educational since research activities were potentially threatening to the 
established doctrine or because they could create a climate characterised by too much 
freedom of expression, incongruent with the repressive and oppressive political social 
regime. As such a general climate of political oppression was prevalent amongst the 
university community, whose already considerable fragility was further upset by 
widespread discriminatory practices and political persecutions of eminent dissenting 
intellectuals.  
  
6.5 The final period of the corporatist regime 
 
Following the post-war economic boom and the increasing international mobility of 
Portuguese society, the needs and the perspective of society begun to change and with it 
the educational system. A study executed with the technical and financial help of the 
OECD looking at the educational structure and needs of the educational system (OECD, 
1966b) analysed in detail the qualitative and quantitative needs of the Portuguese 
educational system in the light of expected economic developments. The Development 
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Plans (see preceding section and Table 20 on that section) include explicitly provisions 
for education, some of which were based on those studies. Mandatory education was 
extended to six years in 1964. New audio-visual techniques were experimented with and 
a Ministerial department was created in 1965 to make studies of the Portuguese 
educational system (Teles, 1963). 
However, at the end of the 1960s the proportion of resources allocated to the 
national education system was the same as it had been since the early 1950s, at about 
8% of the central government budget, and the proportion of this total earmarked to higher 
education level fell from 22% in 1950 to 12% in 1970 (OECD, 1986a). 
The last years of the regime brought about a considerable departure from earlier 
policies. The new political mood was reflected in the so-called Veiga Simão's Reform 
(from the name of the Minister of Education that started the implementation of the 
programme; he was Minister of Education from 1970 to 1974). It was an ambitious 
political programme, pushed by increasing needs of technical skills from the booming 
industrial sector and the now considerable openness of Portuguese society, and it 
unleashed an energetic reaction against the backwards state that the education system 
had reached, with a view in mind to make the system as universal as possible at all levels 
and to all the regions of the country and to put it at the service of economic development. 
Its aims were to definitely implement universal basic education and eradicate once and 
for all the illiteracy problem, upgrade and enlarge the secondary level and enlarge and re-
orient the higher education sector. Pre-primary education was included in the public 
education system and priority went to the higher education sector. It introduced the 
principle of permanent education, as a fundamental component of the educational 
system. 
It involved the creation of new primary schools and large numbers of secondary 
schools, the creation of eleven short-cycle higher education polytechnics (the intention 
was to be institutionalised later in the 1970s) and four additional universities, three of 
which were to be outside Lisbon or Porto, in the main industrial districts. It introduced 
postgraduate courses and degrees, the recognition of postgraduate degrees obtained 
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abroad and new regulations governing the career of university teachers. A major 
institutional and organisational reshuffling of the Ministry and of its central or regional 
executive bodies took place, as well as the re-organisation, creation and functional 
definition of several supporting bodies and agencies dependent on the ministry. Many of 
these measures were based on the OECD Mediterranean Project (OECD, 1966b) 
recommendations. 
This movement was partly a consequence of educational measures adopted 
since the late 1950s encouraging postgraduate students to study abroad who for the 
most part returned home, bringing with them new approaches and perspectives. 
Government support for education abroad has been a more or less constant policy since 
the XIX century, but rather discontinuous in character and not supported by a high level 
of resources. The National Board for Education (Junta de Educação Nacional) set up in 
1936 and the Institute for Higher Culture (Instituto de Alta Cultura) set up in 1952 were 
the main institutional funding bodies of the time. By contrast with the meagerness of 
resources allocated to the National Board and to the Institute and the irregularity of 
funding and policies, the NATO fellowships, available since Portugal's accession in the 
1950s (1958), were awarded on a very regular basis, following detailed objectives and a 
well thought out strategy, and they still are, although their relative importance has now 
declined, and they decisively contributed to the cultural transfer that is embodied in the 
letter of the reform. 
The new universities created under this reform were: the Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa (as the names says it is located in Lisbon), the Universidade do Minho, located in 
Braga and Guimarães (serving one of the main industrialised regions of the North of the 
country), the Universidade de Aveiro, located in the city of Aveiro (serving another 
important industrial region of the Centre-North of the country) and the Universidade de 
Évora (serving one of the main cities of the south called Évora). In Annex F the 
geographical location of each city (and University) can be visualised. 
Due account must also be made of the role of the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation, an organisation sponsored by the fortune of an oil businessman who entered 
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Portugal in the late 1950s. From its outset the Foundation has supported financially 
several scientific and technological activities of which fellowships to study abroad are just 
one. The activity of the foundation has been quite considerable and important, supporting 
education, research, scientific information and dissemination, and actively seeking to 
influence education and research policy.  
 
6.6 From 1974 onwards 
 
 The decade long instability period following the restoration of democracy in 1974, 
temporarily delayed (but also added new ingredients to) the educational policy, but on the 
whole the basic principles just outlined were followed. However, the basic Law that 
institutionalised the Veiga Simão’s reforms, dated from 1973, was never detailed and 
refined (due to the fall of the regime) and many ad-hoc and unintended events followed, 
creating a great deal of instability in the system. The new universities were founded 
(before 1974) and began to take shape, the polytechnic regime was institutionalised in 
1979 (but only after the mid 1980s was it materialised in real buildings and teaching 
activities), and new laws restructured the degrees awarded in high education institutions. 
One negative measure, as such often mentioned by industry, was the abolition of 
secondary level technical education by the new democratic regime (on the grounds that it 
was an institutional set-up at odds with the egalitarian ideological mood pervading the 
new regime). Later in the early 1980s the technical education (now under the name of 
vocational or professional education) was re-established, after the recognition of the 
negative impacts of its absence, and in 1986 it was considered a priority issue (see 
below). 
Universities were awarded financial, administrative, pedagogical and scientific 
autonomy in 1983 (a principle contemplated in Veiga Simão's reform). These principles 
were reinforced by further legislation in 1986 (see below) and in 1988, marking a 
departing point from the previous heavily centralised feature of the system. Still, some 
problems persisted, notably that of funding.  
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Table 32. Number and annual average growth rates of education units in Portugal 
since 1960. 
Academic 
Year 
Grand 
total 
Pre-primary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
 
 
 No. Growth 
rate 
No. Growth 
rate 
No. Growth 
rate 
No. Growth 
rate 
1960-1961 19077 159  18086  751  81  
1965-1966 18928 240 8,6% 17531 -0,6% 1072 7,4% 85 1,0% 
1970-1971 19364 317 5,7% 17018 -0,6% 1950 12,7% 79 -1,5% 
1975-1976 14615 679 16,5% 11584 -7,4% 2217 2,6% 135 11,3% 
1980-1981 15649 1916 23,1% 10575 -1,8% 3010 6,3% 148 1,9% 
1985-1986 17121 2547 5,9% 10850 0,5% 3505 3,1% 219 8,2% 
1991-1992 19720 5337 13,1% 10543 -0,5% 3607 0,5% 233 1,0% 
1993-1994 19586 5388 0,5% 10308 -1,1% 3618 0,2% 272 8,0% 
Source: Carreira (1996) and Gabinete de Estudos e Planeamento do Ministério da Educação (1997). 
 
The system has grown substantially since the 1970s, although this trend was 
visible since the 1960s (see  
Table 32). The growth is not uniform for all levels of education. Pre-primary and 
tertiary levels were the areas with the highest growth rates. The total number of 
establishements has remained in fact fairly constant due to a negative growth rate in the 
number of primary units, which has decreased due to demographic reasons (the birth rate 
has diminished considerably and emigration was also important after the 1960s). Growth 
was spectacular at the tertiary level, with two growth phases between 1970-1971 and 
1975-1976 and between 1980-1981 and 1985-1986. 
Eight-year compulsory education was introduced and the illiteracy problem, while 
still persistent in some social groups, notably the farmers, the elderly and, in general, 
among the poorer layers of society has improved substantially relative to the past 
situation. The number of higher education units almost doubled between 1970/71 and 
1975/76 (corresponding to the creation of four new universities during this period, i.e., 
doubling the number of universities, which as we saw above were four by the early 
1970s), higher education students doubled between 1971 and 1982, as well as 
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expenditure on higher education which almost tripled between 1971 and 1976 and 
doubled between 1986 and 1992 (Table 33). The jump in expenditure after 1986 is 
related to accession of Portugal to the EEC to which we shall refer below. 
 
Table 33. Current expenditure in education. 
 Working Expenses 
 Million esc. 
(1992 p.) 
as % of 
GDP 
   
1961 31800 1,10% 
1966 37500 0,97% 
1971 75200 1,37% 
1976 199600 2,92% 
1981 226700 2,67% 
1986 264400 2,91% 
1991 489400 4,38% 
1992 539500 4,76% 
1993 
a)
 688511 5.10% 
Source: Neves (1994), Carreira (1996) and UNESCO (1997). 
a) Current 1993 prices. 
 
Alongside the growth of the public sector, there was an upsurge on the private 
higher education sector, encouraged and subsidised by the government, a trend related 
to the inability of the public universities to cope with the demand for higher education. By 
the early 1990s the public higher education sector comprised thirteen universities, one 
Open University, six University Colleges, fourteen polytechnics and a polytechnic higher 
school. The institutions were spread throughout the country, located in the district capital 
of each major region. The distribution is not yet even, with 42% of total students in 
Lisbon, and 62% in both Lisbon and Porto, whose combined population does not exceed 
one third of the total population (OECD, 1993b). 
Some problems persisted though. Overall, the century-old class structure 
cleavage still exerted a grip on the system. The OECD Review of National Policies for 
Education, 1984, notes that the higher education system was characterised by a certain 
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"duality", dividing university education from non-university education (where different 
degrees are awarded and different career connotations in terms of social prestige are 
associated with each one), old universities, more preoccupied with scientific excellence, 
from new universities, more concerned with making contribution to regional development, 
and even dividing university members who obtained their degrees abroad from those 
which obtained them in-house. This situation had considerable impacts in terms of the 
overall flexibility of the system, its adaptive capacity to changing conditions and its 
capacity to exploit synergy, both in educational as well as in research activities. It can be 
said that this dualistic character is not exclusive to Portugal but the lack of communication 
between the systems and the close character of each pole makes it a particularly 
fragmented, non-integrated and rigid system. 
Other rigidity problems persisted. University careers are rigid. Once the university 
teacher is granted the equivalent of a PhD, his/her position in the university is granted for 
life. This leads to a stratification of the education system, a tendency for closeness, a 
general lack of co-operation, situations of favouritism, etc. Certain measures were 
considered to tackle the problems, including a more competitive system regulating the bid 
for university positions and the implementation of a system of evaluation of the 
universities, measures and issues that will be addressed in the following years. Those are 
now the great issues faced by the system, and they follow a general principle of making 
the structure more autonomous and flexible.  
 
6.7 From 1986 onwards 
 
In 1986 the Basic Law of the Education System (Diário da República, 1986) aimed at 
ending the somewhat confusing state that the educational system was in (following the 
pre-1974 politically agitated period) to align it with the new Constitution and to provide 
clear guidelines and a global framework for the education system. The present system 
(now under review) is the one created by this law. The main changes relative to the 
previous system are: 
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 Enlargement of compulsory education to 9 years. 
 Establishment of the principle of democratisation of the educational system (meaning 
that no discrimination whatsoever is admissible when the individual enters the 
educational system). 
 Rejection of any exclusive link of the public system to any single ideology or religion 
(this apparently represents the final cut with the Catholic Church). 
 
Other especially important facts in the face of its potential impact on the medium 
levels of education in Portuguese society (traditionally undervalued as we have seen) are: 
 
 Creation of the so-called professional education, implying a division of the secondary 
level in two branches: the technical or vocational branch (for those who want to start 
working after the secondary level) and the general branch (essentially for those 
wanting to proceed to university level). This is not new, as we have seen, but it is 
important because it restructures an old principle and practice that was successful in 
Portuguese society. The concept was regulated in a Decree-Law (Diário da 
República, 1989). 
 The definition and positioning of the polytechnic system (short cycle higher 
education) within the higher education system and its relations to the professional 
education. 
 
Since Portugal's accession to EC in 1986, several programmes supported by EC 
structural funds contemplated training and educational needs, one of which was 
exclusively concerned with educational issues, namely the PRODEP (Programme for 
Educational Development in Portugal, 1989-1993). The PRODEP (Table 34) was 
supported essentially by the European Social Fund and by the European Regional 
Development Fund. The programme aimed to develop all of the educational system in 
Portugal, from pre-school education through primary, secondary (with emphasis on the 
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vocational part) and tertiary (supporting the polytechnics and engineering education), 
development of infrastructures, training teachers and enlarging the role of the Open 
University.  
 
Table 34. PRODEP execution (1989-1993). 
 ECU million % of total 
 
 
(current p.)  
Sub-Programme 1 462,7669  41,0% 
Physical infrastructure    
(construction and equipment)    
    
Sub-Programme 2 303,6075  26,9% 
Professional education    
(infrastructure and training)    
    
Sub-Programme 3 68,29585  6,0% 
Adult education    
    
Sub-Programme 4 291,2959  25,8% 
Higher education    
    
Sub-Programme 5 3,832424  0,3% 
Management of the Programme    
    
Total 1129,799  100,0% 
Source: Departamento de Programação e Gestão Financeira do Ministério da Educação (1994). 
 
It amounted to ECU 1140 million at constant 1989 prices (of which approximately 
90% was spent during the period of the Programme), of which 59% came from the 
structural funds of the European Community (61% of which was financed by ERSF and 
39% financed by ESF).  
As Table 34 shows the great priority was infrastructure development (new 
schools and equipment). Secondary level vocational education and higher education 
came next with approximately 25% of the total for each. 
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The second phase of the programme (PRODEP II, 1994-1999) was approved 
within the context of the 2
nd
 Framework Programme for Portugal (see section on the 
economic system and Table 26 on that section), also financed by the ESF and by the 
ERDF and is now running. It is comprised of five major Sub-Programmes (excluding two 
dedicated to the management of the Programme). The priorities remain essentially the 
same. 
 
Table 35. PRODEP II Programme (1994-1999). Main axis of action. 
 
ERFD component: 
 
Sub-Programme 1. Infrastructure development: construction and equipment 
of schools. 
Sub-Programme 4. Infrastructure and development: construction and 
equipment of social structures in the higher education sector. 
 
ESF component: 
 
Sub-Programme 2. Training of teachers. 
Sub-Programme 3. Professional education. 
Sub-Programme 5. Higher education. 
Source: Ministério da Educação-Departamento de Programação e Gestão Financeira (1996). 
 
Other major programmes had an impact on education and training, although they 
were directed to R&D activities or sectoral economic development, of which: 
 
 The Science and Technology Mobilisation Programme, a four year programme 
launched in 1988 and later replaced by the CIENCIA programme, financed 1500 
research grants (mostly to university or state laboratories researchers) for a total of 
about Esc. 1.9 billion (current prices) 
 The CIENCIA Programme, a four-year programme launched in 1990 (1990-1993), 
financed 2600 research grants for a total of about ECU 76 million (source: SECT). It 
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was replaced by the PRAXIS XXI programme in the 2
nd
 Framework Programme for 
Portugal that expected to spend ECU 210 million for the same goal (source: Gabinete 
do Gestor do PRAXIS XXI, 1996). 
 The Programme for the Development of Portuguese Agriculture (PEDAP), a ten-year 
programme launched in 1986, of which one of the objectives was the construction 
and equipment of several vocational training centres for farmers. 
 The Programme for the Development of Portuguese Industry (PEDIP), a five year 
programme launched in 1988, of which one of the objectives was the training of 
instructors, technicians and specialists and researchers from industry, to set-up 
management courses and the development of advanced pedagogical methods, 
allocating to these activities a total of ECU 215 million at constant 1988 prices 
(source: Ministério da Indústria e Energia, 1992). Its follower (PEDIP II) expected to 
spend ECU 347 million at 1994 current prices in various training activities (Ministério 
da Indústria e Energia, 1994b). 
 
Quantitatively the system has grown considerably, again especially at the tertiary 
level. Between 1980-1981 and 1993-1994 the number of higher education units has 
almost doubled with the recent period between 1991-1992 and 1993-1994 registering an 
average annual growth rate of 8% (well above the GDP growth rate). Presently there are 
22 universities (13 public universities and 9 private universities), 15 public polytechnic 
institutes (short-cycle tertiary education; equivalent to colleges), 31 public higher 
education schools (short-cycle tertiary level education; equivalent to colleges) and 71 
private higher education schools (equivalent to colleges; source: Ministério da Ciência e 
Tecnologia, 1997). A recent distinctive feature of the system is the increasing importance 
of the private sector that absorbs now about 30% of total registered students at the 
tertiary level (INE, 1997).  
It seems that finally there is an even distribution of higher education 
establishments throughout the country (Table 36). 
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In spite of the unequivocal achievements of the last two decades in upgrading the 
system it remains to be seen how much of the gap was actually closed, particularly in 
modern domains of science where multidisciplinary approaches are paramount to the 
advancement and transmission of science and technology. 
 
Table 36. Geographical distribution of population and higher education units. 
 H. Education Units 
 
 Population 
 No. % of total  % of total 
     
North 89 32,7%  34,8% 
Centre 50 18,4%  17,3% 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 102 37,5%  33,6% 
Alentejo 10 3,7%  5,5% 
Algarve 10 3,7%  3,7% 
Azores 4 1,5%  2,4% 
Madeira 7 2,6%  2,7% 
Source: INE (1997) for the education units and the Population Census of 1991 published by INE.  
  
The main obstacles are probably to be found in organisational and social aspects 
of the system rather than in its knowledge contents. It is also an open answer whether the 
objectives of vocational training and middle level higher education have been reached. In 
any case, it is perhaps rather too early to assess the overall impacts on society, and 
particularly on its innovative side. 
 The available indicators indicate the persistence of old problems of the 
Portuguese educational system, namely its relative disregard for the medium levels of 
education. Table 37 represents the situation in quantitative terms. We can say that now 
primary education (first 4 years) is finally available to everyone, but the situation worsens 
gradually for the upper levels. Even at the 2
nd
 cycle the enrolment ratio per age group 
decreases considerably (76%) although the percentage for the next age group (23%) 
may eventually lead to the conclusion that this cycle is attended by almost everyone. The 
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enrolment ratio in next level (3
rd
 cycle) decreases again substantially (61% now) and 
drastically at the secondary level (35%). 
 
Table 37. Enrolment ratios per age group and educational cycle. 
 6 to 9 years  10 to 11 years  12 to 14 years  15 to 17 years  18 to 22 years 
               
 1982 1992  1982 1992  1982 1992  1982 1992  1982 1992 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8)  (9) (10) 
               
1st cycle 100 100  42.9 24  11.9 5       
               
2nd cycle    57.1 76  31 23       
               
3rd cycle       45.2 61   23    
               
Secondary           35   12 
               
Not enrolled       11.9 11   42   66 
Source: Carreira (1996). 
Notes: 1
st
 cycle corresponds to primary education (4 years), 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 cycle to basic education (2 years+3 
years) and secondary to the final  3 years before university level. 
 
The numbers show that the secondary level remains a weak part of the system. 
Also, from the numbers of the no enrolled, we can deduce that 45% of those in the age 
group 12 to 22 years were out of the educational system, which points to a global low 
level of education of the population as a whole. This picture is confirmed, in terms of 
comparison with other European countries, by the numbers in Table 38. Table 38 says 
that 81% of the population (above 25 years old and below 64 years old) possesses only 
elementary education (from 93% in 1991) and only 18% had attained higher educational 
levels (from only 7% in 1991). So the considerable investments of the last decades finally 
succeeded in one thing at last, which was to at least provide elementary education to 
(almost) everyone. However, both the secondary level and the tertiary level remain very 
weak and unsatisfactory links in the educational chain. One can wonder if the level of 
investment has been enough, in view of the initial conditions and in spite of the rate of 
change in enrolment ratios. 
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Table 38. Percentage of the population 25 to 64 years of age by the highest 
completed level of education. 
 Pre-primary, 
primary and lower 
secondary 
 Upper secondary  Non-university 
tertiary and 
university level 
education 
         
 1991 1994  1991 1994  1991 1994 
         
Belgium 57 51  24 27  20 22 
Denmark 39 40  43 40  18 20 
France 49 33  35 50  15 17 
Germany 18 16  60 62  22 23 
Ireland 60 55  24 27  16 19 
Italy 72 67  22 26  6 b) 8 b) 
Netherlands 44 40  37 38  20 b) 21 b) 
Portugal 93 81  3 8  4 10 
Spain 78 74  12 11  10 15 
United Kingdom 35 26  49 54  16 21 
Source: OECD (1993a) and OECD (1996a). 
a) Does not include non-university tertiary education. 
 
Carreira (1996) argues that the qualitative aspects of the educational system have not 
accompanied the quantitative development. He points out that many schools are not 
adequately equipped with libraries, laboratories, sports grounds and other equipment and 
the universities are no exception to the rule. He seriously questions the preparation of 
teachers at all levels of education and particularly those at the tertiary level. School drop 
out rates are extremely high at secondary and higher levels. In the face of these problems 
there is a policy of evaluation of the educational system that is giving now its first steps. A 
special (independent) institution (Fundação das Universidades Portuguesas) whose 
function is to evaluate higher education institutions was created. 
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Another perspective explains the situation in terms of lack of demand for 
education as a result of lack of economic capacity of families to pay for the continuation of 
higher levels of education. Azevedo (1994) says that the percentage of students from 
poorer families decreases as the educational level increases. Carreira (1996) mentions 
the reluctance of many families to provide education to their offspring because of 
economic reasons. However, the fact that more than 30% of higher education students 
are enrolled in private higher education institutions (because the public system has no 
place for them) seems to run counter this argument of insufficient demand for education. 
This situation is partly explained by a deliberate policy of the government to avoid its 
direct involvement in the economic system (including the educational system), a policy 
that is typified by the privatisation process and by other liberal policies but it does not 
invalidate the general argument. 
 
6.8 The education system: a summary 
 
Three main features characterised the education system for a long time: its reduced 
dimensions, its lack of diversity and its duality. Before 1800, scholastic influence of the 
church was the main determinant of the system. The stubborn presence of a system that 
did not evolved perpetuated a cultural cleavage in the society (a very small elite and a 
mass of uneducated people) which was also related to the feudal-like social and 
economic relationships entrenched at the time. In spite of the growing importance of the 
middle class during the convoluted times of the 19
th
 century that marked a phase of 
transition from a system based on a feudal mode of production to a system based on a 
capitalist mode of production, its influence or power its not enough to substantially alter 
the duality of the education system, its rigidity and its reduced dimensions, although the 
first steps in that direction were done at the time, giving birth to alternatives to the 
predominant views and creating the seeds for diversity within the system. The scientific 
paradigm was institutionalised in new universities in the early 1900s after the fall of the 
monarchic regime and after the institution of a more or less generalised mode of capitalist 
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production, which in itself was facilitated by the crumbling of national internal barriers and 
the creation of a open national market (cf. chapter 5). The mid-1800s public works on the 
national communication and transport physical infrastructure substantially contributed to 
that end as well as creating the need and the awareness for sustained support of badly 
needed scientific and technological infrastructures, namely at the educational level. After 
a relatively slow growth of the system the post-2
nd
 World War economic boom and its 
technological demands finally created the conditions for the growth of the educational 
sector, still largely characterised by century-old under-investment, rigidity, concentration, 
dualism and lack of diversity (old characteristics that migrated to the new social actors 
that embraced the scientific paradigm). The system expanded enormously in the last two 
decades and the problem of an uneven distribution of educational resources throughout 
the country seems, finally and to a great extent, surpassed. However, old values prove 
hard to die, and the expansion of the system masks problems related to the its dualistic 
character, namely in the existence of weaknesses at the medium level of the system and 
problems related to rigidities, namely to difficulties in communication flows within the units 
of the system with potentially important impacts in terms of its multidisciplinary nature. 
The most important impact for industry has been, and it probably still is, a general 
shortage of supply of skilled labour and services. 
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CHAPTER 7. THE RESEARCH SYSTEM 
 
7.1 The background 
 
The research system, much in the way of the educational system described previously, 
became the victim of its own former success. The climax of Portuguese world power in 
the fifteenth and sixteenth-century owed much to the contributions made to technical 
change based on epistemological Aristotelian physics, on geocentric astronomy, on 
Galen medicine, on the Greek classification logic of pharmacopoeia, on a natural history 
whose operational references were Aristotle and Plinius, and on an anthropology centred 
on the classical heritage reshaped by St. Thomas Aquinas. The works of the most 
renowned Portuguese scientists at the time, Pedro Nunes (1502-1578), D. João de 
Castro (1500-1548) and Garcia de Orta (1503-1568) are guided and grounded on the set 
of beliefs and on the conceptual framework set up by Aristotelian physics (Barreto, 1991). 
 The stock of accumulated knowledge and the conceptual framework that so 
successfully placed Portugal in a leading position remained firmly encroached and 
pervasive across the social fabric of the country. The paradigm, fortified by its practical 
achievements and endorsed by the church, who saw a perfect match between its self-
evident, self-consistent character and its own global and universal vision of the world, 
resisted much of the attacks thrown at it by the small number of marginal intellectuals 
inclined to adapt the Renaissance spirit and the revolution which was taking shape 
through the works of its most brilliant apologists. 
 The epistemological guidelines of the Portuguese scientific community lasted 
until quite late in the eighteenth-century (Ferraz, 1993), when they were finally shaken by 
internal social convolutions that deprived the country of one of its most fervent adepts: the 
Jesuits. The Society of Jesus, which had a powerful position in Portuguese society, 
controlling virtually every aspect of education, was expelled from Portugal in 1772 and 
forbidden, from then on, to take any part on the making or function of the educational 
system, and concomitantly, on the way research was conducted and oriented. The 
  
140 
1
4
0
 
reformation of the university that ensued paved the way for a change in approach to 
science and technology. The Academy of Sciences, founded at this stage, contributed in 
many ways, in spite of a turbulent life, to raise scientific awareness and support. 
 But the changes were to occur at a slow pace and the lack of priority given to 
education at large and research in particular caused the progressive backwardness of 
Portuguese science and technology relative to other European countries. The expulsion 
of the Jesuits is seen by many as a critical blow to the church influence, but Carvalho 
(1986) argues that the Jesuit expulsion had less to do with different views on education 
and science than on a serious confrontation of power (involving war between the 
Company of Jesus and the state) regarding land domination rights in South American 
colonial territories. The feudal condition of much of the social tissue did not contribute 
either to the spread of an intellectual confrontational attitude. The situation evolved slowly 
following the same fate of the educational system: intrinsic resistance to change derived 
from the social structure, half-hearted attempts to modify the system and political 
confrontations resulting in steps ahead followed by steps back. 
 The second half of the 19
th
 century and the first half of the 20
th
 century marked an 
important point in the advancement, or perhaps in the attempts to advance and update 
the research system. Several science and technology institutions set-up by private 
entities concerned with industrial technology and professional training as well as with 
metrology and quality standards were strengthened. State research laboratories, with 
similar activities, were restructured and established in the fields of agriculture, veterinary 
sciences, marine biology and public health. Two new universities were created (cf. 
previous section), and a quite large number of libraries were established (Silva, 1991). 
The rationale was two-fold. First, to support and foster the modernisation of the country. 
Second, to act as means to diffuse a scientific and technological approach to society's 
problems, in contrast and in opposition to a predominant and powerful literary culture.  
 This scientific momentum was soon to fade out (but not disappear), because of 
another change in regime (in 1926), and it only regained its strength decades later. In the 
interim, the impulse of the momentum contributed to the birth of a couple of research 
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laboratories (the EAN in agriculture, the predecessor of the now INIA, and another one in 
the health area) including the so-called Board of Nuclear Energy that contributed 
substantially to the development of competencies and skills in the field of electronics.  
 The most important institutional measure of this time is probably the creation in 
1929 of the National Educational Council (Junta de Educação Nacional) renamed the 
Higher Institute of Culture (Instituto de Alta Cultura – IAC) in 1936.  Its function was to 
support university research and advanced training. Although “...university research 
funding was still on a small scale and unreliable these institutions at least granted 
scholarships enabling a number of students to pursue their studies and research and 
obtain doctorates in other countries” (OECD, 1986a, p.43). 
 
7.2 The period of economic growth of the 1950s and 1960s 
 
It was during the 1950s that the main state research laboratories were established, 
prompted more by sectoral policies and demand pressures from various economic groups 
than by an integrated science and technology policy. Apparently, they were given a 
prominent role in the research system, according to their share of total R&D expenditure 
data in 1964. By contrast, the share of the higher education system is quite small at the 
time. 
 Ruivo (1991) argues that the rationale behind the figures is politically motivated 
and completely divorced from any science and technology policy. She argues that the 
creation of separate research laboratories and their relative weight was a premeditated 
move to secure government control over research and weaken the social role of the 
university, seen by the political regime as too liberal-minded. There is no available data 
prior to 1964 that would show a definite trend and confirm the argument but the available 
one certainly renders itself to that interpretation. It is also in line with the overall picture 
projected by educational policies and the general fact that the main activities of the 
universities were educational. But the rationale might be another, namely the fact that 
priority was given to immediate physical investment and development and thus it was to 
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be expected that the state would invest in research and technological activities that gave 
quick answers and that could support technically the problems posed by the public works, 
and not invest in activities with a fundamental research character, geared to long term 
results and with no immediate practical applications (the type of research more proper to 
expect from the universities).  
 
Table 39. GERD in current prices, constant price annual growth rates, as % of 
GDP and by sector of performance (1964-1995). 
  %GDP  Current 
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1964a)  0.28  265.8     66.3 6.3 5.3 22.1 
1967a)  0.24  320.4  1.9    68.9 7.8 8.0 15.3 
1971  0.38  751.2  19.0  10,5 (1964-1971)  51.2 18.5 5.6 24.7 
1972  0.37  854.2  5.5    55.2 14.6 5.1 25.1 
1976  0.27  1279.6  -3.9    56.8 17.5 4.6 21.1 
1978  0.32  2521.1  13.2    66.7 17.8 2.4 13.1 
1980  0.34  4118.5  8.4  8,4 (1971-1980)  47.3 19.9 4.2 28.6 
1982  0.35  6541.2  5.4    43.6 20.6 4.6 31.2 
1984  0.40  11307.6  5.8    41.3 24.6 4.5 29.6 
1986  0.45  19867.6  9.4    36.0 30.1 7.6 26.3 
1988  0.50  29910.8  10.2    33.1 33.9 8.4 24.6 
1990  0.60  52032.2  16.1  9,2 (1980-1990)  25.5 36.0 12.4 26.1 
1992  0.63  80397.8  9.3    22.1 43.0 13.2 21.7 
1995  0.60  91878.8  -0.96  8,1 (1990-1995)  26.7 33.7 19.7 19.9 
a) Estimated to include social sciences. Source: JNICT and OCT. Note: The ratio GERD/GDP from 1992 on is 
not strictly comparable with previous years because the methodology to calculate GDP changed. 
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Figure 6. GERD by sector of performance (%). 
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Source: JNICT and OCT. 
 
 
 
Table 40. Total R&D personnel (FTE). 
 Government  H. Education  PNP  Enterprises  Total 
 No. %  No. %  No. %  No. %   
1976 3845 57,2  1554 23,1  242 3,6  1080 16,1  6721 
1978 3797 58,0  1939 29,6  103 1,6  704 10,8  6543 
1980 3711 48,1  2378 30,8  202 2,6  1419 18,4  7710 
1982 4054 47,4  2330 27,2  278 3,2  1892 22,1  8554 
1984 4543 49,0  2799 30,2  361 3,9  1564 16,9  9267 
1986 4355 41,2  3799 35,9  401 3,8  2015 19,1  10570 
1988 4114 37,8  4182 38,4  545 5,0  2042 18,8  10883 
1990 4230 35,1  4840 40,2  976 8,1  1997 16,6  12043 
1992 3956 29,4  6249 46,5  1363 10,1  1882 14,0  13450 
1995 4790 30,8  5894 37,9  3088 19,9  1768 11,4  15540 
Source: JNICT and OCT. 
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Figure 7. Total R&D personnel (FTE) by sector of performance. 
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Source: JNICT and OCT. 
 
 
The research laboratories were under the authority of several ministries, and no 
institutional mechanism was in place to co-ordinate the research efforts of each one, 
hence they evolved according to sectoral contingencies. Still within the constrains of a 
sectoral policy, all of them were reshuffled after 1974, in an attempt to rationalise and 
concentrate efforts and forge closer links with industry which were quite weak. 
 The main research laboratories set-up at this period were: 
 
 IICT (Institute of Scientific and Tropical Research), set-up in 1945. It follows a 
tradition in research that dates back to the previous century. Its forerunner is believed 
to be the 19
th
 century Cartographic Committee of the Ministry for Overseas Affairs. 
Research was broadened to include all human and natural sciences. 
 LNEC (National Laboratory of Civil Engineering), set-up in 1946. The forerunner was 
a research centre of the Technical University of Lisbon (cf. previous section). It aimed 
to give technical support and to conduct research related to a vast programme of 
public works. Its activity was of great importance when infrastructure development 
accelerated following the implementation of the Development Plans and its 
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accumulated stock of knowledge concerning the building of dams and harbours 
developed considerably.  
 INII (National Institute of Industrial Research), set-up in 1957, aimed at providing 
technical assistance and conducting research in industrial related fields. 
 LFEN (Laboratory of Nuclear Physics and Engineering), set-up in 1958. Its aims were 
to conduct research in civil applications of nuclear energy, and build expertise on the 
handling of uranium, a mineral resource on which Portugal is rich. Apparently, there 
are no direct military purposes behind its surge. 
 LNIV (National Laboratory for Veterinary Research), set-up in 1957, probably the 
collation of dispersed bodies. Main areas of research were in vaccine production and 
animal pathology. 
 The Institute of Marine Biology, set-up in 1950. Another institute devoted to fisheries 
research was latter added to it. 
 
7.3 The role of the higher education sector during the 1950s and early 1960s 
 
The higher education sector played a minor role during this period (see Table 39 and 
Table 40). Its (lack of) functionality was partly compensated by the active stance adopted 
by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation that acted as a major research funding 
institution, filling the profound breaches spread all across the system. Besides funding its 
own internal science and technology activities it also financed or co-financed, with criteria 
of excellence, a large number of research projects inside the public universities (Santos, 
1988). The international openness of the 1960s and the 1970s enhanced and provided 
regularity to the inflow of scientific and technological information from abroad, by means 
of research fellowships abroad and by increasing cultural contact at various levels. The 
returnees, in turn, found an industrial sector technologically upgraded by the growth of 
foreign direct investment or licence agreements. Its own scientific and technological 
demands eventually put pressures on the higher education system and at the political 
level, ultimately culminating in the Veiga Simão's reform (cf. previous section). It is from 
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the late 1960s that the rising trend of the higher education system becomes visible (see 
Figure 6 and Figure 7). 
 
7.4 Research in Industry 
 
Interactions between the industrial sector and the social movements and institutional 
changes obeyed a complex interactive pattern of mutual adjustments and reciprocal 
influences between the institutional changes taking place in the public and educational 
sector and the new industrial sectors, the increasing influence of foreign capital and 
industrial growth in general. 
 Although most of the industrial innovation taking place was by virtue of inflows of 
embodied or disembodied foreign technology (Rolo, 1977) through foreign direct 
investment, inputs of equipment and machinery, licence agreements covering production 
processes, patents and trademarks, some domestic resources are spent in R&D 
activities, but they were low in absolute terms (see Table 39, Table 40, Figure 6 and 
Figure 7) and they represented only a share of the resources spent in purchasing foreign 
technology. In 1980 they amounted to 25% of expenditures in foreign technology (Rolo et 
al, 1984) and in 1990 they amounted to 79% of purchases of foreign technology (OECD, 
1993). In a study of a large number of licence contracts (2534 contracts), 50 per cent 
were included in the "turn-key" type and its authors (Rolo et al., 1984) argue that severe 
restrictions related to procurement, production, distribution, markets and post-contract 
obligations, and the weak concern by the licensees with the rationality of acquisition and 
application of technology, its high degree of commercial protection and an almost non-
existent reproductive capacity rendered in the contracts not much room for developing 
indigenous technological capacity and diffusion. Simões (1994) explains the pattern 
arguing that the motives behind licence agreements were market-driven and not 
technology-driven. These assertions bring us back to the arguments of the competence of 
the industrialists. Once again we can argue that the strategy followed by the industrialists, 
as a whole was perhaps not the most efficient one (if we compare the strategy followed 
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by the industrialists in other newly industrialised countries especially in the Asian region). 
The weight of the capital goods sector remains relatively weak which, combined with its 
lack of autonomy (large parts are foreign owned), adds to its relatively weak impact on 
other industrial sectors and on other parts of the technological system and, generally, on 
the development of domestic potential. 
 
Figure 8. Relation between R&D expenses, production and exports. 
 
 
Source: Caraça (1993). 
Notes:  
1) RTD+TT includes expenses with technology acquisition (TT) 
2) Data for OECD countries concerns the period 1970-1980. Data for Portugal concerns 1982. 
 
 
Caraça (1993) notes the low participation of technology-intensive sectors in the 
total output of the country, in 1982, as well as on total exports (Figure 8) and the fact that 
more than two thirds of exports are supported by only 15% of total R&D and only 8% of 
domestic R&D. Figure 8 is based on OECD (1986b) and the comparable data referring to 
Portugal is based on Gonçalves et al (1986). The comparison of Portugal with the eleven 
OECD countries on which the data is based show a more favourable pattern relating 
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R&D, production and exports and illustrates the relative standing of Portugal at this time 
with respect to industrial research. 
 
7.5 The establishment of JNICT in 1967 
 
Government intervention in science and technology is widely perceived as a vital element 
in the causation, direction, nature and pace of technical change (Nelson, 1984; Nelson 
1993; Lundvall, 1992). The establishment of JNICT (National Board for Scientific and 
Technological Research) in 1967 is perhaps the most visible institutional sign of the 
growing awareness of the impacts of science and technology on Portuguese society. The 
function of JNICT was to plan, to co-ordinate, to finance and to promote scientific 
research, with a prominent central role. But, since its outset, it has encountered major 
obstacles and resistance, including the absence of a strong political will, the absence of 
funds and the resistance of other research institutions. The responsibility for JNICT was 
moved back and forth between the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Economy for 
several years until 1986, finally stabilising under the (non-sectoral) Ministry of Territorial 
Planning and Administration, when it acquired a new status and importance. 
 In its early days the instability of JNICT reflected a period of learning and 
"digestion" of international experience in science and technology policy, experimentation 
on, and gradual consolidation and definition of, priorities, mechanisms and approaches to 
domestic science and technology policy. In the meantime, while this process of maturity 
was taking place, it fulfilled two important roles: 
 
 It acted as a "middleman" and co-ordinating body regarding international co-operation 
in science and technology. Two permanent commissions were set-up to deal with 
NATO (INVOTAN) and with OECD and the European Community (COCEDE). In 
1971 Portugal participated for the first time in R&D co-operation with other Europen 
countries through the programme COST. 
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 The systematic collection of quantitative data concerning the national science and 
technology potential through biannual surveys, making available for the first time an 
indispensable statistical tool for decision-making. 
 
7.6 Changes in the higher education sector and in the public sector in the 
1970s and early 1980s 
 
The higher education sector expanded considerably during this period (see Table 39, 
Table 40, Figure 6 and Figure 7), broadly following the principles of Veiga Simão's 
reforms, which argued that the function of the higher education system should be much 
more than educational. The main problems affecting research at this time were: 
 
 A dual system of university funding and responsibility. The university authorities 
(rectors, deans, heads of departments, etc.) are responsible for teaching and 
teaching policy, staff recruitment, management and to some research directly linked 
to education activities. R&D activities, in the strict sense, are conducted under the 
responsibility of research centres funded and attached to an outside, central 
institution (the INIC, National Institute for Scientific Research, set up in 1975, after an 
overhaul of the High Culture Institute - IAC). The shortcomings of these dual system 
are that the universities do not have a formal say on their own research policy (in the 
sense that they do not fund the research done by their members) and the INIC is 
unable to formulate a human resources policy since it has no say on the careers of 
the university personnel. 
 An excessive dispersion and fragmentation of research centres resulting in critical 
mass not being attained. 
 Funding is almost exclusively devoted to current expenditure on personnel which 
together with low salaries, often pushes university teachers to seek extra jobs, makes 
research almost impossible. 
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 Insufficient links between university research and industrial research, steaming from 
the lack of confidence of industry in the capability of university research to produce 
timely and exploitable outcomes. 
 Insufficient links between university research and state research laboratories. 
 Infrastructure weakness in equipment, buildings and libraries. 
 The lack of a well-formulated and accepted science policy and the resultant inability 
to plan the scientific development of the universities coherently. 
 A very rigid organisational structure and functioning. 
 
 The government sector still accounts for the largest share in total R&D 
expenditure and R&D personnel but an accelerated decreasing trend is visible since the 
late 1970s  (Table 39, Table 40, Figure 6 and Figure 7). A reorganisation of the research 
laboratories took place, collating several laboratories and restructuring others. The aim 
was to rationalise the allocation of resources, avoid dispersion of institutions and enhance 
close links with users (industry and agriculture). The following state research laboratories 
were created: 
 
 LNETI (National Laboratory of Industrial Engineering and Technology) The INII and 
the LFEN were brought together to form this laboratory. 
 INIP (National Institute for Fisheries Research) formed by grouping the Institute of 
Marine Biology and the Office for Fisheries Studies. 
 INIA (National Institute for Agricultural Research). The EAN and other smaller 
institutes formed the INIA.  
 
 Some of the state laboratories established their own reputation as centres of 
excellence, of which LNEC, the National Laboratory of Civil Engineering, and IICT, the 
Institute of Scientific and Tropical Research, are the most outstanding examples. They 
self-finance approximately half of their activity through research contracts. The others, as 
a general rule, have yet to forge closer links with users, and more specifically LNETI that 
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was supposed to support industry. Each state laboratory is under the responsibility of a 
specific ministry. 
 According to the OECD Review of National Science and Technology Policy 
published in 1986 the Portuguese scientific and technological system seemed to be very 
rigid and sectoralised with the exception of JNICT. There was a severe problem of 
communication and co-ordination. Each ministry had a certain budget to allocate to 
research and development activities in the state laboratories under its responsibility. The 
allocation of resources was made with no consultation with other ministries. “There is no 
inter-ministerial procedure to enable a rational scientific budget to be analysed, 
negotiated and approved. Each ministry is responsible for organising and managing its 
own research activities which in general are - or rather, should be - co-ordinated by a 
central institute or laboratory” (OECD, 1986, p.36-37).  
 
7.7 The impact of accession to EEC on the S&T system  
 
Since the accession to EEC in 1986, the science and technology system has undergone 
major changes. The GERD/GDP ratio which for more than two decades fluctuated 
sharply around 0.25-0.4 has shown a rising trend since 1984, at least until 1992. The 
number of researchers and higher education students has risen, new research 
laboratories were created (such as the CTQB, set up in 1988, conducting research in the 
fields of chemistry, biochemistry, biotechnology, microbiology and biophysics, and the 
CNIG, set up in 1989, providing extension services and conducting research related to 
the management of natural resources and geographical information systems), and the 
overall science and technology infrastructure was enlarged. Several institutional changes 
have settled down, with potential to strengthen the much needed interactions and 
information flows between the main sectoral actors playing a role in the process of 
technological change and innovation. All this activity was considerably boosted by the 
financial aid and the policy orientation of the Community formalised in a series of specific 
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programmes for Portugal, financed primarily by the structural funds of the community (see 
details below). 
 But there are distressing signs. The most disturbing is the fact that the share of 
business expenditure on total R&D has been falling after showing an upward trend during 
the early 1980s.  On the other hand, and in the face of the most recent statistics on the 
S&T system (OCT, 1997) showing the decrease of the ratio GERD/GDP from 0.63 to 0.6, 
reverting the country to the 1990 level of expenditure relative to GDP, one has doubts 
about the firmness of the political will behind the recent upsurge which has yet to be 
proven a constant and reliable driving force, and doubts exist as to whether they are 
driven by a clear and coherent strategic commitment or rather by circumstantial events. 
 
7.8 A novelty in the national S&T system: major research programmes 
 
A major change, relative to previous policies, was the introduction in the mid 1980s of 
major research programmes. Of the programmes described below, two of them are 
exclusively concerned with R&D activities, namely the PMCT and the CIENCIA. 
 The first one was the Technological Development Plan (PDT) with ambitious 
goals, which aimed at improving the overall S&T system, and particularly those parts of 
the system at the interface between state research institutions and industry. To promote 
links between industry and research institutions the plan envisioned the creation of 
technological parks, R&D enterprises, innovation agencies, training and information for 
industry, technological services, etc. Some initiatives were brought up and others were 
eventually transferred and continued under the auspices of PEDID (see below). The plan 
was elaborated by LNETI, itself under the authority of the Ministry of Industry. 
 The Science and Technology Mobilisation Programme (PMCT), was launched in 
1988 and the realistic aim of the five-year programme was just to induce a boost in the 
S&T system so as to push it in a direction that could contribute to the modernisation of 
the country. It financed advanced training, by providing fellowships and research 
contracts on specific priority areas. It was accompanied by ex-ante assessment, interim 
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and ex-post evaluation. The plan was elaborated by JNICT, under the authority of the 
Ministry of Planning. 
 The CIENCIA programme followed next. It was a four-year programme, financed 
by the EC and the Portuguese government whose contribution was 36 per cent of the 
total. The main objective was to strengthen the scientific and technological infrastructure 
both in the public and private sector, by supporting the establishment or the upgrading of 
laboratories, major equipment, computers, data banks, etc. The second objective was to 
provide advanced training, through the award of fellowships. The fellowships were 
preferentially granted to researchers with no links to the government sector, hoping that 
they would eventually enter the private sector. There were also major concerns regarding 
the development of multidisciplinary  disciplines and sectors and in favouring less 
advanced regions. The CIENCIA programme was administered by JNICT. 
 The PEDIP programme was a programme directed towards the industry. It was a 
large ECU 1.7 billion five-year programme whose objectives were to reinvigorate the 
industrial base and to create and develop new industries. It consisted of several sub-
programmes vertically and horizontally articulated one of which was addressed to 
research and development activities. A new edition of PEDIP was approved recently. The 
PEDIP programme was administered by an office linked to the Ministry of Industry. 
 The PEDAP programme was aimed at the agricultural sector. As the PEDIP 
programme it concerns the whole sector and not only R&D. It was approved in 1986 as a 
ten-year programme, 77 per cent of which financed by the EC and a new edition was also 
approved. Among its objectives, those more close to the innovation system are the 
creation of training centres for farmers, agricultural teachers and advisors, and to promote 
feasibility studies or interconnected studies aimed at assessing strategic and structural 
priorities for the development of the sector. The main contribution to research was the 
creation of a new state research laboratory, the CTQB, mentioned earlier, to conduct 
research in the modern field of biotechnology. The programme was administered by an 
office linked to the Ministry of Agriculture. 
 
  
154 
1
5
4
 
7.9 Major institutional changes and steps to increase the co-ordination of the 
system  
 
A Law on R&D was passed in 1988 (Diário da República, 1988) stating the main 
objectives that should, in principle, set the guidelines for a coherent science and 
technology policy. It states that scientific research and technological development are 
"national priorities" involving the "public, private and co-operative sector" and it aims to 
strength the overall S&T system in its multiple facets. It sets a ten-year target to reach a 
GERD/GDP ratio of 2.5% (we can now see how distant we are from this target and the 
misguided notion of priority embodied in the letter of the Law), and defines criteria to be 
followed in the fields of R&D evaluation.  
 To a newly created Secretariat of State for Science and Technology (SECT) 
placed under the authority of the Ministry of Planning and Regional Administration was 
given, in 1986, the responsibility of global co-ordination of the national S&T system. The 
move should be interpreted as a shift from the previous sectoral approach to S&T 
policies. Among the duties of SECT was the responsibility to elaborate a three-year 
medium term planning document containing the broad lines of policy and actions to be 
undertaken. The plan has effectively been issued regularly but, although it contains 
interesting and useful analysis of the S&T system, it lacks quantitative targets. 
Furthermore, the science and technology budget introduced in 1987/1988, which should 
be a logical extension of the planning procedure, has remained more an accounting 
exercise than an instrument for "...playing a decisive central role in shaping and guiding 
the government research policy" as recommended by the OECD review of 1986. 
 Another institutional measure at this time was to revive the idea of a collegial 
body that would advise the government in all questions concerned with science and 
technology policy, financing, evaluation, co-ordination, etc. A previous council was set up 
in 1982 but it never fulfilled its functions. The new council, the High Council for Science 
and Technology (Conselho Superior de Ciência e Tecnologia), was composed of 
approximately sixty people, headed by the Minister of Territorial Planning and 
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Administration and representatives of other ministries, of the autonomous regions of 
Madeira and Azores, of the state research laboratories, of the universities, the 
polytechnics, the private non-profit associations and industry. 
 During that time, JNICT increasingly took the role of the major financing 
institution for R&D activities. Its budget increased more than 12,000 per cent since 1982, 
managing in the early 1990s about one third of the total national R&D budget (OECD, 
1993). Under a new legal regime which gave it financial and administrative autonomy, 
JNICT was put under the responsibility of SECT acting as its executive body, with 
responsibility in planning, co-ordination, support and evaluation of the S&T system, 
following the broad guidelines provided by the medium-term planning documents. Internal 
restructuring rearranged some of its consultative councils, by creating sectoral 
consultative research councils. The main consultative council of JNICT now includes the 
chairmen of the sectoral research councils and representatives of the sate research 
laboratories, universities and industry. New powers were given to JNICT related to R&D 
and innovation, namely, in encouraging R&D and innovation programmes through R&D 
contracts and in promoting the development of major research infrastructures, according 
to sectoral needs and in collaboration with the state research laboratories. 
Recently, with the change of government in 1995, new steps were taken that 
apparently point to a greater priority given to science and technology policy matters. The 
most important is that a Ministry for Science and Technology was created replacing the 
Secretariat for Science and Technology (SECT) mentioned above which was under the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Planning and Regional Administration. JNICT was the 
most important institution placed under the authority of the new Ministry. Its restructure 
led to its extinction (Diário da República, 1996). In its place were created three 
institutions: 
 
 Observatório das Ciências e Tecnologias – OCT,  (Observatory of Science and 
Technology), whose tasks are: to collect, process and diffuse scientific and 
technological information; to advice on the preparation of the annual R&D budget; to 
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elaborate planning documents and to monitor progress in the goals set up by the 
plans; 
 Instituto de Cooperação Cientifica e Tecnológica – ICCT, (Institute for Scientific and 
Technological Co-operation), whose task is to help the Ministry of Science and 
Technology in all tasks related to RTD activities involving relationships of Portugal 
with other countries; 
 Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia – FCT, (Foundation for Science and 
Technology) whose task is to manage and finance programmes related to the 
development of the national S&T system. 
 
Basically, the Observatory substitutes the statistical and planning service of 
JNICT, the Institute substitutes JNICT in the management of international relations and 
the Foundation substitutes JNICT for the management of strictly national programmes. 
Additionally the Ministry got the responsibility for a number of other institutions including 
the Academy of Sciences and two state research laboratories: the Instituto de 
Investigação Científica e Tropical (Institute for Scientific and Tropical Research) an 
institute with a certain reputation in the field of tropical agricultural products research with 
many connections to Portuguese speaking countries and other less developed countries, 
and the Technological and Nuclear Institute. The other research laboratories remained 
under the responsibility of the sectoral Ministries.  
 Recent actions of the Ministry followed three main vectors: 
 
 the management but also the restructure of the existing programmes related to 
research and technological development, of which the most important is the PRAXIS 
XXI programme follower of the CIENCIA programme (see below) 
 the commitment and attempts to adopt an holistic perspective of the public research 
laboratories and the research centres, the institutes and the technological parks 
created under the CIENCIA. 
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 an horizontal intervention aimed at popularising, diffusing and stressing the 
importance of scientific and technological culture throughout society with a particular 
emphasis on the information technologies as a strategic mean to achieve that goal. 
 
 The main decision under the first vector was to restructure the PRAXIS XXI 
programme. Unlike the CIENCIA programme whose main priority was on investment in 
physical infrastructure (asides from advanced training), the priority of PRAXIS XXI is now 
at the level of research projects with a preoccupation to link that research effort to 
economic uses, i.e., to support research projects involving academia, enterprises and 
technological centres. The differences in priorities are visible in Table 41 and Table 42. 
While almost 75 % of total funds of the CIENCIA programme were devoted to physical 
infrastructures, the PRAXIS XXI programme devotes only about 23% of total funding to 
physical infrastructures. The rationale behind it is that the CIENCIA programme managed 
to equip reasonably if not considerably well a large part of the research community. The 
problem was now to make effective and efficient use of that equipment, a consideration 
often raised in the evaluation reports of independent teams that visited regularly the 
research centres financed by the CIENCIA programme. It was also an issue raised by 
students of comparable S&T systems in Europe subject to similar circumstances and 
events (Tsipouri, 1992). The CIENCIA programme devoted 25% of its resources to 
advanced training and a high priority for advanced training continued under the PRAXIS 
XXI programme. 
Decisions under the second vector of activity of the new Ministry followed also 
the concerns about the effective use of the resources devoted to R&D. The tendency is to 
increase selectivity even more than in the CIENCIA programme. 
 A natural corollary of this philosophy is the implementation of evaluation 
procedures which the Ministry recently undertook covering all 260 research centres 
created by CIENCIA (OCT, 1996) and a global evaluation of the eight state research 
laboratories (dispersed under the responsibility of sectoral ministries). Concerning the 
state research laboratories, in its first phase the evaluation will cover only the strictly 
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called state research laboratories but other institutions will be looked at (such as the 
newly created Institutes under the aegis of the CIENCIA programme) in an attempt to 
have a global and comprehensive perspective of the strengths and weaknesses of all the 
public research system. The 260 research centres will be financed on a multi-annual 
basis according to the demands of the centre and evaluated according to the success of 
the objectives stated in the centre programme. Measure 2 of the PRAXIS programme is 
also a highly selective measure aiming to support large research programmes involving 
relatively few research centres deemed to be excellent. 
 The importance given to science and technology parks was scaled down under 
the directives of the new Ministry of Science and Technology and the efforts are to be 
concentrated in two parks, the Taguspark in Lisbon (which is now the most developed) 
and the Science and Technology park in Porto (still in a very initial state of development). 
The main responsibility for the management, administration and strategic 
decision-making of the Taguspark fall in the hands of academia and a few large public 
enterprises, after a confrontation between an alternative view that supported a more 
widespread and balanced involvement of firms and academia. 
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Table 41. The CIENCIA Programme (1990-1993). 
Sub-
programmes 
Measures Funding 
(ECU million) 
I- Development 
of R&D 
infrastructures 
in priority 
domains 
A-Information technologies and telecommunications. 
B- Production and energy. 
C- New materials. 
D- Health. 
E- Agriculture. 
F-Biotechnology and fine chemistry. 
G- Marine science. 
H- Reinforcement of R&D infrastructures in priority 
domains. 
35 
23 
17 
20 
15 
15 
7 
10 
 Sub-total: 142 
(46.7% of total) 
II- Advanced 
training and 
innovation in 
priority domains 
I – Advanced training 
J- Support of innovation in firms 
L- Creation of an Innovation Agency 
56 
5 
15 
 
 Sub-total: 76 
(25% of total) 
III- Global 
support to the 
scientific and 
technological 
system 
M- R&D infrastructures in the exact sciences and in the 
engineering sciences 
N- R&D infrastructures in the earth and environmental 
sciences 
O- R&D infrastructures in economy and management 
sciences. 
P- Common use R&D infrastructures. 
Q- Infrastructures for popularising R&D 
R- General training in science and technology. 
 
20 
 
7 
 
4 
15 
9 
21 
 Sub-total: 76 
(25% of total) 
IV- 
Management of 
the Programme 
S- Technical support 
T- General support to the management of the programme 
7 
 
3 
 Sub-total: 10 
(3.3% of total) 
 Grand Total 304 
Source: SECT (1990). 
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Table 42. The PRAXIS XXI Programme (1994-1999). 
Measures Actions Funding 
(ECU million) 
1. Reinforcement 
of 
infrastructures 
1.1 R&D laboratories 46 
1.2 Common use R&D infrastructures 46 
1.3 Science and Technology Parks 28 
 Sub-total: 120 
(22.8% of total) 
2. Development of 
the base of the 
S&T system 
2.1 Structural programmes for the development of the 
base of the S&T system 
2.2 Stimuli to the internationalisation of the S&T system 
56 
 
 
21 
 Sub-total: 77 
(14.6% of total) 
3. Mobilisation of 
the  
S&T capacity for 
3.1 Programmes for strengthening technologically the 
enterprises 
50 
innovation and 
regional 
development 
3.2 Programmes for strengthening the S&T development 
of less favoured regions 
30 
 3.3 Stimuli to technological diffusion and innovation 14 
 Sub-total: 94 
(18.1% of total) 
4. Advanced 
training of human 
resources 
4.1 Advanced training to reinforce the base of the S&T 
system 
135 
 4.2 Advanced training for applied research, innovation 
and regional development 
75 
 Sub-total: 210 
(40.1% of total) 
5. Technical 
support(ERDF) 
 
 15 
 
6. Technical 
support (ESF) 
 8 
 Sub-total: 23 
(4.3% of total) 
 Grand Total 524.969 
Source: Gabinete do Gestor do PRAXIS XXI (1996). Note: the calculations were made using three decimal 
places. The numbers are presented with no decimal places (except the grand total) for ease of comparison with 
the CIENCIA programme. 
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7.10 Private non-profit institutions and other mechanisms to support 
innovation 
 
The last years have also witnessed a changing pattern in the national S&T system, which 
is the proliferation of private non-profit institutions. The share of R&D accounted for PNP 
on total R&D is now the highest in the OECD area (19.7% in 1995; see Table 39). The 
early major PNP was the Caloust Gulbenkian Foundation that has played (and continues 
to play) a very important role in the upgrading of the S&T system. The more recent ones 
are the result of government support for this kind of institution, as stated in the major 
programmes described earlier, so as to implement mechanisms aimed at supporting 
industrial innovation. The 1993 OECD Review of S&T Policy tentatively classifies them as 
foundations, institutes and associations. The distinction between the three categories is 
however difficult to define. Most of them are associations of business, universities and 
state research laboratories. The foundations are legal independent entities and can be 
privately or state financed. The foundations and institutes are financially autonomous, the 
associations are confined to the financial management of research contracts. 
 Many of the mechanisms envisioned by the major research programmes aimed 
at building bridges between industry and other research institutions have already been 
launched and they are generally financed both by government and by industry under the 
aegis and the guidelines of the major research programmes. They include an innovation 
agency, two technology parks (finance for another two parks has been approved but, as 
mentioned earlier, the guidelines for the implementation of science parks have changed 
under the directives of the new Ministry), one R&D enterprise in the field of electronics 
and another in biotechnology, nine sectoral technology centres5, venture capital 
corporations (the first ones financed under PEDIP), and several institutes for new 
technologies, incubation centres, technology transfer centres and demonstration units. 
However, and in spite of this array of physical infrastructures there are few if any 
                                                     
5 Industrial sectors covered: textiles and garments, ceramics and glass, mechanical 
industries, cork, wood and furniture, shoes, leather, moulds and special tools, ornamental 
rocks 
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systematic studies of their activities and impacts on the innovation capabilities of the 
system, and particularly on firms. 
 
7.11 Some general remarks on the recent evolution of the system 
 
In spite of the considerable achievements of the system in recent years the situation 
remains deficient both in its structural configuration and if comparisons are made with 
other countries.  
The distance of Portugal from other EU countries is still considerable (Table 43). 
The ratio GERD/GDP is below one third of the EU average and almost one fourth of the 
OECD average. The ratio R&D personnel/active population is also approximately one 
third of the EU average although the ratio total researchers/active population fares a little 
better, but it is still approximately half of the EU average. The comparative discrepancy 
between these two last indicators reveals a structural weakness and/or feature of the 
Portuguese system, that is the low ratio of other R&D personnel/researchers. Once again, 
the dual nature of Portuguese society, visible in other parts of the system (notably in the 
education system, but also in social stratification) and mentioned in earlier sections of this 
work (cf. previous sections) reveals itself.  
 A distinctive feature of the system is the low share of the enterprise sector in 
GERD compared with other EU or OECD countries. According to these numbers it is now 
the country whose enterprise sector has the lowest share in GERD, considerably distant 
from Spain to which often it is compared. Only Greece has a similar pattern. 
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Table 43. R&D resources: international comparisons. 
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Belgium (1991) 1,66  6,1 66,5 26,2 1,2  9,5 4,3 
Denmark (1) 1,8  17,8 58,3 22,8 1  9,5 4,7 
France (3) 2,38  21,1 61,6 15,9 1,4  12,5 5,8 
Germany (2) 2,27  15 66,1 18,9   12 5,8 
Greece (1993) 0,6  32 26,8 40,7 0,6  3,5 2 
Ireland (1993) 1,24  10,4 67,8 21 0,8  6,8 4,7 
Italy (1995) 1,13  22,1 57 20,9   6,2 3,3 
Netherlands (1993) 1,87  19,4 53 24,9 2,7  9,7 4,3 
 
Portugal (1995) 
 
 
0,6 
  
26,7 
 
19,8 
 
33,8 
 
19,8 
  
3,3 
 
2,4 
Spain (2) 0,91  19 51,1 28,9 0,9  4,8 2,8 
United Kingdom (3) 2,19  13,8 65,2 17,5 3,4  9,9 5 
          
EU average 1,91  16,6 62,1 20 1,4  9,4 4,6 
          
United States (2),(4) 2,45  10 71,1 15,4 3,5  - 7,4 
Japan (1994) 2,9  9 66,1 20,2 4,7  14,2 9,9 
          
OECD average 2,15  12,9 66,7 17,5 2,9  - 5,5 
Source: OECD (1995 and 1996c). 
Notes: (1) 1995 for GERD/GDP, 1993 for the other data. 
(2) 1993 for R&D personnel, 1995 for other data. 
(3) 1993 for R&D personnel. 1994 for other data. 
(4) Excluding, partially or totally, capital expenses. 
 
 
Another distinctive feature is the high share of PNP in GERD, the largest (by a 
large order of magnitude) in the EU or OECD area. If the PNP share is spent in activities 
close to the enterprises and the market, it is then a compensation for the low share spent 
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by the enterprise sector and it will represent eventually an unique way of allocating R&D 
resources in downstream (close to the market) activities. However, an analysis of the 
source of funds of the PNP institutions does not seem to support such a view (see 
below). 
The fact that GERD as a % of GDP fell between 1992 and 1995 reveals much 
about the level of priority that science and technology matters receive. Once again, as 
seems usual in Portuguese history, the written targets (in this case we are referring to the 
1988 law on R&D) do not express themselves in deeds, and represent merely 
manifestations of intentions and not programmes of action. The same goals related to the 
development of the C&T system and specifically the closing of the gap that exists 
between other European countries and Portugal are once again present in the 
Government Plan for 1997 (and for 1996 and 1995) but it remains to be seen what level 
of priority and investment is ascribed to science and technology.  
The last available statistics show that the national investment in S&T is being 
replaced by EU investment, instead of the latter being an addition to national investment 
(see Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12; the table with the exact numbers from 
which the graphs were constructed is in Annex E). 
The trend is especially visible in the government sector and the higher education 
sector whereby a proportional decrease of funds from the government is accompanied by 
a proportional increase of funds from abroad. The source of such funds is obviously 
linked with the structural programmes funded by the European Union. This trend is also 
visible in the enterprise sector and in the PNP sector. Consideration should also be given 
to the recent perspective of the Ministry of Science and Technology which seems to have 
ascribed an excessive importance to supporting a limited number of excellent groups 
(and thus reverting again to an elitist perspective of the system), although it remains to be 
seen how far it will pursue this policy. 
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Figure 9. Government expenditure in R&D by source of funding. 
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Source: JNICT and OCT. 
 
 
Figure 10. Higher Education expenditure on R&D by source of funding. 
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Source: JNICT and OCT. 
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Figure 11. PNP expenditure in R&D by source of funding. 
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Source: JNICT and OCT. 
 
 
Figure 12. Enterprises expenditure in R&D by source of funding. 
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Source: JNICT and OCT. 
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 Another worrying characteristic is the relative closeness of each sector relative to 
the others. Each sector mainly self-finances its own performance and contributions from 
other sectors are marginal or non-existent. Even in the enterprise sector, which was 
subject to major investment programmes since 1989, namely the PEDIP, and where 
consequently one would expect an increase in funding from the part of the government, 
the trend is for a decrease in extra-sector funding. Since the level of investment in BERD 
is so low in Portugal the fact that subsidies for R&D investment put at the disposable of 
enterprises are not utilised reveals the low level of priority attached to those investments. 
 The situation of the PNP institutions is intriguing. Originally, the policy intention 
behind the legislation that facilitated the existence of such institutions and the creation of 
new ones (generally by university members and close to higher education precincts) was 
to enhance and facilitate the links between academia and industry. The evolution of the 
performance of these institutions by source of funding seems to indicate that they are 
deviating considerably from their original intentions. As Figure 11 shows R&D activities 
performed by their own funds was drastically reduced from a proportion of 90% in 1980 to 
less than 10% in 1995. On the other hand funds from the government increased 
dramatically from 0.6% in 1980 to 51.2% in 1995. It is pertinent to say that these 
institutions are less and less private and more and more public. Funding from firms is still 
at a reduced level and shows no robust trend. What lies behind these numbers is open 
only to conjecture because, to the author’s knowledge there are no studies addressing 
this problem. According to occasional press reports and informal sources of information 
the underlying causes might be related to lack of demand from the enterprise sector and 
to subsequent government intervention or redirection of funds from other governmental 
sectors to avoid financial collapse. Foreign (most probably EU) funding has also been an 
alternative way to cope with funding shortages. 
 The perennial problem of (lack) of diffusion of resources and technologies 
throughout the entire society continues to characterise and to condition the system. Major 
programmes like CIENCIA, PRAXIS and PEDIP have specifically addressed the problem 
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and have favoured explicitly less favoured regions of the country but the system remains 
quite unbalanced (Table 44). 
 
Table 44. Regional distribution of R&D resources in 1995. 
Region GERD  R&D Personnel  % of  total 
population 
Total R&D 
personnel 
per 1000 
active 
population  
  
Esc. 
Million 
 
 
% of total 
  
 
FTE 
 
 
% of total 
  
         
North 18954.7 20.6%  3559.3 22.9%  35.6% 2,3 
Centre 13821.2 15.0%  2154.2 13.9%  17.3% 3,0 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley 52608.0 57.3%  8529.0 54.9%  33.4% 5,5 
Alentejo 2187.7 2.4%  437.7 2.8%  5.3% 2,0 
Algarve 976.6 1.1%  225.8 1.5%  3.5% 1,5 
Azores 1277.3 1.4%  225.4 1.5%  2.4% 2,6 
Madeira 2053.3 2.2%  408.6 2.6%  2.6% 3,9 
         
Total: 91878.8 100.0%  15540 100.0%  100.0% 3,5 
Source: OCT (1997) and INE (1994 and 1997). 
 
The region of Lisbon and surroundings concentrates 57,3% of GERD and 54.9% of 
FTE personnel whilst its population is only 33.4% of total, i.e., much more than half of 
total resources are concentrated on one third of the total population of the country (OCT, 
1997). In 1988 the share of GERD allocated to the region was 67%. The government 
sector is the one that contributes more to that concentration with 82% of government 
expense in R&D allocated to that region. It reflects the excessive concentration of the 
state research laboratories. Since the state research laboratories are still the main 
vehicles for technology transfer to industry, such a concentration is rather negative in 
terms of diffusion and industrial innovation.  Perhaps not coincidentally, the PNP sector 
and the enterprise sector are also quite concentrated in this region, with 52% of PNP 
expense in R&D and 50% of enterprise expense in R&D allocated to the region. The 
higher education sector is the less concentrated (with 42% of higher education expense 
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in R&D allocated to the region) but it is nevertheless disproportionate according to the 
share of total population (33,4%).  In spite of this concentration of resources not even the 
Lisbon and Tagus Valley region reaches indicators of R&D resource intensity close to EU 
or OECD averages. 
 
7.12 Industrial research: additional comments 
 
The explanation of the funding pattern of PNP institutions leads us to the analysis of the 
enterprise sector. The lack of demand of R&D activities6 by the enterprise sector may be 
due to a general retraction on the part of the firms in R&D investment due to the 
recession of 1991-1993, which would also explain the proportional decrease in GERD 
(Table 39) and the absolute decrease in R&D expenditure in the enterprise sector (Table 
45). The decreasing share of industrial employment in total employment is also an 
explanation, but since the numbers are so low one may wonder if that is really the 
explanation, since the decrease in industrial employment affects more the production 
workers and less the research/development side which should be expected to increase 
(at least in proportional terms).   
The available studies of the R&D dimension of the enterprise sector in Portugal 
are not many but all point in one way or another to a secondary position of R&D activities 
in strategic decision-making. The perspective is not homogeneous and varies across 
sectors. 
It is interesting to compare two major survey exercises made with a time lapse of 
approximately five years. Although they give us only snapshot views, one can compare 
the evolution of the perspectives relative to innovation. One of the surveys (GEPIE, 1992) 
was made during 1988-1990 and it consisted of a postal questionnaire sent to 3276 
enterprises with a response rate of 31,3% (1026 responses). The second survey 
                                                     
6 The activities of PNP institutions can also be classified under the term “Other Scientific 
and Technical Activities” which according to a study of its activities (Commission of the 
European Communities, 1991) may represent a large proportion of its activities; we are 
however more concerned with R&D activities proper when making the present 
considerations. 
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(Baranano, 1995) covers the period 1994-1995 and it was also a postal questionnaire 
sent to 12828 enterprises with a response rate of 5.08% (652 responses).  
 
Table 45. Recent evolution of R&D expense in the enterprise sector. 
 BERD 
Esc. Million 
(constant 
1990 prices) 
a.a.g.r. * Personnel 
(FTE) 
a.a.g.r. * Researchers 
(FTE) 
a.a.g.r. * 
       
1988 9246,5  2041,8  473,5  
1990 13585,6 21,2% 1996,6 -1,1% 436,6 -4,0% 
1992 13466,2 -0,4% 1881,7 -2,9% 481 5,0% 
1995 11921,1 -4,0% 1768,3 -2,1% 463,7 -1,2% 
Source: JNICT and OCT. 
* a.a.g.r.=average annual growth rate 
 
Although the questionnaires are not similar and have different objectives and 
questions and it is somewhat difficult to make a direct comparison of both, there are 
however some questions where one can venture to make a direct comparison. For 
instance, in the 1992 questionnaire there was a set of questions related to the factors of 
innovation. The question asked the respondent to indicate in a given list of factors, by 
order of importance, those that had the biggest impact in terms of product, process or 
management innovation. At the top of the list came the acquisition of equipment and at 
the bottom came investment in R&D activities. In the 1995 questionnaire there is a similar 
question, i.e., the firms are asked to indicate (in this case to attribute a score, on a 1-10 
scale) which, of a given list of factors, are the most important determinants for success in 
innovation. The most striking similarity is the position occupied by investment in R&D 
activities, which came again at the bottom of the list (this time the second least important 
factor). Another similarity that stands out is the importance given to two factors: attention 
to customer needs and the improvement of products.  Acquisition of equipment is also 
given prominence but only when it refers to product innovation (a distinction that was not 
made in the first survey). So, essentially the strategy of Portuguese firms as a whole 
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continues not to be based on investment in research and technological activities but 
rather on the satisfaction of specific customer needs (one of which perhaps is the cost 
factor) and in what is now called “creative imitation” (competitors’ products and their 
analysis are the 2
nd
 most important source of product innovation according to the 1995 
survey) and in the introduction of new equipment and emphasis on production factors. 
The numbers on GERD given above confirm the continuation of this strategic perspective.  
However, there are some improvements relative to the late 1980s. The 
responses of the 1995 survey seem to indicate that the industrialists begin to give more 
importance to intangibles and particularly those related to management innovation.  
The 1992 survey asked which of a given list of management practices had been 
introduced. The main practice (the practice most often mentioned by the respondents) 
was the “introduction of computer aids to management”. However, the term management 
was very vague and ill defined. Based on the few empirical studies of the time (Kovács, 
1990), it is believed that most of that activity is related to the automation of office and 
administrative tasks (and even so, partial automation) and not the automation of 
production (with the introduction of systems such as CAD, CAM or CIM). According to this 
author, advanced automation was used by a relatively minor percentage of the firms 
(18%), and most of them related to the use of CAD only and isolated CNC production 
equipment. Management seems to be conducted within “Taylorist” lines and worker 
participation seems to be reduced. In the 1995 survey the respondents scored high 
training and cultural factors. For instance the following factors were classified in the top 
positions as the most important factors for success in innovation (out of a given list of 
factors): “to develop a culture of continuous improvement”, “general improvement of 
personnel qualifications” (training factors are also important in the 1992 survey),  “to 
develop team spirit”, “to improve the capability to adapt to change” and “more efforts to 
reach a common company vision”. 
We should note again that comparisons should be viewed with care because the 
absence or presence of questions in the questionnaires makes absolute comparisons 
between the two surveys difficult. However, what seems to stand out is that the basic 
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strategy followed by Portuguese firms remain basically the same: low investment in R&D 
activities, product innovation based on adaptation and improvement of existing products 
or technologies, emphasis on process innovation based on the acquisition of machinery, 
slow introduction of automated equipment and reduced integration with other activities of 
the firm. 
The industrial sector has benefited since 1988 from major development  
programmes (see p. 139) namely the PEDIP (Specific Programme for the Development of 
Portuguese Industry) which was in effect from 1988 to 1992 (it was created in 1988 and 
formulated during that year by several laws and legislative acts; see Ministério da 
Indústria e Energia, 1993) financed partly (the largest part) by structural funds of the EU 
and by the government. Table 46 details the investment covered by the EU and the 
government, which, depending on the programme, should involve also private 
investment. The most important axes of intervention with implication for the research 
system were: 1) the support for technological infrastructures; it contributed substantially to 
the creation of a considerable number of institutions (envisioned but not substantiated by 
early plans) concerned with technical and other support activities directly linked with the 
needs of industry and the creation of institutions in the interface between academia and 
industry or concerned with diffusion of technical change and the support of 
entrepreneurial activities based on technological factors (see detail in Table 46); 2) a 
second axis was concerned with professional training, particularly those at advanced 
level and aimed at training researchers for industry; 3) a third axis was concerned with 
productive investment, i.e., innovation by means of acquisition of modern production 
equipment. Support for R&D projects was a diminutive part of this programme. 
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Table 46. PEDIP: Specific Programme for the Development of Portuguese 
Industry, 1988-1992. 
Programmes 
 
ECU 
million 
% of 
total 
Total PEDIP: 1622  
   
1. Basic and Technological infrastructures 528 32,5% 
   
1.1 Basic infrastructures (energy, roads, railways, ports) 276 17,0% 
1.2 Technological infrastructures (metrological laboratories, 251 15,5% 
      Sectoral technological centres, institutes for diffusion of   
      new technologies, centres for technological transfer,   
       Technological poles, enterprise incubators)   
   
2. Vocational Training 185 11,4% 
   
Vocational training, training of instructors,    
Specialists and technicians; production and development of    
advanced pedagogical methods; management courses;   
training of researchers for industry; reinforcement    
of links between continuous training and enterprises   
   
3. Incentives for productive investment 666 41,1% 
   
3.1 PEDIP system of incentives (SINPEDIP) 573 35,3% 
3.2 Rationalisation of energy consumption (SIURE) 15 0,9% 
3.3 Restructure and modernisation of industrial sectors   
    3.3.1 Restructure and modernisation of the woollens sector 24 1,5% 
    3.3.2 Restructure and modernisation of the foundry sector 34 2,1% 
3.4 Support for specific industrial sectors   
    3.4.1 Integrated programme for Information Technologies and Electronics (PITIE) 16 1,0% 
    3.4.2 Programme for the Development of the equipment goods industry (PRODIBE) 5 0,3% 
   
4. Financial engineering 43 2,7% 
   
Financial aid for investment projects, enterprises in difficulty and    
Capitalisation of enterprises; creation of two risk    
capital enterprises (SULPEDIP and NORPEDIP).   
   
5. Productivity missions 128 7,9% 
   
Activities aimed at improving the productivity of enterprises;   
Demonstration projects; support for    
Entrepreneurs; protection of intellectual property and inventions.   
   
6. Industrial Quality and design 62 3,8% 
   
Development of standards, metrology and approval and certification methods;   
incentives to improve quality and design.   
   
7. Management of the Programme 10 0,6% 
Source: Ministério da Indústria e Energia (1993).
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It is difficult to evaluate the impact of the programme. It seems that its most important 
contributions are related to the technological infrastructures it created. As mentioned it 
contributed to the creation of nine sectoral technological centres7, two technological 
parks, one innovation agency and several institutes in the interface between academia 
and industry. An important contribution is also the one devoted to the development of the 
so-called Portuguese System of Quality, concerned with certification, normalisation and 
standards. Several physical infrastructures were created or restructured and precise rules 
were defined and implemented concerning certification matters and the co-ordination of 
the several actors intervening in the system.  
The central programme of PEDIP was the third one - Incentives for Productive 
Investment - and particularly the measure 3.1 (SINPEDIP), concerned with innovation, 
technology acquisition and the increase in productive capacity and modernisation of the 
production processes. A study made by the Ministry of Industry and Energy (Ministério da 
Indústria e Energia, 1994a) on the impacts of the programme seems to conclude that 
globally the programme was beneficial to Portuguese industry and it did strengthen 
existing industrial clusters in the main industrial districts (Lisbon, Porto, Aveiro, Braga) but 
there was apparently too much emphasis on capacity expansion and not enough 
emphasis on modernisation and innovation (p.32-33), which eventually later created 
complications when the recession came in 1991-1992. Many firms were caught off-guard 
with too much installed capacity and debt to resist an unexpected cut in demand. The 
study seems encouraged with the potential for structural change that some indicators 
seem to suggest, such as the presence of many small firms in all sub-programmes and 
the large percentage of the total population of firms above a certain dimension (100 
employees) which were supported. This last view is supported by Confraria (1995). 
The second edition of this programme was called PEDIP II (Strategic Programme 
for Promoting and Modernising Portuguese Industry) and it is a 2.2 ECU billion 
programme that will run from 1994 to 1999 (Table 47). The main axes of intervention 
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remain essentially the same: incentive for productive investment (sub-programme 3 with 
50.9% of total incentives), technological infrastructures (sub-programme 1 with 16% of 
total incentives) and professional training (sub-programme 5 with 14.1% of total 
incentives) but there was a substantial effort to integrate all the sub-programmes of the 
PEDIP II (a criticism often made of PEDIP I was the lack of logic and co-ordination 
between the sub-programmes). To achieve greater co-ordination and integration the sub-
programmes are linked by an incentives system which is the operational rational of the 
programme. The implementation of the several sub-programmes is made by a set of five 
Incentive Systems that are grouped together according to the type of beneficiary. 
Additionally, each system is composed of a set of support Regimes that group measures 
or sets of similar measures and are managed by only one entity of the Ministry. The five 
Incentive Systems are: 
 
- SINFRAPEDIP: support of technological infrastructures and the System of  
Industrial Quality; 
- SINETPEDIP: consolidation of technological professional schools; 
- SINFEPEDIP: financial engineering to support enterprises; 
- SINAIPEDIP: consolidation of industrial support services; 
- SINDEPEDIP: incentives for production investment. 
 
The relations of these incentive systems with the sub-programmes are indicated in 
Table 47. There was also an increased preoccupation with ex-ante evaluation of the 
candidates to avoid the common situation that happened during PEDIP on which the 
firms were incapable of sustaining the investment they asked for. 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 The technological centres were created in the more traditional industrial sectors. They 
include: textiles, ceramics and glass, cork, wood and furniture, shoemaking, leather, 
decorative rocks, mechanics, and moulds and special tools. 
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Table 47. PEDIP II: Strategic Programme for Promoting and Modernising 
Portuguese Industry, 1994-1999. 
Sub-Programmes 
 
 
Total PEDIP II: 
 
ECU 
million 
 
2214,8 
 
% of 
total 
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1. Support and Consolidation of Technological 
infrastructures 
353,4 16,0%        
1.1 New infrastructures for industry 155 7,0%      1.1  
1.2 Support for existing technological infrastructures 84,9 3,8% 1.2       
1.3 Support for existing quality infrastructures 8 0,4% 1.3       
1.4 Support for existing associative infrastructures 23,7 1,1%  1.4      
1.5 Support for existing professional schools 4,8 0,2%   1.5     
1.6 Other support services 34,4 1,6%  1.6      
1.7 Transfers from previous PEDIP 42,6 1,9%        
          
2. Complementary mechanisms of financial 
engineering 
225,2 10,2%        
2.1 Risk capital societies 109,5 4,9%    2.1    
2.2 Financial support for investment 55,1 2,5%    2.2    
2.3 Support for mutual societies 46,8 2,1%    2.3    
2.4 Support for investment funds 13,8 0,6%    2.4    
          
3. Consolidation and reinforcement of enterprises 
strategies 
1127,8 50,9%        
3.1 Audits 30,6 1,4%     3.1   
3.2 Technology acquisition and development 64,3 2,9%     3.2   
3.3 Innovation and internationalisation 328,1 14,8%     3.3   
3.4 Support of dynamic factors of competitiveness 68,9 3,1%     3.4   
3.5 Small modernisation projects 25,2 1,1%     3.5   
3.6 Strategic contract-based programmes 226,5 10,2%     3.6   
3.7 Certification, standards 6,2 0,3%     3.7   
3.8 Industrial property 6,9 0,3%     3.8   
3.9 Support for accession to the stock market 4,6 0,2%     3.9   
3.10 Transfers from previous PEDIP 366,5 16,5%        
          
4. Productivity, quality and internationalisation 
promotion 
139,4 6,3%        
4.1 Quality and design 18,4 0,8%      4.1  
4.2 Inter-firm co-operation 8,9 0,4%     4.2 4.2  
4.3 Internationalisation 6 0,3%      4.3  
4.4 Innovation and technology transfer 35,6 1,6%      4.4  
4.5 Environment 5,8 0,3%      4.5  
4.6 Productivity and demonstration projects 12,7 0,6%     4.6   
4.7 Technological infrastructures close to industry 38,6 1,7%      4.7  
4.8 Specialisation strategies and organisational 
change 
2,8 0,1%      4.8  
4.9 Energy efficiency 10,6 0,5%      4.9  
          
5. Human resources promotion 313,3 14,1%        
5.1 Vocational training under goals of Programme 1 22,9 1,0% 5.1 5.1 5.1     
5.2 Vocational training (goals of Programmes 3, 4) 139,6 6,3%     5.2   
5.3 Support of specific measures 117,7 5,3%      5.3  
5.4 Technical support for professional training 6,3 0,3%        
5.5 Transfers from previous PEDIP 26,8 1,2%        
          
6. Management of the Programme 55,7 2,5%       6 
Source: Ministério da Indústria e Energia (1994b). Note: these numbers are projections and may not correspond 
exactly to the execution of the programme. 
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The evaluation is also made having in mind the confrontation of the real needs of the firm 
and its actual demands. It is a precautionary measure to optimise the incentive.The 
incentive is not exclusively or predominantly directed to modernisation or expansion of 
capacity but it can encompass several dimensions according to the specific situation and 
circumstances. 
Another change relative to PEDIP is that now many of the incentives are not non-
refundable subsidies but rather loans at zero interest rates (apart from the fact that only 
part of the investment is financed, as with PEDIP, the so-called “matching” system). The 
aim is also to send a signal of caution to the potential candidates. Two sectoral 
programmes for electronics, information technologies and equipment goods, in line with 
PEDIP’s previous PITIE and PRODIBE were launched (PRATIC substitutes PITIE and 
PRODIBETA substitutes PRODIBE). There is also an increased concern in terms of 
integration with other major programmes, namely with PRAXIS XXI, when it concerns 
R&D activities. Unlike the first editions of the programmes, these ones benefited from 
accumulated experience and from the fact that the negotiation with the European 
Commission  for the 2
nd
 Framework Programme for Portugal was over an integrated 
packet (Secretaria de Estado do Plano e Desenvolvimento Regional/Ministério do 
Planeamento e Administração do Território, 1994). All the major programmes were 
included in an integrated manner on that packet (cf. section on the economic system and 
Table 26 on that section). 
PEDIP II is now at “cruise” speed and it is premature to advance any conclusions. 
The available indicators (INFOPEDIP, several issues) seem to indicate a good adherence 
to the programme in sub-programmes related to productive investment (in general, sub-
programme 3) and particularly to the sub-programme related to quality certification (sub-
programme 4). This pattern seems to suggest a continuation of the central strategy of 
Portuguese industry relative to innovation, that is, improvement of existing technologies, 
be it product or process, and a relative disregard for R&D proper. The importance 
attributed to quality issues was considerable and it is reflected by the growing number of 
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ISO certified enterprises, which have grown at an annual average growth rate of 100% 
between 1991 and 1996 (IPQ, 1997). 
 
7.13 The research system: a summary 
 
The research system evolution was inextricably linked to the educational system, 
dominated by the same scholastic influences and by the same structural deficiencies 
pointed earlier. The situation only begins to changes (modestly) by the end of the 1800s 
and early 1900s. 
Important quantitative and qualitative changes occur only after the 2
nd
 World War, 
in connection with a phase of high growth rates of the Portuguese economy. R&TD and 
“Other Scientific and Technological” activities are done mainly in the newly created state 
research laboratories and are directly linked to scientific, technological and technical 
needs of infrastructure development. Research funds for universities were very 
diminutive. Only when the educational system was restructured in the early 1970s did 
university research increase in importance and volume, a trend that will only be perfectly 
visible in the early 1980s. R&D resource allocation is now more or less evenly spread 
between the two sectors. It seems that the dual character of Portuguese society reveals 
itself again in this competition for funds between the state research laboratories and the 
universities. 
Research in industry remained diminutive and proportionately is a small part of 
GERD. The technology balance of payments was negative and resources spent in 
industrial R&D were limited and low by OECD standards. The situation remains much the 
same nowadays. 
Resource allocation is not evenly distributed compared to the distribution of 
population. R&D resources are heavily concentrated in the capital city area, particularly 
the resources allocated to the state research laboratories which are the main vehicles for 
technology transfer and diffusion to industry. In spite of recent institutional attempts to 
increase relationships between the research laboratories, the universities and the 
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enterprises, the most notable result of which is the proliferation of PNP institutions, there 
is no visible significant increase in the flow of information between the sectors nor there is 
no visible change in industry perception of the strategic importance of R&D activities. 
Overall, indicators of R&D inputs (expenses in R&D or personnel allocated to 
R&D) and of R&D outputs (patents) are still considerably lower than OECD average. The 
considerations about the education system made in preceding chapters are also 
applicable to the research system in particular those that refer to the impact of the 
dualistic character of the educational system (existence of weaknesses in skills at the 
medium level) on the supply of labour for the industrial sector. Other problems are related 
to rigidities, namely to difficulties in communication flows between the sub-systems with 
potentially important impacts in terms of diffusion of knowledge, technology and skills, 
and problems in terms of diversity, namely the deeply ingrained intellectual aversion to 
(constructive) criticism and to the creation of alternatives schools of thought, particularly 
when it involves new scientific areas and multidisciplinary approaches.  
In spite of efforts at the policy level to implement an integrated approach to 
science and technology, there has been an inability to effectively link science policies and 
the institutions that implement them (JNICT and now the Ministry of Science and 
Technology) and technology policies and the institutions that implement them (e.g. 
sectoral Ministries). 
The impact of all these characteristics on the industrial fabric of the country is, on 
the one hand, a generalised shortage of supply of skilled labour and on the other hand, 
the absence of adequate conditions to stimulate an environment conducive to creative 
thinking and innovative behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 8. EXPLAINING THE SYSTEM LEVEL: FINAL REMARKS 
 
What seems to stand out from the previous analysis of the innovation system in Portugal 
is the immense and primary impact that the underdevelopment of the education sub-
system had on the other sub-systems an on the system as a whole. The shortcoming of 
the education system became particularly negative after the Renaissance. On one hand, 
the system did not grow enough. The reason why it did not is probably connected to 
political reasons (the reverse reasons that underlie other Western European countries’ 
earlier universal education). Reis (1993) argues that Portugal, unlike other more volatile 
states, was a state where there was only one Nation and one language and consequently 
there was no need to introduce any special education effort as a way to forge or reinforce 
national unity. Nor there was an internal threat to national independence and unity from 
any specific regional ethnic or non-ethnic group. The cohesion of the county was also 
reinforced by long-established borders dating from the 12
th
 and 13
th
 centuries and 
facilitated by the fact that the borders were with only one country, namely Spain. On the 
other hand, the education system did not adapt itself properly or in a timely manner to the 
new intellectual era and trends related to the scientific and technological disciplines. It 
persisted in its traditional emphasis on humanistic and literally studies, itself a 
consequence of the heavy presence and tradition of scholastic schools within the system. 
The features of the education system are certainly intimately connected to the broad 
political-ideological environment. Portugal has a political ideological history of its own that 
distinguishes it from other European countries, particularly from those of the northern part 
of Europe. Although geographically a part of Europe, Portugal has been culturally and 
politically often considered apart from it. The ideology that prevailed in Portugal, whose 
roots can be tracked down from almost its inception in the 12th century as a distinct, 
unified country state, is strongly connected to corporatist ideas. Portugal shares its 
corporatist tradition with Spain and almost if not all, Latin-American countries, although, of 
course each country has its own distinctive and unique features. The corporatist 
mechanism is marked by a strong centralising tendency that gives the state 
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predominance in the process of socio economic decision making. The main actors in the 
political process of decision making are the state and a series of broad social groups with 
vested interests in the human, natural and capital resources of the country, like the 
church and the nobility in ancient times, and more recently, the commercial and industrial 
monopolies which arouse due to political, social and economic transformations. What 
basically distinguishes it from the liberal northern European political tradition is the 
relative absence of pressure groups born from the roots of the country’s population. The 
relationships between the social classes are more accurately described by a model of 
patronage-clientelage than by a model of representative-constituent, which partly explains 
why a sharp distinction and divide between social classes tenaciously remained. Only in 
recent decades did Portugal embrace more decisively the liberal tradition that has been 
prevalent for centuries in northern Europe countries, establishing a more representative 
mould of political institutions. The corporatist legacy is, however, still deeply rooted in the 
ways those institutions operate. It was also in recent years that special attention was 
given to the education system but the tradition impinges on the institutions and on the 
capacity of critique, on diversity and on innovative behaviour. These restrictions have 
special negative consequences at the level of the research system affecting one of its 
main characteristics, which is its capacity to create and accommodate and explore 
diversity (Metcalfe, 1993). Typically, intellectual confrontation between different research 
schools is very difficult or non-existent. It tends to be based on destructive criticism rather 
than on constructive criticism and usually there is an overriding prevalence of one school 
of thought with total or almost complete elimination of the other schools. One may 
question if the small size of the research system is a cause or a consequence of this 
attitude. Nowadays, the main institutions that perform research in Portugal are 
handicapped by this function. The universities have not a research tradition, for the 
reasons exposed above and in previous chapters, and their main function is teaching. 
The state research laboratories display probably too much of an ostentatious term 
(research) when referring to themselves. Their genesis, explained previously, ascribes to 
them a strong component of providers of technical services aside from their research 
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functions, which are, by the way, essentially at the applied or development level and thus 
with limited possibilities in terms of the advancement of pure knowledge. In any case, the 
links between the two kinds of institutions seem to be rather weak. 
 Links between the industrial sector and the research system are also weak. 
There is eventually a causal relationship between the technological demand level from 
firms and the slow evolution of the education or research system, and the low level of 
technological supply from industry, in the sense that the Porter-like demand structure of 
the country is not demanding enough nor there are dense relationships between the 
firms. 
The impact of the corporatist ideology on the macro-economic system of the 
country has been that of creating a capitalist system dominated by a monopolistic, 
mercantilistic and state controlled structure, and still particularly prevailing within those 
industrial sectors actively supported by the government for strategic reasons (since the 
mid 1940s). On the other hand, the more traditional industrial sectors, with a much lower 
concentration ratio, with an industrial structure characterised by a large variety of firm 
sizes, has a much stronger Schumpeterian spirit, marked for its entrepeneurship vigour 
and free-lancing attitude. The state-supported large industrial firms and sectors (steel, 
petrochemicals, shipbuilding, heavy machinery) are mainly concentrated in the centre of 
the country, particularly around or close to the Lisbon area (not coincidentally they are 
near the centralised locus of the main political decision making), and have more or less 
been in a state of permanent crisis since the early 1970s. The traditional, free market 
oriented firms and sectors (textiles, shoe making, foodstuff) are concentrated mainly in 
the north, near or close to the city of Porto and have proved much more adaptable to 
external changing conditions, and are still continuing to contribute to a large share of total 
industrial output. Of course, this is an extreme picture and an over simplification of the 
reality, but it has some substance. To complete this simplified picture, there is a range of 
other geographically dispersed firms and sectors that are markedly Schumpeterian in 
nature, such as subsidiaries of multinationals in the electric/electronic industry, in the car 
industry and machinery industry. Their Portuguese counterparts and competitors are less 
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aggressive in terms of dynamic adaptation, as well as those more traditional metal 
industries, wood and wood products, ceramics and glass that fall between the two 
extremes of entrepreneurial spirit and patronage-clientele approach. 
 Overall Portuguese firms have been and are still marked by an excessive neo-
classical rational behaviour in the sense that they tend to allocate their resources in a 
short-term perspective. Thus the system suffers from classic Schumpeterian static 
inefficiencies as opposed to long-term dynamic efficiencies in the allocation of resources. 
Such behaviour would explain why industry is less prone to invest in activities not seen to 
provide visible short-term advantages. In that light certain facts can be explained: the 
small size and the weak power of industrial associations; the long-term conflicts between 
rival industrial associations; weak linkages between equipment producers and users; low 
importance ascribed to education and training with reflections on all areas of industrial 
activity, including technological, commercial and management level; weak demand for 
technology, either in the form of services or in the form of research or development and 
the consequent weak linkages between the industrial sector and the research and 
education sector. 
Two important examples can be pointed out. On the one hand, the excessive 
emphasis on production strategy given by Portuguese firms and the relative disregard for 
management issues shows a lack of a comprehensive strategic approach to technology 
according to Simões (1994) that identifies some of the issues in the following way: 
 
“The critical problems regarding innovative efficiency of Portuguese 
manufacturing enterprises may be clustered around half-a-dozen closely 
inter-related axes: weakness in strategic thinking; insufficient concern with 
the "soft", intangibles aspects which are at the hearth of innovation 
(organisation, tacit knowledge, information, quality); insufficient focus on 
marketing; paucity of "in-house" technical skills; scarce backward and 
forward balanced and demanding linkages; and scarce use of the national 
network of technical support services" (p.15). 
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On the other hand, the development of industrial technological capability has very 
much relied on the imports of technology developed elsewhere. It carries with it two kinds 
of interconnected dependency. The first is a direct dependency expressed through the 
very act of purchasing a particular technology. The second, an indirect dependency 
arising from operational necessities of equipment maintenance, equipment modifications 
and specific tacit knowledge which can only be efficiently tackled by those who provided 
the technology in the first place. Thus, two immediate impacts of the behaviour are 1) 
weaknesses in the ability to exert technological demand pressures on domestic firms to 
supply equipment, machinery or technology in the broadest sense, and 2) weaknesses in 
the ability to enhance inter-sectoral domestic contacts and relationships between the 
industrial sector and the system providing technological services. One can say that the 
justification for these behaviours is, in the first place, the absence of domestic capability 
to provide such technology, but the concern is not so much with the initiation of the 
process but with its continuation. Apparently the Portuguese industrialists have so far 
managed relatively well, and are not inclined to change tactics, unlike the Asian NICs for 
whom the import of foreign technology is but one input to a broader strategy of 
technological development with wide diffusion impacts throughout the whole economy. 
The recent downward trend in business R&D expenditure share can be tentatively 
explained as signalling yet another new cycle of technological dependency through the 
acquisition of new vintages and the discontinuation of indigenous adaptive R&D efforts on 
old vintages. The new theories of intra-firm trade and recent data showing increasing 
shares of multinational firm's in Portugal exports (Simões, 1993), may also add another 
explanatory factor. Tentatively again, there is a suggestion that subsidiaries of 
multinational firms do not have anymore to sustain divisional R&D departments whose 
adaptive R&D function is no longer needed. 
So far, in this synopsis of the evolutionary dynamics of the Portuguese innovation 
system, the factors pointed out have been mostly by the negative side. However one 
must not mask the other side. It should be emphasised that in spite of all the mentioned 
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shortcomings and gaps the system managed to build a considerable and by no means 
negligible technological capability. At least it has not allowed that the income and 
technological gap (which worsened during the 1800s; cf. previous chapters) between 
Portugal and other Western European countries grew larger. The causes of such gaps 
were and are a constant national preoccupation and are at the origin of constant, 
persistent but not very articulated efforts to bridge those gaps. Those efforts and their real 
performance have increased substantially after 2
nd
 World War giving way to huge 
changes and progress. However, the gap remains unclosed. 
To conclude it should be remembered that the above exposition was an attempt 
to characterise and define the past and present environment surrounding Portuguese 
firms, and how likely they have impacted or do impact on the indigenous innovative and 
R&D capabilities and activities of those firms. By what has been written one can expect 
that the system is characterised by the following distribution pattern of firm innovative 
behaviour: a small number of very traditional firms, a large proportion of firms employing 
below average product and process technology and a growing but minority proportion of 
firms employing average process and product technology. Only a very small number of 
firms will employ above average process and product technology, partially internally 
developed, and with a competitive position in international markets. Absolutely original, 
advanced, state of the art innovative output will probably be non-existent or at best 
extremely rare. 
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PART III. EXPLAINING FIRM LEVEL VARIATION 
CHAPTER 9. INTRODUCTION 
 
This part of the study is concerned with the behavioural causes of innovative performance 
at the firm level. The quest for the determinants of innovation at the micro level has 
received increased attention in the social and economic sciences. The interest in this 
issue follows from the realisation that the efficiency of inputs to scientific and 
technological activities, as measured by the correlation between R&D expenditures and 
GDP growth rates, enjoyed significant discrepancies across a whole series of countries. 
The Japanese technological performance recently reinvigorated this debate and 
provoked a frenzied search for the explanations of this phenomenon, not only at the 
macro level (e.g. Freeman, 1987) but also at the micro level (e.g. Womack, J.P. et al, 
1990). 
 The first instances on this quest may be traced back to Marx who saw the 
continuous stream of technical innovations as being directly related to the selfish pursuit 
of rent-seeking activities by the capitalist pole of the dual-class society which he 
portrayed. The invention of new machines and tools that increased the level of 
mechanisation of the production process and that decreased the individual or collective 
power of the operators, and hence allowed for the appropriation of labour surplus by 
capital, were the main goal behind the innovation process. The relentless pursuit of ever 
larger profits earned by the capitalist at the expense of the worker, the exploratory 
attitude of the entrepreneur and his disregard for his employees and fellow man, were 
implicitly the behavioural attributes that characterised a technologically successful 
entrepreneur. Earlier, Adam Smith also hinted at a similar kind of motive when he 
analysed the economies gained by increased specialisation, but the hints stop short of 
that and no significant attempts were made to distinguish the features of innovative firms. 
 The orthodox neo-classical school of economics dismissed the subject all 
together. Firms were viewed as homogeneous, perfectly informed, rationally acting black 
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boxes, whose only admissible difference was a short lagging period necessary to adjust 
themselves to the price signals of the market. Knowledge, science and technology were 
assumed to be non-excludable, non-rivalrous public goods, exogeneously determined 
and at the disposal of all firms and with no extra costs attached. Even the notion of profit 
is not useful in the neo-classical context as an explanation of why firms innovate, given 
the constrains imposed by the assumptions underlying marginal analysis, and some 
authors go even further when assessing this theoretical framework: 
 
"...Indeed, under the standard assumptions [of the neo-classical theory] it is 
difficult to find reasons why firms exist at all..." (Reinert, 1995, p. 27) 
 
 However, to be fair, the neo-classical economic tradition has made significant 
contributions over the last decades to the understanding of technological progress and its 
interactions with market mechanisms. Technical change was identified as a main 
determinant of economic growth (Solow, 1956) and technological knowledge was 
incorporated in the aggregate production function as an endogenous production factor. 
Differences in factor-price ratios are pointed to as a main endogenous determinant of bias 
in the choice of technique, and the notion of induced innovation is introduced. 
Schmookler (1966) ignited the famous debate opposing the demand-pull and the 
technology-push hypotheses of technological change, by emphasising that demand 
factors could explain to a large extent the rate and direction of technological change. His 
study was partly a response to the argument advanced by earlier studies of Schumpeter 
that inventors-entrepreneurs were the main forces behind technical change and growth. 
The notion of learning by doing and its economic implications was first introduced within a 
neo-classical context (Arrow, 1962). The existence of increasing returns to scale in the 
aggregate production function is explained in terms of externalities derived from the 
development of technical knowledge. 
 However, since these studies were conducted within the same basic assumptions 
of the orthodox neo-classical school, namely the notion of equilibrium, the rational 
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behaviour of firms and the assumption of perfect information, their explanatory 
contribution is more at the macro-economic level than at the level of the firm, and their 
contribution was stronger to market theories than to the theory of the firm. The theoretical 
framework could not satisfactorily explain why some firms are more innovative than 
others and why there seems to exist, at any time, and given the same environment, a 
population distribution pattern that includes both firms using advanced production 
techniques and firms using older techniques. 
 Contributions to resolve this lack of theoretical support of empirical facts came 
initially from the management and organisation literature, which identified differences in 
the inner workings of the firms and then tried to identify the factors behind those 
differences. One group of studies, following from Marris (1966), highlights the importance 
of managerial motivation and discusses it in terms of sociological and psychological traits, 
such as status, power, space for personal creativity and remuneration (which is a more 
classic perspective). Another theoretical line comes from the work of Penrose (1980), 
suggesting that the firm is a bundle of physical and human resources and its evolution is 
fundamentally determined by its managerial capabilities.  
 Other approaches focus on the structural characteristics of the firm. The 
transaction-costs approach (Williamson, 1981), which was inspired by Coase's (1937) 
account of the firm as a governance structure, deals with the costs associated with 
performing certain types of economic activities and their influence on the structure and 
size of the firm. He argues that certain inherent characteristics of some economic 
exchanges, namely those connected to imperfect markets, uncertainty, and opportunistic 
behaviour, make it more economical for the firm if those transactions are internalised 
inside the hierarchical structure rather than making them in the market. The behavioural 
perspective of Cyert and March (1963) emphasises the conflicts that arise from the fact 
that the firm pursues different goals at the same time, associated with production, 
inventory, market, sales and profit. For instance, higher sales may imply lower profits, 
higher production may imply higher inventory costs. The firm is then seen as the 
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(unpredictable) outcome of complex internal negotiations and compromises that try to 
achieve a degree of consistency between diverse goals. 
 Explicit technological considerations are more visible in the organisational models 
of Woodward (1965), and Mintzberg (1984). They combine several salient features of 
earlier approaches into an integrated framework, and then propose a taxonomy of 
organisations. Woodward's approach is more technologically determined while 
Mintzberg's is the outcome of complex interactions between internal factors as well as 
external ones. In both models, the organisational structures of firms are closely 
connected with technological factors such as the degree of complexity of the technology 
used by the firm or the characteristics of the production technology. They link innovative 
performance with organisational traits in a causal direction that seems to indicate that 
technology determines the type of organisational structure rather than the other way 
around. 
 A different theoretical perspective on the issue of different patterns of firm 
behaviour and their technological implications comes from the evolutionary theories of 
economic and technical change, which integrates insights from the management, 
organisation and economic literature. Their main source of inspiration is the work of 
Schumpeter (1939), which challenged the neo-classical tradition assumptions of 
equilibrium and perfect information. The concepts of disequilibrium and imperfect 
knowledge appropriability are at the core of the Schumpeterian analysis. The neo-
Schumpeterian or evolutionary theories assume that the choice and actions of the firms 
are severely constrained by imperfect information. Their behaviour cannot be assumed as 
rational but rather as "boundedly" rational, i.e., limited by the kind and level of information 
that the economic agents possess at any given moment. Therefore, achieving a satisfying 
but not necessarily optimal condition is the norm, rather than achieving a maximised 
optimal situation (Simon, 1956). 
 Evolutionary theories are stranded in a psychological basis, inasmuch as they 
emphasise the learning processes involved in the economic process, and they are less 
amenable to formalisation. The behaviour of firms is dependent and shaped by: 
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"...the learning history of agents, their pre-existing knowledge and, most 
likely, also their value systems and their prejudices..." (Dosi, 1994, p. 159) 
 
The analogies with biological systems entails the definitions of four concrete building 
blocks (Dosi, 1994): 1) a fundamental unit of selection (genes), which could be 
technologies, policies, behavioural patterns or cultural traits; 2) a mechanism linking the 
genotype level with the entities (phenotypes), and these could include technological 
systems, firms, agencies or the mind; 3) mechanisms and criteria of selection, involving a 
long list of possibilities such as, for instance, financial market assessments of firms' 
strengths, characteristics of their products, their prices, etc.; and 4) mechanisms that 
generate variations (in the phenotypes through the genotypes), which is the dimension 
that is directly linked to the presumption of rational behaviour. 
 The link between the technological performance of a firm and its organisational 
and behavioural characteristics, which is the main concern of this section, is achieved in 
the evolutionary literature through the notion of routines. Nelson (1982) identifies three 
sets of routines: 1) standard operational routines, related to the way firms produce under 
certain constraints, namely their capital stock and their knowledge content; 2) routines 
that determine the investment behaviour of the firm; and 3) routines that define the 
process of search for doing better things. 
 Working, explicitly or not, within this framework of analysis, there have been 
several contributions to the understanding of the link between innovative performance 
and behavioural patterns of firms. Miles and Snow (1978) classify firms under the heads 
of "defenders", "prospectors", and "reactors". Freeman (1982) also proposes a taxonomy 
based on archetypes of strategy and classifies them under the groupings of "aggressive", 
"defensive", "imitator", "traditional" and "opportunistic”. 
 A series of empirical studies tried to identify the factors that led to success or 
failure in innovation in a specific product, of which the most well known are probably the 
Project SAPPHO (Rothwell et al, 1974) and the M.I.T. study (Utterback et al, 1975). 
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Rothwell (1977) makes a review of the results of seven of the more important studies and 
finds a considerable degree of agreement between them. The identified success factors 
are linked to good communications and effective collaboration, high levels of corporate 
commitment, planning and management techniques (with emphasis on cost control), 
quality of management, personal policy and management style (emphasis on education 
and training), marketing and user needs, and after sales and user education. Apparently, 
the two sets of factors more strongly correlated to success are related to communications 
and collaboration, and marketing and understanding of user needs. Thus, the findings 
seem to revive the demand-pull/technology-push debate, bending in favour of the 
demand-pull hypothesis. The author also argues that the innovation process is a complex 
one and all factors must be taken into account, but advances little in the way of explaining 
the interactions between them. Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) criticise the conclusion by 
arguing that there was a built-in bias on the studies. The criticisms addressed the fact that 
citing user needs ex post facto could be considered a tautology, that the concept "user 
needs" was loosely defined and it lacked the precision of the economic concept of 
demand, and that technology-push factors were not conveniently represented in the 
studies. It concluded that not only supply and demand factors are important factors but 
also they must be coupled to ensure success.  
These studies contributed to the advancement of our understanding of the 
innovation process in several ways. They represent a significant challenge to established 
theories, they pinpointed some apparently recurrent behavioural factors in successful 
innovation, and they brought to the surface the systemic features of the process. They 
also stimulated further research at sectoral level. For instance, Pavitt (1994) builds on his 
earlier sectoral innovation taxonomy of industrial sectors (Pavitt, 1984) and suggests a 
technology-based classification of key characteristics of innovative firms. 
 This paper adopts a somewhat different approach. While most of the earlier 
studies concerned with success and failure concentrated their attention on particular 
innovations at a particular point in the life of the firm, the approach here is based on the 
difference between the global perception of the firm as, all things considered, being more 
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innovative than the average and the perception of another firm as being only average or 
less than average in innovative terms. It can be argued that the study of only a single 
innovation, at a particular point in the life of the firm, does not tell us much about the firm 
as a whole and about the way it got where it is. As such, one can say that a static 
perspective considerably influences such studies. They also do not have much to say 
about the way in which the multiple factors interact with each other. 
We should not forget that there are authors that follow a dynamic approach. 
Maidique and Zirger (1985) suggest that a more useful unit of analysis is the product 
family, rather than the single new product. They argue that organisations learn from their 
mistakes ("learning by failing" as they put it) and that a failure often may lead to a 
posteriori success. They suggest a new (family) product model, which has the attractive 
feature of being explicitly more dynamic, based on cyclical failures and successes of 
individual products, each success feeding on a previous failure and each success, in turn, 
eventually leading to a failure (due to excess confidence breed by the success). 
Georghiou et al. (1986) argue that the innovation process can only be correctly 
understood if the conditions and set-up at the time of launching an innovation and its 
posterior progress and diffusion are looked at simultaneously. For these authors a 
successful innovative firm is not solely classified by the successful market introduction of 
an innovation and the initial perceived innovative level. The subsequent actions of the 
firm are as vital to its success as it is the introduction of the innovation. Therefore the firm 
has to engage “…itself to a sequence of post-innovative improvements which are a 
necessary condition for it to retain and expand its market share.” (p. 3). They further 
argue that technological innovation is an outcome of interactions between technological 
opportunities and market needs which itself evolve over time. 
 Here, somewhat in line with Georghiou et al, instead of looking at a particular 
product or family of products we look at the global performance of the firm over time, and 
we try to identify characteristics that are common to innovative firms and characteristics 
that are common to less innovative or non-innovative firms. First, these characteristics 
are identified, and then an effort is made to identify the way in which these factors 
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contributed to the present situation of the firm, as well as the way in which those factors 
interacted so that they eventually led to superior performances. Throughout the following 
chapters the reader will notice a strong flavour of the influence of evolutionary theories of 
technical and economical change. This is true, inasmuch as use is made of the 
conceptual framework provided by the analogies with the biological sciences. In particular 
we associate the notion of genes or genotypes with the identified characteristics of the 
firm and we associate the phenotype with the global performance characteristics of the 
firm. First the number of phenotypes is reduced to only two kinds, the innovative firms 
and the average firms, but later we propose an enlargement based on a continuous 
spectrum of phenotypes. The main thrust of the study will be in the analysis of the 
mechanisms linking the genotype level with the phenotypic level and in the analysis of the 
mechanism generating variation in the genotypes. We also consider the third conceptual 
block (mentioned above), which is the selection mechanism and the selection dynamics, 
but less formal structure is given to the environmental variables, and the main concern is 
to try to explain differential behaviour assuming the same external constrains. Implicitly, 
the degree of innovativeness is considered the best measure of fitness, but, as was 
mentioned earlier, empirical evidence suggests that this is not always (or indeed, even 
remotely) true, and some remarks on the issue will be made. 
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CHAPTER 10. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS  
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
We shall recall that the methodology followed in this study was based on a SAPPHO-like 
approach (cf. Chapter 2), whereby pairs of firms were matched according to criteria of 
product similarity and size, forming two groups, the so-called “innovative” group, grouping 
together firms that showed above average innovative performance and the so-called 
“average” group, grouping together firms that, compared with their respective pair, were 
less innovative. A total of nineteen firms were approached and extensively interviewed 
according to the guidelines of Annex B. The purpose of the exercise was to find out if 
there were behavioural differences between the two groups of firms, identify those 
differences and explain them. 
 
10.2 Identification and categorisation of differential factors 
 
The information gathered through the interviews was submitted to statistical analytical 
procedures. Due to the limitations inherent in the sample, specifically its small size and its 
non-randomness, the analysis was confined to the application of descriptive analysis, to 
see whether differences in the distribution of the responses of the two groups could be 
visibly identified. The raw information was coded in nominal or ordinal categories, 
although for some variables the initial information was at the arithmetic level (continuous). 
However due to sampling restrictions, it was transformed into a lower level of 
measurement. In the end the analysis identified differences in the distributions. Table 48 
shows the results, representing the variables that showed visible differences between the 
two groups of firms. The reader is referred to Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of how 
the variables in Table 48 came about. 
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Table 48. Identified relevant variables and their definition. 
Category Variable Definition Categories values 
 Existence of automated 
equipment 
The firm uses automated equipment. Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Tangibles Predominance of old production 
machinery 
Share of manual production machines relative to total 
number of production machines. 
Values: 1=yes (50% or more of manual machines); 
             0=no (50% or less of manual machines) 
 Improvements in production 
machinery 
The firm improved in-house its production machinery. Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Use of CAD 
 
The firm uses on a routine basis CAD techniques. Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Use of CAM The firms uses on a routine basis CAM techniques. Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Internal quality control 
laboratory 
The firm has an internal quality control laboratory and 
makes internal control of quality of its products. 
Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
Intangibles  Existence of graduate 
personnel 
There has at least one employee who possesses 
university level qualifications. 
Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Graduate intensity Ratio of graduate personnel to total employment. Continuous variable. 
 
 Type of training Training procedures followed routinely by the firm.  Values: 2=training plan (involving all levels of personnel); 
1=sporadic external short courses (mostly technical 
courses for the factory workers); 0=only internal (on the 
job) 
 Separate R&D department The firm has a separate department where personnel are 
allocated full-time to the design, development or research 
of new products. 
Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Main source of funds for 
investment 
Origin of funds for investment projects. Values: 1=loans (more than 50% of  funds are borrowed); 
             0=own funds (50% or more are firm’s own funds) 
Management 
 
Receiver of subsidies The firm has applied to and was awarded with state 
subsidies in the last five years. 
Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 Type of strategy Planning procedures followed routinely by the firm. Values: 3=long-term and medium-term formal planning; 
             2=medium-term formal planning; 
             1=visionary (unwritten medium-term plan) 
              0=short-term (planning is done on a daily basis) 
 Approach to product 
conception 
The way firms face their task of building machines. Values: 1=integrated approach (system);  
              0=individual machine 
 
Table 48. (Cont.) 
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Category Variable Definition Categories values 
 Existence of exports The firm exports its products. Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
External  Export intensity Percentage of production exported (in terms of sales). Continuous variable. 
 
Stimuli  Importance of external 
competition 
Scoring attributed by the firm to the importance of 
competition with foreign products as a stimulus to the 
development of new products. 
Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 3=moderately 
             Significant; 2=slightly significant; 1=insignificant 
 Type of domestic customer Types of clients the firm predominantly deals with. Values: 2=large innovative firms; 1=any domestic firm;  
             0=only regional firms 
 Competition based on quality 
and performance 
Scoring attributed by the firm to the importance of 
competition based on quality and performance as a 
stimulus to the development of new products. 
Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 3=moderately 
             significant; 2=slightly significant; 1=insignificant 
External 
sources  
Impact of fairs on future 
innovations 
Scoring attributed by the firm to the impact of trade fairs 
on future innovations of the firm. 
Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 3=moderately  
             significant; 2=slightly significant; 1=insignificant 
of knowledge Impact on scrutiny by suppliers Scoring attributed by the firm to the impact or usefulness 
of suppliers on search activities of the firm. 
Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 3=moderately 
             significant; 2=slightly significant; 1=insignificant 
 Impact on scrutiny by 
universities 
Scoring attributed by the firm to the impact or usefulness 
of universities on search activities of the firm. 
Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 3=moderately 
             significant; 2=slightly significant; 1=insignificant 
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 The variables are categorised according to the nature of the factor involved. A set 
of variables is related to differences in the type of capital stock between the two groups of 
firms. They are categorised under the term "tangibles". The second set of variables is 
related to what is now commonly referred to as "intangibles" and the category in which 
they are included is named accordingly. They include the role of software, the level of 
education, the type of training and the existence of separate R&D departments and 
quality control laboratories. The third set of variables is related to management issues, 
and it reveals behavioural differences in areas linked to procurement of funds for 
investment, the type of strategy adopted and the approach to product conception. A 
fourth set of variables deals with what we call external stimulus to innovation and reveal 
differences on whether the firm had an export activity, to what type of domestic customer 
it was related, the degree of importance attached to external competition, i.e., competition 
in external markets or with incoming external products, and the degree of importance 
attached to competition based on quality and performance. Finally, the fifth set unveils 
some differences on the way external sources of knowledge impact upon the firm's 
innovation activities. Annex C gives the complete information on the responses given by 
each group to each variable in numerical as well as in graphical form. The meaning of 
each variable is described in Table 48. Tables and Graphics on Annex C are based on 
this nomenclature.  
 
10.3 Demand factors 
 
The results show obvious similarities with those obtained by the successful/unsuccessful 
empirical studies briefly reviewed in a preceding section. All the factors categorised under 
the term "external stimulus" are somewhat equivalent to the "marketing and user needs" 
factors suggested by those studies. If we consider these variables as proxies for the 
existence of demand for certain products, or product features, or as proxies for a 
response to "needs" (whatever the definition of the term) felt by consumers, then the 
results support the arguments expressed by the demand-pull theorists. The fact that 
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export behaviour differs significantly amongst the "innovative" and the "average" group 
(see Table 49 showing the descriptive statistics of the continuos variable “export 
intensity”), and that the importance attached to external competition is more strongly felt 
by the former group, can be interpreted as innovative firms being more responsive to user 
demands, in the sense that we assume external markets are more demanding than the 
average internal market. 
 
Table 49. Descriptive statistics of the variable “export intensity”. 
 N 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Average group 
 
9 0 0.25 0.056 0.0982 
Innovative group 
 
10 0.05 0.85 0.35 0.2877 
 
 
We make this assumption because roughly 90% of the exports are destined to 
the European Union countries, the United States, Canada and the Asian NICs. If, in 
principle, the demands from these markets are more commanding and require higher 
standards than those demanded by the internal average market, and assuming that 
products whose technological characteristics satisfying the internal average market would 
not satisfy the external markets, then demand (in its precise meaning involving quantities 
and prices) does apparently play a role in fostering innovation. The same argument 
applies for the variable "type of domestic customer", where a significant difference 
appears between those firms that are only serving regional markets (where demand for 
low-tech products exists) and those firms that are serving large domestic firms or 
subsidiaries of multinational-national firms, where demand for technically advanced 
products exists. 
 Using the variable "competition based on quality and performance" to claim that 
demand-pull influences are at work is more problematic because this variable can also be 
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interpreted as a proxy for specific management goals or strategic objectives, not 
necessarily dictated by external market forces. It is reasonable to admit that competitive 
pressures would underlie a defensive-type strategic commitment, but one can also admit 
that this commitment came before any competitive factor had forced it into being. There is 
the possibility that a conscious and intrinsic consideration of the issue was, at some time, 
introduced into the firm's routine approach to product conception. If it was the case, then 
the variable would be better placed in the "management" category. To take account of the 
ambiguity the variable should be perceived as lying in a limbo between the two 
categories. The causal direction of this factor is open to doubts. It can either be 
considered as a consequence of market pressures or as a managerial cause of 
innovative behaviour. 
 
10.4 Education and management style 
 
Another similarity between the results of this study and other studies lies in the variable 
related to educational level. The results show significant differences between the two 
groups of firms concerning this variable. The existence of graduate personnel is 
apparently related to the degree of innovativeness of a firm. The difference is also strong 
when we consider the variable "graduate intensity" (the ratio of graduate personnel to 
total employment).  
 
Table 50. Descriptive statistics of the variable “graduate intensity”. 
 N 
 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Average group 
 
9 0 0.26 0.042 0.0848 
Innovative group 10 0 0.31 0.092 0.0901 
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Table 50 shows the statistics related to this variable. The mean intensity amongst 
the “average” group is less than twice the mean intensity amongst the “innovative” group. 
The minimum value for both groups is zero but there is only one such case in the 
“innovative” group while there are four such cases in the “average” group. It relates to the 
importance of having management of high quality and ability, pointed out by other 
studies, but it also reflects the importance of having personnel with high technical 
competence. 
 The importance of management style (openness, horizontal and organic features) 
is also pointed out in those studies but we found no significant differences between the 
two groups of firms concerning that. There are two possible reasons. First,  the firms in 
the sample are all relatively small-sized, with one exception, so that the horizontal and 
organic nature of the relationships arise naturally. Indeed we found that communications 
between owners, managers, mid-managers, technicians and workers were, in general, 
very fluid and easy to establish, not constrained by bureaucratic barriers and facilitated by 
the often small premises on which the firms operated. Very often the interviewees 
stressed the team spirit of the firm and even the presence of quasi-familiar modes of 
group interaction, and the two-way spirit of loyalty that existed between employers and 
employees. Simões (1995) also refers to “pre-Taylorist” modes of organisation in 
Portuguese firms and says they are not uncommon. Second, the considerable handicraft 
nature of the work involved and the type of skilled work force employed implied that the 
contributions emanating from the bottom were not taken light-heartedly, and that the 
contribution of the work force in certain aspects of the creation of the product was 
accorded significant importance. The style of management was, both in the "average" 
and in the "innovative" group, essentially organic, or, as it was described by one of the 
interviewees, "rigidly flexible". This homogeneity derives, to a great extent, from the fact 
that we are dealing with only one sector, possessing specific idiosyncratic features of 
operational behaviour. Had we considered more sectors, this homogeneity may not have 
emerged. However, it suggests that the type of management is not, at least, a sufficient 
condition for innovative success. 
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 If we take a closer look at the response distribution of the "existence of graduate 
personnel" variable in Annex B, the same conclusion applies regarding the educational 
level, since there is a considerable proportion of "non-innovative" firms that do possess 
graduate level personnel. On the other hand, the variable "graduate intensity" (cf. Table 
50) suggests that the level of investment in the educational level does seem to play an 
important role in the determination of the innovative performance of the firm. 
 
10.5 Planning activities and management techniques 
 
Another point of confluence between this study and other studies is the importance of 
careful and precise planning activities and the use of management techniques. The 
variable "type of strategy" is a proxy of the factor. The majority of the firms in the 
innovative group had some kind of formal planning procedure in place. Half of them 
planned their activities at the medium-term and long-term level, which involved, one the 
one hand a detailed one-year or two-year plan  (some firms even had a three-year plan) 
with quantitative objectives regarding costs, investments and sales, and on the other 
hand a long-term (usually five-year) plan that detailed the overall objectives and strategic 
orientation of the firm. The other half was split between those who had a medium-term 
formal quantitative plan and those that did not have a formal plan but did nevertheless 
have a strong strategic perception of what the firm should do, how to do it, and when do 
to it. We have labelled this mode the "visionary" type of strategy whose characteristics 
could not be mingled with the other type of approach to strategy making, common in 
many of the "average" group firms. This other approach is rather a non-approach, in the 
sense that there was no clear visible strategic perspective, and the firms were essentially 
engaged in the mere day-to-day running of the business apparently not worried about the 
possible threats that future changes could bring to them. More than that, they didn't seem 
to be engaged in any kind of prospective exercise to evaluate possible future trends. This 
type of strategy was labelled "short-term". The results suggest a strong association 
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between the different types of strategy-making and the innovative performance of the 
firm. 
 
10.6 Propensity to risk 
 
The two variables named "main source of funds for investment" and "receiver of 
subsidies" are associated with risk-taking behaviour. Although the relationship with 
innovative performance is not strong, particularly in the first variable, it suggests that firms 
willing to take a real risk by resorting to outside sources of finance, e.g., by borrowing 
from the banks, are more likely to succeed. As it regards the second variable it should be 
noted that the subsidies under consideration are not entirely risk free. First, they required 
previous investment from the firm and did not cover the total investment. Second, due to 
bureaucratic delays in the payment of subsidies to the firms, these had to borrow more 
money than intentionally envisioned, so that, in the end, it turned out that the subsidies, in 
many cases, paid only the interest on the loan. It should also be noted that, in Portugal, 
borrowing from banks could be a really risky move because the interest rates were very 
high. In the early 1980s the yearly interest rate could be as high as 30% . Nowadays it 
has levelled down to a more manageable figure. 
 
10.7 Technological determinants 
 
The results of the variable "separate R&D department" show that the commitment of the 
firm to invest in this kind of resource is significantly linked to innovative performance. This 
link was also evident in other studies. As we understand it, it is a definite option taken by 
the firm to act in a certain way and it expresses the importance it attributes to 
technological development, as opposed to those who regard product development as a 
low-priority task and choose to base their chances on other options or do not perceive 
any advantages in doing so. 
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 If this variable is considered as a proxy for technology-push determinants in 
innovative performance (in the sense that an R&D department embodies the capability to 
organise resources related to scientific and technological knowledge with a view to 
achieving advances that can be translated into the development or improvement of 
products) and that without such an arrangement innovative performance is less likely to 
be successful, then its significance suggests that technological factors seem to be as 
important as the factors related to demand indicated by other variables. 
 This dependence of innovative performance on technological factors should be 
analysed in conjunction with the significant relationship shown by the variable "graduate 
intensity" mentioned earlier, if we assume that the increase in graduate intensity is 
proportional to technical personnel involved in development activities. The argument is 
also strengthened by the strong association suggested by other variables. The superior 
level of production equipment exhibited by the "innovative" group, the importance 
attached to equipment upgrading, the consideration given to quality issues revealed by 
the existence of separate quality control laboratories, and the considerable use of CAD 
and (less often) CAM, all point in the direction that the capability to take advantage of 
scientific and technological advances in the firm’s own field and the capacity to exploit 
technological opportunities opened up by generic technologies are indeed crucial 
determinants in innovative performance. 
 
10.8 Approach to product conception 
 
The variable "approach to product conception" is a reflection of a particular kind of 
difference that showed up in the interviews and it is related to the way firms face their 
task of producing machines. The variable differentiated between two approaches. One 
the one hand, we have firms claiming that they do not sell machines but rather an 
operation. In their view there are several ways of performing a given operation and their 
task is to provide the best possible way of performing that task. In this sense, they see 
themselves more as service providers than as producers of machines. As a 
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consequence, they spend a considerable time evaluating the environment in which the 
machine (operation/service) will be integrated and in considering the limitations, 
possibilities and technical synergy available and the interfaces required. In contrast, we 
have the firms that see themselves as producers of a specific type of machine in which 
they are skilled. The machine performs a single type of function and it is up to the 
customer to integrate it in the overall production process. The general attitude is: "this is 
what we do; we may make some modifications here and there to accommodate your 
requirement, but basically that is what the machine does and it can go no further than 
that". The former kind of attitude seems to be conducive to a much more creative state of 
mind, and the potential to search for new ways of doing things and to open up new 
perspectives when dealing with technological bottlenecks is much greater. Not many 
firms, even in the innovative group, showed this approach and the distribution of 
responses between the two groups is not particularly sharp. But it is an additional 
argument and explanation of the importance of the technological determinants of 
innovative performance. 
 
10.9 External sources of knowledge 
 
Some interesting relationships showed up concerning differences between the impact of 
external sources of knowledge on innovation activities. One interesting difference is that 
the impact of universities on scanning activities was greater for the "average" group than 
for the "innovative" group. In principle, one would expect that innovative firms would be 
closer to universities than the less innovative groups, and that the innovative firms would 
take more interest in new knowledge and its potential for new applications than the other 
firms. This apparent incongruity can be explained with the notions of appropriability. First, 
the technological knowledge used by the sector is relatively mature, whether it is 
mechanics, electronics or even optics, and it is not strongly science-based, and 
consequently much of it is in the public domain. Second, the innovative group have 
largely embodied that knowledge within their own structure, encapsulated by the 
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graduates and the highly skilled technical personnel they employ. What they search for is 
not knowledge with a high public content but rather knowledge with a high tacit content, 
one with the higher potential to improve their competitiveness. That is not to say that they 
do not have relationships and co-operation activities with universities, which most have. 
However, they seem to happen at a rather informal level. Contacts between ex-university 
colleagues or teachers are common. Co-operation is sought at very specific levels and in 
very concrete subjects. Very often it is related to solving a particular bottleneck in 
production processes, when the internal capabilities of the firm fail. Another common area 
of co-operation is at the level of technical calculus that requires either a deep 
understanding of a mathematical sub-area or the need to take advantage of specific 
equipment with powerful computation facilities, e.g., to perform simulations, the kind of 
equipment that the firm does not have. The average group of firms, on the other hand, 
because of their often considerable limitations in educational levels, or graduate intensity, 
and consequently in their knowledge base, often find the contribution of the university 
very valuable, even if the level of knowledge provided by the university is modest. What is 
public knowledge for the innovative firms has not, in many cases, been appropriated by 
the less innovative firms. The knowledge transfer may be in the form of a specific 
technique to handle a certain type of material, a change in designs of parts to achieve 
certain movements, or even a simple mathematical calculation of power requirements, all 
of which can be considered to be in the public domain but which are not mastered by the 
non-innovative firms due to their low absorptive capacity.  
 The notion of absorptive capacity and the degree of "public" knowledge 
appropriated by the firms also explains the interesting relationship between suppliers and 
scanning activities of the firms. For many of the "average" group firms, an important 
source of knowledge comes from the suppliers. The suppliers act as intermediaries 
between their knowledge base and the forefront of technology, bringing to them 
information on advances in many areas of interest to the firm such as new materials, new 
tools, new production machinery and even new techniques. Again, much of the 
information provided by the suppliers was already appropriated by the innovative firms 
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(the supplier works often for these firms) and in many cases it can be considered to be in 
the public domain. 
 The mechanism by which knowledge is appropriated by the two groups of firms 
can be partly explained by the informational networks which they are part of. We noticed 
in the interviews that the managers of the firms in the innovative group were apparently 
moving in the same social circles. They knew each other and were very aware of the 
activities each one was pursuing. They seemed quite intimate with the strategic 
perspectives and the managerial approach of their peers, and even their historical 
background and experience. The same happened with the "average" group, but to a 
lesser extent. Apparently there was a social divide cutting across the two groups of firms, 
with the consequence that the information flowing to each of them was quite different, 
thus explaining the degree of public (or tacit) knowledge appropriated by each group.  
Von Hippel (1988) has described how these kinds of informational network build up and 
how knowledge is transferred between firms within the networks. The relationship 
between fairs and innovation seem to indicate that the two groups of firms make part of 
different social groups. The greater importance attached by the “average” firms to the 
knowledge obtained in trade fairs is probably an indicator of the lack of alternative ways 
of obtaining knowledge. The differences related to the variable “receiver of subsidies” 
may also be an indication of the social divide separating the two groups. The technical 
capacity to apply for subsidies and the social contacts and tacit and informal information 
required for a successful application are ultimately behind the observed variation. 
Together with the fact that the firms possess different knowledge bases at the start due to 
different educational levels, such a kind of dynamic would explain the disparities showed 
by the two groups of firms. 
 
10.10 Conclusion 
 
Analysis of the case studies resulted in the identification of a set of variables whose 
patterns of distribution between the “average” group and the “innovative” group of firms 
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showed significant and important differences. The variables were grouped into five 
categories. The “tangibles” category includes variables related to the characteristics of 
the production equipment of the firm, the “intangibles” category includes factors related to 
educational and technical skills of the firm, the “management” category includes variables 
related to management skills and philosophy, the “external stimuli” category includes 
variables related to the impact of external demand factors on the firm and the category 
“external sources of knowledge” includes factors related to the way information and 
knowledge is appropriated by the firm. 
The results show that either factors related to demand conditions (heralded by 
the demand-pull theorists as the main determinants of technological change) or factors 
related to supply conditions (heralded by the technology-push theorists as the main 
determinants of technological change) are significantly related to differences in innovative 
behaviour. This conclusion is in line with earlier studies concerned with success and 
failure in innovation. However it also seems that none of the factors, per se, is a sufficient 
condition for innovative performance. For instance, the mere existence of graduate 
personnel in the firm, or the management style, are not unequivocally related to 
innovative performance, nor the fact that a firm employs advanced production equipment 
implies necessarily that the firm is more innovative relative to a comparable one (see the 
distribution of variables in Annex C). Nonetheless, and in general terms, the identified 
variables reveal substantial differences between the two groups of firms and several 
explanations for those differences are suggested. A subsequent and logical goal now is 
to understand how the variables interact with each other and how the influence of each 
factor, per se, or in interaction with other variables, can be explained. The next chapters 
will address those issues.  
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CHAPTER 11. FIRMS’ HISTORIES, DIVERGENCE PROCESSES AND 
SELECTION CRITERIA 
 
11.1 Introduction 
 
If the set of characteristics that distinguishes one group of firms from another is not 
coincidental or circumstantial, then one of the main issues to be addressed is how to 
explain the simultaneity of the identified constituents and how are they related to one 
another and to the innovative performance of the firm. The considerations exposed in the 
previous section about the differential pattern of each group gives only a snapshot of the 
present situation and does not give an entire explanation of why firms got where they are. 
What are the mechanisms underlying these trajectories and what caused firms to diverge 
in their path? These are the questions the answers to which I will now try to contribute. To 
that purpose maybe it will be useful to look at the history of the firms that were studied. 
When working within an evolutionary framework of analysis it is fundamental to 
consider the mechanisms and criteria of selection. Above we said that we simplified the 
matter by assuming that innovative performance was the measure of fitness and that the 
selection criteria were based on that. In reality, the matter is not so simple. Firms with 
varying degrees of achievement coexist, which calls for the identification of other 
selection mechanisms. On the other hand, firms with similar levels of innovative 
performance are selected according to other criteria. 
We recall that the methodology used in this study to address the preceding 
considerations consisted of matching together pairs of firms, one of which is labelled the 
“innovative” firm and the other one is labelled the “average” firm (cf. Chapter 2), thus 
forming two groups of firms, respectively the “innovative” and the “average” group. Table 
51 lists the case studies to follow (cf. also Annex A). 
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Table 51. Pairs of firms. 
   "Average" group    "Innovative" group  
         
Pair  Name Present products Size  Name Present products Size
 
         1  Arvorense Lorry bodies, agricultural 
machinery 
30  Herculano Agricultural machinery 200 
2  Vima Conveyors, dumpers 60  Mano Conveyors 110 
3  Avense Components for textile 
machinery, textile machinery, 
other machinery 
23  Industrial Components for textile 
machinery,  
textile machinery 
40 
4  Frama Wood-working machine-tools 82  Pinheiro Wood-working machine-tools 290 
5  Mecano- 
Textil 
Textile machinery 140  ACL Hydraulic components, lifting  
gear, presses, textile machinery 
70 
6  Maquisis Metal working tailor-made 
machine-tools 
19  Seri Metal working tailor-made 
machine-tools 
16 
7  Sersan Machine-tools for the cork 
industry 
25  Prensarte Machine-tools for the cork 
industry 
19 
8  Diarroca Components, presses 25  Adira Press brakes, guillotine shears, 
presses 
250 
9  Mecver Components, presses 49  Guifil Press brakes and guillotine 
shears 
103 
10      Efacec Electric power stations, electric 
and electronic machinery, 
software 
2500
 
Note: Size is measured by the total employees of the firms. 
 
Selection based on innovative performance seems to be the case in the example 
provided by pair 1 (although other factors were also important) where the firms were 
operating in the same environment (see below). In other cases, the environment itself is 
not homogeneous, but multifaceted, and the selection criteria are also multifaceted. In our 
study of the capital-goods sector we found that firms face an environment that is 
composed of firms with varying degrees of innovative performance or behaviour, thus 
characterised by the existence of several demand curves. The multidimensional nature of 
the environment implies that the criteria of selection and the variables on which the firms 
ultimately will be selected are also multidimensional. That fact partly explains the 
variability of performance and behaviour in the population of firms. To survive, a firm does 
not have necessarily to adopt all factors favourable to innovative performance. It will 
selectively adopt those that will make it better suited to the particular sub-environment on 
which it lives. 
In the following lines we will advance explanations of firms’ variational behaviour 
and performance based on the comparative analysis of the pairs of firms introduced 
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above and resorting to evolutionary theory and concepts. First we will describe and 
suggest explanations for the evolution of each firm, taken individually but always in the 
context of its pair. During that analysis the fundamental lines of reasoning and the core 
approach to the subject will emerge as it will be repeatedly applied to each case/pair. The 
systematisation of such an approach and such a line of reasoning will be made after the 
thorough exploration and analysis of each case study and it will result in the suggestion of 
generalisations and of a formal model and theoretical approach which will introduce a 
degree of analytical order into the various events described and previously analysed. 
Thus, this chapter is not only descriptive. As was said above, it aims also to prepare the 
ground, in a thorough manner, for the next one, which will generalise the individual 
analysis. Histories are written as off 1996. 
 
11.2 ARVORENSE and HERCULANO (Pair 1) – to be more equal than others  
 
Two firms that are both producers of agricultural machinery constitute pair 1. The pair is 
quite useful for our purposes because their product lines are very similar and their fates 
seem to be inextricably linked. It is the most comparable of all the pairs in the sample, not 
only because of the similarity of its product lines but also because of juxtaposition of its 
potential market. In this example the firms evolve in almost opposite directions after an 
initial balanced period. Both firms started from humble beginnings in the first half of the 
century, as one-man firms. The founders were blacksmiths forging basic manual 
agricultural tools such as shovels, axes, spades, rakes, etc. Both developed into family-
owned firms by the 1930s. They started manufacturing somewhat more complicated 
products such as ploughs and trailers adopting other techniques, e.g., foundries, casting 
and soldering, and subsequent introduction of machine-tools took place. By the 1950s the 
"innovative" firm reached an industrial stage, with production being fairly based on 
machines and greater division of labour, and not so much on handicraft methods. This 
stage was reached in 1960 by the "average" firm. By this time the main products were 
simple and special purpose trailers, ploughs and a closely connected family of products, 
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such as cultivators, drills and disk-harrows, all designed to be coupled to tractors (which 
were diffusing at a higher rate than before). 
 During that time, the sons of the founders had achieved different educational 
levels. Those from the innovative firm were educated at professional technical schools, 
while those of the average firm only went through basic school and learned their 
professional skills on the job. It is interesting to conjecture why it happened like this. Both 
families had similar backgrounds and enjoyed considerable success in their activities. 
Both were located relatively near to large cities and educational facilities. If sociological or 
geographical considerations are not enough, then the explanation for it can only be found 
at the psychological level. In this context of explaining innovation differentials, the event 
can only be considered as a random outcome of a complex and inscrutable process of 
the mind. It will have considerable consequences on the trajectories of each firm due to 
its "expanding" or cumulative features. This event can be considered as a point of 
divergence that will drive the two firms in different directions, as the impact of the 
occurrence will have an effect on the future of the firms. This event will have considerable 
impacts on the trajectories of each firms.  
 The implications of such social-technical decisions on innovative performance 
begin to show up in differences in the characteristics of the products, the complexity of 
the products within reach of each firm, the modes of organisation, techniques of 
management and cost reduction strategies. The situation worsens as the educational lag 
deepens even further. The owners of the innovative firm attains university level while 
those of the average one attain only secondary vocational technical level. The 
implications for cumulative learning and the expansion of the knowledge base are 
increasingly important, affecting all aspects of the firms, in a positive way for the 
innovative firm and in negative way for the average firm. The situation is worsened by the 
fact that the firms are direct competitors. Eventually the average firm is unable to cope 
with competitive pressures and in order to survive it has to resort to another market, 
meaning a simpler product and actually moving backwards, because it ceased to 
exercise all its skills. 
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 But these repercussions will not be felt immediately. Let us see now how they 
occurred. In the early 1970s both firms engaged in ambitious expansion projects and they 
both diversified into new product lines. However, considerable differences began to show 
up in the characteristics of the products. The new mechanical techniques learned in the 
technical schools, the theoretical context in which they were taught, as well as the 
ancillary disciplines related to production management and accounting practices started 
to express themselves in the form of more reliable products, better applications of 
pneumatic devices, and more cost reduction savings later invested. Later, the educational 
lag deepened even further. The third generation of the innovative firm was educated at 
university level, while the third generation of the average firm was educated at vocational 
technical level, the level at which the previous generation of the innovative firm was 
educated. The social networks in which the firms are now immersed are very separate. 
The implications for cumulative learning and the expansion of the knowledge base are 
crucial. 
 Those implications become visibly clear when the innovative firm started to hire 
engineers, in the early 1980s, and re-structured its organisation to include a department 
concerned only with design and development. Its products were subject to increasing 
refinements, namely at the level of new materials, improved finishing, broader 
applications and sophistication of hydraulic components and controls, and new designs in 
mechanical parts to improve coupling with the power source, and the ease and reliability 
of operation. Planning procedures multiplied, reaching every type of activity of the firm, 
from the operations level to the investment level. Continuous training became a routine 
activity and was applied at every level. 
 By the early-mid 1980s the products were widely superior to those manufactured 
by the other firm and the range of products was broader. Sales grew and were now 
affecting directly the sales of the other firm, which were sinking for some time. 
 Other important events also took place. The innovative firm adopted an 
aggressive marketing policy, definitely abandoning its regional tradition towards a 
national dimension. It built an ever-growing network of representative agents, which not 
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only sold their products but also provided technical assistance, with personnel trained by 
the firm. It started to export in the mid 1980s, first to Africa then, very soon, to France, a 
market that proved to be more regular and consistent than Africa. They now export 
around 30% of their production of which 80% is destined for France, Spain and Germany. 
They also have engaged themselves in sub-contracting activities with French and 
German firms. They have agents in all those countries. Recently they built two factories in 
African countries and are now trying to build one in France. They have also been involved 
in several co-operation agreements with universities, both at the training level, and at the 
development level (in an application of optic devices to planners). In the early 1990s the 
firm embarked on a huge investment that covered building of new plants, acquisition of 
new automated production machinery including a robot, automation at the level of 
administration, accounting, production costs control, stock management and CAD. 
 In the meantime the other firm acted quite differently. During the 1970s the firm 
also expanded and diversified into somewhat more sophisticated products, such as 
frontal loading cranes to adapt to tractors and other functionally differentiated machinery 
to be coupled to tractors (the other firm was also active in most of these product lines). 
However, these products demanded a design expertise that was gradually surpassing the 
skills embodied in the personnel of the firm. Knowledge of mathematical and geometrical 
principles, and techniques necessary to design articulated components and parts, were 
either out of reach of the present knowledge base of the firm or were becoming more and 
more costly to learn (generally involving numerous trial and error experiments not guided 
by a solid theoretical background). However, the firm did not manage to circumvent that 
obstacle by hiring skilled engineers, for instance, or by resorting to external technical 
advisors, even though they were aware of the developments going on in the innovative 
firm. The lack of action may have been caused by lack of funds, or inability to see beyond 
their present circumstances, relying excessively on their own capacities, or insufficient 
risk taking attitudes. Whatever the case, the firm went on a downward spiralling course. 
No new acquisitions of machinery or improvements on the existing stock were made. The 
machinery they now possess is twenty-five years old and virtually unchanged. No 
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attempts were made to expand beyond their regional level of activity. Sales relied on 
market arrangements with sales outlets that were increasingly reluctant to buy their 
products. Many were now agents for the other firm. Sales sunk by the mid-1980s, at 
which time the firm decided to concentrate on manufacturing and repairing lorry bodies, 
relying on the knowledge and the machinery they acquired when manufacturing 
agricultural trailers. Note that the capacity required to build lorry bodies is lower than that 
required building trailers, since the later often incorporated additional devices and 
machinery to serve explicit functions (pumps, motors, pressure gauges, etc.). In this 
sense, the firm followed an unlearning path because it ceased to apply on a repetitive 
basis the skills and knowledge it once applied. 
 
The above comparison is an extreme one, where on the one hand we have one firm 
steadily building in a cumulative way its capacities and achieving considerable success, 
and on the other hand we have a firm that is strikingly characterised by the incapacity to 
move ahead from where it stands, and actually moving backwards, because it ceased to 
exercise all its skills. 
But the story could have turned in another way, had the average firm chosen at 
least to act in specific areas that could mitigate the limitations of their knowledge base. It 
could, for instance, have improved its capital stock, enabling the production of better 
quality products, even if that implied divesting some of their range of products. The same 
applies for training activities. It seems, however, that their main problem was at the level 
of construing a coherent course of action and their incapacity to react to changing 
circumstances. 
 
11.3 VIMA and MANO (Pair 2) – when innovative capacity is not enough  
 
The example provided by pair 2 depicts a situation where several factors are already in 
place, specifically high educational levels, upgraded production machinery and a rather 
well defined strategy, but where divergence between the two firms occurs at the level of 
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R&D and risk attitudes. Both firms produce conveyors or conveyor systems for handling 
intermediate stages of the production process.  
 The average firm relies on the technological knowledge of the owner/managers, 
who have been together since the inception of the firm, thirty years ago, and who are in 
charge of every aspect of the product cycle, from conception and design to production. 
There are no clear boundaries between departments, and none of them is exclusively 
concerned with development. They produce good but relatively non-demanding products. 
They only build conveyor systems to transport unitary solid components. The integration 
between mechanics, electronics and software is reached at a relatively simple level, were 
the path is essentially linear and the bifurcation decisions involve simple algorithms. On 
the other hand, the innovative firm has an R&D department and it pours many resources 
into development work and hiring new engineers for R&D activities. The products are of 
better quality and reliability, and they build systems that are not only able to deal with 
unitary solid components but also with continuous non-solid components. It produces 
also complex, integrated large systems that the other firm is unable to do, due to lack of 
personnel and its lower capacity to integrate complementary technologies such as 
software and electronics. The innovative firm exports 40% of its production to France and 
England while the other firm serves the domestic market. It seems apparent that the firms 
diverged due to the way they took advantage of their knowledge base and how 
cumulative effects building on their technical know-how enhanced the performance of one 
firm against the other. In this case, the relevant factors are related to risk attitude and the 
greater strategic importance attributed to R&D activities.  
 
 The father of the present Director/Owner and another partner established the 
innovative firm in 1961. Initially it was dedicated only to the commercialisation and 
servicing of agriculture equipment imported from Germany, but very soon it initiated its 
own production. It specialised since its beginnings in the production of conveyors and 
transportation systems. Initially the production was geared towards the agricultural sector 
and the machines were quite small and simple. Basically they were made of a metallic 
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structure usually 3 metres long with small wheels, and a motor linked to a transmission 
system based on chains that moved a belt. Its purpose was to load cargo into vehicles. 
The educational level of both partners did not exceed the 5
th
 year of schooling. The know-
how was based on previous experience, observation of similar products and mechanical 
tinkering by the partners.  
 Although the products were quite simple, by the end of the 1960s there was 
already visible a considerable product diversification. Based on the same basic pattern 
and structure they produced a diversity of conveyors adapted and modified to serve 
different purposes, i.e., adapted to transport different types of agricultural products. Since 
the beginning, production was based in a rather narrow product definition but with a 
rather broad approach within that narrow definition. Its marketing approach was precisely 
based on tailor-made production, adapted to different products.  
 The sectoral narrowness of its client base, initially restricted to the agricultural 
sector, was soon enlarged to comprise other sectors of activity. The technical evolution of 
the firm was apparently regular although there were some difficulties along the way. It 
certainly benefited from the expansionist economic period of the 1960’s and early 1970’s 
and it probably suffered with the recessions of the mid 1970s and early 1980s but the firm 
enjoyed steady success and it enjoyed also regular growth. It started to export to the then 
Portuguese African colonies. It hired technically trained personnel and the son of one of 
the founders (and the successor of his father) went through higher education and 
assumed the control of the firm in the early 1980s. 
 This man is optimistic relative to the future prospects of the firm. His optimism 
relies on the positive evaluation that he makes of the soon to came accession of Portugal 
to the EEC. This event represents to him the possibility to access the large European 
market. To prepare the firm for that event there was a large investment in buildings and 
machinery in the early 1980s (1982-1983) which represented a turning point to the firm 
and a considerable upgrade in technical and production terms. The cost of capital was 
extremely high (an interest rate of 30% per year) and to optimise that investment the firm 
also bet heavily on product development and started to seek actively for large customers. 
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It set up a department solely concerned with product development with a total personnel 
of fifteen people, of which 3 were mechanical engineers.  There were also engineers in 
charge of production and in the marketing department. Following its initial intentions the 
firm started to export to the European market but it faced more difficulties than expected 
and the initial optimistic expectations were never quite fulfilled. The maximum share of 
total sales they were able to export reached only 40%, which although quite a 
considerable figure seemed not enough to sustain the debt acquired with the investment.  
 The main foreign clients were in France and in England. The firm acted 
essentially as a sub-contractor and it manufactured in large series for foreign clients. 
Technical relationships between them and contractors were intense. Usually the clients 
requested a solution to a problem formulated in generic terms. The problem was 
generally one of automation of warehouses or production lines. The firm is now quite 
distant from the production of single small units for the agriculture sector. Now its main 
products are complex and large integrated systems for large clients, be they national 
(such as systems for large national manufacturers of consumer products, systems for 
handling mail at the post office, systems for handling luggage at the airport, etc.) or 
international (usually involving much larger quantities and serial production). The solution 
proposed by the firm to the situation and specifications described by the contractor is very 
detailed, involving project conception, engineering, the precise definition of the machines 
and its principles and modes of operation, the specification of the transport lines, etc. 
Afterwards there are many meetings and contacts with the contractors to define and 
make precise every technical detail. Prototypes are often manufactured and sent to the 
contractors for testing and eventual redesign before any production starts. Asides from its 
own technical and scientific capacity and the knowledge shared with the contractors the 
firm also has regular collaboration with consultants from other firms in the sector. 
 The main competence of the firm is in the mechanical area. Almost everything 
related to electric and electronic components is contracted out. The firm maintains only a 
small competence in terms of electric components. Personnel are submitted to regular 
training in the national specialised centres linked to the professional association. 
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Occasionally other firms provided training. On the whole there is a preoccupation to keep 
the skills of the production personnel updated, asides from or in line with its concern with 
the need to keep highly qualified engineers on product development. Thus the firm 
contains all the ingredients, at least at a reasonable level, necessary to be quite 
successful in terms of innovative performance and capability, which it is.  
But there are other factors in this case that will complicate the equation, namely 
those linked to strategy, planning and marketing. The weak points of the firm are to be 
found there. But before referring to them lets us take a look at the average firm. 
 
The average firm was founded at around the same time as the innovative firm, only one 
year later in 1962. Contrary to its innovative counterpart it was founded by highly trained 
people, namely three engineers (one mechanical engineer and one electric engineer 
devoted to product development and production, and one electric engineer with 
administrative functions). Before setting up the firm these three individuals worked on a 
large firm that imported motors and provided technical assistance to their owners. The 
engineers were linked to the technical services provided by that firm. Later this firm 
started the production of components. It is then that the three engineers, profiting from 
the know-how acquired on such activities and from the strategic decision of the firm do 
divest certain lines, decide to start their own firm acquiring the buildings and the 
equipment allocated to production and technical maintenance of the motors from the 
large firm. The firm started with the production of dumpers and conveyors. 
Similarly to the innovative firm, the firm will profit from a particularly good 
economic environment in the 1960s and early 1970s. Until the mid 1970s all goes well for 
the firm. In the mid 1970s the recession imposed hardship on the firm. One of the initial 
partners decided to quit and a new partner/engineer took his place together with some 
employees that acquire a minority share. By the late 1970s the firm seems to take its feet 
and decides to start a new product line, namely the manufacture of forklift trucks, a 
product that combines the two other product lines (dumpers and conveyors) in one. The 
technology employed by the firm also enjoyed an upgrade. Hydraulic principles replaced 
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mechanical principles which resulted in the introduction of hydrostatic transmission and 
brakes in the forklift trucks, and the introduction of hydraulic movement of the container of 
the dumpers. The main change in the conveyors was the diversity of design they were 
enjoying.  Production was also subject to re-organisation. In 1986 it was again subject to 
expansion investment and it benefited from the expansion of the economy. Unlike the 
innovative firm, investment seldom was made by resorting to the bank. In most cases the 
firm used its own funds and it only resorted to the bank for short-term (1 year) loans. One 
of the partners also left the firm. Equity was now evenly distributed between 4 partners 
(which included the minority ex-employees). Conveyors were now the main products 
representing 70% of total sales. The product was subject to a substantial technological 
upgrade specifically with the introduction of electronics and computer control. Above all, 
the product was now designed as a system and not as a single product. Involvement of 
the client became more important and decisive to the success of the product. 
Unlike the innovative firm the average firm relies on the technological knowledge 
of the owner/managers, who have been together since the inception of the firm more than 
thirty years ago and who are in charge of every aspect of the product cycle, from 
conception and design to production. There are no clear boundaries between 
departments, and none of them is exclusively concerned with development. They 
produce good but relatively non-demanding products. They only build conveyor systems 
to transport unitary solid components. The integration between mechanics, electronics 
and software is reached at a relatively simple level, were the path is essentially linear and 
the bifurcation decisions involve simple algorithms. On the other hand, the innovative firm 
has an R&D department and it pours many resources into development work, and hiring 
new engineers for R&D activities. The products are of better quality and reliability, and 
they build systems that are not only able to deal with unitary solid components but also 
with continuous non-solid components. It produces also complex, integrated large 
systems that the other firm is unable or unwilling to do, due to lack of personnel and its 
lower capacity to integrate complementary technologies such as software and 
electronics. The innovative firm exports 40% of its production to France and England 
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while the other firm serves the domestic market and exports a small share of its 
production (5% of total sales) to not very demanding clients in African countries. 
 
It seems apparent that the firms diverged due to the way they took advantage of their 
knowledge base and how cumulative effects building on their technical know-how 
enhanced the performance of one firm against the other. In this case, the relevant factors 
are related to risk attitude and the greater strategic importance attributed to R&D 
activities. However there are some caveats in the behaviour of the innovative firm. The 
risky and large investment that the firm made in 1982-1983 was apparently not based on 
thorough market research and a well conceived and structured plan. It apparently relied 
to a great extent on non-substantiated subjective perceptions of the owner. The size of 
the investment would also require the firm to maintain a minimum regular production 
scale (i.e., mass production). The machines acquired by the firm were not prepared for 
batch production nor did the firm have such a perspective in mind. In fact they wanted to 
get away from that mode of production which had characterised its modum operandi 
since its early days, as described. There was apparently also a certain disregard for 
market activities. For instance the firm did not have a permanent physical structure or 
representative in the UK, which was the country where one of its main contractors was 
based. It also did not diversify enough its client base and its export markets, making it 
dependent on a few contractors based on only two countries. When France and the UK 
entered a period of recession in the early 1990s the firm was not prepared with 
alternatives to face the shrinking demand from the firms in those countries which 
constituted, by virtue of the large nature of their orders, the main clients supporting the 
scale production strategy of the firm. When the agreements with those firms broke down 
the remaining clients were essentially the national clients and these ones were not large 
enough to support the mass production strategy of the firm. Against its will the firm had to 
resort again to tailor-made production but the existing physical and cost structure was not 
aimed at such an activity. The strategic approach to mass production instead of batch 
production seems to be the main problem behind the situation of the firm. Its choice was 
  
221 
too bold and risky and it run against the trends of the time. The average firm, on the other 
hand, relied more and more on batch production and less and less on the products more 
conducive to mass production (dumpers and forklift trucks). It maintained always a light 
structure and expansion was made with caution and by the cheapest possible way (i.e., 
avoiding large loans). 
In 1992 the situation was becoming untenable for the innovative firm due to debt 
escalation. It was then confronted with two alternatives. Either merge the firm with a 
foreign multinational or sell 50% of its equity to a venture capital organisation. It chose 
the last one trying to maintain power over the firm. But the situation did not improve. 
Recession was slow to reverse trends or its effects on the firm, in part because of the 
nature of the equipment goods sector, which is the first to feel the effects of the recession 
and the last to feel the economic recovery, and the financial situation worsened. The firm 
is now close to ceasing its activities. This example is curious, in terms of selection criteria, 
in the sense that the more innovative and dynamic firm is the one for which survival 
prospects are more reduced. The cause is not linked to lack of product development or to 
the quality of the products but rather to a deficient global strategy or to a deficient 
implementation of that strategy. The situation can be explained by the fact that the risk 
attitude was not accompanied by adequate management support, namely lack of rational 
prospective market research and insufficient marketing. 
 
 
 
11.4 AVENSE and INDUSTRIAL (Pair 3) – surviving with a limited knowledge 
base  
 
The histories of the firms in pair 3 illustrates how firms face several alternatives to 
improve their chances of success, even if there are intrinsic limitations in the knowledge 
base. Both firms manufactured mechanical looms, but competition from abroad seriously 
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challenged their chances of survival. The educational level in both firms was at the 
secondary technical level.  
The innovative firm decided to abandon the production of looms because, after 
several attempts to upgrade its product, it concluded that it was not in a position or willing 
to take further risky investments in development activities. After a long search for 
alternatives it identified a family of products for which it perceived enough demand 
opportunities that, coupled with the firm’s specific knowledge and cost advantages, would 
render its production feasible and lucrative. The product niche on which it grounded itself 
was in complementary machinery for the textile industry (lifting and transport gear). It also 
continued to manufacture components for looms. At first, the same mechanical skills 
used in the construction of looms were applied to the new product lines, then it gradually 
added hydraulic and other electric means of control. Over the years there was a 
persistent concern with the upgrading of the product and with the production machinery to 
fulfil quality requirements and cost constraints. It has also maintained uninterrupted 
efforts to keep abreast of new developments in the sector, by participating in international 
fairs, other important events, and in maintaining contacts with production engineers in 
customer firms. Most of its clients are large textile firms and it exports components to 
Swiss textile firms. 
 The firm in the average group persisted in the manufacturing of mechanical 
looms, although demand was shrinking daily. It did not attempt to improve its educational 
level and knowledge base, nor did its attempts to improve its products, based always on 
a mechanical paradigm, bear any results. Search activities were scarce and the firm did 
not find a viable alternative. It began to rely more and more on component production and 
repair of old machines still in operation in local textile firms. Eventually it began to accept 
and look for any opportunity to manufacture components, even if not directly related to 
the textile sector. Occasionally it finds a local customer that still wants a machine (not 
looms) based on mechanical operation, well within its technical capabilities and 
knowledge base that has remained virtually unchanged. No resources were spent in 
training the workforce and no investments in new machinery or improvements in existing 
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machinery were made. It now seeks desperately a market niche on which to survive but 
its efforts in scanning and search activities are weak and restricted. 
 
The innovative firm was established in 1942 in the place where it is today. It 
started with the production of looms and other machines for the textile sector. The father 
of the present owner/manager founded it. The family had a tradition of working in the 
metallurgic sector. The father of the founder was involved in the maintenance of 
machines for the textile sector and the grandfather of the owner was himself skilled in the 
trade (apparently he adapted old guns). 
The products were based on mechanical principles. All looms were mechanical 
with no automatic devices whatsoever. The mechanical tinkering of the founder was the 
fundamental technical and knowledge asset of the firm but it was also its greatest liability 
in terms of management. By 1958 the firm was technically bankrupt and the cause had 
more to do with deficient management in terms of cost control than with the inability to 
sell the product. The son of the founder took over the management of the firm and the 
founder was committed only to the technical function. The firm initiated a difficult period of 
financial recovery that lasted some years. The persistence of the present manager and 
his acute cost-consciousness avoided the collapse of the firm. The production lines 
remained the same, namely looms, adaptation and upgrading of old looms and other 
machines for the textile industry, but sales were decreasing due to the increasing 
technical obsolescence of the products, particularly the looms which remained essentially 
the same. The technological improvements in the looms were basically based on change 
of design to accommodate and adapt the machinery to the manufacture of different 
pieces of cloth or to work with different types of tissue. They also adapted some devices 
that rendered the looms semi-automated. However, competition from large European 
manufacturers with technologically advanced machines and the ever-shrinking base of 
national clients compounded the difficulties of the firm. 
After several attempts to upgrade its product, the firm decided to abandon the 
production of looms because it concluded that it was not in a position nor was it willing to 
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undertake further risky investments in development activities. Probably this decision 
involved a conflict between the technical interests and tinkering of the father and the 
pragmatism and cost-consciousness of the son. After a long search for alternatives the 
firm (through its manager who was now in full control and the main autocratic driving 
force of the firm) identified in 1968 a family of products in which it perceived enough 
demand opportunities that, coupled with the firm’s specific knowledge and cost 
advantages, would render its production feasible and lucrative. The new product family 
was not manufactured by any other firm domestically (everything until now was imported) 
a factor that weighed heavily in the choice of the product (the firm could manufacture the 
product with a price advantage relative to foreign competitors, aside from the fact that it 
could provide more timely product assistance). The necessary know-how to manufacture 
the product was well in reach of the firm. As in other examples mentioned in this study, 
there is here a unlearning movement by the firm when it switches to another simpler 
product line, but in this case it is followed by a learning movement concerned with the 
constant improvement of the simpler product. The product niche in which it grounded 
herself was in complementary machinery for the textile industry (lifting and transport 
gear). It also continued to manufacture components for looms. At first, the same 
mechanical skills used in the construction of looms were applied to the new product lines, 
and then it gradually added hydraulic and other electric means of control. Over the years 
there was a persistent concern with the upgrading of the product and with the production 
machinery to fulfil quality requirements (quality control is a current practice and it is 
contracted out) and cost constraints. Existing production machinery was upgraded and 
new machinery was acquired some five years ago. The production machinery is not very 
sophisticated (no CNC machines for instance) but it is sufficient to manufacture with the 
required quality and at the required cost, or in other words, the cost structure is light and 
good enough to maintain an acceptable quality. The firm has also maintained 
uninterrupted efforts to keep abreast of new developments in the sector, by participating 
in international fairs, other important events, and in maintaining contacts with production 
engineers in customer firms. It is also through these actions that the firm publicises itself 
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and searches for clients. Most of its clients are large textile firms and it exports 
components to Swiss manufacturers of textile equipment and textile firms. Nowadays 
high quality components represent 80% of production and manufacture of machinery 
represents only 20%. All decision-making is centralised in the owner. He performs 
managerial, technical and even administrative functions. The knowledge base of the firm 
derives from the knowledge base of the owner and from a few skilled workers trained on 
the job by the owner or his father and with no formal secondary education.  
 
The average firm was established in 1970. It originated from a workshop dedicated to 
metallic structures for the construction sector. It started with the production of mechanical 
looms. The owner was a local capitalist with interests in other business asides from this 
factory. He was not therefore closely involved in the day to day management of the firm, 
which was done by its employees. The firm was quite successful, serving the regional 
market and at its peak its personnel numbered 90 people. When it was founded in 1970 it 
was equipped with up-to-date production equipment including automatic mechanical 
lathes. A foundry for iron and non-iron metals was also installed. Besides the looms it 
manufactured components and parts for textile machines. 
 The future of the firm was decisively affected by the fall of the regime in 1974. It 
was one of the firms that felt the socialist political contours of the agitated post-
revolutionary period. In 1975 the owner was dispossessed from the firm and the workers 
took control of it. It was not nationalised, as others were, but it entered in a collective 
regime of ownership. This was the fate of the firms that belonged to important capitalists 
with dispersed interests, which was the case of the owner. Similar firms whose owner 
was also the manager were not subject to this fate. The firm entered into what was called 
“auto-management”. All decisions were taken in meetings that included all the workers. 
Decisions were extensively discussed between them and then submitted to vote. The firm 
operated under these conditions until 1986. The firm profited from its good regional 
position and from its knowledge base (not directly linked to the owner but to its 
employees, unlike other firms not belonging to large capitalist groups) in order to survive 
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which it did with no excessive difficulty at least until early 1980s. It continued to 
manufacture mechanical looms for regional clients and to maintain the machines it had 
sold previously. These two main lines of activity sustained the firm.  
 In 1986 the firm was bought (from the expelled but still legal owner; the political 
situation had stabilised in the meantime) by a returned emigrant that had worked 
previously in the firm. This man worked for 15 years in SKF, Germany, as team leader on 
a production line manufacturing ball bearings. He had secondary level professional 
education acquired in Portugal before emigrating (his previous stay in the firm was in the 
context of the training period done at the end of the course). It is worthy to mention that 
this phenomena, i.e., productive investment by returned emigrants, is probably a very 
important phenomena in terms of explaining the industrialisation process in Portugal 
which we have already mentioned in another section of this study (cf. section on the 
Economic System) where it is mentioned the importance of capital investment in industry 
by returned emigrants from Brazil in the 19
th
 century. Unfortunately this is a topic which 
has seldom been the object of systematic research. In this century the returned emigrants 
from Europe acquire an important dimension and perhaps not only and simply as the 
source of important money transfer (the most referred to impact in social or economic 
studies of emigrants). This transaction marked a discontinuity in the trajectory of the firm. 
The new owner brought with him new knowledge and a new style of management. Note, 
however, that the conditions in which he worked in Germany (in large and modern 
production lines of a firm supplying a large consumer market) were hardly replicated in 
the small factory in Portugal. In spite of his knowledge, based on on-the-job experience, 
the theoretical foundations of his technical knowledge were considerably limited. Those 
limitations would be important barriers for future attempts of product development 
resulting in excessive development time, excessive development costs and, sometimes, 
insurmountable technical bottlenecks. Another set of limitations refers to the inability to 
upgrade the production machinery. The firm avoided resorting to banks due to the high 
interest rates and due to the perception that the textile sector was going through a deep 
crisis with an uncertain future. It applies for state subsidies but without success. 
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Ultimately investment capital came from the family of the new owner, at an insignificant 
interest rate. This cheap capital is probably the main factor behind the survival of the firm. 
 Production of looms based on the same old principles was definitely abandoned 
because there was no demand for the machines. The textile firms that had old machines 
and could not acquire new ones were facing severe difficulties due to the technological 
obsolescence of the machines and its reflection in terms of production costs and quality 
of the product. The firm tried the modification and upgrading of existing machines still in 
operation, involving conversion from the principle of the “flying shuttle” to the principle of 
the “lance”, based on the imitation of looms that the owner saw abroad. But the costs of 
transforming a machine soon exceeded the cost of acquiring a new imported machine 
with the same principle.  Another improvement introduced in the old machines was an 
electric circuit to control the colour of the thread. An individual not belonging to the firm 
made it. It was also based on the imitation and simplification of an existing version on the 
market. The decision of the firm to manufacture itself the circuit, instead of buying it out in 
the market was based on two orders of reasoning: one was that the cost of the circuits 
available in the market was too high and they wanted to reduce the costs, and hence the 
price of the loom, and the other was that it allowed the firm to carry out the maintenance 
later on if necessary, instead of replacing the entire circuit by another expensive one 
bought on the market. One can see that this description reveals the type of client base 
the firm was dealing with now, essentially characterised by small firms, technologically 
laggard and financially limited. 
 Due to the difficulties faced in the manufacture of looms, the firm relied more and 
more on the production of parts and components and the maintenance of machines. At 
first the firm was almost exclusively geared towards the textile sector but the 
transformations suffered by this sector after the mid-1980s had reflections in the client 
base of the firm. There were several factors at stake. The sector as a whole had acquired 
new production equipment based on technological know-how not available by the firm. 
There was also a large death rate among the firms of the sector affecting precisely those 
firms that still used the technology familiar to the firm. The large investment of the firm in 
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moulds for replacement of parts was almost completely outdated. The technological 
change in the materials sector had also affected the demand for parts. Many of the 
components of looms were now made in materials other than steel or iron, the only 
materials for which the firm was prepared. Nevertheless, the manufacture of components 
and parts was rapidly becoming the activity that sustained the firm. The foundry, in spite 
of its technological backwardness, and because the firm still had some useful and 
specialised know-how in the manufacture of some non-ferrous parts, still made a profit. 
Because of the factors described above it now accepted and sought orders from any 
sector. However it faced competition from several sides; from unemployed metallurgic 
workers that were now self-employed after buying a second-hand lathe and making their 
own parts at home and from foreign firms that have other scale conditions. 
 After finally quitting the production or upgrading of looms and realising that the 
production of parts and components based on limited technological know-how and limited 
equipment machinery was a business prone to too much competition and risk, the firm 
tried to find an alternative machinery product line. Now its main goal, aside from its daily 
struggle to find orders for parts and components, was to find and define a niche on which 
to survive. In 1990-1991 after the expression of the need of a client the firm started to 
produce machines to stretch and cut tissue. Based again on the visual observation of 
existing machines or photos of machines that perform those functions the firm developed 
its own machine based on the mechanical principles it understood. Even so it had some 
difficulties in the design of some parts, particularly those that were related to the 
transmission and transformation of mechanical movement. Solution to those technical 
problems was only possible by resorting to the technical know-how of students of a 
technological centre. All electric motors and parts are bought out. The production of these 
machines now represents 20% of total sales. Occasionally it also manufactures specific 
one-off machines. Regional demand is reduced and the firm does not want or does not 
have the funds to engage in export activities. As such, its goal to find and define a market 
niche remains a priority. 
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The example above shows that the combination of a limited number of factors may result 
in significant improvements in the prospects of the firm (recall the innovative firm’s 
history). In spite of modest educational levels and knowledge capacities, commitment and 
investment differences in production machinery and search activities and a clear 
visionary strategic perspective gave fruit, and the point at which these decisions were 
made marked defining divergence points in the history of the firms. 
 
11.5 FRAMA and PINHEIRO (Pair 4) – David and Goliath?  
 
The following narrative compares the trajectories of two firms manufacturing woodworking 
machine tools, examining how the firms diverged in incorporating several factors and how 
those decisions were contingent upon their situations and how they were affected. Pair 4 
is an example where limited doses of carefully chosen ingredients are sometimes crucial 
to the innovative performance of the firm ant its prospect of survival.  
 The innovative firm was founded in 1929, starting from the first moment with the 
manufacture of a complete product, namely pumps, initially entirely manually operated 
and afterwards, with petrol motors. The firm remained in this product line for ten years, 
gradually changing to the manufacture of machines for the woodworking sector, a sector 
that was quite strong in the region. It first started to manufacture table circular saws to cut 
planks and then large circular or straight saws to cut trunks. During the Second World 
War it proved difficult for the woodworking industrial sector to obtain imported machinery 
and the firm took advantage of this opportunity and started manufacturing its first 
complete machines for the sector. These machines were the so-called "charriots", after its 
French name, which were basically an apparatus to hold a trunk into whatever position is 
required and then cut it into planks with a large circular saw or with a straight blade. The 
manufacture of pumps was abandoned and the firm dedicated itself to the manufacture of 
this product. Initially, the firm provided machinery for the upstream part of the wood-
working sector, i.e., for those factories that made the initial processing of the tree, and not 
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for the downstream activities of joiners, carpenters and the like. Later, it diversified into 
this sub-sector. 
 The firm had, since its beginnings, the ability to get and import ideas and 
techniques from the producers of other countries (especially European, and later, from 
the United States), many of them under formal contracts, and it has continued to operate 
in much the same way until the present day, combining its own internal capabilities with 
the technological knowledge contracted or obtained abroad. The basic technology for the 
first charriots came from Italy, and was based on the construction of concrete columns (to 
support the trunk) and mechanical means of transmission of motion. Later, the whole 
apparatus was made in steel and iron. The firm had its own foundry and made its own 
moulds. Motion and cutting was still mechanically transmitted or controlled, and some 
operations had to be done manually with the help of mechanical devices, namely rolling 
the trunk over its support base. 
 The technology of the firm evolved slowly. Until the early 1960s, asides from 
changes in design, the only substantial development was the introduction of a mechanical 
device to deal with the rotational movement of the trunk. In the meantime, the firm began 
to diversify into other product lines, namely into lighter machinery to serve the 
downstream wood-working sub-sector. It also started to export to African countries (to the 
ex-Portuguese colonies; by then still under Portuguese control, so the term export is not 
completely adequate). By the mid-to-late 1960s, the first engineers came into place in the 
firm and a small number of personnel were allocated to design and development 
activities. The technology of the firm improved rapidly after that. Pneumatic and hydraulic 
components replaced the old mechanical devices. After a quick passage through 
electrical means of control, it adopted and implemented electronic devices in its 
machinery. Once again, the technological leap was accomplished by an enhancement of 
its internal capabilities through the absorption of external sources of technology acquired 
by formal procedures. It strengthened its internal capabilities with highly trained personnel 
and it reinforced its knowledge and technological base through formal contract 
agreements with external producers. In the early 1970s it started to export to the 
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Mahgreb and to some Asian countries under a licence from a German manufacturer (and 
using the same brand, which was its trick to open the export market doors). It was its first 
experience in foreign markets, other than the internal Portuguese overseas market. The 
electronic components were developed in co-operation with a French firm that designed 
and manufactured the circuits, which the firm then assembled. The exports to Europe 
started in the mid 1970s, first for Holland, then to Switzerland. The firm continued to 
steadily upgrade its products by improving its design, efficiency, reliability and overall 
quality, incorporating hydraulic or pneumatic components wherever possible and 
augmenting and perfecting the electronic control systems. This was accomplished by 
resorting to a variety of external sources, including domestic universities and foreign 
firms. Some of these contacts were based on a one-off contact, particularly those with 
people from the universities, and characterised by an informal nature. Generally, there 
was a person from a university that showed an interest in a particular problem faced by 
the firm and offered help. The firm continued to seek actively abroad for technological 
opportunities or for products that it could profitably manufacture and it made several 
formal contracts of a diverse nature. In the early 1980s more emphasis was put on the 
export market and in the mid 1980s it entered the U.S. market. 
 The 1970s was not only characterised by an improvement in the knowledge base 
of the firm but it was, in general, a period of great expansion. It embarked on serial 
production of machines, especially for the downstream woodworking sector, and 
considerable investments in plant and production machinery were made, alongside an 
increase in R&D personnel. This was accompanied by a general expansion in export 
markets and in the supporting commercialisation structure in those markets. 
 The product portfolio of the firm could now be divided in two main product lines: 
machines for the upstream sub-sector (essentially charriots), and machines for the 
downstream sub-sector whose diversity was reduced to planners, matchers, moulders 
and ripsaws (or machines combining these functions). These latest machines operated 
using the same principles and their construction was very similar. The choice of the 
portfolio reflected the serial production approach pursued by the firm. 
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 However, the firm was to lose its competitiveness in serial production in the late 
1980s. The loss of competitiveness was not caused by lack of development or 
improvements in their products. It has steadily improved its products in its two main 
product lines. Improved designs, more characteristics and capacity, more energy 
efficiency, were all improvements that have been introduced. Several operations were 
combined in one machine (allowing, for instance, a plank to be cut in all its six sides at 
the same time). Quality improvements in materials were continuously introduced and the 
machines were made more robust. Electronic systems for positioning and overall 
numerical control are now standard features of the machines. It introduced laser 
technology in the ripsaws and in the charriots for the precision alignment of the plank or 
trunk and its posterior precision cut. The charriots themselves are not sold separately 
now, but as an integral part of a complete system that encompasses all the production 
stages of a wood mill. In general, its products may not be the best in the market place but 
they are surely above average. 
 Their problems with serial production arose on the one hand from rapidly 
changing external factors, among them changing consumer requirements, which are now 
more sophisticated and specialised, which, in turn, require specialised machines and not 
standard ones (although the demand for standard machines may be rising in other non-
European and non-American, less demanding markets in which the firm had problems in 
entering; they complain, for instance, that their European competitors enjoyed the political 
support of their respective governments in facilitating large-scale commercial 
arrangements with client markets, something that the Portuguese government did not 
do). Increased competition from the Asian NICs was another important factor that 
affected the firm. On the other hand, difficulties also arose from deficiencies in the firm’s 
own production process, which was not fully optimised, or not as much as it should have 
been to compete in and with external markets. Some production practices were not 
modified (for instance, abandoning construction based on foundry and moulds in favour 
of soldering techniques, to avoid piling costs in immobilised moulds) and the firm did not 
engage in much sub-contracting, relying perhaps excessively on in-house production of 
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much of the machine. Its efforts in the rationalisation of the production process came 
across several difficulties. It tried to implement a central computerised system to manage 
all aspects of production but the coexistence of two types of production modes (one 
based on serial production and another on single machines) complicated and reduced the 
efficiency of the system. However, a great deal of the production process is controlled in 
this way (e.g., stocks, materials, times, costs), but the system was not perfected. The 
environment in which the firm operates is also not very friendly to more demanding 
management techniques, such as JIT (Just-in-Time), due to repeated lack of observance 
by the suppliers. Even the internal habits and routines of workers proved difficult to 
change. The firm is now very committed to improve the efficiency of its production 
processes. It has hired consultants and commissioned studies to look at the problems 
and possible solutions. 
 The firm realised that, in order to survive, it had to rely more and more on batch 
production and the manufacture of tailor-made products. Consequently, its motto is now 
flexibility. Taking advantage of its production structure, it combined elements of mass 
production with elements of unit production. Working on a base model or a base 
structure, it introduced whatever requirements the customer asked for. For instance, 
regarding wood mill machinery, the firm elaborated a basic lay-out plan for the whole 
system that couples and integrates logically the machinery for the input of the raw 
material, the path management, the cutting process, the output of the finished product 
and the machines for the maintenance of the main machine. With the basic plan as a 
starting principle, it then adapts the machines according to the specific requirements of 
the customers. The same approach applies to the production of machines for joiners' 
workshops. Working within a basic model, it varies the performance and the 
characteristics of each machine according to customers' requirements. As a 
consequence, it developed a series of ancillary mechanisms that are sold as separate 
options that can be attached to the basic machine, as well as a large diversity of tools 
designed to meet a varied diversity of purposes. 
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 The change of strategy from a serial mode of production to a batch mode of 
production was, however, a factor of disturbance to the firm because earlier investments 
in machinery and management systems were geared to mass production and not batch 
production. The firm is experiencing now some difficulty in changing and adapting to the 
new mode of production and its productivity has dropped. Just now it is still in this 
transition period, trying to take full advantage of its existing stock and adapting it to the 
present conditions. 
 
The average firm in this pair has a different and more modest mix of factors but it 
nevertheless has enjoyed a not insignificant success. Its antecedent is a small blacksmith 
workshop founded in 1943, initially forging metallic structures of several kinds and later 
engaging in the production of car springs. The founder was a blue-collar worker who, 
apparently, worked with or for Eiffel in the construction of some bridges that were built in 
Portugal. This privilege must have surely been a matter of pride for the humble man and 
his offspring. His son and grandson, now in charge of the firm, do not allow such a fact to 
sink in oblivion, as they mentioned it with visible pride. The son of the founder was trained 
at a technical school and inherited the business of the father in 1960, pushing it in a 
somewhat different direction. It continued to fabricate structures but with a different 
material (stainless steel) and on a different basis (more production machinery than its 
predecessor) and targeted to a different type of client, the food industry. 
 Seven years later it started the production of machines for the woodworking 
sector, under growing regional demand for such machines. The machines were aimed at 
the downstream woodworking sub-sector, namely machines for joiners or carpenters' 
workshops. The knowledge to build the machines came from a coalition between the 
owner's formal technical training and ability, an employee that was particularly skilful in 
the craft and in design, and another employee that proved to be rather adept in 
administrative and organisational tasks. This combination of skills and the team spirit that 
permeated the group was quite successful, so much so that in 1973 the owner offered a 
part of the company stock to its two former employees (15% to each one). The skill, 
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dexterity and tinkering of the two technical men are the main factor behind the growth of 
the firm, underpinned by a neat and simple organisational structure. The firm enjoyed 
successive expansion periods and the early 1970s saw significant technological 
improvements in their products, which were essentially manual or mechanical. It adopted 
a new concept for its basic mechanical devices and it introduced pneumatic and hydraulic 
devices as well as electric means of control. The firm also delineated quite clearly its 
target clients (manufactures of wood furniture) and was very open to suggestions and 
requirements from them. 
 It has continued to operate in this way ever since. The son of the owner replaced 
the partner who had been in charge of the administrative tasks. The son has no formal 
technical training, although he completed his secondary education. The firm admitted a 
university dropout student who is now allocated to design and development of products, 
working together with the former employee who is the main contributor to the design 
activities of the firm. The production directors have formal secondary technical training. 
The firm has complemented an apparent deficiency in its knowledge base by resorting to 
hired consultant engineers. They are thinking about recruiting a production engineer, 
which reflects the concern of the firm with organisation and efficiency matters. Since the 
late 1980s it has sent some of their workers to attend short professional courses at 
technical schools. The areas of training include pneumatics, hydraulics, electricity and 
soldering. In this way they have managed to upgrade their skills and their knowledge 
base regularly, and although it is not very sophisticated, it has not become static. 
Learning processes continue. They also spend considerable efforts scanning the market 
in similar products and getting some ideas to improve their own. 
 The strengths of the firm seem to derive from the following sets of factors. First, 
its flexibility in responding to user's requirements and in maintaining a neat and slim 
structure, avoiding the creation of heavy structures. Technologically, the products are not 
ambitious, but they are also sufficiently sophisticated, especially in mechanical terms, so 
as to satisfy their customers. The products are of good quality, with attractive and elegant 
designs and very easy to operate, although their range of operation is frequently rather 
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limited. The firm has been very creative in identifying market niches in products not 
available in the Portuguese market, and has designed several machines that fulfilled the 
gap, thus allowing the woodworking workshops to substitute with machinery previously 
labour intensive processes. The firm also identified clearly their target market, usually 
small or small-medium workshops that do not require or cannot afford very sophisticated 
or costly machinery. It makes considerable efforts in keeping abreast of the difficulties, 
requirements and expectations of its clients and in providing swift and efficient after-sales 
services (a technical services department was set-up for this purpose, one of the few 
additional structures created by the firm). 
 Investment in production machinery is enough to maintain a certain degree of 
quality and aimed at optimising capacity utilisation. It does not possess CNC machines 
but some of the machines are semi-automated and provide a reasonable degree of 
precision. The work flow is devised efficiently with the support of a simple computer 
program to keep track of costs and times. The shop floor is clean and ample, with an 
well-organised layout and it provides a pleasant working place. Unlike its innovative pair 
the firm has never engaged in serial production. It appreciates the flexibility it has and 
wants to keep it that way. 
 The weak points in the firm are related to its excessive dependency on the 
dexterity and creativity of its chief designer, the former employee now partner, and the 
tinkering and mechanical ability of the owner. As mentioned earlier the firm has admitted 
only one person to design activities, a university trained (but not graduated) designer who 
introduced computer assisted design techniques to the firm. The deficiencies in the 
mechanical knowledge base are dealt with by resorting to consultants, a practice that is 
cost-effective and enhances the so cherished flexibility, but that in the long run may 
impair the firm in acquiring and building up its own technological and absorptive capacity. 
The threat is all the more visible as these two key figures in the firm are now getting older 
and close to retirement age. The son of the founder is not a mechanical man and thus not 
a substitute for the knowledge embodied in those individuals. The future of the firm is 
dependent on the vision and foresight of the heir to acknowledge and remedy this 
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deficiency. The capacity to effect the change may be curtailed by a general mental 
attitude that still prevails in many industrialists that is related to the way they regard 
qualified engineers as being too much theoretically oriented and unable to deal with the 
practicalities of the craft. This prejudice is probably rooted in the historical social divide 
that permeated Portuguese society for so long, and the clash between two different ways 
of approaching the production and manufacturing process. There are also problems 
related to questions of the balance of power that the introduction of highly skilled 
personnel would inevitably bring to the firm. 
 Whatever the case, the firm has enjoyed until now considerable success in its 
endeavours. It has moved beyond its regional boundaries of action, although this is still 
an important market, and it commercialises its products nation-wide. It has even exported 
some of its production (around 10%) in the last couple of years to Spain, Canada, the 
Dominican Republic and United States (in order of importance) and it has participated in 
some international trade fairs. Its longing for flexibility and the dependence of its clients 
on the construction business cycles are behind its reasoning for avoiding the 
internalisation of commercial structures or the elaboration of strict or quantified formal 
planning procedures, which however does not prevent it, as mentioned, from having a 
very clear perspective of what its business is. 
 
What are the selection mechanisms involved in this example? The two firms cannot be 
strictly compared because the innovative firm manufactures products (charriots) that the 
other does not. However they can be compared on the other product line. Curiously 
enough, the average firm seems to be going along with fewer problems than is the 
innovative firm. The reason for that lies in the unsuccessful attempt that the innovative 
firm made to engage in serial production, which in itself was due to deficiencies in 
production organisation methods, insufficient investment and training in more advanced 
manufacturing techniques and perhaps a certain failure in assessing and evaluating the 
direction that the (customer) sector was taking. If, however, it is able to surpass this 
problematic transitional period and make the appropriate decisions, it may be able to 
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regain its feet again. The obsession of the average firm with flexibility and slim structures 
has helped the firm get through tougher periods without any particular difficulty. However, 
if the obsession is carried too far it may prove a liability in the future, instead of an asset. 
 It seems apparent that the two firms operate for different sections of the 
environment, regarding their common product lines, or to different markets altogether, 
when export markets are considered, although it seems that the gap was larger than it is 
now. The characteristics of the products reflect the different requirements of the 
environments. 
 The innovative firm produces a relatively small portfolio of very high quality and 
sophisticated machines, with the capacity to process high quantities of material, geared 
to relatively large workshops demanding high precision features. Its strength is its own 
technological capacity coupled with the ability to permanently scan and absorb 
technological novelties through diverse means including formal contract arrangements. 
 The average firm produces a somewhat broader range of lighter equipment, 
relatively cheaply, performing a limited range of operations with a lower degree of 
precision, geared to smaller workshops and less demanding customers. Other helping 
factors that have sustained the firm are its after sales services and its very close contacts 
with customers, its flexibility, a slimmed and cost effective structure, and its creativity in 
devising new machines unavailable in the Portuguese market to perform sometimes 
simple operations but which are a source of great value-added for the workshops that 
employ them. 
 
11.6 MECANO-TEXTIL and ACL (Pair 5) – more troubled manufacturers of 
textile machinery 
 
The firms that constitute pair number 5 provide an additional digression into the 
difficulties experienced by firms manufacturing equipment for the textile sector, and 
shows how they reacted to the threats to their business. 
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 The story of the average firm describes the declining path of a once successful 
firm. Two engineers founded it in 1943, one of them specialised in the manufacturing of 
textile machinery. He came from a Spanish region whose industrial specialisation was 
also in the textile sector. The other engineer acted as the commercial partner and did not 
gave any special technical input. Initially the firm operated under licence from a Spanish 
company and it acted more as an auxiliary arm of another firm that imported textile 
machinery, providing technical assistance, maintenance, repair and assembling.  
In 1963, its activity became autonomous and it started its own production, 
manufacturing whole machines, under a new licence agreement from a Swiss firm. The 
firm specialised in two main product lines, although it occasionally manufactured other 
types of equipment (but with no real significance for the revenue of the firm). The two 
main products or product lines were fibre blenders and ring spinning frames. 
 The firm enjoyed considerable success and growth. It was practically the only 
firm in Portuguese territory manufacturing these kinds of machines and it did not operate 
under complete monopolistic conditions because it faced external competition from 
imported machinery. Tariff and political barriers to such imports were intermittent and 
although they gave the firm some sort of protection, their discontinuous nature made 
them, for practical purposes, rather ineffective as a protection mechanism. By the end of 
the 1970s, almost all large textile firms were its clients, at which time the firm began to 
manufacture its own products, ceasing its licence agreements. 
 The firm invested in its own R&D capabilities, maintaining a separate department 
with several mechanical engineers designing and developing its products. It introduced 
several improvements in the machines. It switched from mechanical systems of control to 
electronic systems of control. It increased the number of spindles and the spindle speed 
through improvements in the electric components of the machine. It made the machine 
less heavy and bulky. It introduced several ergonomic designs to ease its operation and 
increase safety. It automated several of its functions, increasing the flexibility of the 
machine. 
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 The firm remained relatively competitive during the early 1980s but its position in 
the market started to erode, as the economy began to open up and to abolish whatever 
barriers there were to imports of machinery. At this stage the firm employed 140 people 
and it had a relatively sophisticated capital stock that would be subject to additional 
upgrading during the second half of the 1980s when it acquired automated machinery. 
The timing of this investment was perhaps not very appropriate, or not properly 
accompanied by other measures as the firm was beginning to lose its market share. 
 Given the size the firm had reached, its apparent commitment to internal R&D 
activities and the type of machines it produced, the firm made certain decisions that were 
strangely at odds with its situation and may explain its demise. 
 Firstly, the firm never had any formal planning procedure, which, given its size 
(above 100 employees), would be reasonable to expect. This necessity was even more 
compelling as it never developed into a cohesive familiar-type structure that has the 
potential to provide a clear strategic perspective even if not written down. The equity of 
the firm changed hands several times and the distribution of capital was never decisively 
skewed towards a single hand. Maybe it was because of this constant turnover that the 
firm was unable to find a clear direction in face of the difficulties it faced. Whatever the 
causal direction between strategy, planning activities and ownership structure, the truth of 
the matter was that the attitude of the firm was basically reduced to manufacturing the 
machines it traditionally had produced to serve the clients it traditionally had served. 
 The lack of sufficient planning extended to the production process and to training 
activities. Efficient production methods and processes were severely constrained by ad-
hoc addition of equipment and an ill thought out layout and expansion scheme. Technical 
training of workers was almost exclusively done in-house and only sporadically in 
technical centres. It had a considerable (negative) impact on the adoption by the firm of 
upgraded production techniques and on the quality of the products. 
 In addition to that, or because of that, the firm never did embark on export 
activities, which would also be reasonable to expect given its size and the level of 
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investment in R&D activities. It came out with timid attempts to do so, but they were short-
lived, sporadic and not well organised or guided by any explicit strategic decision. 
 It did not invest enough resources in R&D activities in face of the new competition 
that open markets were fostering. Imported machinery using the same basic technology 
was more reliable, faster and more automated than the machines offered by the firm. At 
the same time, spinning frames based on different technological principles and 
trajectories (vacuum spinning) were increasingly available in the market. These 
machines, asides from overcoming the problem of breaks in the thread due to the speed 
of the spindle, combined several stages of successive spinning into thinner threads into 
one operation.  
 The combination of all these factors compounded the problems of the firm. They 
were becoming technologically laggard, losing domestic clients, not searching for new 
ones, and decreasing R&D investments due to financial problems. The firm was also 
excessively closed and inward looking, and engaged in very few relationships with other 
technological centres or firms. Production of components for its ex-licensors, one of the 
few relationships it still had, and maintenance or upgrading of its old machines became 
an increasingly important component of its revenue. Search for new alternatives was not 
pursued. In fact, and surprisingly, it rejected some offers from car manufacturers to 
produce a different sort of product. The offers were very significant and could have 
sustained the firm for several years. To make things worse, some of the R&D engineers 
left the firm shortly after that and founded a firm that took up the orders from the car 
manufacturer. The situation gradually deteriorated, successive divestment took place, 
and the firm downsized its work force and its R&D personnel. At presently, the firm has 
no R&D activities and its activities are practically reduced to maintenance of its old 
machines (upgrading of old machines is now seen as uneconomical by client firms). The 
firm is in serious financial problems and its most likely future is to close down. 
 
The innovative firm in this pair portrays a story of flexibility, high capacity to adapt to new 
circumstances and quicksightedness. It is not strictly comparable to its pair because the 
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products are not identical, although directed to the same industrial user group, the textile 
sector. Nevertheless the problems faced by mechanical firms supplying the textile sector, 
whatever their product line was, seem to be identical, insofar as all firms experienced 
increased difficulties after the mid 1960s due to external competition and compounded by 
the lack of an industrial policy to support and defend their interests, or stimulate their 
activity. In this respect, it is interesting to compare the means used by each firm to get out 
of the difficult situation they were in. 
 We have seen that the latter firm chose to continue the manufacture of its 
traditional product but failed to invest sufficiently or adequately not only in its core 
development activities but also in ancillary activities such as production, training and 
marketing. It also failed to recognise the danger it was in and lacked the ability and the 
flexibility to adapt and grab new opportunities and change its product line. 
 The course followed by the innovative firm was in almost every respect a sharp 
contrast. The firm was founded in 1924 by the grandfather of the actual owner. Before 
starting his firm the founder was a loom maintenance technician. His educational level 
was at the primary level and all the know-how and skills that he used in the manufacture 
of looms, the initial and sole product of the firm, were acquired on that job. It started as a 
small workshop but it soon grew. It possessed its own foundry. The production of looms 
lasted for a long time. In 1944 two sons inherited the firm and gave continuity to its 
production. Both were trained in secondary technical schools. The looms were 
mechanical and were improved steadily over time. The sources of ideas and 
improvements came basically from the imitation or copy of other machines. The firm 
enjoyed continued growth until it reached its peak in 1965, with 120 employees, when it 
then started to be strongly affected by external competition from technologically superior 
machines. It soon realised that it was unable to compete with the imported technology 
and started manufacturing hydraulic presses. By this time the sons of the owners (and 
grandsons of the founders) began to take control of the firm, and in 1970 the inheritance 
was completed. Both were mechanical engineers trained at university level. One of the 
brothers was particularly interested in electronics and later founded his own electronics 
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firm. The combination of their respective interests and expertise later proved to be an 
important factor in the evolution of the firm. 
 In 1973 the manufacture of looms was discontinued, as well as construction 
based on foundry and casting. It switched to soldering construction. Its main product, 
hydraulic presses, was also subject to a significant technological re-conversion. At the 
same time it received an important order from a large firm in the wood processing 
industry. This firm wanted a loading and transport system to carry and store large planks. 
This order marked another turning point in the firm and it contributed to the definition of 
one of its later lines of specialisation, namely the production of lifting machinery and 
related products (work platforms and hydraulic dock levellers) to equip warehouses. The 
firm also specialised in hydraulic components. The product switch was further evidence of 
the capacity and speed of adaptation of the firm in the face of difficulties. The difficulties 
in this case arose from the fact that they were facing increased competition from 
hydraulic press manufacturers. Many firms were now producing this type of equipment. 
The firm was even sidelined by a former partner, a firm that co-operated in the 
development of the press. This second firm was larger and had a consolidated 
commercialisation structure. It was able to manufacture the press at a lower cost, sell it at 
lower prices and distributed it to a wider range of clients. It also independently introduced 
additional improvements to the press. Our firm was quick to realise that its chances to 
compete were getting thinner, and the order to manufacture a loading and transport 
system made it realise how few firms in the Portuguese market were in that niche. Thus, 
it decisively embraced this opportunity. 
 Again based on imitation and copy, but also on their own technological 
capabilities, the two brothers started to develop that new product line, consisting mainly 
of hydraulic column lifts for warehouses, dock levellers, also for warehouses, and work 
platforms for several uses. During the early and following years they served essentially 
large firms, but later included in their list of clients a series of smaller firms. The 
production of hydraulic presses did not cease immediately but its significance decreased 
substantially, until it finally was abandoned. 
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 The products were subject to gradual improvements over time, such as the 
inclusion of better security systems, quality improvements in materials and finishing and 
development of hydraulic and electronic controls. 
 The firm was actively engaged in co-operation with several entities. It had a well 
established and long lasting relationship with an important manufacturer of machine tools, 
it invited the collaboration of several engineers to resolve particular problems, it 
maintained relationships with a technological centre and was keen to accept university 
undergraduates doing their curricular industrial training period. The firm has maintained 
this pattern of co-operation. 
 The firm consistently upgraded its production equipment, with a concern for 
quality, and improved its organisational routines, with a concern for costs and flexibility. 
 In the mid 1980s, the experience and knowledge derived from their earlier 
development efforts of hydraulic and electronic controls for the lifting gear opened the 
way for a new project in which the two brothers would combine their respective skills. The 
project resulted in the development of a new control valve, or more accurately a group of 
hydraulic valves to regulate fluid flows, which combined principles of hydraulics and 
electronics. The product was patented in 1994 and it is now an important source of 
revenue to the firm. 
 Now, the firm employs three engineers and has a department exclusively 
dedicated to design and development activities, using the latest computerised design 
techniques. It has continued to upgrade its production machinery and presently has two 
CNC lathes and one CNC machining centre. Asides from the product lines described 
above, which are being diversified to include lifting gear for disabled people, it also 
produces precision components for German firms on a subcontract basis. It exports 5% 
of its production (in terms of sales). 
 It established an office and commercial department to serve the second half of 
the national market and great attention is paid to after-sales services. It has its own 
quality control department. Production organisation is being restructured and increasingly 
subject to computerised techniques. The firm is now looking for expertise in the area of 
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production engineering so that a properly trained individual can perform the management 
function. 
 
To summarise, we can say that in this case there is progressive divestment in R&D 
activities on the part of the average firm, which initially performed rather well, driven by a 
previous position of near-monopoly and by the relative isolation of the firm in terms of 
contacts with outside sources of knowledge. In spite of possessing good human 
resources it did not take advantage of them, which was one indication of difficulties in 
terms of management and in terms of strategic specification of objectives and goals for 
the firm when products from abroad gradually outperformed their own products and 
eroded its competitive client base. The firm did not invest sufficiently in R&D either 
because it was unable to perceive the threat or because it could not or was incapable of 
finding alternatives.  
The innovative firm reacted flexibly and quickly to threats and changed and 
qualitatively downsized its output (in the sense that it started to produce parts instead of 
entire machines) but without disregarding improvements and development work. It 
continued, in fact, to bet on highly trained personnel and to allocate personnel solely to 
development work, although in a modest way. Unlike the former, the later firm was able to 
find a response to an environment that become more international and demanding.  
 
 
 
 
11.7 MAQUISIS and SERI (Pair 6) – the new generation  
  
The two firms in pair 6, which produce metal working machine-tools, are both very young 
firms, and they provide an interesting example of a new generation of firms that are 
making their way. The innovative firm was founded in 1987 and the average firm in 1989. 
Both possess and started with a high proportion of highly educated personnel, namely 
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mechanical engineers. Both owners are university lecturers and both worked previously 
in other machine-tool manufacturers. Thus, since their beginnings the firms possess a 
solid, updated scientific and technological backlog. 
 Their modus operandi is also very similar. The firms specialise essentially in 
design, project and assembly, to which they give their utmost attention and concentration. 
Every possible standard component that can be bought out in the market is so acquired. 
They reserve for themselves the manufacture of the most sensitive or non-standard parts 
of the machines and the integration of the components. For instance, the innovative firm 
buys in all hydraulic and pneumatic components (this is, in fact, a feature common to 
almost all 19 firms in the sample), all machining units, all small and medium components, 
all electronic components, the CNC kits and the programmable robots. The 
manufacturing activities of the firm are restricted to the structural core of the machine, the 
outer metal shield and the precision binding components. The tools are either selected 
from standard ones existing in the market, or, if they are not available, are designed by 
the firm and ordered out. It also makes the software for the integration of the CNC. 
Overall, in terms of value added, the internal production is around 40%. 
 The average firm is even more drastic, reducing that figure to 10%. This is 
perhaps due to the more demanding requirements faced by the innovative firm and the 
consequent inability to find in the market components that fit those requirements. The 
type of production machinery each firm possesses seems to substantiate this argument. 
The innovative firm has more advanced and sophisticated production machinery (e.g., 
numerical control milling machines) than the average firm. 
On the other hand, this small number is the reflection of a conscious commitment 
to out-source the maximum possible amount of parts and components. The pattern of 
out-sourcing of the average firm is similar to that of the innovative firm, and unlike its pair 
it does not develop the software that is also contracted out. 
 Internally, both firms function as close-knit teams. Every person is considered 
important and communication flows naturally with no barriers. Intensive encouraging of 
the employees to do their best and to help sort out problems is common practice in both 
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firms. Workers on the shop-floor are not allocated to a specific task and rotation between 
tasks occurs frequently. The educational level of the workers is comparatively high (all 
were trained in technical schools and some have completed their twelfth year of 
secondary education). The recruitment of engineers is very selective. They have not only 
to possess the scientific and technological knowledge and ability deemed necessary for 
the job, but their psychological profile must also reflect high degrees of adaptability, 
flexibility and capacity to work in a team. 
 In view of all these similarities, what then differentiates these firms? One of the 
factors is external and it is perfectly captured in a response from the average firm. When 
answering the question of why its products were not more sophisticated, it replied that it 
was because the customers did not want very sophisticated products. It added that, 
technologically, the firm had all the capacity to build whatever machine they wanted. This 
may seem presumptuous but it is probably close to the truth. 
 In fact, there were dissimilarities between the type of customers the firms served. 
The customers of the average firm were mainly firms manufacturing water taps and 
connected or similar products, such as joints, sockets, tubes, etc. Other clients included 
cutlery manufacturers, bicycle manufacturers and domestic appliance manufacturers. 
Occasionally, it sold some machines to manufacturers of car components. The pattern of 
clients of the innovative firm was almost a mirror image of the pattern of the average firm. 
The main client was a car manufacturer (a subsidiary of a multinational), whose orders 
were, actually, the very reason for the creation of the firm. Other clients included a series 
of car component manufacturers and, occasionally, manufacturers of cutlery. Therefore, 
the pattern of customer demand was, apparently, an important determinant of the degree 
of innovativeness of the firms. The car and car components manufacturers are sectors 
that demand higher levels of quality and precision, have higher levels of capital 
expenditure and are willing to pay much better than the other mentioned sectors (in 
general terms). As a consequence, machines built by the innovative firm can be much 
more sophisticated and can cost as much as two hundred and sixty thousand pounds 
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against an average price of fifty to sixty thousand pounds for the machines of the average 
firm. 
 However, internal factors must also be accounted for. The innovative firm 
succeeded very early in its lifetime in defining clearly and unambiguously its product 
specialisation and made that decision with great determination. It is specialised in what it 
calls shred-tear machines, it manufactures only machines based on that principle of 
operation and its client base is very restricted. Its product design and development 
approach is characterised by a systemic nature whereby special attention is given to the 
integration of the operation that the machine performs into the overall production process 
of the client firm. In contrast, the products of the average firm are not specialised in the 
strict sense mentioned above and the range of clients it serves is much broader and more 
diversified. The machines serve a wider range of purposes and operate on wider 
principles. The machines manufactured by the firm include lathes and machining centres, 
but also drilling and tapping machines, saw machines, manipulation systems and bending 
machines. The dispersion of skills and knowledge required for switching between the 
disparate operating principles of the machines may not have good effects in terms of the 
cumulative processes involved in building their tacit knowledge. It may, however, have 
positive effects if the firm is able to integrate such diversity in a fruitful and innovative 
way, as seems to be the case regarding their recent plans for a new product. Anyway, the 
firm is now actively engaged in defining in a much clearer and narrow way its line of 
business. It has commissioned an in-depth market research study to try to identify a 
product and a sector that would allow the firm to achieve a greater degree of 
specialisation. One of the alternatives that it is considering at the moment is to produce a 
completely automated machine to manufacture aluminium windows frames. The machine 
would perform all the basic operations of sawing, milling, grinding and bending, and 
would also load and unload automatically all the raw material and finished products. 
Programming would allow the machine to change all the dimensions of the frames 
(length, width, depth) and even their form (linear or curved) and ingrained patterns. 
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 It is curious to note that the target sector of this new product remains closely 
related to the building sector, as it is the case with their main clients (manufacturers of 
water taps). It shows the constraints firms face that are determined by their social 
spheres of action and influence, and the weight of previous working experience. The 
same argument also applies to the innovative firm. In this sense, social network aspects 
may eventually bind the firms to specific actors and artefacts and influence their 
innovative performance. Each firm was quite aware of the activities of the other but even 
when both firms moved in higher levels of social networks, subtle differences and 
divergence processes still apply. Not only were the owners' previous industrial experience 
and personal contacts were acquired in different firms manufacturing different products 
for different industrial sectors, but they are also attached to different universities that differ 
in their ethos, objectives, capacity, specialisation and established relationships with 
outside social groups or interests. 
 
11.8 SERSAN and PRENSARTE (Pair 7) – there is room for all  
 
Sersan, the average firm in the pair, was born out of a mechanics workshop that was 
created in 1975 by four brothers (plus two employees). Its current name was not its first. 
The name of the firm was altered in 1986 and coincided with the change of activity of the 
firm, i.e., it coincided with the beginning of manufacture of machinery for the cork 
industry. It also coincided with the entry of another brother to the company and the equal 
redistribution of equity, previously concentrated in only one, by all the five brothers. Three 
of them were ex-employees of firms that manufactured machines for the cork industry. 
Another worked in a ceramics manufacturer with functions related to electrical 
maintenance and repair, an activity for which he was qualified by virtue of his secondary 
professional education in electricity and engineering. Two other brothers were also 
educated at secondary professional level. The rest of the personnel had only four years 
of elementary education and were trained while working, in an apprenticeship regime. 
Personnel are hired at a very early age (16 years) to avoid personnel with other types of 
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training and then trained internally. Many of the employees have worked only for this firm 
that tries to maintain a good, although perhaps paternalistic, working environment. 
 The firm started with the production of manual drilling machines which were used 
to make cork stops. The machine was extremely simple, almost primitive. It had simply a 
superstructure supporting a moving part with the cutting tool that was controlled by a 
pedal moved with the foot. The physical principle behind the machine is torque. The 
operator would hold a small plank of cork, choose subjectively the best part (in terms of 
texture and in terms of optimisation of the plank) to cut and then would manually position 
the plank and press down the pedal, and the movement was transmitted through moving 
metal parts to the tool. No additional sophistication was present such as for instance, 
safety devices to avoid hand injury, which apparently was not uncommon. Such a 
machine lets us guess the worst kind of Taylorist mode of production the clients of this 
firm were engaged in. Some untidy workshops with a couple of rows of these machines 
operated 8 or more hours a day by badly paid, uneducated and unqualified personnel, 
producing day after day always the same few sizes of cork stops, later sold to a 
distributor which would buy all the production of a lot of similar firms. These machines are 
still made today, essentially unaltered, only with the addition of an electric motor to 
substitute the pedal. 
 In addition to the drilling machines the firm also manufactures a series of 
machines to finish the cork stops, namely: a machine to cut the stops in standard lengths 
and to polish the top, a machine that smoothes off the lateral part of the stop, a machine 
that washes and treats chemically the stops, and a machine that engraves a drawing in 
the stops. All these machines are also quite simple and operate by mechanical principles 
with electric motors as the power force. 
 Recently the firm has secured the collaboration of another (very) small firm in the 
field of electronics (owned and managed by an electronic engineer) and has engaged in 
other product lines which are more sophisticated. They started to manufacture transport 
and feeding systems, which aside from the usual mechanical components were 
complemented by automatic mechanisms that at the end of the transport line guide the 
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cork stops to basket reservoirs. Additionally they have also installed a system that 
controls the filling of those baskets. The system is based on a set of photo-diodes placed 
at two required positions (signalling a minimum and a maximum). All the electronic 
components and circuits are designed and manufactured by the other firm. Our firm does 
the mechanical part and the electrical part. Their most recent collaborative product, 
based on the same technologies, is a cork stop counter machine. The machine consists 
of a container in the form of a funnel where the stops are placed at the bottom of which 
there is a moving roller that forces the stops to enter in an orderly manner and by the 
force of gravity into four channels. At the end of each channel is a photo-diode that 
counts each passing stop and then sends the signals to a microprocessor that allows 
three operations to be programmed: the quantity of stops that must fill each sack, the 
number of sacks that can be filled and whether it works in automatic or manual. As in the 
case of the transport systems, the mechanical and electric part are made in the firm and 
all the hardware and software related to the electronic components is made by the other 
firm. They have sold only a few of such machines. 
In spite of the relative simplicity of the products manufactured by this firm their 
business is apparently going well. Decision making relative to global aspects of the firm is 
done by all the partners/brothers and additionally each one has a stronger say in 
particular functions/technologies. For instance, one of the brothers is in charge of the 
mechanical part, another of the electric part, another of the marketing and within each 
function (for instance mechanical) there are sub-levels on which one of the brothers may 
be more knowledgeable than another. However, perfect delimitation of competencies 
does not exist (except perhaps as concerns the marketing function) and every decision is 
done with consultation and participated in by all the brothers (recall that they all have the 
same basic vocational training and three of them worked with manufacturers of similar 
equipment). Production is based on teamwork. Workers may work on more than one 
function or one machine although they may be more apt to work with a specific 
machine/function. 
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The firm automated its administrative tasks but production operations are 
managed on a day-by-day basis. Cost control is helped by a simple form of analytical 
accounting but essentially by the subjective perception and comparison of variation in 
costs. Based on this perception, particularly on the realisation that component prices are 
becoming less than the cost of manufacturing in-house the component, the firm is sliding 
more and more towards manufacture based on assembly of parts and less and less on 
in-house manufacture and assembly. The cost of replacing production machinery is also 
a non-negligible factor in the making of this decision. The existing production machinery 
is quite old (10-20 years) and it consists only of mechanical non-automatic machines, 
with no improvements whatsoever. The exception is a recently acquired painting cabin. 
The firm has also started to use CAD very recently. 
The firm tried recently to abide by the new EEC directive concerning machines 
but it soon realised that it did not have the necessary technological know-how to do that. 
It resorted to a technological centre but it found the price too high and did not proceed 
further with the process. This event tells a lot about the limitations of the firm relative to 
more demanding technological or technical conditions. The machines manufactured by 
the firm are simple (even the electronic circuits are relatively simple) and they will remain 
simple unless the firm upgrades its knowledge base. Products that will involve more 
mechanically sophisticated movements are presently out of reach of the firm. 
 The firm is very customer-conscious and its relatively comfortable position owes 
probably a lot to this behaviour. The firm’s motto is “every client is important”, “each client 
is a friend”, and “if a client ceases being a friend it will cease sooner or later to be a 
client”. This attitude is behind the extreme importance that the firm attributes to after 
sales service. We can say that the position and strategy of the firm relies heavily on the 
degree of after sale satisfaction that the firm provides to its client. Since its products are 
not technologically demanding and can be easily made by any existing or entrant firm 
there is an effort to secure customer fidelity to the firm by means of its service so as to 
secure future orders. 
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 The firm supplies equipment goods to a sector that is greatly concentrated on the 
surrounding district. The cork itself originates from a tree that is cultivated in the south of 
the country but the transformation of the cork is done in the North, and specifically in that 
district. The cork is subject to various processes of transformation but the cork stops are 
an important final product. The sector is made of a multitude of small firms working under 
simplistic conditions and making simple products like stops and a few large producers of 
products other than cork stops with a much greater value added and requiring more 
sophisticated transformation processes (such as flooring or specialised intermediary 
products for other industrial sectors). Some of these large producers worked previously 
under licence and have gradually built their own expertise. Consequently there is a large 
demand for simple machines that the firm is able to satisfy. In addition to this, competition 
is reduced. There are only a handful of producers of machines for this industry and, at 
least for the time being, they do not stumble on each other. Very recently, equipment 
goods for the cork sector were either imported from Spain or Italy or manufactured by 
producers of machine tools for woodworking with sometimes not very good results (due 
to the unsatisfactory adaptation of the existing machines to the different properties and 
characteristics of the material). This firm is thus for the time being occupying a niche 
previously almost vacant. Its client base is huge (around 400 firms) but constituted almost 
(if not completely) exclusively by small firms of the type described above. None of them is 
an outstanding client that absorbs the majority or a substantial part of its production. It 
also exports some of its production (10 to 20%) to Spain and Italy, presumably to the 
same type of clients it has in the district.  
 
The innovative firm was founded in 1983, producing hydraulic presses and repairing 
machinery in general. After a brief experience manufacturing also a machine to make 
aluminium frames for windows and doors it soon found its specialised niche. In 1985 it 
dedicated itself exclusively to the manufacturing of machines for the cork industry. It was 
founded by three partners, one of whom later left. One of the partners is a mechanical 
engineer and the other has a professional qualification at medium level (secondary level 
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plus one year plus training). Both worked in the manufacture of equipment goods (one of 
which produced presses) before starting their own firm. 
 The firm started producing relatively sophisticated equipment based on 
mechanical, electromechanical, pneumatic and hydraulic principles. It manufactured 
several kinds of machines for several stages of the production process including transport 
and feeding systems. There have been considerable improvements in terms of 
automation and special characteristics. The products of the firm include an automatic saw 
to produce cork tiles, an automatic machine to smooth and finish the cork tiles, a machine 
that selects cork grains, automatic transport systems, among others. Their most important 
development has been in the introduction of optics (laser) technology into the machines. 
One of the machines makes the selection of cork stops tops optically and separates them 
according to its quality level. Another is a drilling machine to produce cork stops. It “looks” 
at the cork plank, analyses its texture and elaborates a plan that simultaneously takes 
into consideration the quality of the material it analyses and the optimisation of the plank 
in order to reduce wastage. The entire process is automatic. The operator only puts the 
plank in position and then the machine takes care of the rest, i.e., the product ejected by 
the machine is ready for the next production stage. Quality parameters, among a series 
of other parameters, are programmable.  
The firm does not make the optical components of these two machines. They are 
a result of a collaboration agreement with another firm. The firm has established a formal 
agreement with an Italian firm that develops and manufactures the optical devices and 
the accompanying electronic circuits and software (some of the software was developed 
by our firm). The agreement made with the Italian firm is quite formal and involves market 
conditions, namely, the firm is not allowed to commercialise the machines developed 
jointly by the two firms in Italy and the Italian firm does not commercialise the machines in 
Portugal. It is curious to note the similarity of strategies, at least at this level, pursued by 
the average and the innovative firm. However, there is a qualitative difference between 
the technological level of the partners of each firm. While the partner in the case of the 
average firm consists essentially of an electronic engineer, the partner of the innovative 
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firm is a medium sized establishment with a significant level of R&D activities. The 
complexity and the technology of the products of each partner are also qualitatively 
different. 
The technological level of these machines is a long way from the level of the 
drilling machines produced by the average firm and described above. The complexity of 
functions and the overall quality of the machines are at a superior level relative to the 
average firm. The firm has, for instance, no difficulties in terms of calculus knowledge that 
the other is unable to cope with. It also complains about the shortage of skilled workers, a 
complain that is recurrent amongst the firms of the innovative group.  
Administrative tasks are automated as well as cost and time control but not 
production, nor there is any integration system with downstream or upstream functions in 
place. However the managers feel that production organisation and operations should 
also be subject to a systematisation process. Teamwork prevails also in this firm, without 
a visible paternalistic character (although that does not mean it is absent) and many of 
the workers were also trained in this firm but their previous qualification level is much 
higher than that of the workers in the average firm. Half of the workers have secondary 
level qualifications. The firm also sends its workers to outside training courses. 
Approximately half of the workers have benefited from this. 
Design has been made using CAD since 1985 (i.e., since they started production 
of machines for the cork industry). Production apparatus is also better than in its 
counterpart firm. Although the basic equipment is mechanical, some machines (namely 
all the milling machines) were subjected to improvements (e.g., electronic/digital control 
of position/coordinates) and they are going to introduce the same device in all the lathes. 
There are plans to buy a CNC lathe and a machining centre. 
The customer base of this firm is much more restricted than the average firm’s 
base, and since its inception it has served the largest and most important firms of the 
cork sector, and specifically the main national groups (which are also physically located in 
the same district referred to above). Its machines have a price that excludes a lot of firms 
from the cork sector from being potential customers of this firm. In any case, scale 
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considerations would also prevent those firms from buying such machines that are 
designed according to the specifications of large manufacturers of cork products. This 
firm also scores high in its relationships and after sales services with customers, but its 
strategy is not only exclusively based on that. The other important component is product 
development along the lines of increasing automation and quality. Based on that strategy 
they have started to export recently and are betting strongly on the export market to 
increase sales. 
 
The average firm in this pair manufactures extremely simple machine-tools for the cork 
industry and it is able do so because it finds that its products are in demand from a 
multitude of small firms processing cork (making cork stoppers). Their best machines 
required improvements based on relatively mature technologies and simple designs, 
althoug it required outside assistance. The selection criterion is not based on advanced 
technology products.  One wonders whether if it eventually tried or if it were able to 
upgrade too much its products, and presumably charge higher prices, it would not then 
be confronted with a very different and probably unfavourable demand curve from that 
sub-environment. On the other hand, its innovative pair operates in another section of the 
environment comprised by large firms. The machine-tools produced by these firms are 
mechanically much more sophisticated and of greater reliability and quality and 
incorporate sophisticated electronic and optical devices. These firms do not compete for 
the same clients and the survival or growth of one of them does not affect the survival or 
growth of the other, as long as the environment remains split, and as long as each firm 
does not invade the domain of the other. 
 
 
 
11.9 DIARROCA and ADIRA (Pair 8) – worlds apart 
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The average firm was established in 1979. Its owner was a returned emigrant from 
Venezuela where he worked on metallurgical factories as a machine operator. When he 
returned to Portugal he went to work for a then renowned manufacturer of machine tools. 
He stayed there for six years as a supervisor and then established his own firm with a 
partner who left soon after. He is now the sole owner and manager.  
 The educational level of the owner is at the elementary level plus a course on 
technical drawing of machines that he took in Venezuela. The qualifications of all the (six) 
employees are also at the elementary level. Some of them also worked in the same 
manufacturer of machine-tools, which, it should be mentioned, closed down recently. The 
premises of the firm are very small, not exceeding 100 square meters and the machines, 
the workers and everything in general is crowded inside the small place. The working 
conditions, as one might guess, are quite unsatisfactory. This is something that strikes 
one out at first sight. It was the firm with the worst working conditions of all the firms in the 
sample. 
 The firm started with the production of components and metallic structures and 
also machines. Now it only manufactures components, and this is the only product line of 
the above mentioned three that has been consistent and regular. The production of 
machines was pursued during the first years of existence of the firm but it has been 
intermittent ever since and discontinued (due to a lack of orders) some years ago. The 
client base of the firm is, to a great extent, a sub-set of the client base of the renowned 
machine tools manufacturer for which the owner worked. Marketing is based on the 
personal contacts of the owner with that sub-set of clients. Besides marketing, all 
management aspects are controlled by the owner with the help of a daughter who helps 
him with the administrative tasks. No automation whatsoever, even of the administrative 
tasks, was introduced. 
The attempts of the firm to manufacture machines, namely presses, were soon 
destined to fail. The presses it manufactured were small, light, low power presses with 
specific functions and were extremely simple and basic. For instance, around 1983-1985, 
it manufactured a hydraulic press to compress tobacco leaves while putting them in a 
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sack. It consisted of a metallic structure one meter high with a pneumatic arm coupled to 
a sort of plate that compressed the material while descending. The sack had to be put in 
place manually and held in place while the pneumatic arm descended. It was clumsy, 
with no minimum precision, fragile, dangerous and involved a lot of labour force. This 
machine was manufactured by order of a large tobacco company that only bought a 
couple of such machines. It soon got rid of them selling them out to farmers. It 
manufactured a similar machine for a large chemical manufacturer (a state-owned firm) 
but the outcome was similar, i.e., it only sold a few machines. The fate of these last 
machines is unknown. In the meantime it was able to manufacture other simple 
machines. Overall, since its foundation until the present moment, which totals 
approximately 16-17 years if manufactured 30 simple presses and 12 other machines 
which says it all about the success of the firm as machine tool manufacturer. It seems 
that there was here an inconsistency between the clients that the firm looked for and the 
product quality/features the firm was able to provide. Apparently the owner looked for the 
large clients of the bankrupt renowned firm because these were the clients he knew and 
because he was expecting (and rightly so if all the conditions were met) that those firms 
would ask for large orders. But the facts seem to show that those firms were profoundly 
unsatisfied with the products manufactured by this firm. They were only temporarily 
fooled by the ex-foreman of the excellent machine tool manufacturer that went bankrupt. 
The products manufactured by the spillover firm were far behind from the products 
manufactured by the source firm. In spite of this, it seems that the owner did not look for 
another type of less demanding clients, but insisted on approaching large firms. Today it 
still looks for those firms as the port of salvation. The main production at this time is a 
large drill (only the drill not the machine) that it manufactures under the order of an 
important firm in the field of geology. It is a helicoidal heavy piece of iron with no special 
characteristics. It also recently built the structure of a washing machine for trucks and 
buses, again to a large transport firm, but again it manufactured only one unit. Given the 
production and management conditions, the knowledge base and the marketing 
approach, and the adverse environmental conditions that unspecified non-precision 
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component manufacturers face (intense competition, increasing demands on the quality 
of the components, alternative materials for components) the future of this firm does not 
seem promising. 
 
The innovative firm was established in 1956 as a manufacturer of small equipment and 
as a repair shop, an activity that it pursued until 1961, at which time it started the 
production of machine-tools, namely guillotine shears (to cut metal sheets) and later on, 
in 1964, the manufacture of press brakes (to bend metal sheets), the two main product 
lines of the firm. It also manufactures (more traditional) presses but its share in total sales 
is now much smaller. It specialised early on in its lifetime in the first two product lines, i.e., 
in the product lines related to sheet metal machine-tools. The founder was a mechanical 
engineer and his son, now in charge, is also a mechanical engineer. 
 Product development in this firm was and is a constant activity ever since its 
beginings. Mechanically driven machines were soon replaced by machines with 
pneumatic and hydraulic devices that enhanced their performance. For instance, the first 
machines did not go beyond a capacity to cut metal sheet 6.7 mm thick and 3 m long (in 
1961). With the introduction of pneumatic devices that capacity improved to 10mm thick 
and 10 m long (1965). The next improvement was in 1968 with the introduction of 
servomechanisms that enhanced even more the performance of the machines (both 
guillotines and press brakes). The servomechanisms were obtained from a Swiss firm 
and they were used for quite a long time. 
 The firm soon became one of the main national producers of such metal sheet 
equipment (presses were relegated to a secondary position due to the relatively large 
numbers of national firms producing the same type of equipment). Facing limitations in 
their development and growth due to the size limitations of the national market it decided 
to enter the export market, which it did in 1968, exporting to Europe and to the 
Portuguese African territories. Later it started to export to the United States and then 
Asia. Presently it exports 80% of its total production of which 30% to 35% is destined to 
EU countries (including the Scandinavian countries belonging or not to the EU), 30% to 
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USA and Canada, 15% to Asian countries (the main destinations are Thailand, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan) and 5% to the rest of the world (including Australia and 
North-African countries). 
The technological evolution of the firm’s products has been increasingly subject 
to the requirements of its external customers as the share of total production aimed at 
external markets began to increase and then became the major part. The main 
competitors of the firm became the foreign firms competing for the same clients and not 
the internal firms competing for the national market. It began to participate regularly in the 
most important international fairs of the sector, an activity that is both a way of marketing 
its products and a way to know what the other producers are doing (and also as a source 
of ideas for new improvements). The two main product lines were subject to new 
improvements. The most important ones are the adoption and improvement of new 
techniques and devices to perform more accurately and reliably the main functions of the 
machines, namely, to cut (in the case of the guillotines) or bend (in the case of the press 
brakes) metal sheets. The differences in the main techniques/technologies for the 
guillotines are related to the type of synchronism of the movement of the parts that 
support and move the cutting blades and the position inside the machine of the main 
mechanisms and devices that control movement. Developments of the underlying 
principles and perfection of the techniques, devices and materials required by those 
systems enabled the firm to introduce in 1968 the so-called “variable angle cut” and in 
1974 the “oscillating cut”. With regards to the press brakes the technologies are related to 
the introduction of devices that assure bending homogeneity and increase the deflection 
precision, or in other words, that increase the quality of the bend which is determined by 
the accuracy and consistency of the bending angle throughout the length of the bend. 
Additionally and in parallel there is a constant preoccupation with material quality, 
robustness, ergonomic design and safety. 
 In 1979 the firm made another technological jump and started the manufacture of 
CNC machines, or to be more exact, it introduced computer numerical control in its two 
main product lines. Aside from that it continued to introduce constant incremental 
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improvements in the machines affecting the performance and quality of the main function 
of the machine as well as affecting its possibilities of coupling with other productive 
devices/functions, its durability, its ease of operation and its safety. The machines were 
now able to cut metal sheets up to 25 mm thick and 10 m long (depending on the type of 
metal). In addition there were a number of other improvements. For instance, the 
construction was now heavily based on increasingly sophisticated welding techniques (so 
much so that the firm established another separated but affiliated firm exclusively 
dedicated to welding), the design of the superstructure was optimised by computer 
calculus and simulation, there was a number of auto-adjustable mechanisms (such as 
auto lubricated moving parts, self-regulated holding compression force, etc.), selected 
improvement of the material of the parts according to the function it was performing on 
the machine and the wear and tear to which it is subjected, devices that fine tune delicate 
movements of large moving parts, improvements in energy consumption, design of the 
machine to enhance its ease of operation and safety characteristics as well as the 
introduction of specific devices that enhances operator safety. The CNC devices permited 
a series of modes of operation as well as the programming of machine operations. They 
also permited the programming of interactions of the machine with other auxiliary external 
devices (such as for instance the automatic intervention of support tables for feeding 
sheets, the intervention of devices to automatically collect and store sheets after they are 
cut, connection to a remote computer, etc.). 
 Technologically the products made by the firm are at the second best level 
compared with world state-of-the-art. This technological level is partly a deliberate choice 
of the company. One of the factors behind that decision is the lack of world reputation or 
image of the whole country as a manufacturer of technologically advanced products. The 
state-of-the-art machines of this kind (performing the same function) are extremely 
sophisticated and engineered, very reliable and very expensive and they are 
manufactured by developed countries (Swiss, Germany, USA) with an established 
tradition of competence on the world market. Portugal does not have such a tradition (the 
world image of Portugal is of a producer of primary products such as wine or low-
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technology industrial products such as textiles). Therefore the firm believes that it would 
be extremely difficult to find international customers at that technological level if the firm 
would choose to enter such a level, except if the price was extremely competitive which is 
an impossibility for the firm. Within the medium-high technological platform on which the 
firm operates the competition is amongst a greater number of producers but the 
machines are evaluated by their virtues and the firm’s products can stand out if they are 
able to compare positively with similar ones. 
 The product philosophy is based on what the firm calls the “evolutive concept”, 
which is based on the construction of a common superstructure for all the machines and 
the differentiation of the machines by complementing that superstructure with 
differentiated devices or characteristics. So, within each product line, there is a basic 
machine model or skeleton to which can be added additional devices depending on the 
characteristics required by the customer. Some of those devices are standard, others 
may be easily-made modifications of standard products, and others still can be ordered 
and tailor-made. The machine can also be adapted and programmed to interact with 
other external devices. Again, the firm provides a choice of possibilities that goes from 
standard, close to standard and tailor-made external devices.  
In this way the firm tries to conciliate and explore the cost advantages of mass 
production with the market advantages of batch production. However production 
problems are felt quite strongly in the firm. It is perhaps one of its main concerns now. 
Aside from the automation of administrative procedures they have also automated the 
management of stocks and orders by means of a relatively sophisticated software 
package. The firm has experimented and tried to introduce new approaches and 
techniques of production, such as JIT and CAD/CAM but it has proven difficult. CAM, CIM 
and JIT production were implemented but only partially, i.e., only on some production 
lines. The difficulties stem in part from lack of qualification and preparation of the workers 
that are apparently unable or slow to adapt to new production forms and conditions 
(namely they are unable to understand how the factory operates and the importance of 
their small actions to the smooth functioning of production). Problems are also derived 
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from external constrains, in general those linked to difficulties in making the suppliers or 
subcontracted firms abide by strict delivery deadlines. In general this is linked to certain 
vices of production, such as the tendency to put all orders in the same sack and produce 
large series instead of small batches. For instance, if the firm issues an order to a sub-
contractor consisting of three pieces type A for Monday plus three pieces type B for 
Friday, the tendency is for the sub-contracted firm to deliver all six pieces on Friday 
because it is less costly. JIT production presupposes quick set-up times, which is a 
condition not met by many sub-contractors who are not using modern adequate 
equipment nor management techniques. Another problem is the lack of a large enough 
national base of specialised sub-contracted firms, which forces the firm to make many 
parts and excessively complicates the management of production and its automation. 
Behind these difficulties are probably limitations in the firm’s knowledge base relative to 
production management. The firm contracts out many activities and reserves for itself the 
work related to design, work related to shaping metals, machine parts, machine 
interfaces and assembly. Its trend is to become more and more an assembler of systems. 
The creation and separation of the above-mentioned firm dedicated to welding is a 
consequence of this logic. Every part of the machine that requires welded construction is 
contracted out to that firm. All the electrical, electronic and computer control components 
are also contracted out. Many machine parts are also contracted out and it is not more 
only because of the difficulties mentioned above. The firm tries to circumvent such 
difficulties by establishing close relationships with some sub-contracted firms, providing 
training, tools, production specifications and in general everything necessary so that the 
sub-contracted firm manufactures the part as well as they do. 
At the management level, the firm tries also at least to follow the lead. It has a 
separate R&D department to which it attaches a great deal of importance. The R&D 
department is organised by market, i.e., by product lines. There is one section of the 
department that deals with guillotines and a certain type of presses and the another 
section that deals with press brakes and a second type of presses. Additionally there is a 
third section that deals with the integration of electric and electronic components. The 
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main product line sections have each two mechanical engineers, aside from the 
designers, who are professionally educated at higher secondary level or medium level. 
The electronic section has an electric engineer and an electric technician with a short-
cycle higher education course. There are concerns with teamwork and explicit actions to 
enhance work based on teams, which involve not only the R&D department but also the 
marketing and production department. An engineer leads each department, including the 
marketing department. An economist leads the finance department. The firm elaborates 
quite carefully an annual plan after a thorough evaluation of its strengths and 
weaknesses with demanding qualitative objectives, and also a five-year plan with more 
vague and qualitative considerations and goals. At the end of each year the annual 
targets are compared with what was actually achieved and future plans of actions are 
drawn accordingly and taking into consideration the lessons that it learned from the 
ending year. 
The firm maintains a relatively large web of contacts, at least if compared with the 
majority of firms in this sample. Aside from its relationships with the sub-contracted firms 
described above, whereby the flux of knowledge goes essentially from the firm to the 
contracted firm, it has also participated in a project that involved another firm in the 
equipment goods sector and a university. It has submitted applications to participate in 
EU programmes but unsuccessfully until now because they have difficulties in finding a 
partner that is not also a competitor. Their main outside link is with the Engineering 
Faculty of the university in the city in which they are established. It is a regular and 
constant collaboration and established quite some time ago. The origins of such 
collaboration, asides from its geographical proximity, are linked to the fact that many of 
the engineers were educated and graduated at that institution and they have contacts 
with former teachers or colleagues. Many incremental improvements in the machines are 
a result of this collaboration. It takes advantage of more sophisticated machinery that the 
Faculty possesses, namely in the fields of computation (for calculus and simulations) and 
electronics (for specific applications development). It resorts frequently to the sector’s 
technological centre for instrument calibration, certification and quality tests. It 
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collaborated once with a state research laboratory and with another engineering faculty in 
the capital city. Relative to technological matters it has resorted to international 
consultants but only occasionally to national consultants to whom if refers with criticism, 
saying that they are inexperienced and opportunistic. 
 
This example almost speaks for itself because the factors embodied in each firm and the 
trajectories they followed are so contrasting. The average firm starts from a very weak 
knowledge base and relies excessively on the practical experience their members 
acquired in previous working positions. Marketing and the target customer are inadequate 
for the present conditions of the firm and there is no effort to upgrade its technological 
capacity (the owner blames its competitors and complains of unfair competition but it 
never refers to the quality of its products). The innovative firm, on the contrary, 
incorporates a range of factors, including management practices at administrative and 
production level which makes it quite innovative and successful. The selection criterion is 
clearly at the level of the innovative content of the products and at the level of the 
adequacy of the product to the requirements of the customer (which includes an 
important component of after-sales service). 
 
11.10 MECVER and GUIFIL (Pair 9) – worlds apart II  
 
The history of this pair of firms is somewhat similar to the history of the previous pair, 
particularly as regards the innovative firm. The average firm in this pair diverges from the 
average firm in the previous pair in the sense that it is much more determined in the 
decisions it takes, particularly in the decision to abandon a product line and in the ability it 
has to find alternatives. It also benefited from improvements in the qualifications of its 
personnel both at shop-floor and at design level, although it is relatively modest at this 
latest level. However this proves to be adequate and sufficient for its present product line. 
This dynamism and determination makes the difference between an almost inevitable 
  
266 
“announced” death of the average firm in pair 8 and survival of the average firm in this 
pair. 
 The average firm was founded in 1982 by a couple of brothers. Both had 
secondary level professional training and working experience in the metallurgical sector. 
One of them worked as a welder and the other as a machine operator where they gained 
an important practical know-how that it would be the basis of the firm which started first 
as a small workshop manufacturing metallic welded structures. Later it started the 
production of small presses for the agricultural sector to compress specific organic 
products. The machines were very simple, similar to the ones manufactured by the 
average firm in pair 8. The firm soon split into two. The welder moved into other larger 
premises and abandoned the manufacture of presses for which he saw too much 
competition and not much future and dedicated the firm to the repair of agricultural 
vehicles and later vehicles related to civil construction. Aside from the maintenance of the 
motor the firm repaired the body of the vehicle, namely the hydraulic components of 
those machines (e.g., lifters) and manufactured replacement parts. In its quest for orders 
it managed to arrange one from a large manufacturer of electric products which would 
constitute an important part of the firm turnover (about 80-90%). The order consisted of 
the partial manufacture of metallic boxes for electrical transformation posts. The firm had 
to weld all the components. This was its only job. The large firm provided everything else. 
It provided all the drawings, all the materials and all the specifications and precise 
welding instructions and training. This service was beneficial to the firm in two ways. First 
it gave the firm a constant stream of work and security during almost six years and 
second it improved substantially its skills in welding by virtue of the regular annual 
training it received from the large firm. 
 The early 1990s’ recession diminished the orders from the large firm but 
fortunately the firm by then found a smart way to combine its available skills and practical 
know-how. The social contacts of the owner and his quick perception of business 
opportunities are behind the product re-orientation of the firm. The firm decided to 
manufacture garbage containers, equipped with a hydraulic system to compress the 
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garbage, to fit into garbage trucks. It also secured the maintenance of the trucks, 
including the motors. By defining this business it combined all its skills in one product line. 
Its welding skills were used in the manufacture of the container body, its skills in press 
manufacturing and repair were applied in the garbage compressing mechanism and its 
skills in repairing motors were also applied, enabling the firm to provide a complete and 
integrated garbage fleet manufacture and maintenance service to its customers. This 
decision was made around 1991. At the time there was a small number of firms operating 
in that business and there was an increasing concern by city councils with the garbage 
situation due to the ever increasing quantities of waste and also by the requirements 
imposed by law (of which the EU laws are an important component). The fact that the 
owner worked in the city council as an elected local representative explains partially the 
business insight he so cleverly grabbed. The firm quickly contacted a great number of city 
councils nation-wide and was able to sign contracts with many of them. This line of 
activity (manufacture of garbage container and respective equipment and maintenance of 
garbage fleet) represents now 80% of its activity. It continues manufacturing, or more 
precisely, welding (everything else including materials is provided by the other firm) the 
metallic boxes for the large firm and its welders continue to receive annual training. They 
also manufacture individual components under order. 
 At the same time the firm decided to upgrade a little bit its knowledge base and it 
admitted a highly educated (but not graduate) technician (a university drop-out from a 
course in mechanical engineering) who now carries out all the design part of the 
products. The conception of the product was based on visual observation and imitation of 
similar imported products. The firm manufactures almost everything in-house, inclusive 
the hydraulic components (except plastic or rubber parts such as rubber seals). The only 
operation it did not perform was bending the metal sheets but it acquired recently a 
machine to do that (a press brake). Except for this last automatic machine which is 
relatively sophisticated, all the other production equipment is non-automatic and 
mechanical. It does not have a painting cabin which leaves much to be desired in the 
quality of the painting.  
  
268 
Administrative functions are automated; cost control and time control were 
automated with a software package acquired a couple of years ago. It has used CAD for 
about a year now. Strategic management is based on the visionary capacity of the owner 
and on the day-to-day management of orders and production. There are no formal plans 
of action, either long term or short term. Contacts with the outside, in terms of 
technological transfer or co-operation with other firms is reduced to the know-how 
provided by the large firm under the conditions mentioned above. The admission of the 
highly educated technician will eventually enlarge its contacts. 
The most recent and bold movement of the firm is the (possible) establishment of 
an agreement with an African country (an ex-Portuguese colony; it is interesting to note 
here that many internationalisation efforts of the firms in this sample began with Africa) to 
manufacture, repair and maintain the respective garbage fleet. It has already installed a 
workshop in that country with some machines and a small team of workers. They will 
assemble the containers and equipments manufactured in Portugal and sent by ship, and 
will provide for the maintenance of the fleet. 
 
The innovative firm was founded in 1934 manufacturing moulds for the glass industry and 
as a repair workshop. With the progressive integration of workshops within the structure 
of the glass factories the firm had to re-orient its activity. In 1944 it started to manufacture 
equipment goods. It manufactured all kinds of machines. It started manufacturing presses 
and then guillotines but it also manufactured smoothing planners, lathes, milling 
machines, and a plethora of small machines. Every product was manufactured under 
order. When more manufacturers surged and competition increased the firm re-oriented 
again its product lines and, during the 1960s, it decided to specialise in a narrow range of 
products, which are guillotines and press brakes. 
 Concern with constant technological improvement was always present in this firm 
and it always relied essentially on its own development activities and a constant 
upgrading of its skills and knowledge base. The products were subject to basically the 
same trajectory described in the previous pair (Pair 8) concerning the innovative firm. 
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Initially the machines were mechanically driven, then begun to incorporate hydraulic 
systems and in the late 1970s and early 1980s CNC was introduced. Parallel 
developments in ergonomic characteristics, safety devices or design, operations 
facilitators and coupling with external equipment accompanied the main developments in 
the machines. The firm has also specialised since 1978 in a particular technological 
principle namely the so-called “vertical cut” in opposition to the so-called “oscillating cut”. 
The former is based on the positioning of the hydraulic cylinders that command the 
movement of the blades at the bottom of the machine and there is serial synchronisation 
of the cylinders. The latter is based on the positioning of the cylinders at the top of the 
machine and on mechanical synchronisation, and it suffers from the inconvenience of 
increased potential mechanical distortions of the structure and/or the tools. Its main 
recent developments are the introduction of CNC and the introduction of interfaces that 
allow easy coupling of robot systems to the machines. Presently the variability of optional 
devices and models is quite large. Its product and production philosophy is based on 
batch production of a few basic models, but it also manufactures special tailor-made 
models or machines under order. Its motto is flexibility. Investment was made in new 
production equipment and upgrading of the existing one and production management is 
in an advanced state of automation, incorporating advanced CAD, CAM and CIM 
systems (but not in all lines of production). The trend towards automation begun in the 
mid 1980s and major investments in integration were made in the early 1990s. 
 The firm experienced severe limitations to its growth during the 1960s (due to the 
small size of the domestic market) and it begun to export. Its first export markets were 
Spain, USA and UK. Fearing excessive dependence on a small number of export 
markets (and recalling its earlier dependence on the national market and the problems 
that it caused in the past) the firm engaged, in 1992, in a policy of diversification of 
markets. Nowadays it exports, on average, 80% of its production to about a dozen 
countries including the EUA (its main export market) the EU countries (including 
Scandinavian countries), Asian countries (Thailand, Japan and Taiwan) and some 
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countries in Africa and South America. These are the main markets but it exports to other 
countries. 
The firm has a separate R&D department to which it attributes a great deal of 
importance. Presently there are about six engineers working full time in development 
activities. It makes a quantitative 3-year plan concerning strategy and investment (for the 
export component only; there is no plan for national orders) and a five-year non-
quantified plan with long-term objectives. There is also a large and comprehensive 
training programme that involves not only production workers but also managers at all 
levels and in all departments. Outside links include close co-operation with sub-
contracted firms to which there is a team solely dedicated, and co-operation with the 
university, namely a Faculty of Engineering (but apparently the firm is not very satisfied 
with this co-operation mainly because of time delays). Management priorities are now in 
terms of project (R&D), management of sub-contracted activities, sales and after sale 
services. 
 
An additional comment is due comparing the two innovative firms in the last two pairs 
because both the innovative firms in pairs 8 and 9 share a similar story. One started 
around late 1930s producing moulds for the glass industry. The other was founded in the 
mid 1950s, as a machine repair shop and manufacturing small machines. The former 
abandoned the manufacture of moulds when the glass industry incorporated their 
manufacture into their factories, and it then started to produce machine tools. The 
production was diversified (presses, shears, press brakes, lathes, etc.) but there was a 
non-coincidental relation with their former activity (making moulds with presses). 
Competition during the 1960s led them to specialise in two products. The other firm 
adopted a specialised strategy earlier in its lifetime and they have been consistently in the 
same product line since the 1960s. Both firms show a quite clear vision of their goals and 
their strategy. Both began to export during the late 1960s, because the internal market 
was not enough to provide a basis for expansion, initially to Africa and then to Europe. 
Now they export 80% of their production to Europe, the United States, Canada, Asia and 
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for other countries as well. The diversification of markets was adopted to prevent an 
excessive reliance on one country alone (a problem that was felt earlier, before they 
began to export, and later during recession periods). They both produce, on a serial 
basis, a core machine body to which they then add electronic controls, CNC controls or 
other peripherals according to the requisites of the customers. They also produce tailor 
made products and offer a series of options that can be added to the basic machine, 
including coupling systems to robot flexible manufacturing systems.  
The selection criteria for these firms have been based on the interplay between 
technology, performance, quality and price. The technology of the products is 
average/above average, not state of the art, but their quality, efficiency and reliability are 
excellent in the range at which they operate, and the price is competitive compared with 
other producers of similar equipment in the countries to which they export. This mix of 
qualities has proven to be quite successful. When describing their respective histories in 
a preceding section we compared them with an “average” pair but, having in mind the 
trajectory they followed, it becomes clear that their main competitors in the national 
market are themselves, and that their main competitors (in absolute terms) are firms from 
the markets to which they export or firms that have an intense export activity like 
themselves. It is therefore appropriate and pertinent to compare the two firms. What 
distinguishes them is not the technological level or complexity of the products, which are 
in almost all respects identical or comparable, but the way that the same technology is 
incorporated into the design of the machine and in that respect one of the firms has a 
superior degree of flexibility compared to the other firm. The firm in pair 9 has the 
capacity to produce a larger variety of machines than the other has, at no extra cost. 
However, this increased batch production capacity seems to be obtained by sacrificing 
the scale of production at which the firm in pair 8 compares most favourably with the 
other. Both firms are likely and able to grow. It will not be a surprise if they do it by fusing 
their activities. 
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11.11 EFACEC (Case 10) – a multinational tradition  
 
The history of this firm gives a perspective on how a Portuguese firm successfully built up 
its own capacity through formal transfer of knowledge and technology. The firm was 
founded in 1911, as the result of a partnership between a Portuguese family and a 
Belgian family to manufacture electric motors. It was a partnership based on the 
complementary of technological knowledge that each partner brought with them. Before 
the partnership the Portuguese family was active in metallurgy work and it had recently 
begun to experiment and to diversify into the electrical components business. The 
Belgians brought more advanced electric knowledge to the joint venture. For the first ten 
years, the main product remained electric motors, but after that the firm begun to diversify 
into the fields of energy transformation and generation. In 1921 a new company was 
created, involving the same two shareholders and it reflects on the one hand, its 
expansion and diversification approach, and on the other hand its definite encroachment 
on electromechanical machines. Aside from electric motors, the company was now 
increasingly active in the manufacture of transformers and other electric apparatus as 
well as components and accessories of several sorts. Later, an affiliated firm, 
manufacturing electric boards, was created. By this time the diversity of customers was 
high. They provided for a wide range of demands from the public, private and industrial 
sector. The public sector became increasingly important, due to the continuous and 
accelerating building of the communications and energy distribution infrastructure 
systems. However, only after the Second World War would demand from the public 
sector affect in an important way the growth of the firm. In 1948, the firm was larger than 
average for national standards. Its success attracted the attention of large firms, and two 
new entrants made their debut in the firm's capital structure. One of the firms was a 
Portuguese corporation linked to the chemical sector and the other was another Belgian 
firm in the electrical/electronic sector. The new capital provided the firm with the financial 
capability to enter into more ambitious and demanding product lines, namely large 
equipment for electric generation and distribution. Besides the previous accumulated 
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knowledge, the Belgian firm provided the know-how, and the firm manufactured the 
produce under licence. The first 200 KVA, 1.5 tonne transformers were built in 1949 and 
the first medium-tension circuit breakers followed suit. It is also by this time that the firm 
started to produce on an industrial basis, adopting a clear division of labour and heavy 
mechanisation of the factory. This organisational mode of production was applied to the 
mass production of electric motors. Larger and more potent transformers followed soon 
afterwards, as well as the manufacture of high-tension circuit breakers. 
 Eventually the Belgian firm took control of the company in the mid 1950s, buying 
out the part of the capital in the hands of the chemical corporation, acquiring a 70% 
majority stake in the company. It would control the company for the next thirty years. 
 The period in the firm’s life that started with the Belgian take-over coincided with 
a moment of great development of the Portuguese economy. High public investments in 
the national electric infrastructure most benefited the firm during this time, sustaining a 
steady and prolonged period of growth, greatly helped by the fact that it enjoyed an 
almost complete monopoly over the Portuguese market, due to the absence of internal 
competition, for there was not any comparable firm in the same product lines, or indeed 
competition from abroad, for its position and market was secured by considerable tariff 
and political barriers. 
 For the next two decades or so, it basically continued with the same two main 
product lines: electrical motors and power transformers. The products were subject to 
continuous developments and improvements, but these improvements were not based or 
derived from its own R&D activities but rather from the R&D activities pursued by the 
mother company abroad. The new products were developed at the mother company's 
headquarters and the firm made only slight improvements or adaptations to meet specific 
local circumstances. 
 Even after the great expansion period that the Portuguese economy enjoyed 
during the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, the firm continued to grow appreciably. In the 
early 1980s it created an electronic department, aimed at the implementation and 
integration of electronic circuitry and control devices in their products. It also started the 
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production of automatic systems for power plants. By the mid 1980s it started to 
automate its factories producing electric motors. By the end of the 1980s the (two) 
factories that produced motors were completely automated, using the latest technology 
available. 
 The late 1980s were a turning point for the firm. The Belgian shareholders that 
controlled the firm for nearly thirty years abandoned completely their position in the firm. 
The firm was not acquired by another large conglomerate. Its equity was widely 
dispersed, following a public offer, and no single entity acquired a majority share in the 
firm. The largest single position (around 12%) was acquired by a Portuguese financial 
group that had stakes in several industries. The management tried recently to trace the 
possession of the capital of the firm and it was able to identify only 50% of the total, which 
was itself widely dispersed among several shareholders. 
The firm was now, for real purposes, in the hands of the technostructure, with no 
single controlling stake in its administration board. It was not a management buy-out but 
the management effectively took power. This unusual situation, at least by Portuguese 
standards, and certainly a drastic change for the firm, apparently did not prevent it from 
acting efficiently and to prioritise its activities. The management quickly devised its plans 
and a big change in strategy ensued. 
 The change was characterised by three fundamental facts: 1) investment and 
reliance on in-house technological development, as opposed to the dependence on 
licence agreements, 2) re-organisation of the firm based on product market divisions, and 
3) the necessity to export to recoup and sustain the costs of in-house development of 
technology. 
All these strategic factors represent a radical departure from the previous 
orientation of the firm and it has shaken considerably its structural features. The firm has, 
in a relatively short period, evolved from the dependent subsidiary of a foreign 
corporation into a fully-fledged and expanding company with multinational characteristics. 
The firm is now organised as a holding group, comprising several product divisions. The 
present structure is represented by the organogram in Table 52. 
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Table 52. EFACEC organogram. 
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 Each division is responsible for its own management, production and R&D 
activities, and is treated as a different profit centre. The board of directors that includes 
the director of each division carries out the overall co-ordination. The board of directors 
nominates the administration board (except the member from the financial group that 
possesses the largest single share). The firm employs modern management techniques, 
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which include management by objectives, project oriented programmes, R&D as a cost of 
production, emphasis on training, and recruitment of highly qualified personnel. Their 
newest objective is to attract post-graduates at the doctorate level. The firm has multiple 
agreements, co-operative arrangements and projects with universities, research 
laboratories and technological centres. It is a shareholder of the recently created science 
parks and innovation agency. It has also agreements with other firms and is involved in a 
series of development projects with other multinationals. It constituted a joint venture with 
Chinese partners to manufacture transformers and other energy equipment in China. 
R&D activities are now considered essential and the firm compares its own R&D 
intensity with the R&D intensity figures of the main multinational firms in the same sector 
(and it is still considerably lower, by a factor of three, which is a source of great concern 
for the firm). Availability of finance is not seen as an impediment to R&D activities, and 
arguments based on financial resources are not accepted as a reason to not pursue a 
certain project. Presently, two-thirds of their investment is derived from external funding. 
 It is now involved in an aggressive export policy. It started with Africa, the 
Mahgreb countries and the Arab countries, and is now exporting to a wide variety of 
destinations, including Europe, Asia, North and South America. The pattern of export is 
not even. The European and North-American markets absorb mostly its electric and 
electronic products, while the other markets absorb the heavy equipment for generation 
and distribution of electrical energy. The firm is trying actively to penetrate the European 
market in this latter product line, a goal that has proven difficult to achieve, due to subtle 
protection barriers that exist in the market for heavy electric machinery in those countries 
(according to an explanation given by the firm). On average, and considering all products, 
the firm exports 30% of its production. 
 Domestically, the main clients are still in the areas of electric utilities, the railroads 
and communications. In terms of products, although the energy sector maintains its 
importance in the sales portfolio of the firm, the electronic products have acquired an 
increased importance and are now the fastest growing product line. 
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 Although the firm passed through, at least, three different periods characterised 
by different structures of ownership, it seems that a steady and continuous growth path, 
underpinned by a rather early-defined strategy in terms of product specialisation marks its 
history. The initial stages, characterised by a broader product range, were soon followed 
by a concentration of efforts on the two main lines of production (electric motors and 
heavy electric equipment). Government procurement and the fast structural change and 
growth rate the economy experienced during that period, particularly after the 1940s, are 
not isolated factors from the specific strategy the firm then followed, nor is the fact that 
the firm enjoyed a substantial degree of protection from outside or inside competition 
divorced from its continual growth. 
 On the other hand, the diversification strategy followed just after the departure of 
the foreign investors shows how constrained it was by its former strategy. After all, the 
scope of applicability of the knowledge involved in the two main product lines was so 
broad, and its extension to other product lines could benefit so much from the 
accumulated expertise and the scientific and technological proximity, that it seems odd 
that the diversification into other products was not as extended as it was. There are, at 
least, two explanations for that. One is that the strategy and the competencies of the 
Belgian firm were themselves rather focused in terms of product specialisation, and that it 
transposed its own strategy to its subsidiary in Portugal. Another is that the subsidiary 
was only allowed to manufacture a limited number of products and thus its activity was 
constrained by the broader perspectives and the broader strategic concerns of its parent 
firm. In this particular case, the latter explanation seems to apply. The Belgian parent firm 
was involved in a much broader range of products than its subsidiary, and the market 
restrictions that the subsidiary faced seem to substantiate this view. 
 Even though formal R&D activities hardly took place in the firm, and the 
production engineers and the technicians were the most important functional sites of 
whatever development took place, this did not deter the firm from pursuing a completely 
different strategy after the Belgians left. In principle, the option existed to continue to 
operate in a similar fashion, based on licence agreements and imports of technological 
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knowledge, but, apparently, the firm was sufficiently confident in its own capabilities to 
believe that it could develop its own technological knowledge and its own products. This 
is not surprising, at first sight. Its long history of manufacture of specialised product lines 
contributed enormously to the gradual accumulation of knowledge and expertise by the 
indigenous engineers and technicians. The very nature of the products explains how the 
subsidiary appropriated that knowledge. On the one hand, we have electrical motors, a 
relatively simple and mature product, whose principles are easily mastered. The concern 
related to this product is not so much with development but rather with production to 
make it cheaper and to take advantages of economies of scale. On the other hand, the 
heavy electrical production and distribution equipment was built not on a serial basis but 
on a unit basis, and that must have provided the production engineers with the 
opportunity to master its relatively complex principles and manufacturing techniques. 
Although the product was not designed by them, its manufacture and assembling were, 
and to do that, it was absolutely necessary that they had a detailed understanding and 
knowledge of the intricacies and complexities of the systems, because, by its very nature 
and by its demand characteristics and associated cost-benefit considerations, the product 
was not liable to be decomposed into simpler systems or components and manufactured 
by automated machinery. Such a situation would have put more emphasis on production 
management and on the function of the production engineers as supervisors of a 
manufacturing procedure, depriving the firm's engineers from the detailed knowledge that 
a manufacturing procedure based on the assembly of a single product gave them. 
 However, the competence of the firm to embrace with its hands its own destiny 
also involved an element of risk that should not be undervalued. First, although the 
capabilities were there, they remained, in certain domains, below the level of their 
competitors, and second, as any good manager knows, one does not necessarily (or 
even remotely) stay in the same place by doing the same things. The firm had to make 
the appropriate decisions to support, consolidate and make its option work. Albeit the 
past provided a strong technological baggage and experience, its inherited strategic 
condition or its structural organisational features were not necessarily the best guiding 
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post to follow. In this respect, the knowledge, expertise and vision embodied in the highly 
educated staff played an important role on the re-orientation of the firm. The high number 
of graduates employed by the company was also helpful to sustain and facilitate the 
transition. The university background and the informed networks on which these people 
were included have certainly contributed to ease and make it more expeditious for the 
firm to tackle the uncertainties in its future and to implement its decisions. The presence 
of the financial group interests also added and gave strength to the managerial 
capabilities of the firm. 
 It is not possible to separate the selection mechanisms that affected the firm 
during the period when it was a subsidiary of a corporation from the mechanisms that 
affected that same corporation. Whatever they were, its technological competence 
notwithstanding, the survival and growth of its subsidiary are certainly linked to the lack of 
serious competitive threats. In a certain sense, the firm was not subject to any kind of 
selection, since there were no other available options. One can only speculate on the 
means by which the Belgian corporation was able to enter the Portuguese market and to 
bypass its international competitors.  
 The current phase of the firm is characterised by a much more competitive 
environment, whereby subsidiaries of other multinationals have entered the same product 
markets (some multinationals were in Portugal long ago, but the dictates of pre-1974 
Portuguese industrial policy prevented them from competing in the same products) and 
competitive tenders for the same products, in government contracts, are now present. At 
the moment, the firm is still enjoying a certain degree of protection provided by its 
traditional clients, a situation that arises because the capital stock of those clients was 
supplied by the firm, and are thus dependent on the tacit and firm-specific technological 
knowledge embodied in those products. That dependence is particularly strong on the 
energy sector and the railroad system, whereby compatibility problems may prove difficult 
to supplant, or the integration of electronic and computerised systems of control may be 
particularly difficult for outsiders to accomplish due to the technological specificity of the 
systems. However, these advantages are not guaranteed and may be overcome. On the 
  
280 
other hand, political factors also play a part in the preference given to the firm by the 
traditional state controlled clients, as governments tend to and are under pressure to 
favour national firms. 
 The combined R&D and export efforts of the firm are an important factor behind 
its present relatively successful situation. Its penetration in the international markets 
mentioned above, and its policy of diversification conferred upon the firm latitude that it 
did not have before, making it less dependent on a single product line or on a single 
market than it had been. It is still rather dependent on quite traditional product lines, in 
spite of its efforts, which may explain its unsuccessful efforts to enter into more 
demanding markets, like the European one, as it concerns its heavy electric equipment (if 
we are not to believe its claims that the reasons for its failures are of another nature). 
Insufficient development of complementary assets in those markets, such as technical 
services, consultants and software, is probably an added factor to account for, as the 
systems they commercialise are heavily dependent on such assets. However, 
considering that the firm has only recently begun its new life, it is perhaps too soon to 
precipitate conclusions. The firm is in the process of catching up, both in pure 
technological terms and in production terms. Its portfolio of co-operation agreements is a 
good sign of that process. One must wait and see if it bears fruits and how quick they will 
come. 
people were included have certainly contributed to ease and make it more expeditious for 
the firm to tackle the uncertainties in its future and to implement its decisions. The 
presence of the financial group interests also added and gave strength to the managerial 
capabilities of the firm. 
 It is not possible to separate the selection mechanisms that affected the firm 
during the period when it was a subsidiary of a corporation from the mechanisms that 
affected that same corporation. Whatever they were, its technological competence 
notwithstanding, the survival and growth of its subsidiary are certainly linked to the lack of 
serious competitive threats. In a certain sense, the firm was not subject to any kind of 
selection, since there were no other available options. One can only speculate on the 
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means by which the Belgian corporation was able to enter the Portuguese market and to 
bypass its international competitors.  
 The current phase of the firm is characterised by a much more competitive 
environment, whereby subsidiaries of other multinationals have entered the same product 
markets (some multinationals were in Portugal long ago, but the dictates of pre-1974 
Portuguese industrial policy prevented them from competing in the same products) and 
competitive tenders for the same products, in government contracts, are now present. At 
the moment, the firm is still enjoying a certain degree of protection provided by its 
traditional clients, a situation that arises because the capital stock of those clients was 
supplied by the firm, and are thus dependent on the tacit and firm-specific technological 
knowledge embodied in those products. That dependence is particularly strong on the 
energy sector and the railroad system, whereby compatibility problems may prove difficult 
to supplant, or the integration of electronic and computerised systems of control may be 
particularly difficult for outsiders to accomplish due to the technological specificity of the 
systems. However, these advantages are not guaranteed and may be overcome. On the 
other hand, political factors also play a part in the preference given to the firm by the 
traditional state controlled clients, as governments tend to and are under pressure to 
favour national firms. 
 The combined R&D and export efforts of the firm are an important factor behind 
its present relatively successful situation. Its penetration in the international markets 
mentioned above, and its policy of diversification conferred upon the firm latitude that it 
did not have before, making it less dependent on a single product line or on a single 
market than it had been. It is still rather dependent on quite traditional product lines, in 
spite of its efforts, which may explain its unsuccessful efforts to enter into more 
demanding markets, like the European one, as it concerns its heavy electric equipment (if 
we are not to believe its claims that the reasons for its failures are of another nature). 
Insufficient development of complementary assets in those markets, such as technical 
services, consultants and software, is probably an added factor to account for, as the 
systems they commercialise are heavily dependent on such assets. However, 
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considering that the firm has only recently begun its new life, it is perhaps too soon to 
precipitate conclusions. The firm is in the process of catching up, both in pure 
technological terms and in production terms. Its portfolio of co-operation agreements is a 
good sign of that process. One must wait and see if it bears fruits and how quick they will 
come. 
 The following table is an attempt to organise all the qualitative information that was 
provided extensively in the preceding sections of this chapter. The table will help to 
identify more clearly and rapidly the key characteristics of the case-studies. 
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Arvorense 1 Average       R    
Herculano  Innovative       N    
Vima 2 Average       N    
Mano  Innovative       L    
Avense 3 Average       R    
Industrial  Innovative       L    
Frama 4 Average       R    
Pinheiro  Innovative       N    
Mecano-Textil 5 Average       N    
ACL  Innovative       L    
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Table 53 (cont.). Key characteristics of the case-studies. 
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Maquisis 6 Average       N    
Seri  Innovative       L    
Sersan 7 Average       R    
Prensarte  Innovative       L    
Diarroca 8 Average       R    
Adira  Innovative       N    
Mecver 9 Average       N    
Guifil  Innovative       N    
Efacec Case 
10 
Innovative       L    
Legend: R – Regional customers; N – all types of national customers; L – large innovative firms 
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CHAPTER 12. GENERALISING THE RESULTS AND THE ANALYSIS: A 
FORMAL MODEL FOR UNDERSTANDING THE OBSERVED 
VARIATION AT FIRM LEVEL 
 
12.1 Introduction 
 
The last chapters described and analysed extensively the empirical findings 
regarding the individual firms that were the subject of this study. Chapter 10 identified, 
explained and analysed the quantifiable variables that showed up as important differential 
factors of the innovative behaviour of the firms. Chapter 10 described extensively and 
systematically the historical trajectory of each firm, emphasising for each firm (or pair of 
firms) factors considered particularly important for explaining the performance of the firm. 
In this chapter we intend to propose a generalisation, so that the previous exercise will 
not be eventually over-tuned with a descriptive tone. For that end we will propose an 
extension of a conceptual model that will help to explain the differences between firms, 
which are our main concern in this part of the thesis. 
 
12.2 A dynamic divergence model 
 
The considerations given so far suggest that as firms proceed along their path they 
encounter specific moments whereby a decision has to be made that will affect the future 
of the firm and it has to be made based on the existing strengths and limitations of the 
firm. The outcome of that decision process can either reinforce and improve the 
perceived strengths of the firm or it can set it even further apart from leading firms in 
comparable sectors of activity. Those moments were referred to as divergence points and 
some examples were given of certain decisions and the possible consequences on the 
global performance of the firm. By way of generalising it is useful to relate these crucial 
points to the process of innovation, and for that purpose we use the Kline and 
Rosenberg's (1986) chain-linked model of the innovation process. 
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The model includes a series of stages that define the innovation process at the 
level of the firm. At each stage we propose a series of factors that may push the firm on 
to a divergent path of low innovative performance, or conversely, towards greater 
innovative performance (Figure 13). At each stage there are factors that may be more 
important than others. They are not sequential, in the sense that a previous decision 
leading to a low performance path does not necessarily mean a subsequent decision 
favouring another low performance path. Since there are several possible combinations 
of factors, there are also several possible divergent paths and consequently several 
performance positions possible for a specific firm within a given population of firms at any 
time.  
 
Figure 13. Innovation stages and divergence processes. 
 
Source: adapted from Kline and Rosenberg, 1986. 
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 This process of divergence, dependent on the behavioural attitudes of the firms, 
their choices and actions, can be represented by resorting to a biological analogy. 
 
Table 54. Combinations of factors and deduced configurations. 
 Factor combination Deduced configuration 
Firm 1 All factors present. *excellent products 
*market leaders or main 
players at domestic level 
*very active in external markets 
*tendency to grow 
Firm 2 No factors present or low grade 
factors (only internal training, 
short-term strategy). 
*obsolete products 
*serving only declining firms at 
local level 
*likely to disappear in a short 
time 
Firm 3 Automated equipment; 
Improvements in machinery; 
visionary strategy; information 
network reasonable; 
  
*reasonable good products with 
no demanding technological 
concepts involved 
*likely to be component 
supplier in precision 
engineered products 
*serving essentially large firms 
but also a host of varied firms 
*potential to be in external 
markets as a component 
supplier 
*stabilised growth but eventual 
decline (if no other factors 
added) 
Firm 4 High educational level; external 
training; low R&D intensity; 
Automated equipment; 
improvements in machinery; 
Good information network. 
*good products with some level 
of demanding technology 
*manufacturer of sub-systems 
*serving large firms 
*possible sub-contracted firm of 
leading external firms supplying 
sub-systems 
*potential to growth but at a 
slow rate 
 
 
Consider each definition of a particular variable in Table 48 as a gene and consider 
that the firm acts in a Lamarckian space, i.e., it can acquire features that make it better 
fitted to the environment on which it is immersed. Then there are several possible 
combinations of that genes and each combination will define a certain type of firm, or in 
other words and using the biological analogy, a phenotype. In the same way that a 
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combination of human genes determines the global characteristics of a human being, so 
does the combination of variables define a firm innovative performance. Each gene or 
factor has its own function to fulfil and the factor related to management has the special 
and important task of co-ordinating all the others. We may liken it to the DNA, the 
fundamental source of information and guidance for the entire firm. 
 The model is based on the premise that the more new genes replace the old 
ones, the more likely that firm performance will be enhanced. The probabilities of 
innovative success are dependent on the managerial resources of the firm. Independently 
of these, the reasons why probabilities of better performance increase with new genes 
are based on the following assumptions: 1) the more factors are added, the higher is the 
probability that cumulative effects will lead to increased performance, and 2) the more 
factors are added the higher is the probability of increasing the absorptive capacity of the 
firm and consequently increase the probabilities of adoption of new factors.  
Table 54 depicts several possible factor combinations and the deduced 
performance characteristics of the firm. For instance, firm 1 and 2 represent the two 
extremes. Firm 2 is characterised by a combination of low-quality factors or the absence 
of many of them, determining a technologically laggard firm, operating only on local 
markets and on the verge of extinction. Firm 1 represents the "ideal firm” that has 
acquired all the high-quality factors. Its innovative performance is high and it operates in 
international markets. In between, there are a number of possible factor combinations 
from which the global innovative characteristics of the firm, the products that it 
manufactures and the markets on which it operates can eventually be deduced. 
 
12.3 Exploring the extended chain-linked model of innovation and testing its 
usefulness 
 
The model proposed by Kline and Rosenberg and the extension previously 
suggested is based on a systems approach. The process of innovation is the main 
system and the main preoccupation is with its efficiency. The system is decomposed into 
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subsystems, which are the research sub-system, the existing corpus of knowledge sub-
system and the firm sub-system. The firm sub-system, in turn, is decomposed into lower 
level sub-systems, comprising the subjective perception of a potential market, the 
invention or analytic design production stage, the detailed design and test component, 
the redesign and produce element and finally the distribution and market part. The 
functioning and efficiency of the main system are dependent not only upon the individual 
functioning and efficiency of the sub-systems, but are also critically dependent on how 
and how well they are connected with each other. The model sets out to identify what are 
those connections and the links that are perceived to be the most important in 
determining the efficiency and coherence of the system. 
 The possibility to detect the cause-effect relationships between the sub-systems, 
and to identify in what manner those cause-effect relationships affect the efficiency of the 
main system was enhanced by the extension made to the model. We have made it by 
juxtaposing the so-called divergence factors upon the principal model. Specifically, we 
have tried to identify disruptions to the operation of the sub-systems and the way that 
impinges on the other sub-systems, and ultimately on the main system. In doing so we 
can extend the analysis and consider the internal characteristics of the firm, and if we can 
consider the internal characteristics of the firm in the context of the whole model then it is 
possible to combine the analysis of the external environment of the firm with the analysis 
of the internal characteristics of the firm, which was, we shall recall, one of the main 
objectives of this study. However, in what follows, will give emphasis to the internal 
characteristics of the firms, exemplifying the applicability of our concept of divergence 
factors to the explanation of the differences between the firms in the sample.  
For instance, we suggested two kinds of disruption that can occur at the 
"potential market" level, which is the inability to identify a potential market and the inability 
to define a clear route of action, which are in a way closely connected to each other (the 
inability to identify a potential market may prevent a clear definition of the course of 
action, although the reverse may not be true). The “average” firm in pair 3 illustrates this 
situation. In spite of its efforts, the firm is incapable of defining its line of business and its 
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product line, after the previous product line became obsolete. The implications for the 
efficiency of the sub-system "invention and produce analytical design" may include the 
persistence to maintain existent guidelines on design practice, the lack of aptitude to 
create a climate favourable to creative thinking or to contribute to undermine such a 
climate, and the incapability to focus search procedures and to create efficient links with 
the sub-systems "existing corpus of knowledge" and "research" and to make those efforts 
coherent, consistent and efficient. The implications on the sub-system "detailed design 
and test" are similar and are bound to be enhanced, if the disruptive course caused in the 
first sub-system is allowed to continue. Test procedures would continue without a clear 
orientation, diverting resources, efforts and attention and jeopardising efficiency. At the 
production stage, the signals from the upstream sub-systems would disorientate 
operations plans and the balance between acquisitions of raw material, inventory and 
stock. It would provide no orientations on how to proceed in decisions concerned with the 
modernisation of the production machinery or on what machines are needed, eventually 
resulting in unconnected and ill advised investments that would lead to over capacity or 
unneeded purchasing of equipment. Dispersed, unconnected and inefficient links, if any 
at all, with the "research" and "existing corpus of knowledge" would also be a most likely 
outcome. The same malaise would affect the feedback links. Distribution channels would 
be hard to choose, or subject to constant revising, and the distributors themselves would 
grow even more unhappy with the irregularity of the arrangements. As a consequence, 
the efficiency of the main system would be severely compromised, and the prediction that 
the firm will be characterised by a low level of innovative performance is not surprising. 
This is in fact the situation faced by the average firm in pair 3. 
 However, disruptions can occur at other parts of the system, located at middle-
stream sub-systems and the consequences will be different. For instance, failure to 
acquire design skills, or theoretical guidelines to underpin invention, i.e., deficiencies in 
the linkage with the sub-system "existing corpus of knowledge", would result in fairly 
unimpressive designs, which in turn would have no demanding requirements on 
production machinery. The innovative firm in pair 3 is an example of such a situation. It, 
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however, would presumably have no negative impacts on production operations and on 
overall production management, as long as the complexity of operations is not high, and 
that would be presumably the case if the product design is simple, which we are 
assuming it is, and as long as basic management techniques are present (i.e., a certain 
efficient amount of links with external sources of knowledge is maintained). A clear overall 
perspective of its goal maintains the efficiency of the system, and even if the goal 
(innovative performance) in this case is not ambitious, or in other words, the function for 
which the system was designed is not ambitious, that does not necessarily compromise 
its efficiency. 
 Although the “average” firm in pair 1 has defined rather well its line of business 
(agricultural machines) it failed to increase its knowledge base, jeopardising the efficency 
of the "invention and produce analytical design" sub-system. Market demand and new 
technological opportunities required that the firm made improvements  in design of the 
machines which in turn required that the firm updated its knowledge and technological 
base. The implications were that the firm should have increased its links with the “existing 
body of knowledge” and internalise that knowledge if possible. One of the obvious ways 
to do that was by providing a higher education level to its personnel. However the firm 
failed to establish that link in a satisfactory manner. The knowledge base of the firm 
became increasingly distant from the available public knowledge and the firm’s products 
became increasingly inferior relative to more innovative competitors. Deficiencies at the 
production stage were felt in terms of the price of the product relative to other producers 
that manufacture larger series. The “innovative” firm, on the contrary, regularly updated 
its links with the “existing corpus of knowledge” in at least two ways. First by steadily 
increasing its own knowledge base (increasing the level of education and training of the 
personnel), and second by establishing regular links with other institutions. The link with 
the “research” block was also activated, which was made possible, on one hand, by the 
enhanced knowledge capacity of the firm and the possibility it created to engage in other 
type of contacts, and also by its own scanning activities and its own strategic investment 
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in R&D activities. The need to create links with the “research” system became apparent 
when the firm tried to introduce optical devices in its mechanical devices. 
 The “innovative” firms in pairs 8 and 9 illustrate the situation whereby almost if 
not all of the factors were carefully and wisely introduced. Links with the “existing corpus 
of knowledge” or “research” sub-systems were actively although selectively pursued at 
the necessary points in time. Both firms defined at a quite early stage their lines of 
business and specialised rather early in their lifetime, after a short period of activity 
undefined in terms of product family. The decision to start export activities was correctly 
followed by an enormous importance ascribed to development activities, on the one 
hand, and to production management, on the other hand. The necessary links with the 
“existing corpus of knowledge” and the “research” system were established through 
several channels including training, education, formal and informal contacts with 
universities, research institutions and other firms. The technological level of the product 
(medium-high, not state-of-the-art), and the difficulties related to management techniques 
reflect eventually the limitations of the “research” system at national level and the inability 
of such a system to provide the necessary know-how to deal with state-of-the-art 
products (such as for example laser-based machine tools), or organisational settings, and 
to do so in a timely and cost effective manner. This argument is related to the limitations 
of the “research” sub-system (described in chapter 7) on the firm sub-system and it is 
also applicable to other “innovative” firms (namely in pairs 3 and case 10). 
The “innovative” firm in pair 4 illustrates problems occurring in the production 
stage. Similarly to the firms in pairs 8 and 9 in the above example the firm defined rather 
early in its lifetime its potential market, was able to identify and increase the necessary 
knowledge base through links with the “existing corpus of knowledge” and the ”research” 
sub-systems using several communication channels, which included contacts with 
universities, research institutes, technical services, formal licence agreements and co-
operation with other firms, and had in place the necessary distribution and marketing 
infrastructures to satisfy its internal and external clients. The disruption that occurred in 
this firm, and which compromised for a while its health, was at the level of production 
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philosophy and production management, itself perhaps due to deficiencies in the 
connection between the “marketing and distribution” sub-system and strategic 
perspective in the “identify potential market” sub-system. The firm decided to engage in 
undifferentiated serial production of wood-working machine tools and to invest heavily in 
serial production equipment and centralised control and management of production. 
However, the emerging manufacturing paradigm based on batch production and flexible-
manufacturing systems severely compromised the innovation process of the firm, namely 
in the way existing guidelines on design practice were misguided relative to market 
demands. The firm was eventually able to react to the market signals and to adjust its 
development and design activities emphasising product differentiation and batch 
production. However it faced difficulties in the transition period. 
 The “innovative” firm in pair 2 is an example that shows that it may not be enough 
to have the necessary links with the “existing corpus of knowledge” and the “research” 
sub-systems, which the firm had. In the case of this firm the deficiency was, on the one 
hand, at the level of strategic perspective and on the other hand at the level of distribution 
and marketing. The failure in terms of strategy was the inability to estimate clearly the 
size of the potential market. Estimates were too much optimistic and the installed 
production capacity was oversized in relation to market demand. There was also not 
enough investment in export markets differentiation and in commercial infrastructures in 
export markets, issues that should have been addressed having in mind the production 
estimates that were made.  
 To conclude, a systems perspective of the innovation process permits us to 
identify its component blocks and the important linkages that connect them. The 
proposed extended model, by observing the performance of individual sub-systems (at 
firm level) and the disruptions that occur at this level, and by identifying the deficiencies 
that occur at each stage in terms of interactions with higher levels (existing knowledge 
and research), makes it possible to deduce the consequences on the performance of 
other sub-systems and its relations with one another, and by combining the cause-effects 
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relationships flowing across each component allows to deduce and draw the implications 
on the overall system (the innovative performance of the firm). 
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CHAPTER 13. EXPLAINING FIRM LEVEL VARIATION: A 
CONCLUDING SYNOPSIS 
 
This part of the study started with a brief review of the literature concerned with the 
determinants of innovation at the level of the firm, outlying the evolving theoretical views 
that have underpinned our comprehension of the subject. Contributions to the 
understanding of the phenomena have came from several disciplines, notably from the 
economic, organisation and management literature. More recently the subject received 
attention from scholars in the field of industrial innovation. 
 We have identified in our empirical study of the Portuguese capital goods sector 
a number of variables that were significantly associated with the innovative performance 
of the firm. Some of those factors are quite similar with those identified by other studies 
(such as variables linked to management techniques and the impact of demand 
conditions) and they have been used to draw conclusions about the influences of external 
demand factors, as well as the influence of internal behavioural factors on the innovative 
performance of firms. Other variables were more specific to this study, such as the the 
impact of external sources of knowledge or the approach to product conception. 
 After having identified and compared those variables, we took a closer look at the 
particular trajectories of some firms and pinpointed the importance of some factors on the 
development of that process and on the way they have influenced the evolution of the 
firm. We explored some of the relations between the characteristics and the performance 
of the firms and the environmental selection criteria it faces and how they have 
differentially impinged on the firm’s survival prospects. 
 Based on that analysis it was then suggested that differences in innovative 
performance could be explained in terms of the particular competencies that the entities 
acquired along their way and how they incorporated them within the existing structure of 
the firm. Failure to acquire specific competencies at specific points or insufficient 
reinforcement of existing capacities could jeopardise subsequent performance 
characteristics of the firm or limit the firm to a narrower horizon in terms of innovative 
output, due to the interactions between the several factors. We suggested, based on an 
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organic, evolutionary perspective, that the presence or absence of specific factors would 
be reflected in different ways on the firm as a whole, depending on which factors were 
present and on the way they were combined together. 
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PART IV. EPILOGUE 
 
CHAPTER 14. INTERPRETING SYSTEM AND FIRM LEVEL LINKS 
 
14.1 Notes on the approach for connecting the system and firm level of 
analysis 
 
When we started this study it was stated that its objectives were, in general terms, to find 
what were the determinants of Portuguese industrial innovation. The study aimed at 
finding answers for the following questions: 
 
What is the main determinant of Portuguese industrial innovation? Is it the 
political, economic, social or cultural institutional environment? Is it the 
strategy followed by the economic agents? Is it a combination of both? What 
is the relative importance of each factor? 
 
In order to answer those questions we have grounded the analysis on a 
conceptual framework linked to evolutionary theories of technical and economic change 
and on systems theory, aside from recurring to other schools of thought such as theories 
of industrial innovation, organisational and management theories and the systems of 
innovation approach. Since the postulates of evolutionary theories explicitly consider the 
analytical distinction between the environment of a firm, the firm’s internal characteristics 
and the conceptual framework to analyse the interactions between the two dimensions, it 
was particularly well suited to be applied in the present study. 
In line with the research objectives stated above the study was divided in two 
parts, for analytical convenience. In the first part, after establishing the theoretical 
underpinning to consider the national environment as an object of study the 
characteristics of the environment were identified. For analytical purposes the analysis of 
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the environment was made by subdividing the environment in three “sub-environments” 
or sub-systems, which were the economic system, the education system and the 
research system. Each sub-system was extensively described and analysed. Description 
and analysis were made simultaneously and interdependently. Description was 
deliberately oriented, emphasising facts, circumstances, interactions, which logically 
support the explanations or hypothesis the author exposed, and to which the author 
wanted to led its audience. Several explanations for several and multifaceted events, 
circumstances and historical processes were advanced. All of them, in one way or 
another, led to one end, one purpose. That of interpreting and comprehending, at a 
general but embracing level, the idiosyncratic Portuguese process of indigenous 
scientific, technological and technical development. In the second part, after establishing 
the theoretical underpinnings for considering the firm as an object of study, the internal 
characteristics of the firm were analysed. This analysis was based on interview-based 
case-studies of a sample of nineteen firms of the equipment goods sector. The results of 
those case-studies were extensively reported and analysed within the context of an 
evolutionary conceptual framework and a formal model that contributed to the explanation 
of the observed variation was developed and proposed. 
 In this concluding part we intend to bring together the two parts of this study, 
namely the conclusions reached in the analysis of the environment and the conclusions 
reached in the analysis of the firms. In order to do that we will make use of the model 
introduced in the last chapter and we will also introduce a conceptual approach which, 
combined with the previous model, will pave the way for explaining the interactions 
between the two levels of analysis, binding them together in a coherent whole, and 
ultimately answering the questions we have proposed at the beginning of this study. 
However, before we proceed, a note on the methodology is on order. 
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14.2 A note on the methodology 
 
The methodology we used in the analysis and characterisation of the environment was 
archive and literature-based and had a strong historical perspective. The historical 
perspective was considered essential to explain the present condition of the system and 
hence the insistence on the approach. The present features of the educational system, 
the present structural characteristics of the industrial sector and the present knowledge 
level of the research system are all dependent upon initial conditions and their 
subsequent evolution, as we tried to prove in chapters 4 through 8. We believe that the 
conclusions we have drawn are strongly supported by quantitative or qualitative evidence 
presented by the literature to which we have referred in those chapters. 
 The methodology used in the analysis of the firms followed as much as possible 
the experimental-control methodology often used in the social sciences. However, there 
were some limitations in the methodology. One of those limitations was in the way in 
which innovative performance was defined and, consequently, in the way firms were 
grouped together. Some of the criteria, such as the opinion of the experts, were 
essentially subjective. However, there were problems in using purely quantitative 
indicators. Those problems were related to the deficiency of available quantitative data on 
innovation, such as firm’s expenses in the several stages of innovation, or the percentage 
of sales of new products. Another problem was related to intrinsic limitations of the 
indicators. Many firms do not possess separate R&D departments, which does not 
necessarily mean that they do not perform R&D or innovative activities. The percentage 
of sales accounted for by new products can also be a problematic indicator if two firms at 
very different knowledge/technological levels are being compared. The definition of 
newness in this case is at the level of the firm and not at a higher level. As such it was not 
particularly useful for our purposes because it could mask important differences in the 
output of the firm. The conclusion we reached was that selected subjective criteria 
coupled and cross-referenced with other quantitative indicators (where available) 
constituted the best solution for choosing the sample and it was the one which gave more 
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guarantees that the sample would be representative of the innovative level of Portuguese 
firms. 
 Another limitation related to the sources of information was the possibility of an 
eventual selection bias towards a sub-group of the population. This was so because of 
the characteristics of Portuguese society, namely the existence of a relatively strong 
social divide. One may conjecture if the sources of information provided by people related 
to trade journals or the sector association were not eventually biased towards the social 
segment to which they were familiar with. We think such bias is either not present or 
small because such information was confronted with other sources of a more universal 
(national) nature, such as R&D statistics as provided by the respective government office, 
and because, as the field study progressed and information from various social segments 
was collected, we realised that the initial information was quite accurate. The accuracy of 
such information was also related to the relatively small size of the country and of the 
sector. 
Another limitation is related to the small size of the sample and to the issue of 
whether the population was sufficiently or accurately represented. We believe the method 
for choosing the sample was very closely related to a stratified random sampling 
procedure. Possible factors that may have distorted the randomness of the sample can 
be related to the sources of information on which we have relied, a problem to which we 
have already referred. 
In spite of its small size we believe that the sample is a good representation of 
the population, because the population of capital goods producers (in a restricted sense, 
i.e., including only producers of machinery) is also quite small, according to Vasconcelos 
(1994), which identified a total population of approximately 330 firms (cf. chapter 3). On 
the other hand care was taken to emulate as much as possible the size distribution of the 
population. We must recall that almost 99% of the firms in the total sector population have 
less than 500 employees and 90% have less than 100 employees. As such our sample is 
also a reasonably good approximation of the total population. 
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14.3 The systemic approach 
 
The system model proposed in Chapter 12 (cf. Figure 13) is one way to analysis the 
connection between the environment and the performance of the firms in the sample. The 
model help us in identifying the effects a particular higher level sub-system has on the 
other systems and on the main system (the innovation process at the level of the firm), or 
in other words, to detect the cause-effect relationships between the sub-systems, and to 
identify in what manner those cause-effect relationships affect the efficiency of the main 
system. We can make that exercise relying on the arguments advanced earlier on the 
main text and infer, in general terms, the impacts upon the individual firms. 
 For instance, it seems clear from the analysis of the education sub-system made 
in chapter 6 that the deficiencies that were identified, namely those related to an historical 
lack of investment in education activities and the accompanying lack of highly trained 
human resources, had enormous impact in terms of the contents and the availability of 
the “existing corpus of knowledge” in the Portuguese national system. Under the 
circumstances described earlier we would expect that the contents of that block would be 
deficient, weaker or outdated relatively to other systems where investment in the 
educational infrastructure was greater. This is so because under-investment implied 
deficiencies in terms of capital investment in pedagogical laboratories and equipment, for 
instance, or deficiencies in terms of the training of teachers. Systemic reasons and 
network externalities must also be considered. Failure to build a critical mass in terms of 
highly educated human resources implied deficiencies in terms of the possibilities of 
having a wide range of competencies within the borders of the (national) system. A 
diminutive number of educated people, aside from failing to provide such a broad range 
of competencies resulted, in the Portuguese case, in an excessive predominance of one 
educational paradigm or approach (namely literary studies; cf. chapter 6) relative to other 
alternative approaches.  
What were the implications of these features for the firm sub-system? There were 
two orders of impacts. The first was a quantitative impact. The small number of qualified 
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personnel implied that the availability of the “existing corpus of knowledge” for firms that 
had reached a bottleneck in their internal process of innovation and wanted to resort to 
existing competencies was severely limited. We would expect that in such circumstances 
the costs incurred in searching for such knowledge could be in many cases excessively 
high because of its scarcity, deterring many firms from making the connection with the 
external sub-system. They would then be confined to their own knowledge base, 
whatever that knowledge base was (in many cases diminutive, because the educational 
system itself suffered from under-investment and as such impeded wider diffusion of skills 
throughout the system). The other impact was of a qualitative nature. Even if the costs for 
finding and using existing knowledge were not great, there was a high probability that the 
quality of such knowledge was not the best, due to deficiencies in the way it was 
transmitted through the educational system, which suffered from under-investment in 
terms of its quality. Another qualitative impact was in terms of the alternatives that the 
firm sub-system would find in the “existing corpus of knowledge”. Probably, there was a 
restricted number of “search avenues” open to find a solution to the specific problem of 
the firm. Technical solutions would be heavily concentrated on a limited set of 
approaches with potential problems in terms of its efficiency, its adequacy or even its 
applicability. 
Both order of impacts reduced, in general terms, the overall variability within the 
system and as such had a negative impact in terms of innovative potential of Portuguese 
firms. The fact that many firms found in this study did not possess highly trained 
personnel (cf. Table 53) or the fact that the educational level of a large proportion of 
production personnel was only at the elementary level (although no quantitative indicators 
were explicitly given considering that matter, we recall that only the firms in pair 6, i.e., the 
younger firms of the sample, showed an higher intensity of education at the secondary 
level amongst their production employees) are visible signs of the interactions between 
the sub-system “existing corpus of knowledge” and the sub-system of the firm. The better 
educational characteristics of the younger firms relative to older firms (that faced certain 
difficulties or rigidities in updating their work-force), not only at the shop-floor level but 
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also in terms of intensity of graduate personnel at higher levels, may eventually reflect the 
impact of the recent historical developments of the educational system (in quantitative but 
also in qualitative terms). 
Similar considerations can be made about the research sub-system analysed in 
chapter 7. The impact on the firm sub-system is even greater in the sense that the 
research sub-system suffered from even more deficiencies than the educational system, 
both at qualitative and quantitative level. The same two order of impacts described earlier 
regarding the educational system are also valid and applicable to the analysis of the 
impacts and the interactions between the “research” sub-system and the firm sub-system. 
Due to the historical characteristics and evolutionary features of the Portuguese research 
system the link between the firm block and the research block was rare or even non-
existent. Firms resorted preferably and perhaps exclusively, and in many cases 
presumably with great difficulty, to the “existing corpus of knowledge”. Thus the 
importance of external acquisition of technology for Portuguese firms and their general 
inability to evolve behind its mere application (for instance, by resorting to reverse 
engineer and incremental improvements). Not only there was not a public research 
system that could provide solutions to the technical problems of the firms, but also the 
firms themselves did not provide significant inputs, either in the form of financial inputs or 
physical inputs, to the research system. Only recently, specifically after the 2
nd
 World War 
and the following period of accelerated economic growth described in chapter 5, which 
created the demand for a more elaborated and larger research system, can we see the 
links between the two sub-systems increase and the importance of external acquisition of 
technology decrease relative to past conditions. Even so, in the following three-decade 
long post-war period, the enlargement of the research system was done by concentrating 
resources in the state research laboratories, which were more concerned with 
technological services than with fundamental and applied research or technological 
development (cf chapters 5 and 7). In this sense, and in the context of our analytical 
model, the impacts of the stimuli provided by post-war economic growth in the creation of 
state research laboratories were to be felt more at the level of quantitative and qualitative 
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improvement of the “existing corpus of knowledge” of the whole (national) system than at 
the level of the “research” system. Nevertheless, the “research” block was quantitatively 
and qualitatively improved, mainly by means of public resources but also by private (firm) 
resources, in spite of the diminutive overall commitment of resources. In spite of the new 
opportunities to link the firm sub-system with the research sub-system created by recent 
policies of public support and intervention in science, technology and industrial innovation 
(spurred by accession to EC in the 1980s; cf. chapters 5 and 7, specifically sections 5.5 
and 7.8) the intensity and density of those links remained weak. On the other hand the 
intensity and density of relationships of firms and institutions or entities providing 
technical services has increased substantially, because the density of these institutions 
on the national system has also increased substantially (also spurred by accession to 
EC). This explains the general diminishing trend in the deficit of the balance of payments 
related to industrial engineering services (Banco de Portugal, 1998) and also gives 
context to an earlier observation (in chapter 8) predicting that it would be very difficult to 
find Portuguese firms with state-of-the-art and world-class innovative output.  
 The preceding analysis provides us with a sort of descriptive relational map of the 
environment and the firms, but it is somewhat arid as it respects the uncovering of the 
underlying deep factors that are behind the flaws of the system. The next sections will 
hopefully fill that hole. 
 
14.4 The concepts of embeddedness and institutions 
 
We said on the final lines of section 14.2 that a conceptual approach would be introduced 
which, combined with the extended chain-linked model, would provide the necessary 
tools for explaining the interactions between the system analysis and the firm analysis. 
That conceptual body is related to the notion of embeddedness as used by the so-called 
economic sociology school (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992), a notion that is a 
consequence and a produce of the intellectual and academic unsatisfactory position with 
the classical and neo-classical approach to economic action.  
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 This approach is in fact extremely influenced by, and we can even say that it is a 
contemporary continuation of, the so-called nationalist or historical school to which we 
have referred in Chapter 4, particularly as it refers to the inadequacy of the classical 
assumptions to deal with the complex intricacies and diversity of economic realities. In 
particular, it takes issue with the notions of efficiency and rational behaviour (or choice), 
arguing that economic action can not be divorced from other actions that enter into the 
realm of sociology, such as the notions of power, norms and values. As such, and at the 
limit, there is no such thing as a purely rational and efficient economic action in the 
classical or neo-classical sense because every or almost every economic action is 
constrained or influenced by sociological factors (or actions). Another recurrent concept 
of the school of economic sociology is the notion and emphasis on institutions, which is 
the main vehicle trough which macro-economic issues are addressed. Institutions are, on 
the one hand erected by the dynamics of individual or social groups actions, and on the 
other hand, determine the actions of individuals or social groups. 
 In short, economic sociology stands on the following core propositions: “1. 
Economic action is a form of social action; 2. Economic action is socially situated; and 3. 
Economic institutions are social constructions” (Granovetter and Swedberg, 1992, p.6). 
Those propositions are perfectly compatible with our theoretical approach, namely with 
the evolutionary perspective we have adopted,  and with the systems of innovation 
approach, or in general, the systemic approach we have also pursued, and it is also in 
line with the historical perspective we have dearly impinged on this work. This conceptual 
tool is necessary to flesh out in its entirety Dosi's proposition mentioned earlier in page 
190 (Dosi, 1994, p.159). 
 Relative to the notion of embeddedness proper, we shall introduce it and define it 
by resorting to the definitions advanced  and used by Polanyi (1955), and Granovetter 
(1990). In Polanyi the notion of embeddedness is intrinsically linked with the notion of 
institution. For Polanyi, the economic process is not independent of the structure of a 
given society, rather the contrary, the structure of society gives meaning to the economic 
process:  
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“ Nevertheless, reduced to a mechanical, biological and psychological 
interaction of elements that economic process (changes of location or 
appropriation of goods) would possess no all-round reality...[...]...In the 
absence of any indication of societal conditions from which the motives of 
the individuals spring, there would be little, if anything, to sustain the 
interdependence of the movements and their recurrence in which the unity 
and stability of the process depends...[...]...Hence the transcending 
importance of the institutional aspect of the economy...[...]...The instituting of 
the economic process vests that process with unity and stability; it produces 
a structure with a definite function in society ; it shifts the place of the 
process in society, thus adding significance to its history; it centres interest 
on values, motives and policy” (Polanyi, 1955, p.249-250) 
 
From this propositions it follows the definition of the concept of embeddedness: 
 
“The human economy, then, is embedded and enmeshed in institutions, 
economic and non-economic. The inclusion of the non-economic is vital. For 
religion or government may be as important for the structure and functioning 
of the economy as monetary institutions or the availability of tools and 
machines themselves that lighten the toil of labour.” (Polanyi, 1955, p.250) 
 
In view of the definition Polanyi proposes a way to look at or a strategy to follow regarding 
the study of economic action: 
 
“The study of the shifting place occupied by the economy in society is 
therefore no other than the study of the manner in which the economic 
process is instituted at different times and places.” (Polanyi, 1955, p.250) 
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Granovetter’s approach is more refined and elaborated and methodologically grounded 
on social network analysis. It draws on fundamental propositions that were already 
referred to above, namely that: 
 
“(1) action is always socially situated and cannot be explained by reference 
to individual motives alone, and (2) social institutions do not arise 
automatically in some inevitable form but rather are socially 
constructed...[...]...The first proposition leads to...'the problem of 
embeddedness’: the question to what extent economic activity is mediated 
by -or...’embedded in’-networks of personal relations. This discussion will 
lead ...into [the] argument about the ‘social construction of economic 
institutions’.” (Granovetter, 1990, p. 95-96). 
 
Granovetter then proceeds with the definition and subdivision of the concept of 
embeddedness: 
 
“By ‘embeddedness’ I mean that economic action, outcomes and institutions 
are affected by actors’ personal relations, and by the structure of the overall 
network of relation. I refer to these respectively as the relational and the 
structural aspects of embeddedness.” (Granovetter, 1990, p.98). 
 
It seems that the notion of structural embeddeness seems quite similar to the meaning 
ascribed by Polanyi to the same term. It is also the meaning of the term “embeddeness” 
to which we shall resort as we proceed in our analysis of the Portuguese system and 
firms and their mutual relationships and their pattern of interactions. Of course that in our 
analysis we shall not address preferentially economic actions and outcomes but rather we 
will pragmatically extend the concept of embeddedness to gain insights on the outcomes 
of the process of Portuguese indigenous technological innovation, which is our main 
concern here. 
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 We have mentioned that the notion of embeddedness is closely related to that of 
institutions, so we must be more precise of the meaning we shall ascribe to the term. In 
our analysis we shall presuppose the sociological meaning of the term, which, according 
to the review of Edquist and Johnson (1997), is defined in the following manner: 
 
“Institutions are common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or 
laws that regulate the relations and interactions between individuals and 
groups” (Edquist and Johnson, 1997, p.46) 
 
In the same review, the distinction between organisations and institutions is based on the 
arguments of North (1990): “A crucial distinction....is made between institutions and 
organisations...Conceptually, what must be clearly differentiated are the rules from the 
players.” (as cited in Edquist and Johnson, 1997, p.47). Specifically, “...It is important to 
note that organisations are formal structures with an explicit purpose and they are 
consciously created. They are players or actors. In contrast, institutions may develop 
spontaneously and are often characterised by a specific purpose.” (Edquist and Johnson, 
1997, p.47). The authors further argue that “...Organisations are strongly influenced, 
coloured and shaped by institutions. Organisations can be said to be ‘embedded’ in an 
institutional environment or set of rules. This include the legal system, various norms, 
standards, etc., which influence all organisations of a certain kind, (e.g., all firms in a 
country).” (Edquist and Johnson, 1997, p.59). 
 Granovetter further adds “...it is impossible to understand an institution 
adequately without an understanding of the historical process in which it was produced” 
(Granovetter, 1992, p. 17). In order to include the historical dimension into the study of 
institutions the concept of path-dependence, generally associated with David (1985) and 
Arthur (1988), is used. Granovetter argues hat the same concept can be used to explain 
the origins, building up and consolidation of institutional frameworks and it can be 
eventually more useful than the explanation based in terms of efficiency of institutional 
set-ups. 
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 In the following analysis we shall rely heavily on this conceptual framework, to 
make a comprehensive review of the main arguments of the thesis. What has been said 
on the previous chapter must be understood in relation to these additional concepts that 
complement but are nevertheless intrinsic part of the whole conceptual framework we 
have been using throughout the thesis. The specific way firms have evolved, as 
described in Part III, are heavily influenced by the institutional set-up of the country. From 
the extensive analysis that has been made some features of the institutional set-up (the 
environment) are obviously related to the specific trajectory of the firms. We shall try, in 
the following sections to highlight those relationships and thus conclude our argument 
and provide answers to those parts of the research questions, which were left 
unanswered. Unlike the habit of this thesis, a last short section will look towards the 
future, and point out some policy implications. 
 
14.5 The influence of culture on the trajectory of Portuguese indigenous 
innovation 
 
Since the notion of embeddedness is so closely related to that of cultural values, we shall 
start with reference to the study of the cultural environment addressed in Part II, and 
specifically in Chapters 6 and 7. There we referred to two great cultural influences: the 
Hellenic body and approach to “scientific” knowledge and in particular to the 
predominance of the Aristotle school, and the pervasive influence of Catholic values and 
norms. We further added that these two great cultural dimensions were in fact supportive 
of each other and mutually reinforcing. These two institutions (they are institutions in the 
meaning we have ascribed to them) were determinant, for a long time, in establishing an 
intellectual pattern of individual search and inquiry regarding the natural and exact 
sciences which in turn was determinant in defining the trajectory of indigenous innovation 
in Portuguese society. And that trajectory was, as we saw earlier, marked by a late-
coming of Portuguese society as a whole and firms in particular, in embracing the new 
scientific methodology and paradigm that came out of the enlightenment. 
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 The reason for that delay is related to the strength of the catholic institution and 
the innumerable points of conflict between this institution and the new Cartesian and 
rationalist scientific method and philosophy, and its extreme reluctance to abandon the 
Aristotelian elements that were deeply embedded in organisations related to the 
production, teaching and diffusion of knowledge. (We shall recall that schools from the 
primary to higher secondary level were heavily dominated by the church, and the 
university was also heavily influenced by these two institutions and had no alternative 
opponents until the early 1900s). 
 The two philosophies were actually quite coherent with one another. Aristotelian 
philosophy has perspectives that are dear to the catholic and Christian perspectives on 
the notion of the unity of matter as created by God (and are at odds with the new 
atomistic perspectives). 
 The consequences of the delay of Portuguese society as a whole in adapting or 
altering its institutional set-up and in adhering to the rationalist waves of science were 
multiple, but obviously the main ones were the barriers it created to devise and set-up 
organisations which embodied the new institutions, i.e., the new set of rules, norms and 
standards most commonly referred to as the scientific method. Such barriers to the 
creation of new organisations that embodied the new institutional set-up slowed down the 
diffusion throughout the individual members of society of the principles and fundamentals 
of the methodological approach and concepts of the new sciences and their potential of 
applications in industrial devices or in consumer products. In other words, the knowledge 
background necessary to successful technical accomplishment of the design and 
production of new technology were deficient or non-existent in a large percentage of the 
members of society, and were extremely difficult to acquire due to its scarcity. Moreover it 
delayed the establishment of a new mental attitude towards the resolution of 
technological problems, namely what we have called the intellectual pattern of search, 
inquiry and problem-solving. 
 Deriving from this situation, the development of a technological infrastructure 
occurred slowly and intermittently and only very recently. We use the concept of 
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technological infrastructure proposed by Justman and Teubal (1995): “...a set of 
collectively supplied, specific, industry-relevant capabilities, intended for several 
applications in two or more firms or user organisations. They are embodied in human 
capital (both formal education and experience, and include also elements of physical 
capital (such as instrumentation) and knowledge.” (Justman and Teubal, 1995, p. 260). 
An infrastructure with these characteristics surge only after the 2
nd
 World War, and then 
most of its activity was oriented towards the routine provision of technical services. 
 
14.6 The economic structure of society 
 
The conservative influence of the cultural institutions referred to in the previous sections 
were also responsible for the shaping of the socio-economic environment of the country, 
which was characterised by the rigidity of two main factors of production, namely land and 
labour, whose conditions were regulated by laws, values and norms that draw heavily on 
the medieval tradition and organisation of economic activity. The transition towards a 
situation whereby values and norms that were typical and characteristic of a new 
institution, the market, was slow and lasted all the 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century, and 
even so it was never fully realised. The early 1900s was perhaps the historical period 
where the market institution was more fully realised but it soon gave way, in the 1920s, to 
a corporatist regime that practised state intervention at all levels of economic activity. In 
fact, the corporatist regime surged as a socially demanded response to the 
advancements of the market institution at the time and to the consequences it brought in 
terms of its negative impacts on social stability (namely as it regards industrial labour 
dislocation brought about by unequal competitive positions of small artisans and modern 
factories, and market demands on the landed). Only after 2
nd
 World War did Portuguese 
society adhered in a more complete way to the market institution and even so in a most 
prudent way. Enthusiastic commitment to the market institution came effectively by the 
time of Portugal’s accession to the EEC in 1986, but even then it was constrained by the 
socialising dimensions inherent to EEC’s policies and to the various safeguarding 
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mechanisms of national production and economic structure that were implemented when 
accession occurred. 
 This situation, characterised by a relative distancing from market institutions, and 
from the competitive standing that such an institution implies, and specifically as it 
regards the competition for the new product, the new process or the new organisation, did 
not led the individual members of Portuguese society to perceive or to consider 
technological innovation as a necessity. That, coupled with the scarcity of technological 
infrastructures and its inadequacy to the new scientific paradigm, arising from the 
situation described earlier, mutually reinforced the laggard, imitative, and adaptive 
character or attitude towards technical change and its use in productive activities. 
 
14.7 Sociological considerations 
 
Mention was made throughout the main text of the social divide of Portuguese society. 
The origins for that are difficult to discern but certainly one of the causes of its 
aggravation, if not of its origin, can be found on the evolution of the economic 
organisation of society and on the unbalanced attributes of the education system. What is 
worth emphasising is that the social divide lasted, although abated, until the present 
days. In terms of institutional analysis and its impact in terms of innovation the main 
consequences of the prevalence of such a trait is the erection of several communication 
barriers between the main actors that intervene in the process of innovation, namely the 
firms, the research institutes, the universities and other technological infrastructures. 
Whatever the social and psychological factors those barriers are composed of, the fact is 
that the consequences are serious flaws in terms of flows of information between the 
actors with the result that the process of innovation is either hampered right from the start 
or it is probable that it encounters serious difficulties along its trajectory. Notice that many 
firms in the sample had few or none institutional contacts. 
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14.8 The political dimension 
 
It is difficult to analytically differentiate the political institutional dimension from the 
cultural, economic and social institutional dimensions, but there are factors that can be 
better explained by resorting to this dimension, we will suggest that the main impact of 
the political institutions are at the level of the degree of political centralisation of the 
country and at the level of the educational system.  The political system has strong 
centralising features. The tendency to centralise power at the expense of county or 
municipality powers has been for quite some time a distinctive feature of the country. 
Geographically, the unity of the country was clear and in military terms, relatively easy to 
maintain, as the country had only borders with one country, namely Spain. This 
administrative centralising tendency and the unquestionable unity of the country are 
possibly factors that explain the lack of necessity of the state to adopt other methods to 
unify the country and the nation, namely by virtue of the education and indoctrination of 
its citizens. This lack of necessity of universal education explains the large illiteracy rate 
that remained until quite late in the 29th century (and even today, according to OECD 
standards). On the other hand, the centralising administrative feature of the country 
proved itself also a barrier the diffusion of technological and scientific capabilities 
throughout the country due to the tendency to centralise educational, scientific and 
technological infrastructures near the political centres. 
 
14.9 Environment and firms 
 
 We shall now use the distinction between structural embeddedness and relational 
embeddedness (cf. Section 14.3) to highlight the relationships between the institutional 
features and the characteristics of the firms. 
 The concept of structural embeddedness is particularly useful to explain certain 
general characteristics of the firms we have analysed in Part III. All the institutional 
apparatus we have described and on which the firms are embedded explain several 
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characteristics that are common to all the firms in the sample. The Aristotelian approach 
to knowledge, the Catholic philosophy and heritage, the subservience of the educational 
system to this paradigm, the lack or weakness of a critical attitude of opposition and 
intellectual confrontation, the scarcity of educational establishments and technological 
infrastructures, the social divide and the accompanying deficiency in terms of flows of 
information, e.g., the more or less widespread scarcity of a scientific and knowledge base 
and critical mass are all structural characteristics that are behind the imitative and 
adaptive attitude of the firms analysed in the sample. It is remarkable to note that all the 
firms in the sample introduced quite late technologies such as pneumatics and/or 
hydraulic devices and electric and electronic devices. The gap is particularly visible as it 
relates the use of pneumatic/hydraulic devices  in machines. Their usage became quite 
common since the early 1900s in other developed countries. However, almost all of our 
firms (namely those that are oldest) started to use them only after the second half of the 
20th century. The gap is shorter for the electronic/electric devices but it is still 
considerable, taking into account that the use of electrical devices in machines became 
also quite widespread during the early 1900s. The new firms, created in the mid 1980s, 
facing an institutional and organisational environment substantially different from the older 
firms acted quite differently, introducing from the very beginnings, advanced technological 
devices. However, they remain imitative and adaptive, although their action was guided 
by the notions of quality and constant improvement. They were not truly original, in the 
sense that they did not develop substantially different devices, and did not even use the 
latest techniques available and tested in machine tools (such as laser devices and others) 
and as such there was still a gap, although it became smaller. We do not want to stretch 
this argument too far. As it was said, the institutional and organisational set-up of the 
country is nowadays substantially different, namely as it respects the intellectual 
adherence to the scientific paradigm, the diffusion of education, scientific knowledge and 
technological skills. Under the present conditions, there is room for truly original and 
innovative outcome although it will be probably be a very rare and circumscribed event. 
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14.10 Firms and other firms 
 
 The concept of relational embeddedness is particularly useful to explain variation 
among firms embedded in the same institutional set-up and facing up, apparently, the 
same constrains and opportunities. If there are differences between the innovative 
outcome of firms in our sample it becomes clear that the institutional environment is not 
the sole factor in explaining all the characteristics of the firms. In fact, firms face different 
environments, because the environment itself is multifaceted (we have already proposed 
this approach regarding the analysis of pair 7 in Part III) and because the firms, in a 
certain sense, create their own environment. In firms were the personnel is subject to 
higher levels of education, the technical possibilities and the horizons faced by that firm 
are completely different from firms were the education level is lower. In other words, the 
environment is different, and this is only at the level of possibilities, of potential. In real 
terms, the social networks on which each firm is embedded, due to its different 
educational achievements and its different capabilities in terms of mastering technical and 
scientific languages are quite different. The consequence is that there are differential 
capabilities in terms of being able to internalise the factors identified in Part III and 
described in Table 48. For instance, the contrast between the social connections of the 
two firms in pair 1 could not be greater. The same is true for the firms in pair 8. The 
educational attainment level in both cases is quite different. However, even in those 
cases where the level of educational attainment is comparable, there are differences in 
innovative outcomes due to qualitative differences in terms of relational embeddedness. 
Such is the case of the firms in pair 6, the youngest and perhaps the most innovative 
firms of the sample. Both firms are managed by highly trained people with close links to 
university, and employ within their ranks at least people with complete secondary 
education. However, one of the managers is connected to an university with an 
established reputation in mechanics and his main client is a demanding multinational car 
manufacturer. The other manager is linked to an university with no special reputation in 
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the field of mechanics and his clients are less demanding manufacturers of taps, bicycles 
and other fine metallic structures or apparatus for civil construction. The knowledge and 
capability contents implicit in each network determines to a great extent the innovative 
outcome or performance of each firm, i.e., its ability to incorporate successfully the 
determinant factors we empirically identified. In general, the same line of reasoning is true 
for each pair of firm analysed. The richer and varied the social network the firm is 
embedded in (through its personnel), the better is its innovative outcome. 
 
14.11 A final remark: policy implications 
 
According to the structural characteristics we have pointed out, it seems that at this point 
of the development of the institutional set-up of the country the need for policy actions lies 
more on long term emphasis on the intangible side of the infrastructure than on the 
tangible side. The latter still needs some additional efforts, in particular as it respects the 
educational infrastructure, but probably as much important as physical investment is the 
need to reformulate curricula and methodology (this observation is probably valid to all 
teaching levels). In particular, great attention should be paid to the secondary level, which 
seems to be the weakest part of the educational system. 
 Large investments in physical infrastructure were made during the last years. 
Following the taxonomy and the conceptual framework proposed by Justman and Teubal 
(1995) for analysing technological infrastructure (TI) building, one can say that the basic 
TI, due to the developments of the last ten years, reached a minimum critical mass, 
although it still suffers from a high degree of centralisation. This involved a co-operative 
public and private commitment, and we are not wrong to assume that the public initiative 
acted as catalyst to the process (which, according to Justman and Teubal, was an 
expected and probably necessary intervention, due to the special demand characteristics 
and the potential absence of market for these kinds of services). The market building 
process in basic TI seems to have developed satisfactorily, and many technological 
centres seem to be on the verge of running with a profit. As it regards advanced TI the 
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situation is much more modest. There is apparently one or two initiatives which we could 
categorise under the term of advanced TI, involving information technologies and 
research consortia between a research institute, a telecommunications company and an 
electronics firm. Most of the interactions between TI and users (firms) are at the level of 
the “...bread and butter problems facing firms...” (Justman and Teubal, 1995, p.266), 
involving generally little R&D. The amount of R&D involved in this co-operative effort 
depends on the type of industry and the type of organisation involved. Typically, little R&D 
is involved in the output of technological centres, while those of research institutes (often 
linked to universities) involve a greater component of R&D. State research laboratories 
have a balanced evenly split output in terms of R&D content (with emphasis on D). 
Typically again, the links of pharmaceutical industry with TI are more research oriented 
than the links of the textile industry or even the mechanical industry. On the whole, the 
demand for TI services is still quite underdeveloped and there seems to be a need to 
implement policies that can stimulate this interaction. This is an important structural 
feature, as mentioned above, which probably needs to be tackled through state 
mediation.  
 There is apparently the need to implement what Teubal (1997) calls Horizontal 
Technology Policies (HIPs), i.e., a set of measures that promote endogenous generation 
of “socially desirable technological activities” (SDTA). According to Teubal (1997) a 
typical path of SDTA diffusion is associated with three kinds of projects: “A routine set of 
SDTA projects with high appropriability, whose implementation has been substantially 
endogenized; an emerging group of ‘complex’ projects involving significant additions to 
technical and techno-economic knowledge; a group of ‘strategic’ SDTA projects that 
government, due to the learning associated with the above, can co-ordinate and 
orchestrate” (Teubal, 1997, p.1172). The Portuguese system is, to a large extent, still at 
the first stage of this path. There is also the presence of the second category of projects, 
but they are still at a very incipient stage. The academic community is probably more 
committed and advanced in that respect than the industrial community, which is logically 
the main target of these policies. There have been some government initiatives that tried 
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to stimulate the intervention of industry in more complex projects and initiatives, many of 
them using the EU research programs as the vehicle for that end. Tax incentives have 
also been recently linked to industrial R&D. But the results have been far from 
satisfactory, if we measure results by the complexity of the projects that have been 
implemented and the level of committed R&D resources. It seems that the main task of 
the government is to insist on this kind of policies, and in particular at the second stage of 
the proposed diffusion path, reinforcing the still weak ties between the several actors of 
the system and enhancing demand for services with higher R&D contents. Commitment 
and stronger encouragement to participate in EU R&D programmes should continue. 
Priority should be given to the financing of co-operative projects or projects in consortia. 
Another way is to change the organisational configuration of some technical activities or 
centres with a strong orientation towards the provision of industrial services and presently 
affected to universities. This should be done in parallel with increasing efforts of 
decentralisation of TI which, in spite of recent efforts, are still unevenly distributed 
throughout the country. Ancillary technical information services, such as patent, 
information and brokerage services, should also be more decentralised and reinforced. 
However, we believe that the communication problem will only be satisfactorily resolved 
once the majority of the actors speak the same language and at the same level, i.e., 
when the education system has made its levelling mission. 
 In spite of the fact that, apparently, the institutional, or shall we say more 
appropriately, the organisational set-up is in place, it does not necessarily mean that the 
interactive and co-operative dimension of the process follows, even with government 
intervention. And this is because one can not divorce institutional set-up from its historical 
and cultural context. The way that institutions run and function are path-dependent, are 
idiosyncratic, are socially as well as economically determined, and as such their 
outcomes, in terms of innovation producing, differ from country to country. It may be not 
enough to support organisational bodies similar to those of other countries if the broader 
institutional set-up (that includes law, culture and values) prevents them from fulfilling the 
function they were supposed to perform. If policy measures are to be taken they must 
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necessarily take into account the specificity of the institutional set-up and their (co-) 
evolutionary characteristics. 
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ANNEX A. THE PRODUCT LINES AND THE SIZE OF THE FIRMS IN THE SAMPLE 
                           "Average" group                        
"Innovative" 
group  
           Pair  Name Previous products Present products Size  Name Previous products Present products Size
 
           
1  Arvorense Agricultural machinery 
 
Lorry bodies,  
agricultural machinery 
30  Herculano Agricultural machinery Agricultural machinery 200 
2  Vima Dumpers 
 
Conveyors, dumpers 60  Mano Conveyors Conveyors 110 
3  Avense Looms Components for textile machinery, 
textile machinery, other machinery 
23  Industrial Looms Components for textile machinery,  
textile machinery 
40 
4  Frama Wood-working  
machine-tools 
Wood-working  
machine-tools 
82  Pinheiro Wood-working  
machine-tools 
Wood-working  
machine-tools 
290 
5  Mecano- 
Textil 
Textile machinery Textile machinery 140  ACL Looms Hydraulic components, lifting  
gear, presses, textile machinery 
70 
6  Maquisis Metal working tailor-made  
machine-tools 
Metal working tailor-made 
machine-tools 
19  Seri Metal working tailor -made 
machine-tools 
Metal working tailor-made 
machine-tools 
16 
7  Sersan Machine-tools for the  
cork industry 
Machine-tools for the  
cork industry 
25  Prensarte Machine-tools for the cork 
industry 
Machine-tools for the cork 
industry 
19 
8  Diarroca Presses, components Components, presses 25  Adira Presses, press brakes 
And guillotine shears 
Press brakes, guillotine shears, 
presses 
250 
9  Mecver Presses, components Components, presses 49  Guifil Moulds, presses, press brakes, 
guillotine shears, lathes, other 
Press brakes and guillotine 
shears 
103 
10       Efacec Electric power stations Electric power stations, electric 
and electronic machinery, 
software 
2500
 
Note: Size is measured by the total number of employees. 
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ANNEX B. THE INTERVIEW TOPICS AND THE AIDE-MÉMOIRE 
 
B.1 The objectives behind the interview topics 
 
1. Date of start-up 
2. Ownership status 
Objectives: 
To identify equity composition as share of total capital and its influence on innovative 
performance. To look for differences on: independent company or subsidiary, majority of 
capital owned by nationals or foreign companies, family owned or owned by a society of 
shareholders. 
 
3. A historical perspective of the firm 
This part of the interview will serve as a preliminary introduction to the more detailed 
aspects that will later be asked for. It will act as a “situating” exercise, and a way to have 
a comprehensive perspective on the firm. With the purpose of facilitating analysis of the 
firm trajectory the history of the firm will be divided in defined periods. The criteria for 
setting the periods will be subjectively dictated by the interviewee and can change 
depending on the firm. 
 
4. Initial product line/range and its subsequent evolution until this day 
Objectives: 
To assess the output of the firm and how it has evolved over time, based essentially on 
“peer” review. 
Contents: 
This topic is a description of the types of products the firm is engaged in. Information on 
the degree of its technological content will be based on the following: 
-self-assessment by the producers 
-evaluation by other producers of similar types of products 
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-evaluation by university or research organisations experts 
-evaluation by users 
-the industry literature 
-patents 
 
5. Factors deemed to have a direct relation to innovative performance: 
 a) Technical knowledge 
  - of the engineers or scientists 
  - of the technicians  
  - of the production staff   
 b) Demand for the product(s) 
  - niche 
  - import-substitution 
  - competing  
   -on what grounds? Price, quality or performance, service 
   - with whom? Domestic or foreign competition 
 c) Source of technology and its impact 
  - internal 
   R&D department 
   production engineers 
   technicians 
   marketing staff 
   other 
  - external 
   customers 
   suppliers 
   strategic alliances 
   licence 
   imitation 
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   universities 
   research laboratories    
   other research institutes 
  - impacts 
   future innovations 
   search activities 
   ongoing R&D 
   instrumentalities 
   production 
   technical backup 
 d) customers 
  - sectoral characterisation and composition 
  - domestic composition 
  - foreign composition 
 5a. 
Objectives: 
To capture a dynamic picture of the internal capabilities of the firm and its evolution over 
time and to establish relationships between its output and its internal capacities. A map of 
its competencies vs. its actual or future needs could be drawn. 
Contents: 
This topic intends to capture both a qualitative and a quantitative picture of the 
technological capacity of the firm embodied in human resources. Quantitative measures 
will be: 
-the number and share of postgraduates and graduates 
-the profile of the graduates and postgraduates 
-the number and share of skilled technicians (at least a vocational secondary level 
course) 
-resources devoted to R&D 
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Qualitative information will be: 
 
- the differential importance of each group relative to the set-up, improvement or 
development of products, and their own relative capability compared with similar groups. 
It will be a subjective picture relying mainly on self assessment and cross comparison of 
opinions between the groups. If possible a qualitative assessment by using a discrete 
scale will be used. 
- comparison over time, assessing the relative importance of each group as time goes by. 
No time periods will be imposed. They will show up according to the specific dynamics of 
the firm. 
 
 5b. 
Objectives: 
To assess the impact on the innovative capacity of the firm of several variables related to 
market conditions. To classify entrepreneurial behaviours. It could be a useful criterion for 
classifying firms. 
Contents: 
This topic seeks to ascertain which factors were the most important to the dynamic set-
up, improvement and development of products. A discrete scale as well as qualitative 
descriptions will be used. Comparison over time, assessing the relative importance of 
each group as time goes by. No time periods will be imposed. They will show up 
according to the specific dynamics of the firm. 
 
5c. 
Objectives: 
To scrutinise the ways in which firms obtain information, and to assess the impact of each 
source of information on the innovative behaviour of the firm. 
Contents: 
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The topic intends to assess qualitatively and quantitatively the importance of each 
possible source of knowledge, ideas or physical inputs to the innovation process inside 
the firm, using the Faulkner (1994) framework. Comparison over time, assessing the 
relative importance of each factor as time goes by. No time periods will be imposed. They 
will show up according to the specific dynamics of the firm. 
 
 5d. 
Objectives: 
To see if differential patterns in sectoral technological dynamics of users are important in 
terms of the firm/sector own technological dynamic. 
Contents: 
Quantitative measures of patterns of exports and sales. Identification of customers. 
 
6. Type of production equipment 
Objectives: 
To assess the importance of equipment modernisation on the general attitude of the firm 
towards innovation and the importance attributed to it. 
Contents: 
Distinction between mechanic, semi-automated and automated equipment. Additional 
software and hardware systems such as CAD, CAM, CIM.  
 
7. Finance 
Objectives: 
To identify the means by which funds for investment are acquired, e.g., own funds, 
borrowing or public offers. Identification of difficulties and barriers associated and their 
impacts on innovative behaviour. 
 
8. Organisation and management 
Objectives: 
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To identify the impacts of management practice and philosophy on innovative behaviour. 
Contents: 
A qualitative dynamic description and assessment of the various aspects of organisation 
and managerial decisions. 
 
8a.Functional lay-out. Addresses the type of organisation structure that prevails. 
Function or market oriented. Existence of a separate R&D department. Existence of 
quality control laboratories. 
 
8b. Decision-making. Location of the critical decision-making and patterns of authority 
(paternalistic, autocratic, democratic, co-operative). Patterns of strategy making (long-
term vs. short-term). Co-operation, association and joint-ventures (With whom? How 
many? Why?). 
 
8c. Managerial techniques. Related to 5b but trying to get some more detail. Planning, 
information flows,  work assessment, training. 
 
8d. Marketing. Importance of marketing. Marketing techniques. Distribution channels. 
Expenditures.  
 
 8e. Internationalisation. Which forms are adopted, if any, and why. 
 
9. External conditions 
 
9a. Government influences 
Objectives: 
To ascertain if government policies had any impact on the innovation rate and/or direction 
of the firm and to try explanations on when, why and where those impacts occurred. 
Contents: 
  
327 
3
2
7
 
  - policy 
  - government contracts or demand 
  - direct financial support (subsidies, taxation) 
  - indirect financial support (tariffs, trade  barriers, investment barriers) 
 
9b. General institutional environment and its impacts 
Objectives: 
A qualitative dynamic picture of the possible influences of other environmental conditions. 
Self assessment by interviewees. Possible a-posteriori construction of a qualitative table 
based on systematisation of subjective opinions, which could be used for quantitative 
analysis. Variables most looked for are: 
-regulations and laws 
-supply of human resources (managerial and technical) 
-supply of technical services 
-supply of financial services 
-supply of consultants 
 
10. A historical account of the most important innovation (or the most significant 
failure) and how it came about. 
Objectives: 
Useful for looking at the way problem solving is conducted and at the distinctive way the 
firm acts, and to complement the quantitative and fragmented part of the interview.  
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B.2 The aide-mémoire or the final questionnaire 
 
I General Information 
 
1. Name of company:............................................... 
2. Date of start-up:................................................... 
3. Number of employees:  
Time period 1:____________ 
Time period 2:____________ etc. 
4. What is the equity distribution of the firm? 
Time period 1:_____________ 
Time period 2:_____________ etc. 
 
II  A historical perspective on the firm 
This part is directly related to topic 3. 
 
III Technological factors 
Part III is directly related to topic 4 (questions 5, 6 and 7), topic 5a (questions 8a, 
8b, 9 and 10), topic 5b (question 11), topic 5c (questions 9 and 10), topic 5d 
(question 12), topic 6 (questions 13a, 13b and 14), topic 7 (question 15). 
 
5. What was the initial product or product line at the date of start-up of the company? 
Give no more than five products/product lines. Place the products by descending order of 
importance (in terms of sales). 
 1:_______________________ 
 2:_______________________ 
 3:_______________________ 
 4:_______________________ 
 5:_______________________ 
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6. Did the firm diversify into other products or product lines? 
 No. Continue with next question. 
 Yes. Indicate, by descending order of importance, in terms of sales, the five 
 main new product/product lines: 
 1:___________________________ 
 2:___________________________ 
 3:___________________________ 
 4:___________________________ 
 5:___________________________ 
 
7. Describe the main improvements on the main five product/product lines since their 
introduction in the firm. If possible, include sketches and drawings of the products. 
 Product line 1:_________________________________________________ 
 Product line 2:_________________________________________________ 
 Product line 3:_________________________________________________ 
 Product line 4:_________________________________________________ 
 Product line 5:_________________________________________________ 
Note: A taxonomy to follow while answering this question: 
  - mechanical improvements 
  - change in design 
  - new mechanical components 
  - new electric components 
  - new electronic microprocessor components 
  - other 
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8a. Indicate the number and share relative to total employment of the following categories 
of employees. 
 
     Time period 1 Time period 2    etc. 
     No. % No. % 
graduates with technical functions 
graduates with administrative functions 
technicians with secondary level course 
technicians with a vocational secondary level course 
employees subjected to training courses 
 
8b. Indicate the profile of your graduates. 
 
9. Indicate the importance of each functional group, as a whole, to the process of in-
house development of new products or improvement of existing ones. Use the scale 
shown below. 
 
Scale: 1-insignificant 2-slightly significant 3-moderately significant 4-very significant 5-
crucial 
     Time period 1 Time period 2  etc.   
 Researchers 
 Engineers 
 Technicians 
 Workers 
 Others 
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10. Indicate the importance of the following sources of innovation on the indicated innovative activities using the scale shown below. 
 
Scale: 1-insignificant 2-slightly significant 3-moderately significant 4-very significant 5-crucial 
    Internal Source        External Source 
            
Impact on:              R&D Dpt.   Engineers   Techni.   Marketing   Other                Customers   Suppliers   Imitation   License   Alliances   Literature/Fairs   Research lab.   
Universities/PNP 
1)Future innovations  
2)Search activity 
3)Ongoing R&D 
 -Underpinning 
knowledge 
4)Instrumentalities 
-R&D procedures 
-Skills in 
experimentation  
and testing 
5)Production 
6)Technical  backup 
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11. Indicate the importance of the following market conditions on the development or 
improvement of products, using the scale shown below. 
Scale: 1-insignificant 2-slightly significant 3-moderately significant 4-very significant 5-
crucial 
         
      Time   Time  etc. 
      period 1 period 2 
domestic competition 
competition on international markets  
import substitution 
competition based on price 
competition based on quality, performance 
competition based on service 
Other (specify) 
 
 
 
12. Who were and are your main customers? Indicate the sector and the share of firm 
sales, in descending order of importance. 
Time period 1 
Product  Name of customer Sector Share Market (domestic or   
         foreign) 
1     ____% 
2     ____% 
3     ____% 
4     ____% 
5     ____% 
     100% 
etc. For additional time periods 
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13a. Indicate the type of production equipment utilised by the firm and the relative share 
(by number of machines) of each type of equipment.      
    Share of total equipment production 
  Time period 1  Time period 2  etc. 
manual   ___%   ___% 
semi-automated ___%   ___% 
automated  ___%   ___% 
  _______  _______ 
  100%   100%    
 
13b. Describe the main improvements on your production equipment. 
 1:_________________________________________________ 
 2:_________________________________________________ 
 3:_________________________________________________ 
 4:_________________________________________________ 
 5:_________________________________________________ 
Note: A taxonomy to follow while answering this question: 
  - mechanical improvements 
  - change in design 
  - new mechanical components 
  - new electric components 
  - new electronic microprocessor components 
  - other 
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14. Indicate the existence or non-existence of the following types of production aides. 
Answer yes or no. 
 Time period 1   Time period 2   etc. 
CAD 
CAM 
CIM 
 
15. When investment is needed to develop or improve new products, from where does 
the funds come? 
  Time period 1   Time period 2  etc. 
Own funds  ___%   ___% 
Borrowing  ___%   ___% 
Public offers  ___%   ___% 
   _______  ________ 
   100%   100% 
 
IV External factors 
Part IV is directly related to topic 9. 
 
16. Government influences. Indicate the importance of each factor on the rate and 
direction of innovation activities within the firm (for each time period). 
 
Industrial policy 
Economic and fiscal policy 
Government contracts or procurement 
Direct financial support (subsidies, taxation) 
Indirect support (tariffs, trade barriers, investment barriers 
Others (specify)  
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ANNEX C. TABULAR AND GRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
C.1 TABLES OF FREQUENCIES 
 
C.1.1 Tangibles 
 
Table 55. Table of frequencies of the variables: tangibles. 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 
AVERAGE GROUP INNOVATIVE 
GROUP 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
  Group 
count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Existence of automated No  6 66.7   1 10.0   7 36.8   
Equipment Yes  3 33.3   9 90.0   12 63.2   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Predominance of  No (50% or less)  4 44.4   9 100.0   13 72.2   
old machines Yes (50% or more) 5 55.6      5 27.8   
 Group Total  9 100.0   9 100.0   18 100.0   
Improvements in  No  7 87.5   2 20.0   9 50.0   
Production machinery Yes  1 12.5   8 80.0   9 50.0   
 Group Total  8 100.0   10 100.0   18 100.0   
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C.1.2 Intangibles 
 
Table 56. Table of frequencies of the variables: intangibles. 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 
AVERAGE GROUP INNOVATIVE 
GROUP 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
  Group 
count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Use of CAD  No  7 77.8   1 10.0   8 42.1   
 Yes  2 22.2   9 90.0   11 57.9   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Use of CAM No  9 100.0   5 50.0   14 73.7   
 Yes   5 50.0   5 26.3   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Internal quality control  No  8 88.9   2 20.0   10 52.6   
Laboratory Yes  1 11.1   8 80.0   9 47.4   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Existence of graduate  No  4 44.4   1 10.0   5 26.3   
Personnel Yes  5 55.6   9 90.0   14 73.7   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Type of training Only internal  7 77.8   2 22.2   9 50.0   
 External courses   2 22.2   3 33.3   5 27.8   
 Training plan    4 44.4   4 22.2   
 Group Total  9 100.0   9 100.0   18 100.0   
Separate R&D  No  7 77.8   2 20.0   9 47.4   
Department Yes  2 22.2   8 80.0   10 52.6   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
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C.1.3 Management 
 
Table 57. Table of frequencies of the variables: management. 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 
AVERAGE GROUP INNOVATIVE 
GROUP 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
  Group 
count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Main source of funds for  Own funds  8 100.0   7 70.0   15 83.3   
Investments Borrowing    3 30.0   3 16.7   
 Group Total  8 100.0   10 100.0   18 100.0   
Receiver of subsidies No  7 87.5   2 20.0   9 50.0   
 Yes  1 12.5   8 80.0   9 50.0   
 Group Total  8 100.0   10 100.0   18 100.0 
Type of strategy Short term  6 75.0   6 33.3 
 Visionary  1 12.5 3 30.0 4 22.2 
 Medium term  
formal planning 
1 12.5 2 20.0 3 16.7 
 Long and medium term 
formal planning 
  5 50.0 5 27.8 
 Group Total  8 100.0   10 100.0   18 100.0   
Approach to product 
design and 
individual machine 9 100.0 6 60.0 15 78.9 
Problem solving integrated approach    4 40.0   4 21.1   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
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C.1.4 External stimuli 
 
Table 58. Table of frequencies of the variables: external stimuli. 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 
AVERAGE GROUP INNOVATIVE 
GROUP 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
  Group 
count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Existence of exports No 6 66.7   6 31.6 
 Yes  3 33.3   10 100.0   13 68.4   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Importance of external  insignificant  7 77.8   2 20.0   9 47.4   
Competition slightly significant       
 moderately significant   1 11.1   2 20.0   3 15.8   
 very significant     2 20.0   2 10.5   
 crucial  1 11.1   4 40.0   5 26.3   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Type of domestic regional firms 4 44.4    4 21.1   
Customer any domestic firm 5 55.6   4 40.0   9 47.4   
 large innovative firms   6 60.0   6 31.6   
 Group Total  9 100.0   10 100.0   19 100.0   
Competition based  insignificant 1 11.1   1 5.3 
on quality and slightly significant       
Performance moderately significant 4 44.4   4 21.1 
 very significant 2 22.2 6 60.0 8 42.1 
 crucial 2 22.2 4 40.0 6 31.6 
 Group Total 9 100.0 10 100.0 19 100.0 
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C.1.5 External sources of knowledge 
 
Table 59. Table of frequencies of the variables: external sources of knowledge. 
VARIABLE VARIABLE 
CATEGORY 
AVERAGE GROUP INNOVATIVE 
GROUP 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
  Group 
count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Group 
Count 
Group 
percentage 
Impact of fairs on  insignificant 5 55.6   5 31.3 
future innovations slightly significant    1 14.3   1 6.3   
 moderately significant   3 33.3   3 42.9   6 37.5   
 very significant    3 42.9   3 18.8   
 crucial 1 11.1   1 6.3 
 Group Total  9 100.0   7 100.0   16 100.0   
Impact on scrutiny  insignificant 3 33.3   6 85.7   9 56.3   
by suppliers slightly significant 2 22.2 1 14.3 3 18.8 
 moderately significant 1 11.1    1 6.3   
 very significant  2 22.2     2 12.5   
 crucial 1 11.1      1 6.3   
 Group Total  9 100.0   7 100.0   16 100.0   
Impact on scrutiny  insignificant  5 55.6   6 85.7   11 68.8   
by universities slightly significant    1 14.3   1 6.3   
 moderately significant 3 33.3      3 18.8 
 very significant 1 11.1      1 6.3   
 Group Total 9 100.0 7 100 16 100 
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C.2 GRAPHICS 
 
C.2.1 Tangibles 
 
Figure 14. Existence of automated equipment. 
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Figure 15. Predominance of old machines. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Improvements in production machinery. 
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C.2.2 Intangibles 
 
Figure 17. Use of CAD. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Use of CAM. 
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Figure 19. Internal quality control laboratory. 
 
 
Figure 20. Existence of graduate personnel. 
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Figure 21. Type of training. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Separate R&D department. 
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C.2.3 Management 
 
Figure 23. Main source of funds for investment. 
 
 
 
Figure 24. Receiver of subsidies. 
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Figure 25. Type of strategy. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Approach to product conception. 
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C.2.4 External stimuli 
 
Figure 27. Existence of exports. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Importance of external competition. 
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Figure 29. Type of domestic customer. 
 
 
 
Figure 30. Competition based on quality and performance. 
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C.2.5 External sources of knowledge. 
 
Figure 31. Impact of fairs on future innovations. 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Impact of suppliers on scrutiny activities. 
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Figure 33. Impact of universities on scrutiny activities. 
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ANNEX D. LONG-TERM SERIES OF GDP, GDP PER CAPITA AND 
ANNUAL GROWTH RATES 
 
 GDP GDP GDP per 
capita 
Average annual growth rates 
 (current 
prices) 
(1990p) (1990p)   
 million 
escudos 
Million 
escudos 
escudos GDP GDP per capita 
      
1833 220 281576 78706   
1840 206 218476 58351 -3,6% -4,2% 
1850 224 249008 64457 1,3% 1,0% 
1860 282 242224 59708 -0,3% -0,8% 
1870 392 341284 78027 3,5% 2,7% 
1880 502 410491 87526 1,9% 1,2% 
1890 679 523800 102453 2,5% 1,6% 
1900 829 604541 111274 1,4% 0,8% 
1910 947 683247 115345 1,2% 0,4% 
1920 2629 424739 69885 -4,6% -4,9% 
1925 11368 595721 92954 7,0% 5,9% 
1930 16304 873904 128236 8,0% 6,6% 
1940 20220 1186013 152662 3,1% 1,8% 
1945 30230 1127662 139092 -1,0% -1,8% 
1950 42255 1367172 160804 3,9% 2,9% 
1960 74860 2144051 240867 4,6% 4,1% 
1970 185668 4019418 464771 6,5% 6,8% 
1973 294062 5183719 599758 8,8% 8,9% 
1980 1306548 6555641 695704 3,4% 2,1% 
1985 3661467 6830432 707964 0,8% 0,4% 
1990 8560600 8560600 872819 4,6% 4,3% 
1992 11343000 8880172 950263 1,8% 4,3% 
Source: Neves (1994). 
Note: The percentage refers to the period starting in the year located in the row immediately above and ending 
in the year located on the row. 
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ANNEX E. GROSS EXPENDITURE IN R&D: PERFORMANCE AND FUNDING, 1980-1995 
 
(Current prices)    1980  1986  1990  1995 
           
           
   Esc. Million % Esc. Million % Esc. Million % Esc. Million % 
           
Government           
 Performance  1.947,4  7.150,6  13.240,2  24.572,3  
 Funding Gov. 1.754,3 90,1% 6.199,7 86,7% 10.766,6 81,3% 18.629,1 75,8% 
  HE 0,0 0,0% 0,0 0,0% 0,0 0,0% 0,0 0,0% 
  PNP 0,2 0,0% 16,8 0,2% 33,8 0,3% 100,1 0,4% 
  Firms 0,0 0,0% 292,8 4,1% 181,6 1,4% 62,1 0,3% 
  Own 171,6 8,8% 441,8 6,2% 1.895,2 14,3% 3.711,6 15,1% 
  Foreign 21,3 1,1% 199,5 2,8% 363,0 2,7% 2.069,4 8,4% 
           
H. Education           
 Performance  819,7  5988,9  18.748,0  30.956,4  
 Funding Gov. 785,1 95,8% 5745,6 95,9% 17.738,6 94,6% 27.135,1 87,7% 
  HE 12,7 1,5% 74,8 1,2% 321,8 1,7% 884,8 2,9% 
  PNP 14,9 1,8% 75,6 1,3% 153,4 0,8% 615,9 2,0% 
  Firms 1,1 0,1% 51,6 0,9% 131,5 0,7% 234,4 0,8% 
  Foreign 5,9 0,7% 41,3 0,7% 402,7 2,1% 2.086,2 6,7% 
           
  
 
3
5
3
 
 
    1980  1986  1990  1995 
           
           
   Esc. Million % Esc. Million % Esc. Million % Esc. Million % 
           
PNP           
 Performance  171,8  1512,4  6.458,4  18.122,7  
 Funding Gov. 1,1 0,6% 43,6 2,9% 863,4 13,4% 9.442,5 52,1% 
  HE 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 0,0 0,0% 0,0 0,0% 
  PNP 166,5 96,9% 900,9 59,6% 2.459,2 38,1% 1.687,9 9,3% 
  Firms 4,2 2,4% 38,3 2,5% 1.689,2 26,2% 2.519,2 13,9% 
  Foreign 0 0,0% 261,4 17,3% 1.065,9 16,5% 4.174,3 23,0% 
  Other PNP 0 0,0% 268,2 17,7% 380,7 5,9% 298,8 1,6% 
           
Firms           
 Performance  1179,6  5215,7  13.585,6  18.227,4  
 Funding Gov. 39,4 3,3% 189,8 3,6% 882,1 6,5% 942,7 5,2% 
  HE 0 0,0% 0 0,0% 6,0 0,0% 0,0 0,0% 
  PNP 0 0,0% 0,4 0,0% 50,8 0,4% 48,7 0,3% 
  Firms 1063,8 90,2% 4485,7 86,0% 11.910,7 87,7% 14.532,1 79,7% 
  Foreign 50,9 4,3% 79,4 1,5% 581,9 4,3% 2.644,4 14,5% 
  Other firms 25,5 2,2% 460,4 8,8% 154,1 1,1% 59,5 0,3% 
           
           
Total   4.118,5  19.867,6  52.032,2  91.878,8  
Total foreign   78,1  581,6  2.413,5  10.974,3  
% foreign   1,9%  2,9%  4,6%  11,9%  
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ANNEX F. PORTUGAL MAP. 
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